

**Karl-Fritz Daiber /Gerdien Jonker (eds.)**

**Local forms of religious organisation  
as structural modernisation:  
Effects on religious community building and globalisation**

**Lokale Formen religiöser Organisation  
als strukturelle Modernisierung:  
Einflüsse auf die religiöse Gemeinschaftsbildung  
und Prozesse der Globalisierung**

Dokumentation eines Workshops am Fachbereich Evangelische Theologie,  
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## Vorwort / Foreword

Erste Überlegungen zu dem hier dokumentierten Workshop beruhten auf Beobachtungen in zwei unterschiedlichen Forschungsfeldern: einmal im Rahmen von Forschungen über Entwicklungen des Islam in Deutschland. Zum anderen bei Beobachtungen von Neuentwicklungen im Rahmen des koreanischen Konfuzianismus und Buddhismus. In beiden Fällen ging es um religiöse Organisationsbildungen, die Formen organisatorischer Gemeindebildungen im Christentum entsprachen.

Wir danken der VolkswagenStiftung dafür, daß durch die Förderung des Workshops die empirische Basis dieser Beobachtungen verbreitert werden konnte und die weitere theoretischen Diskussion angestoßen wurde.

Die vorliegende, von der Universitätsbibliothek Marburg betreute Internet-Veröffentlichung publiziert die Beiträge der Teilnehmer, Vorüberlegungen der Organisatoren und eine erste Auswertung in der Gestalt des einführenden Berichts, der in der ersten Fassung der VolkswagenStiftung vorgelegt worden ist. Leider konnten nicht alle Arbeitspapiere veröffentlicht werden. Es fehlen die Beiträge von Cha Seong Hwan über den Wonbuddhismus in Korea und die Beiträge von Mansor Noor Mohd über die Situation in Malaysia. Wir bedauern dies, konnten es aber nicht ändern.

Zu danken haben wir dem Fachbereich Evangelische Theologie der Philipps Universität für finanzielle und organisatorische Hilfen sowie Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern der Universität, die uns tatkräftig unterstützt haben.

Zu danken haben wir insbesondere den Teilnehmern der Tagung, die sich bereitwillig auf die Themenstellung eingelassen haben. Während der Arbeit ist ein Stück Gemeinsamkeit des Forschens erwachsen, die über die Tage in Marburg hinausreicht.

März 2003

The preparation for the workshop that is documented below started from two different observations in two different parts of the world. Karl-Fritz Daiber observed in Korea new developments in the organisation of Korean Buddhism and Confucianism. Gerdien Jonker noticed a similar development in Muslim community organisation in Europe. Without knowledge of the other's experiences, we both observed new forms of religious organisation that seemed to come close to Christian forms of community building. Once we began to compare these observations, a thesis began to materialize and the idea of a workshop that would encompass empirical descriptions of religious organisation in different religions was born.

Thanks to the VolkswagenStiftung who offered us the financial aid to bring together scholars from different parts of the world, it was possible to create a larger empirical basis for our thesis. During the workshop, scholars of Religion doing fieldwork in Hongkong, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, Siberia (Novosibirsk), the USA and Europe compared their findings. The result offered us a common basis to contemplate the theoretical impact of what appears to be a global change in religious organisation.

In the following the reader will find the contributions of the participants (except for two) and some of our preliminary thoughts plus a first conclusion. However, to our distress the papers of both Cha Seong Hwan on Wonbuddhism in Korea and Mansor Noor Mohd on the situation in Malaysia could not be published.

We are grateful to the Faculty of Protestant Theology at Marburg University who supported us financially and in many other ways. A heartfelt thanks also goes to the students and members of staff who lent us a helping hand with the actual organisation. Last but not least we say thank you very much indeed to our workshop participants who were willing to accept our suggestions and to look at "their" field of research with our questions in mind. It has created a field of common interest and exchange that surpasses our meeting in Marburg.

March 2003

Gerdien Jonker Karl-Fritz Daiber

## **Gerdien Jonker/ Karl-Fritz Daiber: The Beginning**

Outlines of a Workshop „Religious Belonging and Organised Religion”

According to Max Weber the *societal* character of any existing religion by necessity crystallises its religious ideas. This observation on the variety of religious forms is still valid today. For example Christianity in its manifold shape focuses on Jesus Christ's representation on earth and as a consequence struggles time and again over legitimate leadership. Contrary to Christians, Muslims feel the weight of their assignment that individuals should stand up for their lord by themselves and consequently try to avoid the settling down of intermediaries

But due to the character of modernity a tension has appeared. The ongoing internal differentiation of society, - its accompanying compulsion towards professionalisation and bureaucratisation, has created a new set of institutional expectations. The way religions still continue to present themselves in non- or half-organised forms now clashes with the scheme of modern society to communicate on the same terms. Governments for instance prefer a central contact, a board of representatives who can speak for 'their' community. Welfare organisations search for transparent organisational structures to which they might lock up, so to speak.

Also, ever since 1894, when the world religions met in Chicago for the first time, religions communicate among themselves. A globally shared awareness of what religion is and where it might interfere arose from this. Whatever its ideological and organisational origin, in a globalizing world religions increasingly share a common frame in which to act. Whether in need of being acknowledged as a legal body, whether acting as an intermediary between the people and the state, whether playing the role of a global actor in UNO-decision-making policies, religions all over the world are facing the necessity of a higher organisational degree. And this commonly has taken the form of membership organisation.

Niklas Luhmann in 1977 already pointed out two tendencies in the development of religious community building (also: Luhmann, *Die Religion der Gesellschaft* (2000), Peter Beyer, *Religion and Globalization* (1994)). One tendency concentrates on the centre and tries to reach back to essentials, tracing the fundamental ground on which to stand while coupling it to rational forms of organisation. The other one heads for the periphery, while pursuing and ongoing differentiation and individualisation. This development seems to crystallise in ever-smaller religious initiatives with a tendency to undock. In other words: The centre seems to become a dense conglomerate of organisational levels able to keep up communication in different directions, while the periphery develops into a place where more particular forms of religious communication unfold.

We propose to focus on the question of membership. If our hypothesis is right, the change from unspecified religious belonging to religious *organisational* membership brings about transformations, which change the face of religion. In what ways 'old' religious communication ways 'old' religious communication are being linked? Have new dividing lines between members and non-members been made out? Does the membership implicit new obligations? Do members now act as believers with more intensified forms of religious communication? And what does that mean for non-members? In what ways are these defined? How do they voice themselves as a group? Also, are new and different segments of society being included into the centre? For women for instance this might have far reaching

consequences for female inclusion into a traditionally male oriented domain. How does female participation come about? Where does women's membership collide with gendered representation? Which inroads do women make where decision making and representation of the community as a whole is concerned?

This workshop will bring together theories and empirical research in a comparative perspective. *Its* theme will be the changing form of religion in different religious systems, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Christianity in both majority and minority situations.

Berlin/ Hannover in February 2001

Gerdien Jonker      Karl-Fritz Daiber

## **Karl-Fritz Daiber: Bericht über den Verlauf**

Das Thema des Workshops fokussierte das Interesse auf den Prozess der Bildung religiöser Organisationen, genauer Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen, und verstand diesen als Vorgang struktureller Modernisierung. Von Modernisierung kann dabei in dreifacher Hinsicht gesprochen werden:

- einmal als Rationalisierung von Sozialgestalten, etwa durch Bürokratiebildung, aber auch in der Gestalt der Ausbildung definierter Mitgliedschaftsregeln,
- zum anderen als verstärkte Individualisierung und zwar in dem Sinne, daß Gruppenzugehörigkeit nicht mehr traditional oder natural (Familie, Stamm, Nation) vorgegeben ist, sondern auf Entscheidung beruht, zumindest die Disponibilität der Zugehörigkeit individuell bewußt bleibt,
- zum dritten kann Organisationsbildung und Modernisierung zusammengesehen werden, weil Organisationen als Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen im religiösen Kontext häufig Laienorganisationen sind, Initiativen und Mitwirkung der nichtpriesterlichen Religionsangehörigen ermöglichen, politisch gesprochen, Demokratiepotentiale darstellen.

Der Workshop hat Phänomene religiöser Organisationsbildung auf lokale Organisationsbildung beschränkt. „Lokal“ meint hier, daß eine regelmäßige Face-to-face-Kommunikation der Mitglieder unter- und miteinander möglich ist. Diese Rahmenbedingung realisiert sich in erster Linie im gemeinsamen Wohnort. Daß das räumliche Feld dabei unterschiedlich verstanden werden muß, ergibt sich aus der Verschiedenheit des alltagsweltlichen Raumerlebens und der Möglichkeiten des Umgangs mit räumlicher Nähe und Distanz ( Stadt-Land-Differenz). Der Workshop hat sehr schnell gezeigt, daß die in diesem Sinne lokale Ebene nicht streng von der regionalen, auch nationalen Ebene getrennt werden kann. Nationale Organisationen bilden einerseits lokale Basen, wie umgekehrt lokale Organisationen sich überlokal vernetzen, und zwar bis hin zur Ausbildung globaler Organisationen oder Netzwerke. Nicht zuletzt von daher erweisen sich Organisationsbildungen als Globalisierungsfaktor, dies gilt nicht zuletzt für religiöse Organisationen.

Globalisierung wird von daher gesehen als Ausbildung von weltweiten Kommunikationszusammenhängen erkennbar. Dies ist unter dem Aspekt der Medienkommunikation inzwischen eine Selbstverständlichkeit. Wichtiger ist, daß sich reale Begegnungsformen entwickeln. Hier sind internationale Kontakte von Gruppen zu nennen, zugleich freilich Konferenzen in einzelnen Weltregionen oder auf Weltebene überhaupt.

Phänomene von Globalisierung sind allerdings zugleich als strukturelle Veränderungen der Gesellschaftssysteme zu beschreiben, gekennzeichnet durch die weltweite Zunahme rationaler Sozialformen im Zusammenhang mit gesellschaftlicher Differenzierung und zugleich durch Zunahme auf individueller Entscheidung beruhender, interessen geleiteter Sozialformen. Unter beiden Bewegungsrichtungen kommt also der Organisationsbildung eine Schlüsselfunktion im Prozeß struktureller gesellschaftlicher Globalisierung zu.

Die einzelnen Beiträge haben in unterschiedlicher Weise konkrete Phänomene, die in diesem Zusammenhang relevant sind, beschrieben. Im folgenden sind sie als Entwicklungen in zwei Weltregionen ( Europa und Ostasien) zusammengefaßt.

*Religiöse Organisationsbildung in Europa und der Türkei*

Max Weber hatte das alteuropäische religiöse Organisationssystem der Parochien als System gekennzeichnet, das auf lokaler Basis die Amtbezirke der Priester flächendeckend abgrenzte, ohne zu einer eigenen Vergesellschaftung der Laien zu führen (Max Weber, Gesamtausgabe, Band 22-2, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Teilband 2: Religiöse Gemeinschaften, Tübingen 2001, 199–201). „Gemeindereligiosität“ verwirklicht sich nach ihm innerhalb dieses Systems höchst labil.

*Karl-Fritz Daiber* nahm in seinem einleitenden Beitrag diese Weber-These auf, zeichnete das katholische und protestantische Parochiesystem in seiner historischen Entwicklung nach, zeigte Neuansätze seit Pietismus, Aufklärung und den Vereinsbildungen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf, verwies auf die rechtliche Umwandlung der Parochien in Kirchengemeinden vor allem im Protestantismus und entwickelte von daher die These der unabgeschlossen Transformation der Parochien in religiöse Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen. Auf der programmatischen Ebene führt dies seiner Meinung nach zum Anspruch, sämtliche Parochiemitglieder in die Gemeinschaft religiöser Kommunikation einzugliedern (Gemeindeaufbau), ohne daß dies faktisch gelingt, sich vielmehr die nominellen Gemeindemitglieder nach Kern und Rand neu gruppieren, genauer: die Bildung von informellen Gemeindekernen Formen der Randmitgliedschaft, der distanzierten Mitgliedschaft, mit produziert.

Dem christlichen Parochiensystem analoge Entwicklungen hat *Emel Topcu-Brestrich* für den türkischen Islam aufgezeigt. Die Westorientierungen führten im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts, also in der Spätphase des ottomanischen Reiches, zu Reformen, die im laizistischen türkischen Staat Atatürks einen vorläufigen Abschluß fanden. Eine vollständige Trennung zwischen Religion und Staat fand freilich insofern nicht statt, als Religion staatlich kontrolliert blieb. Der Präsident der staatlichen Religionsbehörde (Diyanet) ist dem Premierminister direkt unterstellt. Von der zentralen Ebene werden alle lokalen Ebenen gesteuert. Örtliche Distrikte, etwa größere oder kleinere Städte, haben ein lokales Amt von Diyanet. Ein leitender Mufti beaufsichtigt die jeweils nachgeordneten Moscheen und Koranschulen. Die Laien errichten Abgaben, die zum Bau und zur Unterhaltung der Moscheen dienen und die Bezahlung hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter ermöglichen. Maßgebend für die Zugehörigkeit ist im allgemeinen der Wohnsitz, eine zusätzliche Vergesellschaftung der Laien im Sinne einer Gemeindebildung ist nicht gegeben. Die Bindung an eine spezielle Moschee ist nicht vorgeschrieben. Es handelt es sich also um ein System religiöser Vergesellschaftung ohne Ausbildung von rechtlich verfaßten Laiengemeinschaften. Der muslimische Gedanke der Umma erleichtert ein derartiges System. Wo sich religiöse Gruppierungen neben der Diyanet-Organisation bilden, geraten diese leicht in Verdacht, lösen Kontrollbedürfnisse, ja Verbote aus. Auf der politischen Ebene einer islamische geprägten Gesellschaft ist oft die Parteienbildung mit Ausdruck religiös beeinflusster Organisationsbildung. Entsprechende Prozesse wurden von Mansor Mohd Noor auch für Malaysia dargestellt.

Die infolge der Migration von Arbeitern und ihren Familien von der Türkei nach Europa, insbesondere nach Deutschland, entstandene islamische Minderheitenproblematik wurde von *Gerdien Jonker* beleuchtet. Hier entsteht im Zusammenhang mit der Organisation ethnischer Vereine auch eine neue Notwendigkeit der Organisation religiösen Lebens, sofern es nicht nur durch einzelne je für sich oder in Familien praktiziert werden kann. Im Interesse der Schaffung von Moscheen als Gebetsstätten bildeten sich notwendigerweise Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen, speziell als Moscheevereine oder erweitert als Kulturvereine. Das deutsche Recht ermöglicht dies im Rahmen des allgemeinen Vereinsrechts. Die Rechtsentwicklung zeigt sich aber nach Darstellung von Jonker relativ resistent, wenn es darum geht, dem Islam die gleichen Rechte einzuräumen wie den christlichen Kirchen, jüdischen Gemeinden oder zum Teil der Humanistischen Union (Körperschaften des

öffentlichen Rechts). Die Folgewirkungen liegen weniger auf der örtlichen als auf der Ebene der Regionen (Länder) oder des Gesamtstaates und der entsprechenden politischen Mitwirkungsrechte und Einflussmöglichkeiten. Daß dem türkischen Islam in Deutschland Schwächen im Bereich der Organisation von Gläubigen zugesprochen werden müssen ergibt sich aus theologischen Prämissen einerseits (Gott-Mensch-Relation ohne priesterliche Vermittlung), aus den veränderten gesellschaftlichen und damit kulturellen und politischen Bedingungen andererseits (Minderheitenproblematik, Islam nicht mehr selbstverständlicher Teil der Alltagskultur).

Einen weiteren Aspekt der religiösen Organisationsbildung unter den Bedingungen der Minderheitensituation zeigte *Martin Baumann* in seinem Beitrag über die hinduistischen Tamilen in Europa auf. Bezeichnenderweise geht es hier zunächst um Gemeinschaftsbildung auf ethnischer Grundlage. Zentrales Interesse gilt den Kultorten, also den Tempeln, die Gemeinschaftsrituale ermöglichen, spezielle Familienrituale und rituelle Vollzüge von einzelnen unter priesterlicher Leitung. Leitfrage wird von daher die Frage nach dem Vorhandensein von Tempeln, bzw. deren Eigentumsverhältnissen: Wem gehören die Tempel? Baumann zeigte, daß die Modelle aus Sri Lanka im Grunde übernommen werden: Tempel können im Eigentum von einzelnen Priestern stehen, insbesondere charismatischen Priestern, im Eigentum von Familien oder aber von Vereinen, deren Vorstände in der Regel von sekundärer Bedeutung sind, auch hier dominieren die Priester. In der hinduistischen Religion geht es also weniger um religiöse Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen, es geht vielmehr um die Bereitstellung von Tempeln als religiöser Dienstleistungszentren, Wirtschaftsbetrieben ähnlicher als organisierten Gemeinschaften. Dies zeigt, daß auch unter den Bedingungen moderner Gesellschaften die religiöse Transformation nicht ausschließlich in Richtung Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen läuft, sondern daß die ältere Tradition, die auch die Bildung christlicher Parochien beeinflußt hat, nämlich die Tradition geistlicher Dienstleistungszentren, die ihren Unterstützerverband nicht formell definiert, erhalten bleibt.

Eine ganz andere Situation zeichnete *Tatiana Barchunova* im Rahmen ihrer Analyse der religiösen Situation in Novosibirsk. Hintergrund ihrer Analyse war die Umbruchssituation nach dem Ende der Sowjetunion, verbunden mit ökonomischer Ungesicherheit, mit dem Verlust eines politisch abgesicherten Orientierungssystems und einer gesellschaftlichen Ordnung, in der der einzelne eine klare Statuszuweisung innerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung vorfand. Von dieser Ausgangslage her erklärt sich für sie, warum Menschen in religiösen Gruppen eine neue Orientierung, eine Unterstützung im Prozess der Identitätsbildung suchen. Wichtig für diese Gruppen ist ihre Gemeinschaftsfähigkeit und damit die Ermöglichung neuer sinnerschließender gemeinsamer Lernprozesse auf der Basis religiösen Glaubens.

Die Regierung reagiert auf diese Gruppenbildung pragmatisch-tolerant, auch wenn sich dabei die alte Vormachtstellung der orthodoxen Kirche reduziert. Auffällig ist, in welchem hohem Maße die religiöse Gruppenbildung im christlichen Kontext verläuft. Sie stellt somit nicht zuletzt eine Pluralisierung des Christentums dar (Bedeutungszuwachs für Protestanten, Katholiken, kleinere christliche Gruppierungen). Die Bildung von Glaubensgemeinschaften vollzieht sich aber auch innerhalb der orthodoxen Kirche. Damit würde sich eine Veränderung eines an priesterlichen Dienstleistungen orientierten religiösen Sozialsystems andeuten.

Insgesamt haben die Untersuchungen unterschiedliche Entwicklungen aufgezeigt. Es ist anzunehmen, daß auch dort wo die religiöse Organisation dienstleistungsorientiert bleibt, sie stärker als je zuvor von je individuellen Entscheidungen, nämlich sie in Anspruch zu nehmen, abhängig ist, sogar verstärkt abhängig wird. Neben der Bewegung hin zu Laienorganisationen, ja Glaubensgemeinschaften, steht die andere, Religion in der Gestalt ihres priesterlichen und damit kultischen Angebots je ad hoc auf Grund persönlicher Entscheidung in Anspruch zu nehmen.

## *Religiöse Organisationsbildung in Ostasien*

### *Hongkong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Nepal und Pakistan*

*Lai Chi Tim* untersuchte die Bildung von daoistischen Gemeinschaften und Mitgliederorganisationen im südlichen China. Er grenzte sich von Max Webers Interpretation des Daoismus als mehr oder weniger ausschließlich magisch orientiert ab und zeigte frühe Beispiele einer kontrollierten daoistischen Lebensführung auf. Der Bildung von Laiengruppen wies er eine lange Tradition zu, bis in die Zeit um Christi Geburt zurückgehend. In dieser langen Tradition sah er auch neue daoistische Gemeindebildungen in Hongkong, heute verbunden mit der Zielsetzung, die Tempel den jeweiligen lokalen Gesellschaften als religiöse Dienstleistungszentren zur Verfügung zu stellen (Totengedenken) und darüber hinaus erzieherische und karitative Einrichtungen aufzubauen.

Gruppen- und Organisationsbildungen ging *Karl-Fritz Daiber* im Blick auf den Buddhismus in Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia und Nepal nach: Auf lokaler Ebene haben sich vielfältige Formen religiöser Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen mit dem Charakter von Laiengemeinden gebildet. Diese Organisationen können tempelorientiert sein, auf eine charismatische geistliche Gründerpersönlichkeit zurückgehen und damit eine Art Neugründung einer Sekte oder eines Ordens darstellen, sie können aber auch auf Laieninitiativen aufbauen und damit Gruppen bewußter Buddhisten organisatorisch zusammenfassen. Zentral ist innerhalb dieser Gruppierungen eine Art Rückbesinnung auf reine Lehre. Insbesondere die Laienbewegungen sind durch ein antisynkretistisches Element gekennzeichnet. Diese geistliche Rückbesinnung ist indessen nicht orthodox einer einzigen Lehrströmung zugeordnet, sondern eher offen, unterschiedliche buddhistische Traditionen nützend. Zu den Aktivitäten der Gruppen gehört häufig die Praxis karitativer Verantwortung, zum Teil als Verantwortung für die nationale Gesellschaft und die Weltgemeinschaft formuliert. Religiöser Glaube soll Teil der Lebenspraxis werden, sich nicht allein auf den Vollzug religiöser Rituale beschränken. Damit kommen Züge eines „modernen Buddhismus,“ zum Tragen. Das Verhältnis zu Geistlichen ist nicht einheitlich. Zum Teil sind die neuen Organisationen Gründungen von Mönchen oder Nonnen. Bei den Laiengemeinden im strengen Sinne ist das Verhältnis zu diesen neu bestimmt: Sie werden von der Gemeinschaft berufen, ihre Dienste werden mehr oder weniger lange in Anspruch genommen. Auch die globale Vernetzung ist unterschiedlich akzentuiert, zum Teil fehlt sie vollständig. Die Organisationen verstehen sich dann in der Regel als Teil einer lokalen Gesellschaft. Dies ist insbesondere bei den Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen der lokalen Tempel der Fall. Zum Teil operieren die organisierten Gemeinschaften auch weltweit, oft als lokale Dependancen, die von einer Zentrale abhängig sind. Schließlich können die örtlichen, autonomen Gruppen in einem netzwerkartigen Verband zusammengefaßt sein, der eine Vielfalt internationaler Kontakte ermöglicht.

*Mansor Mohd Noor* hob im Blick auf die Situation im islamisch geprägten Malaysia vor allem die politische Funktion islamischer Organisationen hervor. Diese agieren in der Regel auf der nationalen Ebene, haben indessen in den einzelnen Regionen und Städten örtliche Gruppierungen. In ihnen drücken sich nicht zuletzt verschiedene religiöse und politische Strömungen des Islam aus, sie agieren zum Teil regierungskritisch und tragen nicht zuletzt dadurch zur Ausbildung einer Zivilgesellschaft bei. Auch die ethnisch fundierten Organisationen sah Mansor vor allem unter dem politischen Aspekt der Vertretung von Interessen. Ihre Funktion, Träger etwa chinesischer Volksreligiosität zu sein, stellte er nicht völlig in Frage, bezweifelte aber, daß dieser Funktion eine tragende Bedeutung zukommt.

Die Untersuchung von *Jamal Malik* bezog sich auf ein zweites asiatisches islamisches Land, nämlich auf Pakistan. Am Beispiel der religiösen Schulen zeigte er den gesellschaftlichen Antagonismus zwischen lokalen, in diesem Fall vor allem pakistanisch-nationalen Varianten

des Islam und einem global orientierten Islam auf, der ein Interesse daran hat, islamische Staaten in der Weltstaatengemeinschaft zu verorten. Träger des ersten sind die Mullahs und ihre religiösen Schulen bzw. theologischen Ausbildungsstätten, Träger der zweiten Orientierung die politisch-staatlichen Eliten. Die partielle Einbeziehung der religiösen Schulen in das staatliche Schulsystem führte einerseits zu einer curricularen Modernisierung des Unterrichts der religiösen Schulen, andererseits lösten die mit der staatlichen Anerkennung verbundenen Subventionen ein Anwachsen der Zahl und der Bedeutung der religiösen Schulen aus und führten damit auch zu einer verstärkten Islamisierung. Ein besonderes Problem sei das Überangebot islamischer Theologen, dem der Arbeitsmarkt keinen entsprechenden Bedarf entgegenhalten könne.

Maliks Beitrag nahm das Thema des Workshops nur ansatzweise auf, er wies aber einen einflußreichen Beitrag der Religionen zur Gestaltung lokaler Gesellschaften hin, nämlich auf den ihrer Schulen. Er verwies zugleich auf Globalisierungseinflüsse, die sich in der Gestalt lokaler bzw. nationaler Konflikte niedergeschlagen können.

### *Korea*

Innerhalb des Workshops waren drei Beiträge ausschließlich Korea gewidmet. Im Rahmen des Vergleichs von Daiber waren zusätzliche Entwicklungen im koreanischen Buddhismus dargestellt worden, nämlich die Entstehung mitverantwortlicher aktiver Laiengemeinden als Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen. Daß sich organisatorische Strukturen gerade bei neuen Religionen bilden, zeigten Cha Ok Soong und Cha Seong Hwan.

*Cha Ok Soong* untersuchte die Donghak Religion, entstanden in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, heute unter dem Namen Chondogyo noch in Korea bestehend. Frau Cha sieht in dieser Religionsbildung einen Versuch, angesichts der immer stärker sich anbahnenden und von den europäischen Mächten erzwungenen Öffnung Chinas und Koreas, eine nationale Identität sichernde Neuinterpretation religiöser Tradition als eigenständigen Weg der Modernisierung der Gesellschaft zu etablieren. Der charismatische Gründer greift dabei auf konfuzianistisches wie daoistisches Erbe zurück, auch Spuren christlich-katholischer Auffassungen lassen sich erkennen. Anders als der vorherrschende Mainstream des Konfuzianismus kommt der Begründer der Donghak-Religion zu einem Sozialkonzept, das die Gleichheit aller Menschen betont und die Hoffnung auf eine koreanische Staats- und Gesellschaftsordnung des himmlischen Weges in Korea zum Ausdruck bringt. Anhänger fand die neue Religion vor allem unter der benachteiligten ländlichen Bevölkerung. Die Donghak-Gemeinden wurden straff organisiert. Dies ermöglichte den Donghak-Bauern-Aufstand von 1894, der vor allem durch die Hilfe Japans niedergeschlagen werden konnte. Die Donghak Religion hatte starke Nachwirkungen in der japanischen Kolonialzeit. Die koreanische Unabhängigkeitsbewegung von 1919 war von ihr beeinflusst.

Am Beispiel der Donghak-Religion zeigt sich exemplarisch der Einfluß religiöser Gruppen auf die Bewältigung der krisenhaften Veränderungen im Übergang zur koreanischen Moderne. Religion kann hier insofern eine zentrale Rolle spielen, weil ihr Erbe nationale Identität wahren läßt und zugleich politische Zielvorstellungen für die Gestaltung der Zukunft vermittelt. Die Entwicklung einer Mitgliedschaftsorganisation, die von der lokalen zur nationalen Ebene durchgliedert ist, ergibt sich einerseits aus der Notwendigkeit der Abgrenzung gegenüber den noch dominanten Kulturmustern, andererseits auch aus dem politischen Gestaltungswillen.

Die Suche nach einem eigenständigen Weg in die Moderne ist auch kennzeichnend für eine zweite koreanische Neureligion, den Wonbuddhismus, dessen Anfänge in das Jahr 1916 zurückgehen. Dieser ist nicht in gleichem Maße wie Donghak national orientiert, aber gleichwohl koreanisch eigenständig und von daher antijapanisch. Der Wonbuddhismus versteht sich als buddhismusnah, er ist aber zugleich von anderen Religionen beeinflusst. Von

daher zeigt er sich als dialogoffen. Auffallend sind seine sozialen und seine erzieherischen Aktivitäten (vom Kindergarten bis zu Universität). Hinsichtlich seiner Organisation verwies *Cha Seong Hwan* auf deren streng hierarchisch- zentralistischen Charakter. Die Einzeltempel arbeiten streng weisungsgebunden. Lokale Laienorganisationen bestehen nicht. Die Dominanz einer großen Priesterschaft (Frauen und Männer) ist ungebrochen, bewährte Laien können in die Leitungsgremien berufen werden. Von daher schätzte Cha Seong Hwan die Potentiale dieser Religion für den Ausbau demokratischer Strukturen in der Gesamtgesellschaft als eher gering ein. Die auf den Kernbestand der Priesterschaft bezogene Organisation diene der Abgrenzung von anderen religiösen Gemeinschaften und habe darüber hinaus strategische Bedeutung (Identitätssicherung und Selbstbehauptung im multireligiösen Kontext).

Von ähnlichen Interessen ist die Ausbildung von konfuzianischen Organisationen in Korea bestimmt. Der Konfuzianismus war von 1392-1910 Staatsreligion. Seine Wirkung bestand nicht zuletzt in der Vermittlung von tragenden Kulturmustern bis hin zu deren ritueller Ausgestaltung. Von daher war die Bildung von speziellen Mitgliedschaftsorganisationen nicht erforderlich.

*Keum Jang-tae* zeigte in seiner Untersuchung zum gegenwärtigen Konfuzianismus in Korea die Reaktionsmuster auf, die seit 1945 zu einem organisierten Konfuzianismus führten. Der organisierte Konfuzianismus zählt in Korea zu den staatlich anerkannten Religionen, unabhängig von seiner Selbsteinschätzung als Religion oder Lebensphilosophie. Zahlenmäßig ist der organisierte Konfuzianismus unbedeutend. Da er indessen wichtige zentrale, regionale und lokale konfuzianische Einrichtungen, vor allem Akademien, unterhält, rituelle Begleitung in herausgehobenen Lebenssituationen (Hochzeit, Tod) anbietet und seinen gesellschaftspolitischen Einfluß geltend macht, sorgt er für die öffentlich-explizite Präsenz konfuzianischer Tradition über die sowieso kulturell nachwirkenden konfuzianischen Lebensorientierungen hinaus.

Organisationsbildung bedeutet in diesem Fall die Sammlung eines Restbestands von Überzeugten. Sie ermöglicht ein Serviceangebot für offen Interessierte und vor allem, wie gesagt, die Sicherung von Einfluß auf die gesellschaftliche und politische Willensbildung. Das Beispiel des koreanischen Konfuzianismus ist für die weitere Diskussion deshalb aufschlußreich, weil sich Analogien zu Entwicklungen in Europa aufdrängen, und zwar zu solchen, die auf der nationalen Ebene zur Ablösung der christlichen Staatskirchen, auf der lokalen Ebene zur partiellen Transformation von Parochien in Kirchengemeinden als Mitgliederorganisationen führten.

### *Theoretische Diskussion*

Der Workshop wurde mit dem Vortrag von *Peter Beyer* über das Thema „Forming Religion in Global Society: From Organization to Invisibiliy“ eröffnet. Beyer entfaltete seine Religionstheorie im Anschluß an Niklas Luhmann. Wie Luhmann gilt sein Interesse einer streng soziologischen Betrachtung von Religion. Darum versteht er soziale Systeme als Gestalten von Kommunikation, deren Spezifikum durch die Bindung an einen binären Code entsteht, nach Beyer, abweichend von Luhmann, an den Code gesegnet/verflucht. Das Religionssystem differenziert sich in verschiedene Formen aus, gesellschaftlichen Funktionssystemen, Organisationen, sozialen Bewegungen und Netzwerken. Die Ausbildung von Organisationen erlaubt es, nicht ausschließlich auf der Basis der Kerncodes zu kommunizieren, sondern im Rahmen der kommunikatorischer Codes anderer Systeme. Grundlegend verläuft die Kommunikation in Organisationen über die Unterscheidung Nichtmitglied/Mitglied. Die hohe Bedeutung von Organisationen, gerade auch religiöser Organisationen, für den Prozeß der Globalisierung wurde unterstrichen.

In der Diskussion mit Beyer während der Schlussphase der Tagung spielten insbesondere Probleme des theoretischen Ansatzes selbst, gleichsam als Beiträge zur Selbstreferentialität der Theorie eine Rolle. Ihre heuristische Funktion kam durch die angebotene semantische Kategorisierung von Religion zum Tragen. Insgesamt waren aber doch die Phänomenbeschreibungen zu vielfältig, als daß sie sich durch einen solchen höchst abstrakten theoretischen Zugang hätten ordnen lassen können.

Die Auseinandersetzung mit den phänomennahen Einzelanalysen versuchten dann die abschließenden Beiträge von Mady Laeyendecker-Thung, Gerhard Wegner, Theresa Wobbe und Matthias König ansatzweise zu leisten.

*Mady Laeyendecker-Thungs* Überlegungen waren deutlich interessen­geleitet. Sie argumentierte von Erfahrungszusammenhängen aus, die den Bedingungen einer „missionarischen Kirche“ galten. Von daher schätzte sie die Frage nach der lokalen Gemeindebildung als sekundär ein, und zwar im Vergleich mit neuen eher funktionalen, von Teilaufgaben bestimmten Zusammenschlüssen. Ihre Gedanken zur Globalisierung und zum interreligiösen Dialog waren vor allem auch um Gesichtspunkte nachhaltiger Entwicklung gruppiert. Organisationsbildung war für sie eher „prekär“. Organisationen könnten nur höchst bedingt für religiöse Gemeinschaftsbildungen relevant sein. Im übrigen drängte sie auf eine präzisere Verwendung des Organisationsbegriffs. Hier hob sie vor allem den rationalen Charakter von Organisationsstrukturen hervor, das Prinzip der Rollendifferenzierung und der kollektiven Zielorientierung.

*Gerhard Wegner* ging vergleichend der Frage nach unterschiedlichen Systemebenen von Religion nach, ihrer kulturellen bzw. ihrer organisatorischen Verortung. Hierzu verwendete er die Beispiele aus Taiwan, Korea (Konfuzianismus) und Russland (christliche Orthodoxie). Er kam zu dem Schluß, daß sich Religion in ungewöhnlich vielfältigen Sozialgestalten manifestieren kann und unterstrich im weiteren den Einfluß, den Religionen auf gesellschaftliche Modernisierungsprozesse ausüben. Dies wurde für ihn besonders deutlich am Beispiel der Donghak-Bewegung in Korea, aber auch an den Entwicklungen in Malaysia. Zugleich betonte er die Widerständigkeit, die Religionen im Rahmen von Modernisierung und Globalisierung entwickeln können. Von daher hob er die Variabilität der möglichen Funktionen von Religion hervor. Im Blick auf eine allgemeine Religionstheorie bejahte er mit Luhmann die Notwendigkeit zur religiöser Organisationsbildung in der Moderne (Bedingungen öffentlicher Religion, Marktsituation, Mitgliederrekrutierung und Ressourcensteigerung). Er teilte die Skepsis im Blick auf die Organisierbarkeit von Religion in einem umfassenderen Sinne. Insbesondere die Zentrierung auf einen begrenzten religiösen Code hielt er für problematisch. Für die theoretische Weiterarbeit verwies er auf Anthony Giddens Überlegungen zum Zusammenhang von Lebenswelt und organisiertem Handeln (The Consequences of Modernity, 1990).

*Theresa Wobbe* sah in den Beiträgen eine ganze Reihe von weiter zu bearbeitenden Problemen berührt. Sie unterstrich zunächst die Vielfalt der Erscheinungsformen von Religion und nannte die folgenden, zum Teil in den Analysen wiederkehrenden Problemstellungen:

1. Kern- und Randbildung im Vollzug organisatorischer Verdichtung,
2. das Verhältnis von Staat und Religion,
3. das Zusammenspiel von internen und externen Faktoren im Prozeß der Organisationsbildung,
4. die Verschiedenheit der Funktionen, die Religionen in unterschiedliche Kontexten haben,
5. die Unterscheidung von Volks- und Elitereligion,
6. das Problem des Interesses an religiöser Organisationsbildung,
7. der Einfluß säkularisierter gesellschaftlicher Kontexte auf Organisationsbildung.

Wobbe konkretisierte diese Problemstellungen durch den Rückgriff auf einzelne vorgetragene Beispiele.

*Matthias König* ging zunächst auf den theoretischen Bezugsrahmen ein und konstatierte die Schwierigkeit, von der hohen Abstraktionsebene der Religionstheorie nach Luhmann/Beyer überhaupt religionsvergleichend zu arbeiten. Er hielt eine theoretische Respezifikation für unumgänglich und empfahl Theorien aus dem Umfeld des Neoinstitutionalismus ebenso wie Eisenstadts Theorie multipler Modernitäten.

Drei Einflußfelder schienen ihm auf Grund der Vorträge besonders wichtig zu sein:

1. Der Einfluß zivilisatorischer Traditionen, die in spezifischer Weise religiös schon mitgeprägt sind (Weltreligionenkonzept im Sinne von Max Weber).
2. Der Einfluß des modernen Nationalstaates auf religiöse lokale Organisationen (Einfluß auf das religiöse Erziehungssystem in Pakistan, Definition von Religion im Rahmen der staatlichen Statistik und öffentlichen Anerkennung).
3. Der Einfluß transnational-globaler Zusammenschlüsse und Organisationen, und damit der Einfluß von transnationalen Wertevorstellungen (Menschenrechte) auf lokale religiöse Organisationsbildungen.

Die theoretischen Beiträge waren erste Versuche, sich auch vergleichend den verschiedenen dargestellten Situationen zu nähern. Allerdings führte dies nur bedingt zu einer Problemreduktion, eher zu einer Erweiterung der Problemsicht, sogar auf der theoretischen Ebene selbst.

## **Karl-Fritz Daiber: English Abstract: Report on the Discussions**

Initially, the workshop was intended to provide new insights on three different levels:

1. on the level of phenomenal description,
2. on the level of developing a theory of religious organisation,
3. on the level of clarifying the self-image of religious communities (problems of core and margins) and the social conditions of inter-religious dialogue.

Clarifying the self-image of religious communities turned out to be the least important aspect. Merely Mady Laeyendecker-Thung spoke of aims of inter-religious dialogue, yet this issue did not prove to be relevant for the course of the workshop.

The same is true regarding the self-image of religious communities (problems of core and margins, elite vs. mass religion). The problem was mentioned several times, from different perspectives, yet was not central for the discussions.

On the level of phenomenal descriptions, the workshop provided the most valuable insights. Here are some of the consequences resulting from pluralising the phenomenal field for a theory of religious organisations:

The modern formation of organisations has a pre-modern history, not only in Christianity, but also in other religions. Wherever religious specialisation happens, groupings based on a individual decision for affiliation arise. These communities may not necessarily be organisations in the sense of rationalised social systems. They are alike in respect to the decision for membership.

Religious groupings like that and thus religious organisations create a difference between 'outside' and 'inside'. To distinguish core and margins of a religious community contributes further to this topic.

Depending on the respective social system, religious organisations serve different purposes. They are relatively flexible in response to functional assignation. The respective functions of religious organisations in the narrower sense and religious groupings based on membership rules in the wider sense not only depend on modernisation processes – they also help to produce modernisation themselves.

The formation of religious organisations turns out to be extremely dependent on three determinants of their social context:

1. the socio-cultural characteristics and the inherent cultural patterns, corresponding to which organisations of ethnic or religious minorities (or more generally spoken; grouping with divergent religious patterns) must show themselves to advantage,
2. the structural preconditions of national states, their understanding of religious freedom and religion and their development of religious law.
3. the global influences of partial international religious systems (global religious organisations) as well as the growingly universal principles of the national state, e.g. the tendency to separate state and religion.

Finally, the apparent continuity of religious culture shows that religious organisations only partly cover religion as a whole. On the local level, this leads to religious service centres, such as temples, monasteries, church buildings, in addition to membership-based organisations. Due to what they offer, these centres interest people who are not firmly affiliated as formal members. Both, organisations and service centres characterise the presence of religion. Moreover it is an open question to which extent the affiliation with social groupings that are not a matter of free choice (families; local/ ethnic/national communities) effects individual decisions concerning social affiliations, so that individual options of choice may not fully be realised.

As the analyses demonstrated, the relative variety of societal and cultural contexts showed an empirical complexity. Up to now, the theoretical discussions and outlines in German sociologies of religion imply the background of Christian (if not to say: secular) culture. The results based on these outlines are by no means wrong, but biased, since they relate too little to developments in other cultural contexts. Against this background, pluralising the phenomenal field gives a new impetus to further research, not least for co-operating with religious science and sociology.

## Lectures and Comments

### *1. Religious Organisation Building in Europe and Turkey*

#### **Karl-Fritz Daiber: The Unfinished Transformation of the Christian Parish System into Membership-based Organisations - Aspects of Modernisation in German Churches**

##### 1. Starting Point: Max Weber's Description of the Problem

In the framework of his sociology of religion, as published in „Economy and Society“ (chapter 5 of the German version), Max Weber also raises the issue of congregation. According to Weber, the genesis of congregations and congregational religion arises from the interests of those who „manage the cult“ - in the widest sense the mystagogues, priests and prophets, and can be considered a social routinisation of religious charisma, in order to secure the permanence of religious traditions and insure the economic existence of a certain religious enterprise (Weber (2001):2267ff. Weber (1956): 358).

Weber points out at least three different main types of permanent religious organisations on a local level:

Congregations, with a clearly defined lay membership as it especially appears in the form of „sects“.

Associations, above all of a political nature, that consider themselves assigned to a god; a priesthood is then entrusted with the respective cultic responsibilities.

Parishes, mere administrative quantities which delimit the jurisdiction of priests and represent at most passive ecclesiastical tax units.

In European Christianity, parish churches (*paroikias*) are related to local units of settlement, such as villages or cities. In ancient Buddhism, parishes were just districts in which temporarily resident monks met for semimonthly convocations. Parishes are forms of religious organisation without a congregational character, since the lay people are not socialised as a group of itself and miss any right to influence the religious practices. Consequentially, Weber denies the congregational character of the medieval occidental Christian and Islamic parish (or: parochial) system. In his analysis he does not give any attention to the German Church organisation of the beginning 20<sup>th</sup> century. Yet from Weber's distinction between „church“ and „sect“ (only the latter is explicitly mentioned within this context), one may derive that he assumes the continuation of parochial structures.

The parochial system, at least in its basic features, continued in Europe, in Roman Catholicism even globally, until the present day. Local parish churches, even if they are understood as congregations (Kirchengemeinden) function as administrative areas to circumscribe each priest's or pastor's responsibility. In this sense, congregations are defined locally, like parishes are. Not only the specific religious denomination, but also to live within a certain local area constitutes the respective affiliation to a parish for which a parish pastor is responsible: The place of residence, besides the respective denomination, determines the affiliation with the local parish. It is possible yet unusual to choose.

This short outline suggests that transformation processes have changed the „medieval“ parish system and still do. In the following, I will deal with these processes and their description.

## 2. Historical Survey of Christian Congregational Formations in Europe until the 18<sup>th</sup> Century

To get a better grasp on the parochial approach, I will describe the history of this principle of church constitution very briefly.

From its very origins, the Christian religion has been a congregational religion. The Christ cult was mainly performed in the form of Eucharist, which integrated a common meal, at least in the beginning. Baptism mediated full membership and thus allowed for a distinctive social demarcation. The demarcation lines were drawn first against the Jewish community, secondly against the various ancient cults, e.g. worshipping the Roman emperor. The Christian communities became increasingly aware of their own different identity. They understood themselves analogous to the Israelite faith in their Exodus from Egypt and their desert walk (cf. Hebrews, 1Peter). Acts 13:17 calls the time in Egypt *paroikia* stay in a strange land. Thus, the Christian congregation considers itself a stranger in the respective society. Consequentially, a collective consciousness is developed that clearly distinguishes between those who are members and those who are not. The early Christian congregation is therefore a preliminary stage of a „sect“, as Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch portrayed it as an ideal type. At that time, *paroikia* addresses the whole Christianity - it is a theologically programmatic expression. The notion loses its graphic meaning later on, and rather stands for an limited area of pastoral care assigned to one priest by the bishop.

The social constitutions of Christianity change gradually, above all related to the growing number of believers. The first real turn takes place in the 4<sup>th</sup> century: The Christian religion is granted tolerance status within the Roman Empire by Constantine; the Christian church is even favoured since 313. After a full range of resistance against this policy, it is generally accepted from 380 on. The Christian religion, as represented by the Roman bishop, becomes the state religion; the Empire's citizens are called to take on the Christian faith, since by then, it is the only one of public importance.

These developments have an enormous effect on the social constitution of Christianity: The common gap between the Christian community and the political powerful is bridged. There is no longer any basis for feeling a stranger or for drawing demarcations lines; society and religion, culture and religion gain congruence. The Christian church and its subordinate structures become, little by little, a public institution of religious supply, that lacks distinct religious processes by which congregations could be created that would stand out from non-Christians.

Since the 3<sup>rd</sup> century already, two lines of development turned out to be formative for the Christian occidental parish system. First, the increasing differentiation of priesthood hierarchy: Bishops of rural parishes were assigned, and thus subordinated to the urban bishops. They became presbyters, priests who cared for their local area on the behalf of the bishop. Second, the initiatives of local authorities: Large Landowners employed priests for their Christian slaves, or for the rural population in general, and put up churches (Holtz: 4-14). In the Germanic Central Europe, this custom was further extended: Local authorities put up churches, filled benefices and provided the financial supplies - for a long time independently from any episcopal leadership. Only gradually the bishops managed to take charge.

The idea of religious supply is characteristic for the European parish system, not least in the interest of local authorities. Similarly important is the integration into the episcopal diocese, i.e. priests acting on the bishop's behalf. In spiritual or religious respect, Christian believers do not become a congregation any more.

Since the latter 8<sup>th</sup> century, the parish system is so developed that also the compulsory church affiliation could be pushed through: All inhabitants of a parish had to rely on the local pastor, the *parochus*, in all aspects of religious supply. At the same time, the parish system provided blanket coverage: one parish borders on the other. Thus, a state of development had been

reached that lasted until about the 17<sup>th</sup> century, demonstrating the complete integration of the Christian church into the local and translocal system of government.

Nevertheless, forms of community building show a great variety, if one looks at the religious orders, for instance, the heretic movements or even the urban group formations in general, such as the guilds, association of manual workers in order to settle their affairs autonomously. A great majority of them also felt obliged to share their religious practice.

This homogenous political and religious system produced real difficulties for the dealing with the Jewish minority. It represented an alien element that was both excluded and integrated by ghettos. The unsolved problem of this religious minority erupted partly into persecutions and pogroms.

The 16<sup>th</sup> century reformation that brought Protestant churches in the single territories into being also caused a different theological understanding of the congregation and the pastor. The out-dated parish system, though, remained - at least in all exclusively Protestant areas, Lutheran as well as Reformed (cf. the development in Zurich: *zürich/reformiert/online*). Exceptionally where the Protestants represented a minority, congregations based on personal decision could develop. In Germany, the denomination of a territory's population was determined by the denomination of the local authority (Peace of Augsburg of 1555). Within a single territory, either homogenous Roman Catholic or homogenous Protestant parishes existed. In both cases, the compulsory church affiliation was as valid as the traditional principle of the Roman Catholic canon law: „Quis est in parochia, est de parochia“ - Who lives within the parish, belongs to the parish (Holtz: 24).

The Christian parishes are therefore forms of a rationally relatively organised government, within which local communities are religiously administered.

### 3. The Beginning Reorganisation

In 1648, the Thirty Years' War came to an end, a religious war that inflicted devastation in great parts of Germany and, in some territories, diminished half of the population. In France, Protestants had been persecuted since the 16<sup>th</sup> century already. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, they were tolerated yet finally driven out; lots of them emigrated after 1690, e.g. to Prussia. In England, Anglicanism asserted itself against Catholicism during the 16<sup>th</sup> century. A century later, Oliver Cromwell led a Puritan Revolution. Europe was characterised by military conflicts that were partly caused by the different Christian denominations. This fact also influenced the declining sympathies for the Christian religion, allowed for its radical criticism and made people turn away from the church. The symbiosis between church and state began to crumble.

This happened against the background of the early Enlightenment Movement, the new intellectual orientation towards the principles of human reason, thus against the background of the genesis of rational sciences, rational economics and a rationally justified natural law, all of that related with new ideas about social life, state, church and society. Surprisingly, the religious forces themselves also supported this development, both in theoretical and practical respects.

On the theoretical level, the theory of collegialism tried to redefine the relation between church and state. Collegialism considered the church a social quantity of its own. None of their levels just represents a state institution only, but a “collegium”, a “college”, forming a community, an association. It is assumed that in these “colleges” people, based on their free decision, meet in order to worship God on the basis of common dogmas. The collegium is understood as a free and equal community (Schlaich). Thus this concept defines the church as a community based on personal decision, and not least on the local level. Consequentially, a congregation cannot be represented any more just by a pastor providing the religious supply

in his *parochia* - it must be conceived of as a personal community with specific rights of participation and cooperation.

The 18<sup>th</sup> century collegialist theory was not generally accepted for a long time, and it was not until the 19<sup>th</sup> century that it gained some influence.

On the practical level, the Pietist movement at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century realised the idea of the Church as a community based on personal decision already, namely with the so-called *collegia pietatis*, small communities that met for bible study and sought to realise their Christian principles in every-day life. These groups considered themselves belonging to the *parochias*, and yet as a special personal community pursuing a specific religious aim. Autonomous congregational formations, such as the one of Count Zinzendorf in Herrnhut, were exceptional.

These theoretical and practical new orientations in the realm of the Protestant church were imbedded in an encompassing change of society. The later on so-called „civil society“ began to develop. The philosophical Enlightenment also led to the foundation of collegia, clubs, salons, in which people met for conversation and common action (e.g. philanthropic) as well as for formation of political opinion (v. Dülmen). What burst in the French Revolution of 1789, mirrors therefore all-European transformation processes resulting from an increasing will to participate in social and political life on the citizens' side.

#### 4. Developments of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century

Already the „colleges“ of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century gave a hint to the genesis of a new social form which was constitutive for modernity, namely the association of individuals with a common aim. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, these associations gained high importance for society in general and for the organisation of individual life in particular, first in urban, later on also in rural contexts. (They were called *Vereine* in Germany). The sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck conceives of the *Vereinswesen* as a root system of the modern society in general (Tenbruck: 211-226. Cf. Boockmann u.a. on specifically historical analyses of the *Vereinswesen*). He argues that social action is no longer restricted within traditional structures but built on the free and voluntary coming-together of deciding subjects (Tenbruck: 225f.). According to Tenbruck, especially associations show this „modern“ type of structure. In a more abstract manner, Luhmann points out the same when talking about membership-based organisations, or organisations in general, and describing the formation process of an organisation as form of social differentiation in modernity (Luhmann (1972): 247f.).

Associations, like the ones Tenbruck thinks of, characterised the growing modern societies of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and have been decisive for the situation of social life until the present day, and not just in Germany. The pre-forms of the political parties, reading circles, ideological associations, societies of ethical culture, later on the *Lebensreform* movement or the German Youth Movement can be seen as examples (Tenbruck: 224). From the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century on, gymnastics clubs appear, predecessors of the sports clubs, representing the whole range of leisure clubs. The philanthropic and the religious associations are relevant as well. The main field of work for the latter is the philanthropy, which is structured in Germany as „Home Mission“ in form of an umbrella organisation from about 1850 on. Two further fields of work of Protestant associations are the Foreign Mission and the bible distribution. The problems of social change were not primarily dealt with by the federal churches and their *parishes* but by associations rooted in initiatives of lay peoples or unconventional theologians (Kaiser: 268).

The forming of associations in German Catholicism was equally extensive. In Prussia, a mostly Protestant territory, the Catholic associations helped to create a Catholic milieu where one could live and structure one's everyday life according to Catholic patterns of piety

(Gabriel, Mooser). Moreover, professional associations played a more important part than in Protestantism (Mooser: 68f).

So the new type of a membership-based organisation the association (*Verein*) was established in the surroundings of congregations, whereas the congregations themselves remained fields of work of the respective pastor or the pastoral staff. As a result of urbanisation, the parishes grew - in big cities, parishes encompassed about 20,000 to 30,000 Christians sometimes -, yet a thorough modernisation of the whole system did not happen. Even the increase of parishes and, in consequence, the construction of new church buildings in the cities did not start until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Concerning the legal structure of the congregations, the theory of collegialism had led to a new orientation in 19<sup>th</sup> century Protestantism, though: With respect to the church constitutions, Christian communities were still understood territorially (as parish churches), but at the same time as congregations based on personal decision. The notion of *paroikia* vanished more and more towards the term „congregation“. In the course of this new „congregational“ orientation, the participation of lay people in leadership issues was settled: elected parish councils were set up. Elements of democratic participation that were generally in force in associations' law were integrated into the church constitutions in accordance with genuine Protestant traditions. In addition, the parish is now understood as congregation. It is still defined territorially, yet not exclusively - besides that, it is seen as community based on personal decision.

The practical impact of this constitutional change was little, though. For the majority of its members, the local congregation remained an institution of religious supply performed by pastors - a supply that, with increasing congregations' size, could not be guaranteed any more. Since 1880, experiences like that led to attempts to reform the inner organisation of the parish communities. On the programmatic level, the insight gained acceptance that within each parish, a congregation with participating and active members still had to be built (Möller: 324).

The programmatic discussion focused on the increase in efficiency of the parochial principle, looking at it from the congregational aspect. It did not infringe the territoriality of parish organisation. All Christians of one denomination in a specific region were formal members of the federal church (*Landeskirche*) and therefore of its parishes as local congregations. Unsurprisingly, the new ways of pastoral work in the parishes could not reach the totality of members. Thus, cores of actively participating members arose that differed and even dissociated themselves from passive members on the margins. Naturally, the forming of core and margins can be noticed in nearly every membership-based organisation. Yet within the church congregations, only relatively small cores developed on which the communicative congregational work of the pastoral staff was concentrated.

## 5. Developments in the Second Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century

The new developments on the local level after the Second World War are grounded in the crises after 1918, after the First World War, and in the age of National Socialism. Both decisive points are connected with changes on the national level and, during the time of National Socialism as well with direct intrusion upon the everyday life of congregations, pastors, federal churches or single Christians.

After the First World War, the Catholic and the Protestant federal churches ceased to be state churches. They still were public institutions, „public corporations“, federal as well as parish churches, but their close connection with the state was dissolved.

On the level of theological reflection (cf. Luhmann (1977): 59-63 on its function), the high loyalty towards the state, mainly in Protestantism around the First World War, was questioned. The difference between church and state was emphasised. The separate identity of the church was brought out. Especially the movement of Dialectic Theology around the Swiss theologian Karl Barth was influential, although before the Second World War, it did not bring up any programme to reform the congregational life. Pastors who were close to Karl Barth nevertheless moulded their congregations with their Word of God theology and the distinct focus on preaching.

Directly, National Socialism did not lead to any relevant changes in church organisation, but it did so in (Christian) associations. According to the National Socialist idea of *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community), independent associations were dissolved or transferred into National Socialist organisations, in order to represent the national unity under one Fuehrer.

Religious associations partly escaped from this intrusion by setting up new fields of works within the churches, e.g. the Christian youth associations that had to give up their autonomous organisation. They could merely continue to exist in the form of parish-related youth groups and had to limit themselves officially to just one activity: reading the bible together. By this, the churches lost an important part of their independent lay activities. The centring around the pastor was intensified again.

Right after the Second World War, when a lot of people in Germany experienced a crisis of orientation, the Christian churches managed to gain new importance. The churches and their pastors were considered able to set new standards or at least to be an important partner while seeking for standards. Unfortunately there was a tendency to take on this new task with little self-criticism. Thus restoration tendencies gained ground not least in the Protestant churches. All members of the churches were supposed to submit to the conditions of a distinctive Christian community, to participate actively in the community life of their congregation, i.e. in the worship services, in Eucharist, in the wide-spread congregational groups such as youth, women's men's or volunteer groups (Rendtorff: 95-101). This objective could have been achieved in a small community based on voluntary membership. The Christian parish churches, though, were congregations whose members mostly belonged to them by virtue of tradition, by means of infant baptism. The quantity of members was determined parochially, i.e. by one's domicile in a defined territory. Clearly this brought up a lot of inevitable tensions.

In the period following, above all in the 1960es, these experiences increased. The Protestant programme reacted like this: The special religious norms of the church were not called for any more, although they remained subtly effective in the form of pastoral expectations.

## 6. The Unfinished Transformation

The presented observations address the social form of the Christian local parish church which is prevalent in Germany and its historical development within the framework of the ancient European parochial system. It has repeatedly become apparent that the local parish churches have been the most important social form of Christian socialisation but almost never the only possible one. Since the early Middle Ages, monasteries have been places of Christian community building, since the 18<sup>th</sup> century the free colleges have played that part and since the 19<sup>th</sup> century the multitude of Christian associations with their either tight or loose connection with the institution of the church. At the present time, new groupings join in as more or less formalised membership-based organisations.

With regard to the whole development it is striking to which high degree both the Catholic and the European Protestant Christianity were inclined towards a rational social structure: The parish system was rooted in the extension of episcopal authority, or rather: power of leadership. It serves the religious and moral control of the single Christians and is therefore functionally integrated into the secular authority, as it is characteristically shown by the compulsory church affiliation. Since the parish system provides blanket coverage, an exclusive system of religious supply arises from this relatively complete inclusion of all members of society.

The rationality of this order is expressed not least in the increasing relevance of legal procedures and documents. Since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Protestant congregation orders mostly base on territorial church orders. Nowadays, there are part of the church constitutions. The Catholic church took up Roman legal traditions and formed a canon law whose parts and current developments were summarised in the Codex Iuris Canonici of 1917/18. A revised version exists since 1983 (Schmitz). So in the European tradition, the orders of the local parish church are always subject to church law development and interpretation. Until the 20<sup>th</sup> century they concerned the relation between church and state and reached, as a legal issue, beyond the canon law in a narrow sense. Among the world religions, the Christian religion has a special position because of this tendency for formalisation and legal permeation of its social structure. It offers presuppositions to clearly dissociate from other social systems. Even in times of symbiosis between secular and religious authorities (Catholic bishops as territorial sovereigns, princes holding the supreme government of the church, being *summepiscopi* of Protestant territorial churches) church and state could be distinguished at least in their essentials.

The way German federal churches understand congregations shows how strong the parochial form of organisation still is.

The Protestant federal churches (*Landeskirchen*) do not know a special law for Protestant associations. It is true that they provide a whole lot of different fields of work (for women, men, youth etc.) that are legally structured as well, but they do not have the same status like the parish church, their regional organisations and the respective federal church (Hammer: 340). The German federal churches meet intentions to accept new communities with a membership based on a special spiritual idea as new congregations of the respective federal church with reserve. Meanwhile several autonomous new congregations exist that organise themselves according to the state law for associations. They are completely communities based on personal decision, without regard to territorial aspects. Ethnic congregations, e.g. among Koreans or Chinese students, belong to the same type. They are often not formally constituted.

For the German Catholic church, the Corpus Iuris Canonici of the Catholic world church is still fundamentally valid, as it determines in c.515 §1:

„The parish is a distinct community of believers that is permanently erected in a partial church and whose spiritual welfare is entrusted to a pastor as its own shepherd under the authority of the diocesan bishop.“

The normal case of a local congregation is the territorial one. A community based on personal decision is possible, as well as other special forms like grass-roots congregations. The local congregation is mainly a parish church, an area of work for one pastor, even if in the version of 1983 the idea of the community of Christians, the people of God, is stressed. Strictly speaking, the episcopal diocese represents the local church (Schick).

According to the national law, parish churches and congregations are public corporations, but they do not carry out any state tasks any more. The territorial order is merely understood as order within the church, yet against the background of the long state church history. Nevertheless, this way of parish organisation proves functionally important for the local civil society, e.g. in Germany for the ensemble of associations that are primarily active on local levels (villages, small cities, city districts). Local parish churches take part in this ensemble and allow for civil involvement in local affairs. Yet who are the real representatives of this involvement? The pastors and the other professionals, the members of the elected parish councils, the participants in worship services and congregational groups, in short: the congregation's core.

It has been stated already that a differentiation between core and margins happens in all volunteer organisations; sometimes it is even formalised itself. To some associations, one can belong as a passive member, one just makes a financial contribution and supports the aims of the association ideally. Parish churches do not provide such a formalisation. The congregation's core arises from a process that is dependent on the parish pastors and on the readiness of the respective members to participate actively and to take responsibility. Experience shows that further factors have an effect on the development of these informal cores, such as affiliation with a specific milieu, a social stratum, a certain lifestyle (Vögele et al., Benthaus-Apel). There can be enormous differences between single parish churches: relatively solid cores may have a very selective effect. If the members are mainly affiliated with one milieu, they may easily shut themselves away. Members of other milieus perceive the community as too biased regarding the predominant ways of life and social positions of its active members. Since one normally belongs to the local parish, people seldom orient themselves towards other congregations, although this is principally possible and even welcome. The normal pattern of behaviour is the non-participation, the self-placement on the margins of the congregation. Unquestionably, there is a high amount of church members who are not at all interested in their congregational life. Yet there are also the ones who potentially could belong to the core, but do not want to belong to the core of their specific local congregation.

Besides that, there is an even more fundamental problem with the parochial organisation of local churches: This system continues a public order according to which religion is not a matter of choice. Religion was a public institution that provided religious supply in a rather homogenous manner. In the traditionally formed act of infant baptism, one achieved a kind of membership that was mainly theologically important. The affiliation with a certain parish church was determined by the domicile. An individual decision was impossible, not even an individual choice of the pastor. The respective local pastor was the responsible one. Thus fundamental possibilities of choice were lost. The single Christian is confronted with a church whose activities are always bound to the local administration of religion. It was this type that Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch addressed with the notion of „church“.

Their type „sect“ was something different, it was a social form of religion that could be considered a volunteer organisation. To be a member was necessarily subject to one's own decision. It took a conscious will to join in. This automatically implied a higher degree of

identification between the organisation and its single members, but also of their duties and the social control. This social form of a Christian community was established in North-American Protestantism and gained importance around the world. Surprisingly enough the Catholic world church has nevertheless retained the ancient European parochial system. Theological reasons weighed more in this respect than practical considerations.

Europe and Germany have a long history of formation of Christian congregations. This history cannot be simply forgotten. It can be made conscious though in order to notice the dilemma that the present parochial orientation represents in the process of social modernisation.

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## Appendix

### Max Weber on Parish and Congregation

The relationships between political authority and religious community, from which the concept of religious denomination derived, belong in the analysis of domination [cf. below, ch.. XV]. At this point it suffices to note that *congregational religion* is a phenomenon of diverse manifestations and great fluidity. We want to use the term only when the laity has been organized permanently in such a manner that they can actively participate. A mere administrative unit which delimits the jurisdiction of priests is a *parish*, but not yet a congregational community. But even the concept of a parish, as a grouping different from the secular, political, or economic community, is missing in the religions of China and ancient India. Again, the Greek and other ancient phratries and similar cultic communities were not parishes, but political or other types of associations whose collective actions stood under the guardianship of some god. As for the parish of ancient Buddhism, moreover, this was only a district in which temporarily resident mendicant monks were required to participate in the semi-monthly convocations.

In medieval Christianity in the Occident, in post-Reformation Lutheranism and Anglicanism, and in both Christianity and Islam in the Near East, the parish was essentially a passive ecclesiastical tax unit and the jurisdictional district of a priest. In these religions the laymen generally lacked completely the character of a congregation. To be sure, small vestiges of congregational rights have been retained in certain Oriental churches and have also been found in Occidental Catholicism and Lutheranism. On the other hand, ancient Buddhist monasticism, like the warriors of ancient Islam, and like Judaism and ancient Christianity, had religious congregations with varying degrees of organizational elaboration (which will not yet be discussed in detail). Furthermore, a certain actual influence of the laity may be combined with the absence of a regular local congregational organization. An example of this would be Islam, where the laity wields considerable power, particularly in the Shiite sect, even though this is not legally secure; the Shah usually would not appoint priests without being certain of the consent of the local laity.

On the other hand, it is the distinctive characteristic of every sect, in the technical sense of the term (a subject we shall consider later [see below, ch. XV: 14]), that it is based on a restricted association of individual local congregations. From this principle, which is represented in Protestantism by the Baptists and Independents, and later by the Congregationalists, a gradual transition leads to the typical organization of the Reformed Church. Even where the latter has become a universal organization, it nevertheless makes membership conditional upon a contractual entry into some particular congregation. We shall return later to some of the problems which arise from these diversities. At the moment, we are particularly interested in just one consequence of the generally so very important development

of genuine *congregational* religions: That the relationship between priesthood and laity within the community becomes of crucial significance for the practical effect of the religion. As the organization assumes the specific character of a congregation, the very powerful position of the priest is increasingly confronted with the necessity of keeping in mind the needs of the laity, in the interest of maintaining and enlarging the membership of the community. Actually, every type of priesthood is to some extent in a similar position. In order to maintain its own power, the priesthood must frequently meet the needs of the laity in a very considerable measure. The three forces operative within the laity with which the priesthood must come to grips are: (a) prophecy, (b) the traditionalism of the laity, and (c) lay intellectualism. In contrast to these forces, another decisive factor at work here derives from the necessities and tendencies of the priestly enterprise as such. A few words need to be said about this last factor in its relation to the first one.

As a rule, the ethical and exemplary prophet is himself a layman, and his power position depends on his lay followers. Every prophecy by its very nature devalues the magical elements of the priestly enterprise, but in very different degrees. The Buddha and others like him as well as the prophets of Israel, rejected and denounced adherence to knowledgeable magicians and soothsayers (who are also called "prophets" in the Israelite sources), and indeed they scorned all magic as inherently useless. Salvation could be achieved only by a distinctively religious and meaningful relationship to the eternal. Among the Buddhists it was regarded as a mortal sin to boast vainly of magical capacities; yet the existence of the latter among the unfaithful was never denied by the prophets of either India or Israel, nor denied by the Christian apostles or the ancient Christian tradition. All prophets, by virtue of their rejection of magic, were necessarily skeptical of the priestly enterprise, though in varying degrees and fashions. The god of the Israelite prophets desired not burnt offerings, but obedience to his commandments. The Buddhist will get nowhere in his quest for salvation merely with Vedic knowledge and ritual; and the ancient sacrifice of *soma* was represented in the oldest Gathas as an abomination to Ahura-mazda.

Thus, tensions between the prophets, their lay followers and the representatives of the priestly tradition existed everywhere. To what degree the prophet would succeed in fulfilling his mission, or would become a martyr, depended on the outcome of the struggle for power, which in some instances, e.g., in Israel, was determined by the international situation. Apart from his own family, Zoroaster depended on the clans of the nobles and princes for support in his struggle against the nameless counter-prophet; this was also the case in India and with Muhammad. On the other hand, the Israelite prophets depended on the support of the urban and rural middle class. All of them, however, made use of the prestige which their prophetic charisma, as opposed to the technicians of the routine cults, had gained for them among the laity. The sacredness of a new revelation opposed that of tradition; and depending on the success of the propaganda by each side, the priesthood might compromise with the new prophecy, outbid its doctrine, or eliminate it, unless it were subjugated itself.

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**Emel Topcu-Brestrich: Islamic Organization in Turkey**  
(Reason of strong Centralization) Conflicts between Centre and Periphery

**Abstract**

In this article the existing Islamic understanding of Turkey and Religious organizations will be analysed. As a result of the Turkish government being successor to the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to look at the Ottomans as well, discussing the transformational process. As a central republican organization for religion Diyanet and its organizational structure will be discussed, explaining the influences of laicism on it. Finally the conflict of such kind of state controlled religious life will be discussed, focussing on the new Islamic movements among the people and their effect on the national assembly.

**(Key Words: religion, Islam, sunna, authority, religious freedom, religious organization, modernism, laicism, Turkish Laicism, westernisation, Islamism, Kemalism)**

## Introduction

The greatest reality of religion is freedom, the inner freedom of the individual. It is almost impossible to differentiate real religion from free thinking. Throughout history human beings have used every means including religion to gain power. Islam is also a religion where freedom has its root in the human conscience. The first four hundred years of Islam was the golden age of free thinking in Islamic history. That period was dominated by free thinking. Islamic States also operated under this influence. But later Islamic States started to use religion to control people. The states had an official religious code of conduct. Lay people who were out of this paradigm were out of religious freedom too.

The authority carried out by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as to what is sacred or profane became segmented after his death. A serious conflict developed about the legality of the Halifas (successors of Prophet Muhammad) causing the creation of two schools in Islamic thought called Sunna and Shia which are representative of the political inclination throughout the Islamic world. They are the Orthodoxy of Islam<sup>1</sup>. While Sunna believe in the election of successors, Shia believe that successors of Muhammad (PBUH) are Ehl-I Beyt (The Family of Muhammad PBUH) from Ali (husband of his daughter), and that the 12 Imams (successors of Muhammad PBUH) are without sin (masum).

Islam was the state religion during the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans used Sunni thought to legalize their activities. Because of the tight control of the state there were no free thinkers or philosophers and all Ulema (Scholars) were under the control of government. Ulema could not produce any original Islamic literature. Original thinking and heterodox Islamic groups were repressed.

The Turkish Republic which was established in 1920 on the heritage of the Ottomans, applied the same repressive ideas to control religious life. The one important difference is that, the Turkish republic is laic, not a religious state. Although religious freedom is addressed in the Turkish Constitution, there are still restrictions. The current constitution Art.24 states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14... Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control." and then comes the afore mentioned Article 14: "None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights". In Turkey it is easy to legitimise the restriction of human and religious rites.

## The Ottoman Empire

In the beginning of the empire the Ottomans, were a tribe of border dwellers of the Selcuk Empire. The relationship between common people and the government was very simple in this small community administration, it was a relationship in the manner of the *Traditional Islam*, and that is why religious codes of conduct was the same for common people as for the government. The first three Ottoman Emperors also had very strong connections with *mystics* who influenced the Ottoman's understanding of religion.

### *Religion in The Ottoman Empire*

As the social structure and the cultural situation developed, so to did and the position of the emperor by the conquest of other lands effecting in an increase in the population. As a result, the relationship between rulers and common people changed into an alliance with the

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<sup>1</sup> INAYET, Hamit; *Cagdas Islami Siyasi Düşünce*, Yönelis Yay, 1988, Istanbul p.23-24

Ulema (scholars). The new system was established, with the help of scholars -not the mystics, from Medrese (education system in Ottoman times). Medrese in educational and religious institutions as in other Islamic lands was the representative of the Fikh (Islamic law) and played a major role in the new system. In the Period of Fatih Sultan Mehmed (1451-1481), the Ottoman Empire became very centralized and this central government took its final shape during the period of the Magnificent Sulayman (1520-1566). The State Islam received its authority from the Medrese based High Islam and was in conflict with Tekke (the organization of Sufism)<sup>2</sup>. State Islam refers to the place of Islam in state ideology as reflected in central and local bureaucracies, administration policy as well as foreign policy<sup>3</sup>.

After being centralized in the period of Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the Ottoman Empire had the Kanun-I Esasi (Constitution) for state administration<sup>4</sup>. Although it is stated in the Kanun-I Esasi (Constitution) that the state religion was Islam, the Ottoman State was not a theocratic state. For almost every kind of organizational rule there were not religious but secular regulations that were established by emperors. These regulations took their origin from Islamic law and Örf (Osmanic tradition). Ottomans used the religion to establish politics, to legalize its activities and to organize social life. Ottomans were not ignorant of religion but at the same time not under its control.<sup>5</sup>

The State chosen for itself Sunni thought as representing the state. Although the majority of the common people were also Sunni, there were differences between the religious conduct of common people and the interpretation of the Sunna from the State point of view. The people understood Islam as a life style and a system of belief, while the State viewed Islam as a political institution. As the Empire extended its border, Muslims from other ethnicities, people of other faiths who converted to Islam and people of other religions were included into the empire. Although the general justification of the Ottomans' war throughout the world was to serve their faith, in reality it was not true. It was only advancing the boundaries of the Ottoman political empire. The Ottomans were more politically minded than religious<sup>6</sup>.

The minority groups within the Ottoman Empire had the right to self rule, to live and to judge themselves according to their religion. With the centralization policy in the XVth Century, after the defeat of Constantine, central churches were established for various Christian denominations by the initiation of Sultan Fatih. All the churches through out the empire were connected by these central churches. A central synagogue was also founded in Istanbul for Jews<sup>7</sup>. By centralizing all minorities, the Ottomans had only one negotiating partner and could thereby control them easily.

#### *Islamic Institutions and Organizations*

In The Ottoman Empire there were two top positions which dealt with religious affairs in the central organisation, the Shaykh-al Islam and the Kazasker. Both positions were hold by the highest Ulemas (scholars) and were both filled through nomination by the Vezir-i Azam, who was the executive head of The Ottoman Empire and the leader of the political authority. That indicates that in The Ottoman Empire political power was regarded as being

<sup>2</sup> OCAK, Ahmet; *ibid*, p.111

<sup>3</sup> OCAK; Ahmet; **Din ve Düşünce, Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi**, IRCICA, Ist,1998, p.110

<sup>4</sup> TOPCU, Emel; **Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Fatih Dönemi Kamu Yönetimi**, Ocak yay., Ankara, 1993

<sup>5</sup> VEGIN, Nur; **Din ve Devlet İlişkileri: Düşüncenin "Bitmeyen Senfonisi"**, **Türkiye Günlüğü**, sayı 29, 1994, p.6-12


<sup>6</sup> WHEATCROFT, Andrew; **The Ottomans**, Viking Press, London, 1993, first edition, p.50

<sup>7</sup> OCAK, Ahmet; *ibid*, p.116-117

above religious power, which holds good for another argument addressing The Ottoman State as only a partially religious system<sup>8</sup>.

# Religious Organization in Ottoman Time

## Center



The Kazasker was the head of religious, administrative and educational bureaucracy. He was a full member of the Diwan (highest advisory and executive assembly in The Ottoman Empire).

The Shaykh-al Islam was not a full member of the Diwan, but he was occasionally invited to meetings with the Diwan as a consultant. His office is younger than that of the Kazasker in Islamic history and it gained more and more influence, through the charisma of his office-holder<sup>9</sup>.


<sup>8</sup> DURSUN, Davut; *ibid*, p.323

<sup>9</sup> DURSUN, Davut; *ibid*, p.318-320

# Central Religious Organization in Ottoman Time

## Palace

(Center)



The tasks of the Shaykh-al Islam was limited to religious affairs of the Diwan and the Sultan - The Ottoman Empire. His main job was to determine whether decisions or activities of the Diwan and Sultan were conducted according to Islamic rule. But since he was nominated by state it was very difficult not to approve the state's executions. In urgent situations the state could get his Islamic approval (fatva) even after the execution. The Shaykh-al Islam could also nominate the high Ulemas with the approval of the other both, the Vezir-i Azam and the Kazasker.

In local administration involved with religious affairs there were the three organizations, all in the hierarchical line with Kazasker and Shaykh-al Islam:

Kadilik (with affiliates through out). served in justice and administration, and was nominated directly by the centre, the highest position for that district

Muftülük (with affiliates through out). the position responsible for making decisions to do with religious problems, he was assistant and adviser to Kadi.

Medrese, organized the educational life and provided education in every where.

Mystic religious organizations (tekkes) were not officially connected with the state<sup>10</sup>.

### *Conflict between Centre and Periphery*

The power of the Sultan was limited by the Sharia, and the tradition of his ancestors. New rulings from any Sultan had to be implemented within these limitations. Since the Sharia gives the possibility to rule according to the need and tradition of the time, the Ottomans used it perfectly for their needs and established a system similar to that which Plato had written of in his Republic. As the representative of the centre, Ottomans used very elaborate, sophisticated and unique methods. The centre which had very tight control over the tax system and ground administration, and as the owner of the official religion, had found a fundamental starting point for a new education, justice and legality.

<sup>10</sup> DURSUN, Dr. Davut; **Yönetim Din İlişkileri Acısından Osmanlı Devletinde Siyaset ve Din**, Isaret yay, Bilimsel Arastırma Dizisi 1, İstanbul, 1989, p.314

To establish a ruling elite, young male (Devshirme) from religious minorities were gathered and educated in a school called Enderun located in the palace. They were between 9 and 16 years of age when first brought to the school. They were educated very intensively in science, religion and sports etc. in order to become good servants of the government. These people were called servants or slaves (kul) (not in the real meaning of slavery) of the sultan. They could have a career according to their ability. They were administrators of The Ottoman Empire, but they did not have the right to convey their property to their children. Some of them were not allowed to marry. They belonged totally to the Emperor<sup>11</sup>. Almost all positions in central and local administration were held by Devshirme. After the centralization process was initiated by Fatih Sultan Mehmed, even the highest position in the administration, called Veziri Azam, was filled by a Devshirme after the destruction of the rise to power of hereditary aristocratic families who traditionally held this position.

As we have seen in The Ottoman Empire the establishment was made up of people of non-Islamic orientation who later converted to Islam and were educated in the palace for the purpose to be later entrusted with the administration of the empire, in a modern sense: bureaucrats, not aristocrats. So there was no feudal system, but a centrally controlled ground administration, the same with the army. That system had no access for the common people. But its periphery was composed of nobles who came from pre-Ottoman times, autonomous mystic religious groups, and other religious and ethnic groups from different parts of the empire, which had participation in some way with the local administration<sup>12</sup>.

The land system was as sophisticated as complicated. It was organized in the same way as The Ottoman Empire, which was divided into partially autonomic states. In some the land belonged wholly to the state, in other cases the state only received tax for the fief. Some lands became private and was given to Muslims with the obligation to provide soldiers to the empire. So each state had officers from the empire. That officers: the ruler of the state, the head of justice, called Kadi, the teachers of the Medrese and the Muftis (the religious heads of the region) and others were nominated by the Diwan. By that way The Ottoman Empire had full control over the local administration. In every state, taxes were collected by local officers, who had enough power to misuse their position in their own interest against the local people without ever being disciplined<sup>13</sup>. It is no wonder, nomadic Turks, who were denied land, turned against the empire when faced with the harsh and merciless attitudes of centrally appointed, tax collectors. These officials, who generally worked for their own interest, insulted the people because of their religious conduct, former traditions and cultural understandings<sup>14</sup>.

Local settled people had few or almost no influence over any administrative affairs. Because of that the common people did not agree with Ottomans rule. That disagreement could easily increase in economic crises and turn into local uprisings often lead by local aristocrats or local scholars. Uprisings were willingly perceived as religious movements. Although based on socio-economic origin people used religious motives. The slogan of these movements was almost every time the same: "Sharia (Islamic Law) is going out of our hand."

### *The Modernization Period in The Ottoman Empire*

<sup>11</sup> SHAW, Stanford; **Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye**, I.cilt, çeviren; Mehmet Harmanlı, İstanbul, E. Yayınları, A.S. 1982, p.232

<sup>12</sup> MARDİN, Serif; **Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset, Makaleler I**, İletişim yay. İstanbul, 1991, p.30-32

<sup>13</sup> LYBYER, Albert, Howe; **Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devrinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Yönetimi**, çeviren; Seckin Cilizoglu, Sürec Yayınları, İstanbul, 1987, p.34-38

<sup>14</sup> OCAK; Ahmet; "XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu'sunda Mesihyanik Hareketler", **V. Milletlerarası Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi**, TTK, yay, 1990, p.820

Because of its complicated and traditionally backed organizational system the Ottoman Empire could not keep track with the new European developments of XVIIth century in the correct way. They perceived the necessity of change and favoured at first the backbone of empire: the formerly glorious army. For establishing a new army parallel to the old one many young people of the palace were sent abroad, especially to France, to study the new developments on that field. In fact these people brought many new ideas to the Ottoman State, and in that course it became possible for the children of the aristocrats, to do the same.

Throughout 18th Century there was an enormous effort to rescue the country by strengthening bonds with the West. The Ottomans hired Western soldiers to teach their army new disciplines. A French Officer, Count Alexander de Bonneval, came to modernize the Ottoman engineer and bombardier corps in 1729. There was opposition against this and when the opposition came into power all the advances were ruined. That initial go and stop movement characterized the permanent ambiguity in the attitude of the Ottomans towards the West<sup>15</sup>, but during the XIXth century the Ottomans were under the spell of modernization so the Saray (palace) started some reforms titled Tanzimat (to bring something in order) in 1839-1876, which had been laid by Sultan Mahmut II. After the Gülhane Imperial Edict in 1839 many reforms were realized, at foremost in the military and than in the state's administration, in legal and educational systems. By revising the Sultanat form of the state important steps had been taken in the direction of a modern central state<sup>16</sup>.

The Ottoman reformists wanted to establish a modern central nation-state using the model of the West. The problem was to adapt the non-Muslims and different ethnic Muslims to this new system which would allow them to exist in harmony. At the same time the Ottoman Empire was permanently loosing its territories to peoples struggling for national independence (as the Greeks, the Serbs, the Bulgarians, the Arabs etc.). By that way it was loosing some of its ethnic groups as well. So to save the empire, the nation state model seemed to overcome that problem. Everyone in power wanted to use a different way to apply that model. But at the same time the question of a corporate identity of Turkish-speaking Muslim Ottomans also had to be answered.

After some time the power players understood that by imitating the West they could loose their own identity. All these problems were often discussed in terms of civilization. To which civilization did the Turks belong, and to which civilization did they want to belong in the future? Most did not want to become totally westernised. They wanted to make it on their own without loosing their identity in that process. Their main identity had been shaped by Islam and Islam left its mark on one of the greatest civilizations known in human history, but what about it's future prospects?

The Islamic world began to face the West as a rapidly modernizing social force, which was apparently much stronger and more dynamic in terms of economic development, military technology and scientific achievements. The question of the changing role of Islam as a social system in a world challenged by modernization and secularisation had been on the agenda among Ottoman intellectuals ever since the middle of the nineteenth century. So Islamism was the answer, which most of them agreed upon. Some of them wanted to use it as a link to keep all the remaining ethnic groups together and some wanted to turn to the old traditions of Islam because they believed that the weakness of the Ottoman Empire happened because people had left Islam and some were ready to use Islam as a veil to hide their real aim<sup>17</sup>. Nobody could abstain from that movement, because it was deeply rooted in the people.

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<sup>15</sup> WHEATCROFT, Andrew; **The Ottomans**, p.68

<sup>16</sup> KARPAT, Kemal Prof. Dr. H.; **Türk Demokrasi Tarihi**, Istanbul, 1967, p.14-15

<sup>17</sup> LEWIS, Bernard; **The Emergence of Modern Turkey**, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p.232

Islamism came to the agenda, especially in the XIXth Century and naturally Sultan II Abdulhamit was also one of their advocates. His goal was to link together his people in the empire under the authority of the Ottomans. He tried to spread Islam in the form of a mission and continued his activities in Central Asia, North Africa, and the Far East. He was using this weapon against European colonialism.

The moderate supporters of Islamism defended Islam as not being against democracy, but a real supporter of it. Their arguments conclude, that Islam was actually ready to accept every kind of invention and development, and there was every kind of answer in the Holy Kor'an for the needs of human beings.

In 1865 the Young Turks had no special attitude towards Islamism and for some of them there was no other civilization than the Western civilization. They couldn't find any compromise between the Islamic and European ways of life. Others did not oppose this Islamic opinion, but the sultan. The Young Turks were generally educated in France and in their ranks were mostly intellectuals and professionals from Istanbul. They were aware of the power of Islam in their society, which was mediated by the Ulema (Islamic scholars) and Medrese, which wanted to keep the society in a traditional form. So the Young Turks began to use Islamic paroles for their propaganda to promote their way of modernization. So the most famous Young Turk, Ziya Gökalp, published the Islamic periodical *Islam Mecmuasi* and tried to connect Turkish Nationalism to Islam and to offer some reforms in the context of Islam, but lay people did not respond. It was symptomatic that the Young Turks remained an elite movement<sup>18</sup> opposed to the traditional system of the Ottoman State and in enmity to the Sultan. Their increasing influence forced the Sultan to establish a governmental system based on a constitution. But that First Constitutional Period (1876-1878) did not change the pattern of power. After 2 years that reform was withdrawn and the absolutist system of the sultan remained in power until 1908, when the Young Turk revolution forced the second Constitutional Period into being under another sultan. At that time they had more supporters of their movement in the administration, so that period was more promising.

As they were in power the Young Turks adopted the ideological Islamic discourse in their programme, but they could not convince the real advocates of Islamism of their sincerity, because of the liberal development in the rules of family rights causing suspicion for their real intention. Despite of this suspicion, modernization, based on western ideological achievements gained speed among Ottomans as well as in many other Middle Eastern countries.

In the Second Constitutional Period the two main ideologies of Islamists and Westernizers became visible in the flood of publications that poured the market. Both sides had their moderates and extremists. While the Westernizers were ranging from pure Western imitators and anti Islamists to those seeking the technology of the West but not its culture, Islamists were ranging from those claiming that the Kor'an and Sharia (Islamic Law) constituted the only source of wisdom to those who often had a Western education, and who approached the question of religion in a moderate way realizing that Islam needs a new interpretation for preserving the heritage of a unified Islamic world.

Camalettin al Afghani (1838-1897) and his disciple Mohammed Abduh (1849-1905) were the international leaders of this second kind of Islamism. According to them Islam in its traditional form couldn't answer the problems posed by a society in the process of worldwide modernization. Their position was as: when we change the interpretation methodology of the original Islamic text we could find the solution in Islam that fits the contemporary time, and:

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<sup>18</sup> MARDIN, Serif; *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, p.11-30

actually in Islam a specific type of rule is not prescribed, but the administration should be just<sup>19</sup>.

## **The Turkish Republic**

### *Establishment on the Ottomans' Heritage*

Through all these processes the Ottomans have lost most of their power. Reduced to the Turkish motherland and occupied by European armies they were called by European countries "the *Sick Man*". Nevertheless the Turkish people did not give up. They fought for their country. High Commanders, especially formed by the Ottoman Army, played an important role in this fight. They organized the people to fight against the invaders of their country and after long and tedious wars they succeeded to rescue some parts of Turkey. The leaders of this movement were promoting a total westernisation of the country. After the war they established a republican administration and changed everything within the country in a few years. They were the most radical people in that affair, because they disabled any democratic development but overthrew everything so radically that no person or group had the courage to oppose them. That group of republicans and commanders had no scholars or philosophers among them, their mentality was that of soldiers. Thereby very important developments took place<sup>20</sup>:

**1) After all these changes Turkish society had lost its connection with its own history.**

2) Turkish society faced a cultural erosion which has not stopped to this day

**3) As compared to other countries in the world there is almost no progressive modernisation in Turkey since the Foundation of the Republic.**

The reforms, which were achieved were:

Before publicly announcing the Republic they separated the monarch from Hilafet (religious representation). Thereby, state and religion were separated from each other (1922). Thereafter the Republic with its parliament was publicly announced in 1923. The Ottoman Monarchy was overthrown in 1924. In the same year education came under the control of the national ministry of education, and all other kinds of educational institutions outside of governmental jurisdiction of other maintenance, as *Tekkes* (mystic organizations) and Medreses were closed and forbidden. The religious organization which was organized in the beginning of the Republic as a ministry was subordinated as a division to the Prime Ministry.

In 1925 international time and calendars, Turkish family law, criminal law, contract law, and a law giving everyone a last name and a hats law for men passed the parliament. The Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928 and international weight and measurement was accepted in 1931. All power was under control of the Reformists and there was no place for any opposition or divergent opinion.

France was the model for the development. During the time of the Ottoman rule, France was the favourite country of the elite. The Republicans had imitated the positivism and laicism without understanding its real application in a European setting, especially for a formerly Catholic country.

The ideas of August Comte played an important role in the beginning of the Republic. He was the founder of Positivism and according to his ideas spiritual leaders were important for the development of a society, not necessarily catholic theologians. He came to the

<sup>19</sup> LEWIS; Bernard; **The Emergence of Modern Turkey**, p.234-235

<sup>20</sup> HOCAOGLU, Durmus; Sekularizm, Laisizm ve Türk Laisizmi, **Türkiye Günüğü**, Sayı 29, Temmuz-Agustos 1994, p.58

conclusion, that Christianity could no longer play a role in Western societies, so societies had to find a new religion to improve their conditions. He emphasized that this new religion could be the Religion of Humanity with the same function as the old one but laic and without transcendence. In this new religion human logic has the highest position without God. According to Comte humanity overtook the place of God forever, but mankind should never forget his service in history. In this new religion, society is the most important element and everything should serve the society<sup>21</sup>. The reformists of Turkey used this ideology to create a new society out of the old one.

Therefore, to set Islam out of power, they tried to replace it with an ideology, which could fit the mental needs of Turkish society. So they instituted reformist proposals contrary to Islamic religion at the beginning of the Republic. The Attitude of the reformers ranged from creating a deformed Islam, to creating a new religion similar to the ideas of Comte. These are the foundations of Kemalism, an ideology to substitute Islam.

As a result of this mentality attacking Islam and his Prophet in the school history books began eventually in 1931. Prophet Muhammad was represented as a stupid illiterate old fashioned Bedouin without any culture from the Arabian desert. His book, the Qur'an and what he said (Ahadith) could not be applied to modern society anymore. But the ideas of the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal, would lead the country into a new future. Kemalism demands six attitudes of its followers: to support the republic, nationalism, reformism, the state's organization, laicism, populism (the people), which serve as the six pillars in the rank of a religion. As poet Behcet Kemal Caglar described him as a prophet for this religion others viewed him as a god, enabling the Turkish people to revive. After such proclamations it became difficult, to decide whether Kemal Atatürk was a prophet or a god, but a faith's direction was already found: the area of Cankaya where Kemal Atatürk lived<sup>22</sup>.

#### *Laicism in Modern Turkey*

Laicism came first on the agenda of the Ottomans in 1866 by a letter from the exiled Pasha (Aristocrat) Mustafa Fazil who lived in France to Sultan Abdul Aziz about the backward attitude of the Ottomans. This letter was of no effect until its publication in "La Liberté", a Paris newspaper in 1867. This letter consisted of many reform proposals. It was translated into Osmanic and delivered in fifty thousand copies to Istanbul, where was circulated among Young Turks by hand. Despite the financial support from this Pasha to the *Young Turks* in the beginning the Young Turks were no advocates of laicism. It was later discovered that the letter was not written by the pasha himself, but by a French journalist<sup>23</sup>.

As can be seen the Turkish laicism has been rooted by French influence. France formerly was a very strong Catholic country, and people considered to be profane were declared to be an enemy of the church, thereby losing the right to live. Reformation and enlightenment weakened the position of the church and as a result *National Catholicism* or *Gallicanism* took place in France, preventing Protestantism, which introduced secularism in Europe. By the initiative of Louis XIV, the *Déclaration Des Quatre Articles* was published by the authority of the *Clerical Assembly*. According to this declaration, the responsibility of the pope was limited to the sacred field and could not be extended to profane, but the popes influence was supervised by a national Ecumenical Council. Thereby the root of laicism was shaped in France, based on the social and religious conditions in France and it took a long time to ripen. Therefore in the beginning of the French revolution the term laic implied only

<sup>21</sup> VERGIN, Nur; *Din ve Devlet İlişkileri: Düşüncenin "Bitmeyen Senfonisi"*, p.11

<sup>22</sup> BAKILER, Yavuz Bülent; *Atatürk'e İlah- Tanrı-Put- peygamber Diyenler, İslamiyat*, cilt3, sayı 3, temmuz-eylül 2000, p.169-173

<sup>23</sup> CELIK, Hüseyin; *Türkiye'de İlk Laiklik Teklifi ve Arka Planı, Türkiye Günlüğü*, Sayı 19, Yaz 1992, p.113-114 (First appearance of Laicism in Turkey and its backgrounds)

separation from authority of church and state. Later on this term became politicised because the church was an advocate of the Kingdom and not of the revolution. After the revolution the term laic was used politically for the total separation of public organizations and religion. Consequently all primary schools became public in 1882 and it was compulsory to have a public and a laic prime education. Eventually in 1901 all confessions and communities were organized according to public law and in 1905 the separation between government and church took place<sup>24</sup>.

Twenty years later Turk laicism followed the French version, although the sociological development in Turkish society bared no similarity to the French one. The facilities were not ready, but all ornaments were in place: the People were not ready for such a change. They were Muslims and happy with their religion. They were not in need of a change their religion or life style. This kind of development took place among the elite group of Ottomans because of European influences and could not be reflected in Turkish common people. Many reforms had already been carried out during the Ottoman period, first in the army and later in the bureaucracy without affecting the daily life of normal people. They knew that something was happening in the empire which had little effect on them. With the Republic of Turkey all changes suddenly took place with tremendous force from the centre. Moreover, after having been severely stressed by poverty caused by the successful wars for liberation, there was no opportunity to protest against the unacceptable.

All education systems were connected to the Ministry of Education, Medreses were closed and religious education was no longer conducted. Mystic organizations were closed, and all forms of religious activity came under the control of one centralised organization called Diyanet which was connected directly to the Prime Ministry.

*Diyanet: The Religious Organization in Turkey  
Organizational Development*

During the Ottoman period the Shaykh-al Islam was a high ranking theological bureaucrat, who was responsible for ensuring that everything was done according to Islamic rule. That function was fulfilled in the Turkish Republic after 1920 by a ministry called "Sheriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti" until 1924 without change, when it was cancelled by a constitutional amendment. The reason for the change was to place religious services, such as leading the public prayers, giving fetvas etc. under the direct political control of the prime minister by establishing an organization. Its name was "Diyanet Isleri Reisligi" (Committee of Religious Issues). Later this name changed to "Diyanet Isleri Bakanligi", a less Arabic form with the same meaning.

In 1924 Diyanet consisted only of its president, consultant groups and some civil servants. In 1927, 1935, 1950, 1961 and in 1965 legal amendments were steadily adapting and developing the Diyanet Isleri Bakanligi to the needs of the time and its increasing influence on its inner and outer appearance. In 1965 its functions were in short: "to carry out the services for Islamic religion and belief to enlighten the society about religion and to administer the mosques and other praying places", including administration of ancient documents, publishing books and doing further education. Finally, in 1982 the powerful Diyanet was defined by the new constitution as "(this organ is) an organ which serves in general administration according to the laicism in Turkey. This organization must not participate in any kind of political activity or thought, and should strengthen national unity and solidarity".

After 1976 that central governmental organization increasingly began to arrange and service religious life abroad, to serve the Turkish citizens who live in those countries. Because

<sup>24</sup> HOCAOGLU, Durmus; Sekularizm, Laisizm ve Türk Laisizmi, p.47-48

of the state's character of Diyanet by interfering in foreign sovereignty that activities are based on efforts and demands of Turkish people abroad. By that way with DITIB a Europe wide branch of Diyanet was founded.

All Turkish mosques and places of prayer are under control of Diyanet. The government sends an imam (preacher) and caller to prayer who are paid by the government. All clerks of Diyanet are civil servants of the Turkish government. They receive their education by studying in government schools or universities, internalising the official state's ideology, so that there is no danger of delivering any sermon that is against this understanding.

Diyanet is a service organization. Lay people are not members of this official organization, but according to their need common people build a mosque or a place of prayer and transfer it to Diyanet and then Diyanet will send an imam (preacher) to direct the daily five times prayers and to preach on some special occasions. Lay people usually do not have a particular relationship with Diyanet. They go to the mosques only to pray with other Muslims, because in Islam praying together has more value than praying alone. On Fridays there is a special joint prayer for the male Muslims, who gather in mosques and pray together, with others, with a public sermon before the prayer.

With the current construction, the Diyanet conveys the message of the current Turkish political authority to the people, especially when the official authority wants the people to accept a new policy of the Turkish government. From the very beginning Diyanet's sermons went according to the official ideology, e.g. a sermon about democracy, the activities of Kemal Atatürk etc. according to the current political situation. Another function is to keep the people calm or to make them see a situation from an official point of view, e.g. in economic crises, people are invited to be humble and not extravagant. To keep traffic fatalities down to a minimum people are told to obey traffic rules, and in civil war situations not to resist. All this strengthened with many examples from Islam<sup>25</sup>.

As a typical example for Diyanets purposes we will mention a retired high ranking soldier, who has been appointed by government to work now at Diyanet as a representing consultant. In the army he was responsible for education issues, which he continues in Diyanet –having no religious background, but with enough authority to make important decisions for Diyanet.


To control Friday prayer in Ankara a townwide technical installation was installed by Diyanet to transmit the central sermon all over the city. This pilot project has been so successful that other big cities in Turkey will be brought into line soon.

#### *Centre Organization*

Diyanet is a hierarchical organization with three major departments: centre, local and organizations abroad. At the top are a president and five vice presidents. In the centre of the organization are three divisions subordinate to the president. Muftis head the local administrations, as civil servants who explain Islamic rules, but not issuing fetvas, as their Ottoman title would suggest, but supervising all the workers of the mosques and Qur'an courses, who are nominated by the centre. In 2001 Diyanet consisted of 940 people in the centre, 74.447 people locally and 37 people abroad, maintaining 75.001 mosques.

<sup>25</sup> YAR, Erkan; *Dinin Siyasallaşması ve Dinsel Bürokrasi*, **İslamiyat**, Cilt 4, sayı 1, Ocak- Mart 2001, p.45-46

## Central Religious Organization (Diyamet)



In the centre of Diyanet there are three different kinds of service units. Two of them are typical just like in any other state organization: the *Counsel&Control Division* and the *Service Division*. The *Main Service Committee* fulfills Diyanet's work. In this committee there are seven units:

1) Highest Decision Committee is headed by a president and consists of 15 members and a few consultants. This committee arranges the main service politics of the organization, answers the religious questions, carries out research in religious subjects and make decisions on publication affairs.

2) Qur'an Authenticity Committee, controls the Qur'an Copies on authenticity for print.

3) Religious Service Division, enlightens lay people about religious issues, determines the common praying times.

4) Religious Education Division, arranges training courses for personell of Diyanet to improve the service quality, opens new Qur'an courses and controls their activities.

5) Religious Publication Division, produces media, publishes books, periodicals etc. and service the library at the centre.


6) Foreign Relation Division, delivers religious services to Turkish people living abroad and trains the personell who will be nominated for service abroad.

7) Pilgrim Service Division, organizes the pilgrimage for the Turkish contingent to Mekka.

### *Local Organization*

Every big and small city has an office of Diyanet, called Müftülük. This local administration is also hierarchically shaped. The Mufti heads a set of employees, such as preachers, a general administrator, an administrator for Qur'an courses, supervisors, Qur'an teachers, prayer leaders (Imam-Hatip), caller to prayer (muezzin) and managers. All mosques and Qur'an courses in the area are also supervised by this local division in the city. According to the geographic division of Turkey every small city unit is under the control of its big city unit.

## Diyanet's Local Organization



### *Abroad Organization*

Diyanet is also organized outside of Turkey, according to the need of Turkish people who live abroad. Diyanet sends an attaché in religious affairs and preachers for the mosques, which the local people have established with the DITIB organization, which was founded in Köln/Germany in 1985. The "Diyanet Isleri Türk-Islam Birliği" (Turkish Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion) now works throughout Europe with on the initiative of local people, being the legal arm of Diyanet abroad.

### *Critical Voices about Diyanet*

A state's religious organization in a laic country as in Turkey raises many questions among the religious and also the laic people: Does Diyanet fit in a laic government system? Are its services according to the needs of the people? Does Diyanet represent all religious groups (especially Alevis) in Turkey? etc.

Many people, the laic and the religious alike now have objections against Diyanet, but even some scholars found Diyanet useful for Islam. Especially in the beginning of the Republic there was need for a central organization, because in Ottoman traditions religious organizations had never been independent. There was no social religious structure, to work

independently of the government. Diyanet continued this tradition being controlled by the government, a government, which on the other hand spread propaganda against the authority of Islam, as mentioned above. If there had not been any governmental organisation for religion at the implementation of the Republic the influence of superstition on Islam in Turkey may have been increased<sup>26</sup>.

Alevis would like to have representatives in Diyanet, but Diyanet promotes only the Sunni Islamic tradition following the Ottoman and Turkish tradition. By sending hocas (preachers) into Alevi villages even missionary or enlightening activities can be ascribed to Diyanet, teaching them the real Islam<sup>27</sup>. Alevis are not considered to have a valid Islamic confession, and some Alevi organizations do not want to be represented in Diyanet. Because the regulation of Diyanet is against differences in Islam. Islam is indivisible, based on Sunni tradition, so Diyanet serves all people in Islam, to understand their religion and to be united<sup>28</sup>.

There is no equal representation of the female gender in Diyanet. Higher positions in Diyanet are not occupied by women, and between 1944 and 1952 there were only 4 female clerks at Diyanet. Nowadays there are only 17 women out of 922 officers in the Centre of the Diyanet, and even 2685 female preachers for women out of 5904 preachers working for Diyanet, preaching once a week in a small set of mosques. Without female representation in the Diyanet, there can be no policy for women.<sup>29</sup>

### *The Question of free Islamic Movements*

Contrasting the democratic name of the regime, there was only one political party at the beginning of the Turkish Republic and no room for any opposition. The Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party, RPP) was encouraged to execute many Ulema (scholars) by martial law, close the tekkes (Place of mystics) and medreses, abolish the Arab alphabet into latin because of having unlimited power. The representatives of Ottoman Islam were effectively driven underground. Thereby Islam was left without any institution of higher learning for many years. Inner opposition was not accepted. But ironically this laic Jacobinism reversed in Republican People's Party (RPP) in the political climate after the Second World War, when oppositional parties could establish themselves. In 1946 the new Democratic Party (DP) came about, attracting all conservative people who remained silent in the autocratic period of RPP. And in the RPP some of its members began openly criticize the executions arranged by their party and dared to ask unfamiliar questions. In their opinion the RPP had gone too far to abolishing all traces of Islamic education<sup>30</sup>. These developments clearly signified a softening in the official attitudes and shortly before the first real democratic elections in June 1950 twenty Islamic sanctuaries were reopened. The common liberalization process started with the victory of DP. Now religious movements could (re-)establish because a minimum of religious freedom began to grow. During the election of 1957, DP used even more religious mottos in its propaganda. That development caused the military coup in 1960 to 'rescue' the democracy (Kemalism) from Sheria (Islamic Law)<sup>31</sup>. Even the prime minister and two other members of the civil cabinet were executed by martial law. So the first democratic spring in Turkey ended up with the execution of the leaders of this movement, despite the consensus of common people enjoying some (religious) freedom. Since 1960 whenever call for freedom of religion are heard, propaganda is spread by the Kemalist to the

<sup>26</sup> HATEMI, Hasan Hüsrev; *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı ve Diyanet İşleri Teskilatinin Önemi*, **Türkiye Günlüğü**, Sayı 29, Temmuz-Agustos 1994, p.87

<sup>27</sup> YAR, Erkan; *Dinin Siyasallaşması ve Dinsel Bürokrasi*, p.44

<sup>28</sup> KUTLU, Sönmez; *Alevi-Bektasiliğin Diyanet'te temsili Problemi*, **İslamiyat**, Cilt 4, sayı 1, Ocak-Mart 2001, p.21-41

<sup>29</sup> SUCU, Ayşe; *Diyanet ve Kadın*, **İslamiyat**, cilt 4, sayı 1, Ocak-Mart 2001, p.55-60

<sup>30</sup> MARDIN, Serif; **Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset, Makaleler 3**, p.123

<sup>31</sup> JÄSHKE, Gotthard, **Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlik**, Ankara, Bilge Yay., 1972, p.104-105

effect that "Sheria is coming back", just as the protest movements in the Ottoman period had done, who used the motto "Sheria is going out of hand". So according to the civil constitution, the army should helpfully rescue Turkey from that dangerous situation by military coups.

A new constitution followed, giving more room for Kemalistic and, socialistic thoughts. They provided a more tolerant climate for the Alevi, therefore in 1960 a political party was founded by the Alevi, called Birlik Partisi. Although Alevi were supporters of Kemalism from the very beginning, Turkish leftists and Marxists now began to cooperate with the Alevi, because their influence was offering solutions to the minority problem of Alevi. Another religious movement, the Sunni Islamic Milli Görüş, led by Prof. Necmeddin Erbakan, was benefiting from that climate and founded the Milli Nizam Partisi in 1970, promoting Islamic attitudes. The policy led in a short space of time to its ban. Subsequently Prof. Necmeddin Erbakan founded in 1972 a new party with another name, the Milli Selamet Partisi. This party got 11% of the votes in 1973, sent 48 representatives to the National Assembly and was partner in the coalition<sup>32</sup>. These parties are based on the same Milli Görüş movement, i.e. a protest movement against the unislamic aspects of modernism. But it remained the most successful and effective initiative until today bringing a sound modernism to the lay people, who elsewhere would not have taken notice of modernism. This movement was the key challenge of the new democracy in Turkey. Its parties were forbidden shortly after being founded, and then reopened under different label, again forbidden etc. Now Prof. Necmeddin Erbakan has been totally forbidden to take part in politics, but his movement survives. Now, there are even two different parties in Turkish politics, which are rooted in the ideology of Erbakan's original movement.

Indeed Erbakan and his movement Milli Görüş have the intention to reorganize the Turkish life according to the Islamic way. They have declared it in every instance but they have never declared to change the Turkish republic into an Islamic state. It is the accusation which is made to that movement but in which respect they want to change the modern right system is a discussing theme. It is not obvious if they want to bring Sheria (Islamic Law) or not. They can touch may be cultural aspect but not the law system. Till now they didn't have any assertion like that. Economic ideology of Milli Görüş is the Industrialization of Turkey which is prevented by the Christian West, it is the time to sacrifice and to work more to catch the West. Turkey should not try to join to EU but to use its own resource. In their past discourse, they were against the modernization level of the Turkish people, according to them theatre, bale, and dance are not acceptable for the simple Turkish people<sup>33</sup>. As till 1987 the motto of this movement was Milli Şuur (National Consciousness), at the first time in 1990 they have used Adil Düzen (Justice System) as motto. Adil Düzen is not only the radical criticism of the capitalist social economy but also a bundle of ethical postulate that takes its root from Islam. Social solidarity, not being extravagant, justice in tax, in the distribution of state credit not only being in the side of riches, the abolishment of interest, social peace, social welfare, and justice in income distribution.

By the time this party is completed its organization process and the Naksibendi (a mystic organization) power in the party turned out the membership of the party. It means, for the people, instead being a member of a sufi organization, being a party member had primary function. Although it was under the musk of Islam, this party make the people come in peace with modernism. It was not requiring account from modernism but saying that they were the only one who know the modernism at best. In the process the policy of these parties ranged from nationalism to Islamism. But when they were in government in 1995 under the

<sup>32</sup> MARDIN, Serif; *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset, Makaleler 3*, p.125-126

<sup>33</sup> *ibid*; p. 135-136

leadership of Erbakan as prime minister, they have executed so many things which was totally in conflict with their past discourse. In short the policy of these parties has been changed by the wave of the time. And the discourses were every time different and ambiguous and it was depending on being of in the government or not<sup>34</sup>.

There is another movement which it takes its root from the Ottomans is sufi movement. Although the official attitude, in the beginning of the Republic, was so strict towards tarikas (sufi ways), this way of believing has penetrated in the life of the lay people so deep that they have fast never stopped their activities. While Naksibendi was continuing its activities in secret way, some new half Sufi half in the way of new interpretation or in the way of new understanding of Islam, emerged like *Nurculuk* (With the leadership of Said Nursi) and other elite sufi understandings. Especially Nakshibendi and Nurculuk had gained big power in process of time. One Nakshibendi Sheyh with his deep knowledge and mystical power have got so many politician including one of the late President Turgut Ozal under his effect. The some other politician like Erbakan who was leader of Milli Görüş movement and some ministers were his spiritual students. One other Nakshibendi Tarika under the leadership of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan created a very strong group called *Süleymancılar* who are already throughout Turkey and Europe organized and have effect political system indirectly. They didn't accept the religious service what government provided in Turkey and they have their own religious school but not accredited by government. They are some how illegal. That is why their followers have generally followed both programs, in state school laic education and in their religious school religious. When they pray they don't pray after the imamet (leadership) of a person who is made his religious education in government school. One another Nakshibendi Tarika is called Isikcılar. They are against every kind of reformism in Islam<sup>35</sup>. Although non of them has represent in politic because of their manpower in almost all political parties they had effect.

Between 1970 and 1980 was the decade of big movements from rural area to the urban and overflow Islamic publication in the book markets. The defender of Islam were at first the students, and later step by step the staff at the universities, staff in the bureaucracies, owners of private companies. They were better organized and better educated than before. But as long as religious piety remained in the ownership of village or small town people as popular Islam there was no problem for the laics. As classified ordinary traditionalism, by the understanding of laics, religiosity were belong to a natural part of traditional society, but an anachronism in modern society. However, as the educated people with good profession inclined to Islam, this was interpreted as if something were produced wrong by the development process. It was looked upon as anomaly, as something that would need combated. That is why laics are stubbornly resisting any effort by Islamists to allow for greater flexibility in utilizing the Friday lunch-hour for prayer. Although there would be no difference whether one leaves for lunch at twelve or at one o'clock, but according to laics no respect should be given to the staff of state who want to join the Friday prayers. Laics thinks that if consent is given on one point, the next step may even be worse. The most notorious issue in recent times that the official laicism is challenged is the headscarf. In contrast to wide belief that the veil is prohibited at universities or else-where in modern Turkey by law, there is no direct law in this issues. The fact that one law was levelled at men's, not women's garb has made it less significant during the latest conflicts over the veil. The law referred to here is the well-known "Sapka Kanunu" from 1925: the law that banned the fez and imposed the use of a Western type of felt hat. Until the 1960s, there was a general consensus the constitutional principles related to laicism should be interpreted in such a way that Islamic attire should be banned from the universities

<sup>34</sup> YILDIZ, Ahmet; *RP-FP'nin Din Söylemi: Elestirel Bir Yaklaşım*, **İslamiyat**, cilt 4, sayı 4, Ekim-Aralık 2001, p.177-192

<sup>35</sup> MARDIN, Serif; **Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset, Makaleler 3**, p.32-33

and other public offices. When this consensus was challenged by different Islamic groups, other ways were sought in which to formalize legally such a prohibition. Many students refused to yield to the pressure, and preferred to undergo punishment or to be expelled from school rather than change their beliefs concerning headgear.<sup>36</sup>

The re-erection of Islam in the daily life of people caused some problem about the future of the modern Turkey. Nevertheless, the Islamic Revolution in Iran brought question if the Turkey slip to the Islamic way too. The answer of this question came by the military cue in 1980. The national assembly is banned and so many member of it were suspended including Erbakan the leader of the Milli Görüş movement and Milli Selamet Partisi, with the reason being guilty of by using Islam in his political aim. The aim of the generals who have banned the National Assembly was to protect the laicism. On the other side the generals and the laics were not aware of the social dynamics which shape the common and protoplasmic pillar of the belief of the people. They were not in the capacity to understand the power of the religion in lay people. Their idea about this subject is superficial. For example the generals believe that the conflict between the Sunni and Alevi is created artificially. Continuation of laicism is provided by the regular military cues because the system which is created by laicism is created some position that the elite groups who had that position get benefits from it. These elites consist of doctors, lawyers, public prosecutors, professors and administrators. The future of these groups hang on the continuation of modern law system so the reason of military cue now and then is the protection of those positions.<sup>37</sup>

In cold war time the enemy of Turkish army and official ideology was Communism nearby Islam. After the end of this period the PKK (Kurdish Freedom Organization) came on the agenda and nowadays the Sheria (Islamic law) is the direct target of official ideology.

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<sup>36</sup> ÖZDALGA, Elizabeth; **The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey**, Curzon Press, 1998, p.35-41

<sup>37</sup> MARDIN, Serif; **Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset, Makaleler 3**, p.127-132

## **Evaluation**

The modernization period began in Ottoman time and continued without break in Turkish Republic. The name of the state changed, but the people and its mentality remained the same. The revolution changed structures only, especially concerning religious organizations. The central religious organization structure remained under state control, now using a laic system adapted from France. The difference is, that Ottomans did somehow respect the religion and defined themselves as an Islamic state, where the Turkish Republic defines itself as laic. Religion is now presented as a service of the state.

Because many religious leaders were executed in the beginning of the Republic for fear of their opposition and resistance, lay people lost their trusted direction. Common people were already very poor and uneducated, and were not ready for such changes in the society, but they had to accept everything that was directed from the centre. Even today they do not have real contact with this government oriented religious organization called Diyanet, because it is a civil states organization, which gives no chance for identification processes, and it is used by the government as an agent to apply the official ideology to the common people. Even if they do not trust Diyanet, they have to accept the preachers from Diyanet in the mosques, which they have built, because there are no other preachers allowed, and by that way the government controls and educates the people by means of that central religious organization according to the need of the politics. It is not allowed to be organized in any other movement which does not suit the official policy. Therefore such organizations like Milli Görüş are banned. The corollary of this activities was that the new republic moved towards a state of controlling religious life tightly.

Nowadays there is a big discussion around Diyanet, whether it is necessary for Turkish society anymore or if there is no place for such kind of religious organization in such a strict laic system like Turkey. Why it does not really serve the Alevis or why is it organized according to Sunni school of thought? Whether lay people shall be allowed to organize their religious organization in own responsibility, etc. Time will show its result.

## **Gerdien Jonker: Forming Muslim Religion in Germany: Between Shari'a and the Constitution**

In Germany, historical conditions have long set the legal frame for religious organisational structures. The legal Articles that settle the conditions for religious organisations and their co-operation with the state were formulated against the horizon of Christian self-understanding and today are being implemented with the current organisational examples of the Catholic and Protestant churches in mind. During the last forty years, non-Christian religious groups such as Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists have set up shop in the German states. Their organisations mirror religious ideas that differ considerably from the Christian concept. The legal norm tolerates differing organisational concepts as private associations, however, whenever religious groups seek co-operation with other societal institutions they must first prove agreement with the relevant Articles of the constitution.

This contribution deals with models of Muslim religious organisation in Germany. It examines Muslim ideals on the subject of community life and measures its distance to the legal norm. The question is raised how much organisation Muslim religious life digests. Muslim groups that in the future might be acknowledged by German courts still await the implementation of the EU Directives on religious rights. In treating all religious organisations as employer's associations, this supranational body follows a trend that tightens up national legal norms and forces them to adapt to EU standards. Muslim groups in Europe however have hardly taken EU legal norms into focus yet, developing global awareness through the amorphous concept of the Umma, the solidarity of all Muslims instead. The consequences of this dynamics will be discussed in the concluding remarks.

### *1. Legal norms for the organisation of religious life in Germany*

Although all EU-countries have inscribed religious freedom in their constitutions as a basic human right, the legal norms that set the scene for its implementation differ considerably (Koningsveld and Shadid 2001). Most of Northern Europe fosters a legal concept whereby religion falls within the domain of the state. In countries like Denmark, Finland or Norway the Lutheran church represents genuine state interests, and, as a consequence among others, she dominates the administration and organisation of other religions (Alwall 2001, Baeck Simonsen 2001). Contrary to this model, in Holland and the UK religious organisations are treated as private associations whose interests should never intertwine with those of the government. In principle (but not always in reality), this allows non-Christian communities to occupy the same place in society as churches (Lewis 2001, Beck 2001). Germany takes a position somewhere between the former and the latter. Until the year 1919, the Catholic Church and Protestant Churches occupied the status of a state church and loyalty to the state was its hallmark, as the two were supposed to live in harmony and defend the same principles. When this arrangement ended, it was laid down in the Weimarer constitution that churches had the right to formulate their own religious thoughts without any state intervention.

Theology thus being rescued from governmental interests, its outcome once again offered an object of state intervention. As far as the Christian churches are concerned, thinking about the trinity cannot but lead to immanent action expressed in work towards the improvement of society, or "doing God" as some say. Helping the poor, organising welfare, social work, hospitals or religious instruction in schools constituted the fields in which she once again became entwined. The distinct relationship between church and state was ensured through contracts that gave the church the status of corporation of public law (Körperschaftsstatus). It guaranteed religious freedom while allowing the Lutheran church to hold on to its former

position as an important resource for German governments to organise society (Jonker 2000, 2001). The legal arrangement also signs responsible for the fact that both Lutheran church officials and lay people, when confronted with representatives of different churches and different faiths, sometimes still act as if they represent the state.

The new Weimarer legislation asserted freedom of belief, consciousness, confession and ideological worldview as a basic right. It also defined the criteria for the acceptance of faith communities other than the Catholic church and Protestant federal churches (Landeskirchen). Applicants should give proof of a recognisable and shared religious consensus, enough durability, a sufficient amount of members as well as a constitution (Art. 137 WRV = Art. 140 GG, s. Das Grundgesetz 1995: 1018-20). In the many court cases that have followed the installation of this legislation to this day, the last criterion – a constitution - was gradually reformulated into the demand to give prove of a clear-structured organisation. Through this shift, judges surely did not intend to exercise influence on basic religious ideas, which after all were considered the sole property of the religious group concerned. Rather, the more civil servants co-operated with church officials, the more church organisational structures leaned towards mirroring state bureaucracy. This resulted in a church bureaucracy that is usually circumscribed as "transparent". In the long run, the rapprochement between church and state bureaucracies was taken for granted and the same transparency expected from other applicants as well.

The Protestant free churches (Baptists, Methodists and Salvation Army), the Mormons, the Seamen's Church of Hamburg and even the Humanists followed the example of the established Christian churches (Lutherans and Catholics) (Jetzkowitz 2000). Each of these acquired the status of corporation of public law and co-operating with the state in organising important societal fields. It must be noted however, that, till 1971, only Christian organisations concluded contracts with governments in different German states. The Christian perspective on religion dominated their co-operation as a matter of course and this again may have helped to prevent judges from asking whether the precise organisational structure of the applicant really fell within German jurisdiction. After all, whether Protestant or Catholic, German Christians consider their churches to represent Christ on earth and although this representation is realised in quite different ways, clear-structured and committed organisations belong to it. Till Muslim groups appeared in court, the thought that religious communities for their own religious reasons might refrain from any organisation at all just never occurred.

## *2. Muslim applications seen through legal lenses*

In 1971, the Jewish community was the first non-Christian religion in Germany to obtain the same legal status as the churches. As a matter of course, she did not mirror the bureaucracy of her Christian counterpart. But the recent German disaster culminating in the extinction of the European Jewry set the scene against which the remaining Jewish community was endowed with as much rights as the country could muster. Undoubtedly, she could give proof of a shared religious consensus as well as a written proof of durability in the German countries that went back as far as the 12<sup>th</sup>. Century. The status of her members – one becomes Jew through birth only, not through additional baptism and registered membership - as well as their number did not answer the legal norm but for obvious reasons this was not assessed. As for her constitution, it was left to the Jewish community to organise herself in ways that she alone thought fit and find ways to co-operate with local governments in the fields she preferred (Nachama 2001). In short, in the case of the Jewish community in Germany, the

legal norm appeared to be flexible enough to embrace a religious organisation that defied Christian expectations.

Some years after this event, a Turkish Sufi lay-organisation in Northrhine-Westphalia, called The Islamic Cultural Centres (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren, in the following: VIKZ), tried to follow in the Jewish footsteps. Its application was rejected in 1979 on legal grounds that embraced three basic arguments. As this Muslim group had started to organise in Germany since 1973 only, it was noted that the VIKZ still had insufficient durability. A second issue constituted its membership conditions. As in the Jewish community, Muslims become Muslims through birth only. Registered members and membership conditions were unknown in these quarters, and, back then, still left this Muslim applicant puzzled. Instead, the VIKZ had simply counted all Muslims living in Northrhine-Westphalia as potential participants in the community life it proposed to organise. The third objection concerned its organisational structures. Although this Sufi lay-organisation centres round a charismatic leader and organises in the classical pyramidal model of a hierarchy, judges nevertheless claimed that the applicants' organisation did not show enough transparency. And indeed, transparency that is understood as the ability to meet state bureaucracy constituted a criterion, which the Muslim applicant had not faced yet. As the trial lasted, evil tongues whispered that this organisation had rightwing, even fascist sympathies, rumours that quickly spread in media-reports without being checked. Fear for Muslim fundamentalists (it was the year that the Islamic revolution boomed in Iran) might certainly have precipitated the final court decision (Jonker 2002a: 81-111).

Durability, membership conditions and transparency in organisational matters from now on constituted a ruler with which all Muslim applicants were measured. In the regional courts of Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart or Frankfurt different Muslim groups presented themselves and each of them had to discover that what they considered good Muslim management of community life could not be recognised. Courts, looking at Muslim organisations through the lenses of the Law, perceived these applicants in negative terms only. What they saw was 'no durability', 'no membership' and 'no transparency', a list, which in the long run became enlarged with 'no common religious consensus' (Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts Berlin 3, 19.12.1997: 4, cf. Jonker 1998) as well as 'no loyalty to the constitution' (Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts Frankfurt, 2002).

Muslim applicants on their part, far from recognising the picture of have-nots the legal frame presented them with, first of all experienced difficulties in making them understood. Simple lay men, people with very poor basic schooling who did not even begin to see the difficulties their application caused in the system, had to explain religious perceptions they just took for granted and felt deeply insulted when rejected. Distrust insinuated itself as a matter of course. In the 25 years Muslims have now spent in regional courts, other negative experiences with German society came to add to the picture the Muslim Umma in Germany nurtures of majority society. The resentment it sustains constitutes a state of affairs that has complicated living together considerably.

### *3. Reconsideration and adjustment on the Muslim part*

Today, Muslims from many different countries and with very different religious traditions are taking care of religious community life through their private initiative. Their majority (70%) originates from Turkey, Bosnians and Albanians taking second place. As almost each initiative favours a different understanding of how to live as a Muslim and considers its own proposition best of all, people prefer to organise in isolation from other. It is a fragmented religious landscape that presents itself to the outside view. Muslim community life bases on

local initiatives tied to one particular neighbourhood or even to one particular street. Apart from different language communities divided in Sunni and the Shia directions, it comprises a multitude of Sufi organisations, each of which circles around its own Scheikh, several heterodox sects such as Alevi and Ahmadiyya, as well as serious differences in political orientation. What they have in common is their form. These are all private associations run by voluntary workers who organise for the benefit of the Muslim Umma in their immediate neighbourhood.

The overwhelming majority of Muslims in Germany however is not organised anywhere. Out of fear for political or social control, they do not want to join community life. They also think it unnecessary to seek advice from legal experts or spiritual leaders. Instead, these believers claim to be very well able to figure out the necessary expert knowledge - daily conduct in accordance with Muslim Law (Shari'a) - themselves. According to the latest polls, 3.040.000 Muslims live in Germany of whom only some 10 -15% feel attracted to, and makes use of the multifarious offers of the religious communities surrounding them. Offers are made in over 2.600 mosque centres (Wilamowitz 2001) that for the most part are unconnected and ignorant of each other (Jonker and Kapphan 1999: 46-51).<sup>i</sup> Four umbrella organisations represent about the half of these on a national level. The umbrellas understand themselves as political representations each of which proposes to defend the interests of the German Muslim Umma as a whole (Lemmen 1999; Jonker 2002b).

The wish to participate in Muslim education in state schools has lately induced a second form of Muslim co-operation. In 1998, the federal court of Berlin finally permitted the Islamische Föderation Berlin, a local federation of some eighteen Mosque organisations, to give religious instruction in Berlin schools. This move has stimulated Muslim organisations in other federal states to finally build regional coalitions in order to obtain the same rights. In the states of Hessen, Hamburg, Bremen, Baden-Wurtemberg as well as in the city of Erlangen new religious bodies (Islamische Religionsgemeinschaften) are at the moment being created that claim to represent the majority of Muslims in that state. All of these formulate religious education in German public locations as a pressing need that can only be met through Muslim solidarity across community borders. As yet, the federal courts have acknowledged none of these bodies. But it has already become apparent that its creators have studied the German constitution and are willing to mould themselves into its image. The wish to obtain access to religious education thus functions as a motor for homogeneity. The strong interest Muslims take in it rouses the impression that in the near future it might function as a catalyst for more homogeneous organisational structures to appear.

Before this new development, Muslim umbrella organisations had been firmly installed only on the national level only. As might be expected, this was very much to the liking of the German courts, governmental bodies and other societal institutions, which meanwhile have professed their preference to work with one partner only. Between the two levels however a major difference must be noted. Contrary to the newly emerging regional coalitions, the majority of the existing national umbrella coalitions do not understand themselves to be religious organisations at all. Religious representation, they claim, is against the essence of the Islamic ideal. Therefore, any representative assignment must limit itself to the enabling of local Muslim initiatives and to the defence of Muslim interests on a political level only. As each mingles a different confessional and political brand, the four umbrellas have attracted different coalitions of local mosque organisations. One is congruent with the Islamic Cultural Centres (*VIKZ*). One covers the Islamic Community of Milli Görüş (*Islamrat*). One represents eighteen in their majority non-Turkish religious communities (*Zentralrat*) and the

last one is an offshoot of the Turkish directorate for religious affairs, that, through this body, represents Turkish state interests in Germany (*DITIB*).

With the exception of VIKZ (s.below), these umbrellas have repeatedly stated not to be able to act as churches, nor to acquire the status of the corporation of public law (*Körperschaftsstatus*). In other words, after more than 25 years of adjusting, there remains a serious difference between German legal interests and Muslim perceptions concerning the feasibility of Muslim religious organisation. The distance between the fragmented, local communities on the one hand, and those few regional bodies that now try to set up a coherent Muslim religious administration sufficing legal conditions on the other hand, is still too wide apart. In the following, the question will therefore be considered: How much organisation Muslim religious life actually digests?

#### 4. Muslim ideals of community

Muslim religiosity, as the majority of Muslims understands it, does not require much organising. The five pillars of faith prescribe that one prays five times a day, gives to the poor, participates in the yearly fast, visits the Mecca sanctuary once in one's life, and believes in the one God without acknowledging other idols. In principle, these demands can be performed without the help of others and as a matter of fact that is how many Muslims deal with them. The basis of Muslim faith is a minimal construction that can be performed literally anywhere and likewise leaves room for the impossibilities of daily hardship. Thus, whenever believers are ill or on travel, pregnant or in any circumstances that do not allow to meet the demands, prayers can be postponed or fasts skipped, and the Mecca pilgrimage appears to be an achievement that only should be performed when the means are available. Muslim faith leaves much room for individual decisions. In fact, as will be explained further below, its bottom line is often quoted as consisting of individual responsibility only.

However, according to the oral tradition (*Sunna*), religious community life plays an equally important part. For instance, daily prayer is complemented with a communal Friday prayer, in which ideally all the male believers of one village or city join in. The fast is complemented with a worldwide celebration and likewise the end of the yearly pilgrimage is celebrated collectively. *Sunna* was compiled into a legal codex believers consider to be of divine descent: *Shari'a*. It settles daily conduct and has something to say even on the most futile of life's aspects. Amongst others, it offers detailed instructions how to divide gifts, how to take care of others and how to be compassionate. It also contains precise ideas on the subject of solidarity and the building of community. Although not on the same level as the five pillars of faith, *Shari'a* is considered a divine command for the organisation, the preservation as well as the protection of Muslim community life.

The names of several generations of prayer halls that were installed in Germany since the Seventies betray what the different initiators thought central to Muslim community. Although barely managing little makeshift places in cellars and shops, the first generation overwhelmingly opted for signs that contained the word *Cami*, "central mosque". And the second word they added inevitably evoked famous mosques back home: *Süleymaniyye Cami*, *Ayasophia Cami*, *Fatih Cami*. These two words signalled for a long time that the organisational energy focussed on the enabling of community prayer and male social gathering. It is noteworthy that some twenty years later the new generation focusses on community in a different way. Once in power, they change to names that indicate the pursuit of knowledge. Signs with texts like *Muslim cultural centre*, *Muslim educational centre*,

*Muslim information centre, Muslim institution for the pursuit of religious and spiritual knowledge, Muslim library, Muslim place of learning, or Muslim house of wisdom*, one by one replace the old mosque names. For the new generation of mosque organisers, the pursuit and production of Muslim knowledge in a minority situation has become a challenge that has brought them to the threshold of internal differentiation, the pursuing of professional careers and other organisational considerations.

Islamic community life bases on the initiative of lay people. Men and women perform their work on a voluntary basis. They are not paid but consider this to be *Hizmet*, a service to the community, which is favourably counted on the Day of Atonement. Especially in a minority situation, *Hizmet* asks for strong dedication and conviction. In Europe, Islam is not an automatic part of society. Its history is not mirrored in the substance of urban places or landscapes. Its tradition is not a substantial part of libraries and bookshops. Every single item touching upon Muslim religiousness must be reproduced first and brought to the surface, so to speak. Contrary to the founder generation that first of all looked for a familiar place in a foreign country, Germany-born Muslims therefore often first need to embrace religion in a conscious act of conversion. To many, living as a Muslim is not automatically part of the familial and societal structures, but presents a choice amongst others. And, where the founders had looked for a place of communion that echoed a society they were familiar with, young Muslims who opt for religion consequentially create localities where they can guide their children and find guidance themselves.

The generational shift implies other changes too. *Hizmet* is often considered a male task, but the reality of the migrant community urges especially women to become active and organise fields that are closely related to a Muslim woman's role: The organisation of daily life and the education of children. In principle, every Muslim can join work without much ado, but the reality of competing Muslim organisations urges volunteers to inscribe as members and makes them pay for their membership. In principle, the Muslim community is an egalitarian community, in which everybody available qualifies for the jobs to be done. In the reality of German society, where political and welfare institutions expect Muslim organisation to produce professionals that can co-operate in highly specified fields, young people with a German university education gradually begin to gain territory. In principle, the Imam is *primus inter paris*, just somebody who recites the prayer in front of others and knows more about *Shari'a* than his fellow men. But in the reality of the minority situation, he has grown into an authority, who is expected to represent Islamic knowledge and show ability to take decisions and guide others.

Conscious choices, the need for guidance, the changing role of the Imam, membership, access to religious education and the professionalisation this involves: If it was not for the dogma of individual responsibility, every one of these changes could have already presented a point of departure. The impetus could have lead to organisations able to meet the standard of German institutional expectations. But instead of setting into motion internal differentiation, these changes heightened inner tension instead, and apparently this can not be overcome all that easy. As has been said before, it belongs to the base of Muslim faith that, whatever he or she does, a Muslim is personally responsible for one's deeds to God only. Instead of a human authority that guards over religious life, the Islamic tradition pictures the Day of Atonement as the supreme moment when every believer will stand before God and be called to account. Because of this, nobody - says the majority of scripture-minded Sunni Muslims - but nobody can stand between Muslims and their God. These believers can not imagine any religious authority that represents them and indeed refuse the very thought. For Sunni Muslims, personal responsibility is a dogma of Muslim faith. It functions as a compass that guides them

through daily life. It also makes organisation, with its inevitable differentiation in lay people, professionals and representatives, suspect, something they mistrust.

There is one exception to the majority viewpoint. Muslims on the spiritual path – organised in Sufi orders and Sufi lay-communities - claim that they do need help from a spiritual leader after all. As these people say, "Nobody can get through with daily prayer alone. Somebody must be there who helps one" (Jonker 2002a: 210). Such a helper might be a *scheikh*, a *pir*, or a *dede*, in any case, a spiritually gifted person. Of course, whoever claims a need for help does not have religious conduct according to the *Shari'a* in mind. The above quotation does not touch upon the very many details of personal and familial daily life. It hints at another possibility, one that only spiritually minded Muslims – the so-called Sufis - believe in, namely to spiritually unite with the prophet, in order to receive his "light" - the Muhammedan light - and his prophetic inspiration. According to the Sufi dogma, seekers must first connect to a genealogy of holy men, the so-called *Silsila*, whose last living representative functions as spiritual guide and allows them access to "the path".

These different confessional outlooks also set the points for Muslim organisational models in Germany. In finishing a picture of the two main ones will be drawn. One is the large and popular *Islamic Community of Milli Görüş*. It will be contrasted with the aforementioned *Islamic Cultural Centres*. *Milli Görüş* sets on personal responsibility and consequently refutes any configuration of inner authority and control. The *VIKZ* focus on a charismatic leader who serves his followers as an ideal example. Although the *imitatio Muhammadi* is a matter of personal choice, the teacher-student relationship it results in equally calls for authority, obeisance and control.

Both organisations are of Turkish origin and represent different propositions to overcome the Turkish State control of all religious matters. Emel Brestrich-Topcu explains in this volume how in Turkey the organisation and control of religion makes part of governmental rule. *Milli Görüş* and the *VIKZ* both started their lives as protest movements against state prohibition of traditional Islam and the forced modernisation it proposed instead. Both organisations are forbidden in Turkey, but once in Europe, they encountered the legal space necessary to solidify their initial protest into organisational concepts. Their religious careers have led them into opposite directions, but nevertheless, *Milli Görüş* and the *VIKZ* can both be considered as products of modernity.

##### *5. Personal responsibility and its organisational consequences*

The *Islamic Community of Milli Görüş* started as a grass-roots movement in the wake of Islamic political opposition in Turkey. Its proposition to organise religious life for Turkish migrants in Europe, and, through its branches, keep Muslim-flavoured political sentiments awake, proved to be an immediate success (Seufert 1999:295-322). The mother organisation is established near Cologne and claims to assist approximately 650 local mosques all over Europe, which loosely organise in 36 autonomous regional federations. The following description bases on empirical research that I began after the 11<sup>th</sup>. of September 2001 and which is still underway.

*Milli Görüş* representatives, members and sympathisers alike, advocate the belief that every single Muslim is responsible for his own actions and only God can judge these. The dogma has resulted in an organisational pattern of overlapping networks, one in which local communities figure as autonomous entities that take their own decisions. Spokesmen in the mother organisation claim that "the top" – a presidium of four persons

that leads a central executive - does never exercise any control over its basis. Moreover, it does not acknowledge any instances of control, nor does it recognise religious authorities. "The people", organised in regional executives, locally rule their religious life as they think fit and the mother organisation lends a helping hand only when this is explicitly asked for, representatives say.

"The basis" too invariably presents itself as the private initiative of some engaged believers united in *Milli Görüş* sympathy. They stress the responsibility of all Muslims before God and view their own role as that of "helpers" or "enablers" who communicate with "the people" "from heart to heart". In the *Milli Görüş* organisation, one could say, it is the responsibility-theme that commands all religious communication. It dominates official rethorics, serves as a source for individual action-taking, justifies a subjective feeling of being taken serious and determines the way sympathisers interpret happenings, including mishaps or actions that have come under heavy criticism of majority society.

The responsibility theme is however insolubly linked to community. *Milli Görüş* sympathisers do not belong to the category of individual Muslims who stay at home and organise their religious conduct by themselves. To the contrary, in *Milli Görüş* concepts the community theme takes an equal place of honour. The religious community is the place where solidarity is imparted. Responsibility, community and solidarity are inextricably entwined to the extent that the interests of the community come before those of the individual. Within the community, the individual is taken care of, helped, loved, strengthened and – if need be - defended. These two themes, responsibility and community, have resulted in the picture of an ideal community, one in which all are equal, all have a chance, all take action, all promote the Islamic ideals and nobody is responsible for the actions of others.

However, as in all other groups with an egalitarian claim, the ideal picture covers the real functioning of the organisation, not only for outside observers but also for those who participate in it. As happens in youth groups or house communities, in every local *Milli Görüş* community there are some believers who are more equal than others. In about thirty years' time, some of the original founders have managed to occupy as many nodes in the network as they could possibly score. Having dedicated their lives to "Islam", these men firmly believe in their model role and publicly claim their actions to be the benefit of the community as a whole. However, they do not stress the fact that it is they who take all the decisions, who permit some individual initiatives but cut others off, who encourage some young men to make an internal career but oppress the rest. The reality of an authoritarian and autocratic rule is simply not discussed. Personal responsibility, resulting in the refusal of institutionalised control, has thus created a system of uncontrolled power.

Being a minority in Europe has doubtlessly strengthened this power system. Because of the thwarted institutional and legal expectations of German civil servants, but also because of actions within the *Milli Görüş* community that have been interpreted as anti-Jewish and against the German constitution, this organisation has come under suspicion and is being observed by the federal agency for internal security. As a consequence, *Milli Görüş* sympathisers feel threatened. They defend their community against negative portrayals, refuse deviant opinions and very much dislike internal critical voices that name the reasons for miscommunication. Moreover, the *Milli Görüş* community is not familiar with a culture of discussion. Transgressors of the communal view are inevitably warned through anonymous threats, or, if need be, punished through isolation. Needless to say that go-betweens between the *Milli Görüş* community and German society,

people who represent the community in public and who are able to relate to the inside what happens on the outside, are hardly listened to. *Milli Görüş* activists try to ward off the confrontation with reality. Rather, the image of the *Umma*, the amorphous world-wide Muslim solidarity that is locally represented by their own community, has created a blind spot, one that successfully prevents them to face their actual situation.

The organisational picture of *Milli Görüş* that presents itself to the view has two very different faces. From within it is interpreted as an open, egalitarian, and protective community, which offers good prospects for young people to become initiative, works towards a better society and therefore expresses the true spirit of "Islam". Many young people, especially women, feel attracted by the possibilities it holds in store for them. The community helps whoever initiates a *Kindergarten*, a youth club, street work, libraries or little cultural centres, they claim. To outside observers, this picture stands on its head. Seen through the lenses of majority society, the *Milli Görüş* organisation presents itself behind high borders, is opaque in structure and intention, hides autocratic power structures from view and advances aims that are incompatible with the German constitution. Moreover, it appears to be unwilling to co-operate, seems to nurture hostility against German society and to work steadily towards a parallel society.

#### 6. *The organisational limits of spiritual seekers*

Between the years 1997 and 2001 I have performed empirical research in the *Islamic Cultural Centres* (VIKZ) in Europe, resulting amongst others in the analysis of its organisation that will be sketched out in the following (Jonker 2002a). The VIKZ claims to be a reform of a Sufi organisation. As Sufis aim at enabling the spiritual path, all Sufi organisational concepts are dominated by the teacher-student relationship. In the course of many centuries, the concept solidified into the administrative classification of *Tariqat*, orders, which revolve around the remembrance of a succession of holy men. The last in succession in each order, usually a living person, serves the seekers as their ingress into the orders' experience and functions as their teacher (*Sheikh*). Students commonly describe themselves to be like wax in his hands, or "like dead corpses in the hands of a funerary washer". (Schimmel 1985). The relationship between pupils and teachers has been epitomised as one of unconditioned obeisance.

The *Islamic Cultural Centres* (VIKZ) took this principle as their basis too. Nevertheless, they claim not to be a Sufi order any more, but a reformed and modernised organisation that is only reminiscent of the former Sufi branch. As this is the order of the *Naqshibendiyye*, it seems to them in retrospective that it already prepared for their move through a long history of reformations and renewals of Muslim faith. According to the VIKZ, it was their founder, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, who finally initiated in Turkey in the fifties the last and most definite renewal. With the installation of a system to preserve and reproduce the traditional Islamic sciences, the founder reacted to the quickly disappearing knowledge of the Islamic tradition in this country. His initiative was able to attract the attention of peasants, migrants and fugitives alike, people who somewhere in the dishevelment of the 20<sup>th</sup>. Century had lost their orientation.

In the sixties, many persecuted followers opted for migration to Western Europe and the initial protest movement crystallised in a world-wide lay-community that once again became hierarchically structured. Its relative nearness to religious virtuosity resembles that of a Catholic lay-community. And so does the status of its teachers. These do not suffice themselves with engagement but take an oath and dedicate their entire lives to the

cause of "Islam". Therefore, VIKZ teachers are neither comparable to religious virtuosi in Sufi orders nor to lay people active in other Muslim communities. Working on a voluntary base and dedicated in a special way to their organisation, they constitute a type halfway between lay people and experts and may be coined as 'learned lays' or 'lay-experts'.

Back in the fifties, the founder discarded his own role as *Scheikh* and put the collective study of the Islamic Sciences in its stead. In migration a dual directorate was added. As it must enable the communities' learning aims, this ruling body signs responsible for 'outward' material conditions (*Zahir*) but also claims the responsibility and control of spiritual growth 'inside' the community (*Batin*). The outcome is an mixture of spiritual search, in which each teacher higher in the system aids the ones below, as well as a system of traditional Islamic learning that enables students to set the points for their own religious conduct and to guide others.

The communities' attention evolves around two age groups. Children between 14-18 years of age constitute the main body of students, whereas young adults between 18-24 years of age establish the main body of teachers. As each of them obeys the one above and the top is manned by a much elder generation, questions of authority have been clearly fixed in this group. The organisation of *The Islamic Cultural Centres* thus builds on a hierarchy. Its aim is the production of learned lay men and women who are able to hand on their knowledge to the next generation. But notwithstanding the fact that this organisation contains a lot of intellectual capacity and is on the verge of religious vocation, it does not allow for internal differentiation.

The organisation of the VIKZ rests both on obeisance and empowering. Obeisance is needed to advance on the spiritual path, they say, and it is given to anyone ranking above, to teachers, to elders, to leaders, to staff. But studying the sources leads to the empowering of individuals as this enables them to take responsibility for their own religious conduct. The mixture is responsible for the production of learned and spiritually endowed believers, engaged in the production of traditional religious expertise. In principle, these could grow into a new vocational class that is able to teach outside their own community. But so far both obeisance and the pull of the spiritual path successfully prevented this from happening.

Today, the VIKZ takes very little interest in all matters outside their own community, including the co-operation with other Muslim organisations or the institutional expectations of majority society. They wish to advance on the path of religious knowledge and deem withdrawal and social closure to be the necessary ingredients to accomplish this. This has not always been the case. In the near past, churches, municipalities and other institutions of majority society who recognised its potential to fill the gap of the still lacking expert group in Islamic education, have tried to influence internal matters and to stimulate internal differentiation. And on the Muslim part, the initiative initially met with sympathy. As in other Muslim communities, the VIKZ too dreamt of extending their system of learning to German schools and were willing to go a long way to reach this goal.

In 1996, the organisation started to open up and actually produced some experts for religious dialogue as well as a hand full of professionals who could deal with the legal and institutional frame. Plans were in the air to co-operate with universities in order to develop a vocational training for religious teachers. The directorate even lessened its

authoritative grasp and lent its regional organisations more administrative freedom in order for them to co-operate with governmental institutions and arrange coalitions with other Muslim organisations. Then, in 2000, the old leader died and his successor unmasked this plan as a secular endeavour that actually endangered the organisations' religious aim. Fear for secularisation made him close the borders again and the energy of the community turned once more inside.

### **7. Concluding remarks**

Islamic organising in Germany still is in its initial stage. It offers a religious market full of diversity in which two bids elevate from the rest and for 25 years have aimed for recognition through obtaining the status of corporation of public law (Körperschaftsstatus). It was said in the beginning, that the German constitution prescribes that religious partners should formulate their religious thoughts without state intervention. The Islamic Community of Milli Görüş and the Islamic Cultural Centres have each internalised the legal norm as laid down in the German constitution. They have reconsidered their membership status and their constitution. They have explained their religious consensus and Milli Görüş especially defended itself against accusations of not being loyal to the constitution. As each of them has a different understanding of the ideal of Muslim community or what makes it tick, the resulting organisations are quite different.

For reasons that have been explained in this contribution none of them obtained recognition yet. Courts applied rulers that were definitely Christian flavoured and perceived the Muslim applicants as have-nots: No durability, no membership, no transparency, no religious consensus and no loyalty to the constitution. *Milli Görüş* did produce an independent generation that set the points for internal differentiation and a professional stratum. But this development came to nought as the organisation fell in the trap of the egalitarian claim that covers power structures, refused to face the results and felt threatened by criticism instead. Meanwhile, the VIKZ oscillated between obeisance and empowering, found itself on the verge of building professional strata, but then, for fear of secularisation, enwrapped itself once again in its spiritual search. Still, as these organisations started their career as protest movements that were quickly forbidden in their home country and only fully enfolded their organisational principles in Europe, they can be considered as genuine European products. In finishing, this will be described in three steps.

(1) In Germany, both groups encountered the legal space necessary to solidify their initial protest into organisational concepts. Once in Europe, they discovered that their religious independence made them a potential candidate for most governments and each tried to mould into the legal and institutional frame as they understood it. But the resulting organisations only gradually internalised the legal norm and for a long time did not possess the capacity and knowledge to co-operate with majority institutions. Moreover, it became apparent that the Muslim majority ideal of the egalitarian community does not converge with Christian principles of organisation.

(2) The wish to obtain the right to teach Muslim education in German schools has now forced these and other Muslim organisations to build coalitions. Local coalition building itself is not a new phenomenon but coalitions that claim to represent all Muslim communities in a certain state and present themselves in federal courts as religious bodies (*Islamische Religionsgemeinschaften*), offer a prospect of future cross-community co-

operation. Religious education then might be called a catalyst for homogeneity. The wish for religious education has set into motion criteria building that are deemed necessary for access. It calls for concern with legal norms and for legal and administrative procedures to be mastered. All this functions as a further turn of the screw towards the genuine European product.

(3) Finally, cross-community co-operation calls for a new definition of group identity. This seems to be the part that takes up more time than everything else. Representatives from different communities with different interpretations of Muslim faith now realise the need for common action but when these meet, they first try to define who they are and what brings them together. The outcome must be able to satisfy their people back home, the predominantly elder generation that up till now organised their religious community life in isolation from other Muslims.

What is still missing in this picture is an expert group that can take care of the tasks ahead and also will set into motion internal differentiation. As has been explained several times, to the majority of believers the latter contradicts an important principle of Muslim faith. They insist on group solidarity instead and believe in egalitarian ideals that cover unclear power structures. At the moment, this cluster of ideals and interests seems to present the main deadlock. It prevents many Muslims from facing the third legal norm especially, which originally was described as "the need to have a constitution", but because of Christian self-understanding was turned into "transparency of organisation". Rather, the confrontation with bureaucracy makes them rush towards the ideal of Muslim solidarity and to idealise the egalitarian *Umma* instead.

Muslim organisations in Germany are now trying to come to terms with national legal implementations and it will be a matter of time till one or more succeed. The development is only a few years old and will need time to crystallise. But in six states already new cross-community coalitions have submitted their organisational structures to the courts, managed a curriculum and seek co-operation with universities. The new EU Directives on religious rights might prove helpful in this respect. Through treating all religious organisations as employer's associations, these have set into motion a dynamics that might sustain the new cross-community coalition building. The confrontation with global standards such as securing the rights of employees, equal pay for equal work and gender mainstreaming could stimulate professional strata to consolidate. (Baer 2001). EU Law also offers rights that on a national level can not be obtained all that quickly. Muslim women in Germany who felt discriminated because of their headscarf, already brought their cases before the European court. This step too asks for expert knowledge, internal differentiation and – more than ever - coalition building.

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<sup>i</sup> During a research in all 82 Muslim communities in Berlin, which took place in 1998, we asked - among other questions - where the next mosque could be found. Less than 10% of the interviewees could answer this question. In mosque organisations, which had joined one of the umbrella organisations, interviewees mentioned some of the other mosques in Berlin that made part of their own interest group. Nobody however could give a complete list of these.

## **Martin Baumann: Organising Hindu traditions in Europe, the case of Tamil Migrants from Sri Lanka**

This paper provides a case study of a transplanted religious tradition and the tradition's endeavours to reconstruct organisational patterns in a socio-culturally different environment. I shall look at Hindu traditions from Sri Lanka which in cause of the flight of Tamil people came during the last two decades to Europe.

My presentation has three parts: Part I outlines the emergence of the Tamil Hindu diaspora in Europe. It sketches main developments and takes-stock of the present situation. The focus will be laid on processes of religious institutionalisation, exemplified by the German case. Part II systematises main models of organising a Hindu temple, both in Sri Lanka and in Europe. The final part provides a selective analyses, concentrating on issues of membership and structural modernisation.


### *I. The emergence of the Tamil Hindu diaspora in Europe*

The context in which Tamil Hindu temples emerged: Presently, the largest group of Hindu people in continental Europe is constituted by Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka. In contrast, in Great Britain the vast majority of Hindu people is made up of immigrants from India, in particular from Gujarat and the Punjab. Tamil Hindus in Britain comprise a small minority within this heterogen fold of an estimated 600.000 British Hindus. Crossing the channel, in continental Europe, especially in Switzerland, Germany, France and Scandinavia, Tamil Hindus numerically form the largest group. Altogether, Tamils come up to an estimated number of 210.000 persons. Numbers for refugees from Sri Lanka given are: Germany 64.000, France and Switzerland about 40.000 and Great Britain 35.000 Tamils. Minorities of a few thousand Tamil refugees live in the Benelux countries and in Scandinavia. In Eastern Europe, we find a few Tamil refugees only, if admitted to stay at all (Baumann 2001).

In religious terms, about 75% of the Tamil refugees are Hindus, about 20% Catholics and some 5% Protestants of various denominations. For Germany, we may speak of about 45,000 and for Switzerland about 30,000 Tamil Hindus.

Tamils from Sri Lanka have come as asylum seekers to Europe since the late 1970s. I shall outline the developments in more detail and concrete figures by looking at the German situation. In 1978, about 1,300 Sri Lankan people, mainly students, lived in Germany. As the conflict between the Sinhalese majority (74%) and the Tamil minority (18%) increased in Sri Lanka, steadily more men left the island and applied for asylum. However, in the wake of the escalating civil war since 1983, the number of refugees rose significantly. In 1985 alone, 17,400 refugees from Sri Lanka applied for asylum.


Chart 1: Sri Lankan persons applying asylum in Germany (1978-2002)<sup>ii</sup>




Whereas up to 1983 about 7,600 asylum seekers had come, two years later their number had climbed to 27,500 people in total. A steady increase ensued during the next years. The figure peaked in 1997 with 60,300 Sri Lankans counted in the foreigners' statistics. About 90% of the refugees are Tamil people.

During the last five years, the number fell significantly, to 45,000 statistically registered Sri Lankans in June 2002. The main reason for this drop is the rapid increase of adopting German citizenship by Sri Lankan Tamils. These German Tamils are no longer reckoned in the foreigners' statistics. In the 17 years 1981-1998, only 6,600 Sri Lankans were able to gain German citizenship. During the following three years, 1999-2001, 10,700 Sri Lankans became Germans. Charts 2 and 3 visualize the developments:

Chart 2: Sri Lankan and naturalized citizens in Germany (1978-2002)<sup>iii</sup>



Graphic 3: Sri Lankan persons gaining German citizenship (1981-2001)<sup>iv</sup>



The main reason for this significant increase is the legal possibility for a foreigner, having stayed in Germany for 15 years, to be entitled to apply for German citizenship. In total, 17,400 Sri Lankan Tamils are now legally Germans. This makes up a good third (37,3%) of the entire Tamil population, numbering all together 64,000 people. We can state that for a growing number of Tamil people the flight has turned into a permanent stay, the former refugee has become an immigrant and citizen.

The social and legal profile: In the beginning mainly young men came, fleeing both persecution by the Sri Lankan army and forced recruitment by the Tamil Tigers, the "liberation" army. Since the late 1980s, also women and children succeeded in escaping from terror ridden northern parts of Sri Lanka. Whereas, in the mid-1990s there had been twice as many men as women, in recent years the percentage distribution has grown closer together. Both sexes are comparatively young. The legal status of Tamils in Germany varies according to their date of entrance: Whereas those coming until 1989 had been granted asylum and a right to stay, those arriving since 1989 were able to acquire a status of toleration only. This shift is due to a changed jurisdiction. The status of being tolerated has to be renewed every six months. All in all the legal status of about half of the Tamil population is comparatively safe whereas the status of the other half varies between different levels of allowances to stay for a time.

In line with German policy of distributing asylum seekers all across the country, the refugees from Sri Lanka were settled in small numbers in a multitude of towns and cities. This policy intended to prevent the formation of ethnic colonies. Nevertheless, a numerical concentration of Tamil people evolved in the Ruhr area (situated in the mid-northern part of Germany). This was (and is) due to pragmatic reasons such as a less restrictive jurisdiction and the fact that relatives have lived there already. Of relevance is also the fact that permission was granted to work legally while still being subjected to the asylum proceedings. It is in this region that a small Tamil infrastructure with shops, cultural and political societies and the founding of Hindu temples has evolved.

Despite their insecure legal status, Tamils have started to open small places of worship since the late 1980s. Both the sharp increase of the number of refugees and the arrival of women and children played a decisive part. In addition, those Tamils, having lived for several years in Germany by then, had acquired financial resources and administrative skills to get a society and temple functioning. Whereas in 1990 only five small temples, in 1995 the number had increased to twelve temples. And again, until Autumn 2002, the number of temples had doubled to 24, of which 14 are situated in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (58%). A clear concentration with 11 temples is observable in the industrial Ruhr valley, the city of Hamm being home to three temples alone. [Map 1 for October 2002, not reproduced here]

Apart from the ongoing process of founding additional places of worship, since the mid-1990s a related development came to the fore: Temple committees had been eager to move their temples from the initial poor and secluded basement rooms to more spacious and representative halls. Formerly small and unnoticeable places of worship changed to well arranged temples with splendidly decorated shrines. The enlargement of the temples and the founding of new sacred places can be interpreted as a consolidation and stabilisation of the Tamil Hindu presence in Germany. The uncertainty and unresolved existence during the 1980s has changed to a growing familiarity with the unknown surrounding and an intention to build a new home away from home. Religion appears to play a vital role in this process of maintaining one's identity and difference on the one hand and of integrating in the new society on the other. Despite the expansion of places of worship, in general the temples are hardly known and noticed by the public.

The size of the temples varies according to the rooms available and to the financial support obtainable. Some temples are more or less hidden in small cellars. Others are set up on the ground floor of a residential house. A few temples are arranged in spacious halls of converted industrial buildings. Finally, in Hamm/Westphalia the first traditionally South Indian styled temple with a huge *gopuram* (entrance portal) has been inaugurated in July 2002.<sup>v</sup>

A central board or organisation to bring together the various officiating priests and *brahmins* and the temple committees does not exist. On the one hand competition for prestigious status and influence has prevented any organisational platform or unified representation so far. On the other hand, divergent attitudes exist with regard to the issue whether a close preservation of rituals or, in contrast, adopted and abbreviated ceremonies should be carried through in the temple. In general, this fragmentation in organizational terms mirrors the heterogene and diversified situation of the Sri Lankan Tamil minority in Germany. This also is true for the situation of Tamils in other European countries. This fragmentation is also an important reason why in Germany priests and *brahmins* have spend no thoughts at all to possibly apply to have "Hinduism" registered as a public body by a German federal state (status of *Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*). In contrast, other migrant groups, in

particular those of Turkish Muslims and Vietnamese Buddhists<sup>vi</sup>, have eagerly striven for such a reputable status in recent years.

## *II. Organising Tamil Hindu temples in Europe: basic structures*

In which way are temples organised and maintained by Tamil Hindus in Europe? What is the temple's basic structure in financial and organisational terms?

All temples are financed by donations of believers and worshippers. These donations are given in various ways: *bhaktas*, i.e. worshippers of the god, may pay for a private ritual performed by the priest in the temple. The length and elaboration of the ritual varies, depending on the specific demand of the worshipper – and the money spend on the previously bought "ritual ticket". Prior to the little ritual, the *bhakta* has purchased a so-called "ticket" for € 3,- or € 5,- or more euro. According to the ticket's value the priest conducts a more or less elaborated ritual in honouring the god or goddess and passing on the demands and wishes of the worshipper. Such so-called *arccanai* rituals are very common and they take place after the joint, elaborate worship of the gods. The focus of this little ritual is the family and the individual *bhakta*. This system of buying tickets was introduced in South India during the 1930s and 1940s and was taken over in temples in Sri Lanka.<sup>vii</sup>

Apart from the income through ticket sell, worshippers may donate money to the temple occasionally. This applies in particular while visiting the temple or taking part in festivals. Also, a family may subscribe to bear the costs of a specific festival day, i.e. to pay the costs for food, flowers, substances like oil and camphor used in the rituals. Finally, worshippers who feel more aligned to a specific temple may contribute on a regular basis, i.e. spend € 108,- or € 1008,- per year. Also, some give loans or cash for specific items of the temple.

Who owns the temple? As in Sri Lanka, we find two basic models: A temple may belong to a particular family, i.e. is privately owned, or it is owned by the residents of the area. In this case, the temple belongs to a society and is managed by a committee of office-bearers.

Apart from a few exceptions, stated below, most Tamil Hindu temples in Europe are society-owned and are constituted on the basis of a registered religious body or registered society. This society owns the temple in the way that it has bought the land and building or it pays a monthly rent for the use of the converted house. Such societies are usually named "Tamil Hindu Cultural Society" or variations of this. The society is headed by a committee of seven to eleven office-bearers, usually consisting of a president, vice president, treasurer, secretary and three or more committee members. Tamil Hindus have reconstructed the main patterns to organise a temple, known from the Sri Lankan model, also in Europe. I will systematize these patterns:

a) A temple committee exists and it employs a priest. The priest's responsibility is the sacred sphere, i.e. performing ritual acts and serving the gods and goddesses. In functional correspondence, the committee's responsibility is the non-sacred sphere of the temple, i.e. the management in terms of administrative, financial and representational work. This binary structure of committee and salaried priest is the general practice in Sri Lanka, especially in the Jaffna region. Committee members are high-caste persons, usually of the agricultural Vellalar caste. Most temples in Switzerland, Germany and for example the only temple in Sweden, the Ganesha temple in Stockholm, are set up along these lines.<sup>viii</sup>

b) Though officially a temple committee exists, it is mainly the head priest who manages the temple. The priest is both a member of the committee and of the religious staff. In structural terms, the priest is employed by the committee and receives a monthly salary. This model, though not often in use, can be found in some urban temples or pilgrimage centres in Sri Lanka. Albeit a straightforward concentration of power is at hand, this organisational structure prevents committee infightings and - depending on the priest and his reputation among worshippers and donators – can exercise a dynamic growth and outreach of the temple. In Europe, the by now almost famous Sri Kamadchi Ampal temple in Hamm/Westphalia is based on this structure. Its main priest, Sri Paskarankurukkal, is both an energetic organiser and a pious temple priest. Founded in a private cellar in 1989, the temple grew steadily up to its current size as the biggest Tamil Hindu temple in Europe. Three months ago, in July 2002, 14 priests from Sri Lanka and India inaugurated this newly built sacred abode for the goddess Sri Kamakshi in Hamm. The temple's annual festival with a public procession of the goddess attracts up to 12,000 visitors, turning the area into a little Jaffna for a few hours. (Baumann 2000: 147-168; Luchesi 2001 und 2003)

c) The temple is owned privately and the owner employs a priest. In Sri Lanka this model of temple patron and priest is often employed by wealthy members of the Vellalar caste. Many of the Vellalar are land owners and enjoy a high social prestige. However, in ritual terms they are of a low caste, originally no "twice-born" persons (Pfaffenberger 1982). Members of this caste respectively certain sub-lineages, have built a temple, maintain it and pay for the rites and the priest. It is them who receive the lion's share of the religious benefits of temple worship and festivals (Pfaffenberger 1982: 61-64).

Looking at Tamil temples in Europe, we find this patron – priest model at the Murugan temple in Hamm/Westphalia. This small, nicely decorated temple was established by the shop owner Yoganathan in 2001. According to Yoganathan, in dreams, the god Murugan asked him to build the temple and he did so (Wilke 2003). Yoganathan is not a Vellalar but a person from a low caste. In Autumn 2001, Yoganathan brought a *brahmin* priest from Sri Lanka. He employs him as salaried priest to do the worship (Tam. *pucai*). Apart from some financial win which the Yoganathan hopes to generate during the next years, the temple also serves as a

status maker and status climber. The temple conducts the annual festival (Tam. *tiruvila*) and the founder aims to establish this temple on a similar level with fully acknowledged brahmanical, orthodox temples through a process of Sanskritisation.

d) Finally, we have the case where there is no committee and the temple owner is the main priest resp. priestess. This model is based on extraordinary or charismatic gifts of the person, acknowledged by people coming to him/her seeking help and advice. In Hindu terms, the cosmic energy "*shakti*" manifests in this person and acts or speaks through her/him. In Hindu traditions, this is an established and known model. It leaves apart caste barriers, restrictions based on religious purity and concepts of formal religious training. Though this model is the rare exception (Sivathamby 1990: 162), it can be found all over South Asia and nowadays in Europe too.

One extraordinary example is the Sri Abirāmi goddess temple in Brande in Denmark. This temple, located on a rebuilt farm since 2000, belongs to the temple priest Lalitha Sripalan and her husband. Due to her ability to get possessed and to heal and to speak divinations in this state, the female priest and her temple have become well-known among Tamils in Europe (Fibiger 2003).

### *III. Selective analysis: Membership and structural modernisation*

Having sketched the main structures in which way Tamil Hindus in Europe have achieved to organisationally recreate the institution of a Hindu Temple as an abode of a goddess or god, I would like to step back a bit. Temple life is only one among various aspects of Hindu religious life. Of great importance certainly is the religious practice at home, e.g. the observance of purity regulations, of fasting, regular worship at the home shrine, reliance on astrological calculations, the singing of devotional songs and much more. Also, we have the dimension of life circle rites, celebrated at home and in the temple (see, among many, Knott 1998). However, I would like to turn to the sociological questions central to this workshop. Following, I address two key concepts given in the theoretical framework sent out to the participants. I will focus on analytical insights raised by Niklas Luhmann. Issues selected are that of membership and that of structural modernisation of the temple institution. Again, the analysis takes us out of Europe to South Asia and back again.

*Membership* in Hindu traditions in South Asia: Except for mendicant orders of ascetics (*sadhus*), monasteries and neo-Hindu movements evolved in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Hindu traditions in general do not have a formal membership. A Gujarati follower of Krishna or a Tamil worshipper of Shiva do not "enter" a specific tradition and become a new member. They are a part of the tradition – and thus a "member" in general sense - by. Later they may selected a

specific god or goddess within the encompassing tradition. Birth regulates caste membership. And membership in a specific caste (Skt. *jati*) regulates access to sacred knowledge and ritual practice. Access by far is not admitted to all. In particular people of low castes and so-called Untouchables are assumed to be defiling to high caste people and to ritually purified places such as temples. In this respect, many Hindu traditions are highly exclusive and separative – a decisive contrast to the idealised image of the tolerant, philosophical Hinduism painted in many western text books.

Interestingly, this binary structure of admitted/ non-admitted person comes to the fore highly visible in the context of the Hindu temple. Who is entitled to enter a Hindu temple and who is forbidden?

For two millennia, in India and Sri Lanka Untouchables were prevented to enter an orthodox, brahmanical temple. Social exclusion, ritual stigmatisation and violence formed a strong alliance to keep the temple doors close to them. Untouchables and low-caste people maintained their own temples and strove to upgrade them in Sanskritising the practice and pantheon. However, those temples and people remained at the bottom of Indian society. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, first voices, strongly influenced by western and Christian ideas, criticised the exclusion. However, it was no earlier than the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that so-called scheduled castes and tribal people were admitted to Sanskritic, orthodox temples.<sup>ix</sup>

In Sri Lanka, this issue of temple entry let feelings run high in the late 1960s, as Jaffna society, the centre of Sri Lanka's Tamil Hindu culture, faced the so-called temple entry conflict. Untouchables and low caste Tamils, having profited from the introduction of general school education and new professional opportunities, demanded access to brahmanical temples. This temple entry movement started with nonviolent protests at prestigious high-caste temples in 1968. Strong high-caste responses strove to save and regain the status quo, however. Observers spoke of a war of castes and an end of established (Vellalar dominated) Hindu society in Jaffna. Due to public pressure, during the 1970s most large temples opened their doors to Untouchables, though hesitantly (Pfaffenberger 1994).

Analysing this issue of membership admittance in sociological terms, the rapid social and economic change which Sri Lankan society faced during colonial and post-colonial times, demanded an adaptation of the institution of the temple to new social structures and conditions. The temple committees had to take decisions how small or wide it will draw its range of membership. The previously harsh restrictions applied to certain social groups had to be softened, i.e. the doors could not be hold closed any longer. A closer look shows, however, that the restrictions had to change to less explicit terms of exclusion – i.e. admittance to a certain degree -, in order to maintain the established institution of the temple.

In terms used by Niklas Luhmann in his *Die Religion der Gesellschaft*, temple committees used the means of "tactical manoeuvres" (*taktisches Lavieren*, 2000: 239). In specific, restricted areas the organisation implemented reforms and shifts. However, basically patterns of social and economic power remained unchanged, ritual practices and doctrinal

teachings were not altered. Though theoretically low-caste persons can enter a brahmanical temple now, few do so due to an ongoing implicate stigmatisation. In this respect Luhmann seems to be right in his observation that organisational reforms at best push through their linguistic ruling (*Sprachregelung*) but do not achieve a success with regard to the intended goals and effects, i.e. an actual acceptance of low-caste people in religious terms (Luhmann 2000: 246).

Coming to Europe, both Sri Lankan refugees and my reflexions, the power relations to a large degree were reconstructed in the diaspora. In most cases, persons from the Vellalar caste have been instrumental in setting up a temple. Vellalar people dominate the temple boards and committees. Temples are open to all, though Vellalars expect that people from lower castes obey to their instructions. Also, as social scientist Christopher McDowell in his study on Tamil refugees in Switzerland observed, at times low-caste men avoid visiting Vellalar temples. Instead, they undertake pilgrimages to certain Catholic Churches. Here, they pray to Maria, who is assumed to be a Hindu goddess. Maria is expected to fulfill wishes and to help in crisis. For example, the Black Madonna at Einsiedeln is considered to be Mariyamman, a popular and powerful goddess in Sri Lanka and South India (McDowell 1996: 233-236).

In general, Tamil Hindu temple organisations have transplanted and - according to Vellalars successfully - reconstructed known patterns from Jaffna society. Due to the diasporic situation, temple committees had to take decisions, at times awkward ones, for example to admit low-caste persons and women to the board. It has to be studied whether such decisions, inherent to an organisational institution such as the temple, also will or has already led to a deconstruction of doctrinal contents and teachings, as Luhmann holds (2000: 248).

Secondly, in future times a transformation of the implicitly structured Tamil minority in European states into formal structures is not unlikely. I suppose two parallel developments: The yet unstructured circle of regular supporters of a temple, referred to above, might develop into a formal membership society with fees. Secondly, we might observe the formation of caste societies, institutionalising the implicate differences and boundaries. Such a trend took place in Britain among Gujarati and Punjabi Hindus during the 1970s and 1980s. However, size is an important factor of this development. Whereas in Britain the number with about half a million Indian Hindus had been big enough, the Tamil minorities in continental Europe might be too small to form separate Vellalar or Karaiyar caste societies. In this respect it is important to notice that a future growth of the Tamil minority is unlikely, as the number of new asylum seekers dropped significantly in recent years (see chart 1 above).

*Structural modernisation:* Part II sketched the basic patterns of a temple's organisation. It certainly deserves an in-depth study whether the evolved model of temple patron and priest and that of temple committee and salaried priest displays a structural modernisation. I think so

that it does. For, we have a functional differentiation of spheres, the committee being responsible for worldly management affairs, the priest taking responsibility for the sacred sphere. This organisational pattern is a heritage of colonial times, and again we have to travel to Sri Lanka and past times to better understand present structures. I will not do so here (see Pathmanathan 1990, Pfaffenberger 1994).

However, fact is that the organisational formation, evolved during colonial times, acquitted people and institutions of the tradition well to be reconstructed in a different, modern environment. Compared to other migrant groups and transplanted religious traditions, Tamil Hindus have been very effective and successful in founding societies and recreating a home away from home. In a short span of time, Tamils in specific regions achieved a functional completeness to cater for their socio-cultural, political and religious needs. It is not an "institutional completeness" (Breton 1965) in the way that Tamils could live in a world of their own. Rather, Tamils use compartments of both the residence society and the newly created little Tamil world in Europe. Beneficial to this achievement certainly have been cultural features prominent among the middle and upper strata of Jaffna society: These are a high esteem of learning and education as well as an aggressive and diligent working ethics. Such cultural features are highly compatible with structures of a modern, differentiated society and are supportive to a successful integration of the migrant group. Also, such cultural compatibilities will, I expect, accelerate the structural modernisation of both socio-economic and religious organisations of the migrant group. These developments are occurring presently and it will be interesting to observe whether in a few years a functional differentiation not only between politics, economics and religion exists (which we have got already), but whether also a differentiation between Tamil culture and Hindu Shaiva religion is worked out.

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<sup>ii</sup> Based on table "Asylbewerberzugänge, Hauptherkunftsländer und Anerkennungsquoten", BMI-A5-936 047/05, from 01.07.1998 and table »Sri Lanka, Asylbewerberzugänge seit 1995", letter

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dated 30.09.02 from the Bundesministerium des Innern to the author. The number for 2002 has been reckoned on basis of the months January to August 2002.

<sup>iii</sup> Based on Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2, 1988: 20-21, the same 2002: 20-21 and Bundesverwaltungsamt Köln, Ausländerzentralregister, »Die ausländische Bevölkerung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 31.06.2002«, letter dated 13.08.2002 o the author.

<sup>iv</sup> Based on Statistisches Bundesamt, »Einbürgerungen nach ausgewählten früheren Staatsangehörigkeiten«, 1981-1999, Tabellen V III B 175 and the same, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2, 2002: 57 and table 14 »Eingebürgerte Personen 2001 nach bisheriger Staatsangehörigkeit und Altersgruppen«, letter dated 06.08.2002 from the Statistische Bundesamt to the author.

<sup>v</sup> Pictures are available at the URL <http://www.baumann-martin.de/Kamad-Tem.html>.

<sup>vi</sup> For "Islam in Germany" and its endeavours to apply for the status, see, Hannemann/ Meier-Hüsing 2000, Fritsch-Oppermann 2000 and the studies by Gerdien Jonker. For similar endeavours by Vietnamese Buddhists, see Baumann 2002.

<sup>vii</sup> See for the ticket system in Tamil Nadu, South India, Fuller 1984: 10-11, 21-22, 98-101 and Good 1987: 12-15. For Sri Lanka see Sivathamby 1990: 166. For Great Britain, here the Murugan temple in Archway (?), see Taylor 1994: 326-328. For Germany see Baumann 2000: 135-136.

<sup>viii</sup> For Sri Lanka, see Banks 1971: 67; Sivathamby 1990: 162-165 and Pfaffenberger 1994: 144. For temples in Europe, see Baumann et al. 2003.

<sup>ix</sup> For example, the Kamakshi temple at Kanchipuram, administered by the Kamakoti vidyapith (a monastery and lineage of gurus) and considered a bastion of Smarta brahmins, opened its doors no earlier than 1983. In this year the reigning Shankaracarya, Sri Jayendra Sarasvati. (b. 1935), began a radical transformation of the temple's and monastery's outreach; as a consequence, also members of scheduled castes and tribes were admitted (Cenkner 1992: 63).

## **Barchunova T. V., Ph. D.: Faith-based communities of practice in Novosibirsk**

Presentation for the Workshop “Local Forms of Religious organisation as structural modernisation: Effects on religious community-building and globalisation”, Marburg, October 2 – 5, 2002.

*“...Where masses of people must cooperate in an uncertain and eruptive environment, it is usually necessary to secure unity and flexibility without real consent”*

W. Lippmann

### *Introduction*

My presentation was supposed to be named “Settling Down in Novosibirsk: Minority Religions and the Russian State”. However, my major focus is not this topic but faith-based communities as a means of social cohesion. It will consist of two parts: in the first part I will try to explain why I am not doing research on the relationship of the Russian state and minority religions right now. In the second part I will be dealing with the role of religious communities in the construction of local networks.

### *Part 1. The Russian State and the Minority Religions*

Novosibirsk is an industrial city, the center of the Federal Unit in Western Siberia. The population is 1 375 000 inhabitants. There is great ethnic diversity in Novosibirsk and Novosibirsk province (*oblast*). According to statistical data there are about 80 ethnic groups on the territory of the province. The ethnic variety is an implication of Novosibirsk as a place of exile. In terms of religion, the majority of the population is Christian Orthodox. However, after the religious outburst in the middle of the 90-we have a large variety of religious communities.

There are four governmental institutions that have to deal with the functioning of religious groups in Novosibirsk (province law department; municipal department, Federal Security department; and local parliament). The general character of this relationship is: there are state regulations on the religious organisations and the government is supposed to function on the basis of those regulations. However, the government is too pragmatic, or too preoccupied with poverty, bloody conflicts related to the redistribution of property etc, or too confused with the contradictions in the law to follow the regulations. Therefore, the relationship of religious groups and the government is a networking mechanism very often built on reciprocal adjustment, a sort of a “common sense” law.

The majority of the population is concerned with self-survival, including spiritual survival, related to resistance to the rabble forms of pop-culture and mass-media production. It operates in the space that is relatively free from state legal control that in Russia usually takes the form of a penalty. A good illustration of this attitude is the situation in the educational system. In spite of the political confrontation between Catholics and Orthodox the local governmental educational institutions are dealing with Catholics allowing them to teach in governmental colleges since there is a shortage of teachers of foreign languages. Our pragmatic government has allowed Catholics to build and administrate an orphanage. Moreover, last year the governmental commission has recognized this orphanage as the best in Russia. There is a cultural exchange between Italian Catholic organizations and Novosibirsk cultural organisations (for instance, libraries).

The same pragmatic cooperation takes place in the relationship between the government and the so-called sects. Thus, the administration of the Sovetskii district of Novosibirsk in November of 2002 has awarded a charter to the Sahadja-Yoga association for the “promotion of the renaissance of the moral foundations of Russian society”.

The reason why at this stage of analysis I am not concentrated on the relationship between the government and the minority religions (all religions but the ‘Established’ Orthodox) is that I have not yet designed a model that would allow me to describe the “common sense law” which is governing this relationship, juxtapose it with cases of breaking this law and performing overt religious favoritism and yet not distort the situation which I would characterize as a fragile balance. (The major difficulty in designing such a model is: how to describe the pragmatic cooperation between faith-based communities and the government which somehow contradicts the legal norms or main-stream politics and not to damage the participants of this cooperation.)

The situation with the relationship between the state and religion is not different from the situation in the other spheres of social life. Political scientist Liliia Shevtsova has characterized it as “Stability: Russian style ”: “The Russian government (vlast’) is missing substantial energy, power and instruments for crucial changes. This is one of the objective reasons for the stability in Russia”<sup>1</sup>. In this situation “The society has learned how to rely on itself”,- continues Shevtsova.

And this is exactly what I am concentrated on: various networking mechanisms developing independently or most independently from the government.

### *Part 2. Faith-based communities as means of social cohesion*

#### *General information about Novosibirsk. Background of research*

Let me give a quick glimpse of the religious milieu in Novosibirsk.

The variety of registered and non-registered communities is very wide.

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<sup>1</sup> Shevtsova Liliia. Rossiia: logika politicheskikh peremen (Russia:Logic of political changes). In: Shevtsova Liliia (ed.) Rossiia Politicheskaiia (Political Russia). Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998, p. 364.

## Registered religious organizations in Novosibirsk – 2002

	Religious organizations	Number of communities
1.	Christian Orthodox	17
2.	Orthodox – Old believers	2
3	Catholic	3
4	Evangelical	9
5	Lutheran	7
6	Pentecost	5
7	Adventist	7
8	Presbyterian	2
9	Latter Day Saints	2
10	Mennonite	1
11	Jehovah Witness	1
12	Muslim	2
13	Jewish	2
14	Baha'i	1
15	Hasidic	1
16	Krishna Consciousness	2
17	Buddhist	2
18	Apostolic	2

In Novosibirsk there originated two influential all-Russia movements a conservative *Bogoderjavie* (Power of God) and a neo-pagan *Anastasia* movement, which has its followers also abroad (Canada and Germany). We have one of the biggest Russian centers of Live Ethic movement. It is not by chance that Novosibirsk is one of those few big cities in Russia where we have a special Orthodox anti-sectarian center<sup>2</sup>. It is interesting, though, that it legitimizes itself not through affiliation with the government but through affiliation with the “European Federation of the Centers for Research and Information on Sectarianism“.

I started my research of faith-based communities several years ago within the framework of my project on ethnicity (funded by the Ministry of Education of Russian Federation), then continued it within a framework of a project on social cohesion (funded by Carnegie Foundation).

From the very beginning, this research was very stressful. First of all, the geography and climate of Novosibirsk are very unfavourable for doing research. Novosibirsk occupies a territory equal to 491,3 square km. Some districts of Novosibirsk have a density of population lower than 1000 inhabitants per square km. The infrastructure of the city is underdeveloped. As one of my interviewees described the situation: “you travel to synagogue through the whole city for two hours and a half and when you arrive the synagogue is locked because it is too cold and no one showed up (Leo, 34 years old).” However, the major problems were not geographical but theoretical and methodological.

Before Perestroika (1985), there were three approaches to religion in Russia: ideological (as a superstition and prejudice which has to be eliminated); historical (which was also mostly

<sup>2</sup> However, Novosibirsk somehow proved to be out of focus of sociological research. The religious situation in Novosibirsk is either briefly referred to (see for instance: Kaariainen K., D. E. Furman (eds.) *Starye tserkvi, novye veruiushchie* (Old Churches, new believers). Saint-Petersburg, 2000; Shchipkov A. V. *Vo chto verit Rossiia* (What Russia Believes in). Saint-Petersburg, 1998) or not mentioned at all. See for instance an important publication on the recent religious milieu in Russia where Novosibirsk is not even mentioned (Witte John, Jr., Bourdeaux Michael (eds.). *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia. The New War for Souls*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York, 1999).

ideologised), and political, developed mostly by Western scholars who approached religion predominantly as a dissident movement.

Because after Perestroika no approach to current religiosity, different from the “superstitions-paradigm”, has been developed, most Russian scholars have adopted the models used by Western authors such as Fletcher, Bourdeaux and others<sup>3</sup>, for whom religion was the locus for political opposition and political resource. This tradition is continued by most of the researchers of religion in Russia. Most of them are concentrated either on history or on legal and political aspects such as changes in the legislation; local legislation *versus* national legislation<sup>4</sup>.

However, this approach now does not seem valid since big politics is separated by a large gap from the rest of the population. This is the general feeling of the population that has become common place in media and political research<sup>5</sup> and very often expressed by my interviewees. This is how the editorial of the weekly *New Siberia* (N 533, January 17, 2003) expresses this situation: “The interests of normal citizens, including those who are politically and economically advanced, are shifting from the public sphere to the private one”. Surprisingly enough, that this situation is accepted by the government. Thus, the document issued by Mayor’s office of Novosibirsk, Siberian Academy of Science and Medical Academy (Siberian Division), and Interregional Association of the Heads of Enterprises named “The Concept of Social and Economic Development of Novosibirsk for the First Decade of the XXI Century» (Novosibirsk, 1999) says: “Today many people understand that *nobody* but the dwellers of Novosibirsk themselves can and will solve the problems of Novosibirsk. *No one besides the citizens themselves* is interested in the progressive social and economic development of the city” (p. 19) (*italics mine*. – T. B.).

Of course, religion is a political resource but since the government is so dysfunctional and so separated from the rest of the population this approach is irrelevant in terms of the popular majority.

The other problem with this approach is that it introduces the notion of ‘**normative**’ religion under different guises.

*Guise 1.* The researchers introduce the dichotomy of indigenous and foreign religious groups which sometimes sounds like a dichotomy of authentic/non-authentic; traditional/new. And when religious groups are analyzed on the doctrinal level the researchers often attempt to approach them from the point of view of authentic/non-authentic, true *versus* eclectic.

*Guise 2.* The non-institutionalized religious communities are either neglected or empirically mistreated.

Thus, sociologist Y. M. Plyusnin argues: “Extremely little authentic religious activity (attending churches and praying - matters about which it is possible to judge by the presence of icons in people’s homes) takes place either in small towns or in villages. On the basis or

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance: Bourdeaux Michael. *Religious Ferment in Russia: Protestant Opposition to Soviet Religious Policy*. London et al.: MacMillan; New York: St. Martin Press, 1968; Fletcher William C. *The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917-1970*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1971; Fletcher William C. *Soviet Believers. The Religious Sector of the Population*. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas. 1981; Scheffbuch Winrich. *Christen Unter Hammer und Sichel*. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus Verlag, 1972.

<sup>4</sup>From this point of view a recent Conference “Siberia at the Crossroads of World Religions” is a good illustration of the state of the field. Most of the papers presented were historical or textological. Some of them were dealing with the relationship between religious groups and the state. Very few of them were about new trends in the religious life in Russia (see: *Sibir’ na perekrestke mirovykh religii*. (Siberia at the Crossroads of World Religions). Materials of the interregional scientific and practical conference dedicated to the memory of the outstanding teacher and Biblical scholar, professor of Novosibirsk State university M. I. Rijskii. Novosibirsk: Novosibirsk State University, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography and Institute of History of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Science, 2002.

<sup>5</sup> See: Shevtsova Liliia. *Op. cit.* P. 359.

certain episodic observations, it is possible to conclude that genuine, actively religious believers make up only 2 to 5 percent of the Russian population"<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, religious awareness for him belongs to "superficial and thus easily observable aspects" of the worldview of Russians.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, my major problem was somehow to avoid the normative approach and think of appropriate methodological means for the analysis.

Three years ago when I first met one of the organizers of the present conference, Doctor Gerdien Jonker, I was going through a crisis desperately looking for explanations as to why so many people in Russia got involved in religious communities during 1994-95, what were the reasons of the later demobilization etc. And I was stuck because of the lack of appropriate methodological means. I have not been satisfied with any of the concepts available such as sects, new social movements etc.

Finally, I came up with a simple idea to approach new religious communities as a religion, i. e. religion as a connection, as a bond<sup>8</sup>, and found an adequate instrument for that.

*The concept of community of practice. Definition. Modification of the original concept*

This instrument is the concept of community of practice developed by two Stanford (USA)-experts in the theory of learning - Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger.<sup>9</sup> The three crucial traits of a community of practice, according to E. Wenger, are:

1. mutual engagement, essentially regular interaction;
2. a joint negotiated enterprise; a shared goal and the practice involved in achieving that goal;
3. a shared repertoire of negotiable resources accumulated over time, including specialized terminology and linguistic routines, resources like pictures, tapes, gestures, meals.<sup>10</sup>

In other words, this definition covers *doing* something, and what E. Wenger calls *negotiation* of meaning of this doing.

One of the most important dimensions of the communities of practice is that "*membership in a community of practice is acquired as the result of a process of learning*".<sup>11</sup>

It is the conjunction of learning and doing which makes the concept of the community of practice extremely appropriate for the analysis of the transformation period in Russia with its ugly labour market dynamic. If a sociologist has to become a bee-keeper, a biologist – a businessman, a historian – a trade agent, they seem to have no time to go through special long-term training, and second, there may be no special training institution for a new sphere of activities. A good illustration of the case is realtors - a profession in Russia which emerged as a result of privatization. "What does a professional realtor have to know and be able to do? The work on the real estate market demands various skills in different areas. A realtor is both a lawyer and a psychologist. He has to be familiar with architecture, design, has to be able to analyze information. The real estate market is 10 years old. The first real estate agents had to acquire their profession by themselves – to learn through experience and mistakes, 'invent bicycles'. Now, many of them have become heads of departments and affiliates and directors of well-known Real Estate Agencies in Novosibirsk. They are eager to share their experience

<sup>6</sup> Plyusnin Yurii. A New Russia - or the Same Old Russia. An Alternative Worldview in the Making. In: Isham Heyward, Shklyar (eds.) *Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes*. Westview Press, 2001, p. 23.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 21.

<sup>8</sup> Religion originates from Latin *religiō, religiōn* - "obligation (as of an oath), bond between man and the gods (Hoad T. F.(ed.) *The Concise English Dictionary of English Etymology*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.397).

<sup>9</sup> Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>10</sup> Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice*, 76.

<sup>11</sup> Janet Holmes and Miriam Meyerhoff, "The Community of Practice: Theories and Methodologies in Language and Gender Research," *Language in Society* 28 (1999): 179.

with novices. And it is they who started the Academy of Realtor Art. <...> They are sure that realtor art has to be learned. And it is not theoreticians who have to be teachers for the novices. It is those who have succeeded in this business who have to teach it...”<sup>12</sup>

Thus, in a situation where there is a lack of a developed system for continuing education, various communities of practice perform the function of an institution for acquisition of new social skills where the exchange of experiences facilitates the learning process.

The significance of learning in the communities of practice reflects the general trend under modernity that is described by Western sociologists as the increase of the cognitive mode of responding to the changing social reality (in N. Luhmann’s terms – to ‘the disappointed expectations’)<sup>13</sup>.

The same dynamic of labour market makes the *meaning* constituent of the communities of practice also extremely important. A military war complex engineer switching to gardening on his lot (dacha) or a medical doctor who is compelled to plant potatoes for the whole family needs an elaborated justification for their new occupation other than economic necessity. Otherwise it will be perceived as downward mobility too destructive for their identity. This is why educated people tend to justify their gardening practices with all sorts of ideas of relationships between a human being and nature. Sometimes, they build their own models of this relationship, sometimes they borrow them from other sources such as writings of Novosibirsk businessman Vladimir Megre, who ascribes them to the revelation that he received from a forest spirit Anastasia whom he presents as a patron of urban dwellers who work at their dachas (*dachniki*)<sup>14</sup>. Her protecting function seems to be similar to the function of the favourite Russian popular saints like Saint Nicholas, the patron of travellers. Her image also echoes a famous image drawn by Russian writer A. I. Kuprin in his story “Olesia” (1898). Anastasia announces to Vladimir Megre: “...Everything bad which happens to a man is caused by this man himself, when he is breaking the rules of spiritual being and ruins his ties with Nature”<sup>15</sup>. According to Anastasia, dacha people restore the connection that makes a perfect justification of meaning for a new gardener.

In my research of meanings sanctioning the new *Vita Activa* of my interviewees I am not analyzing the process of negotiation of meaning as is prescribed by the initial model set up by J. Lave and E. Wenger. What I am analyzing is the *justification of meaning* by leaders and individual members of the communities of practice.

#### *Subject of Analysis. Methods of research*

At this stage of research my **subject matter** includes all sorts of communities aimed at the quest for significance of a human being and his/her relations with the ultimate reality, including groups which are officially registered as religious organizations, which are not registered as churches but call themselves churches, as well as spiritual therapies and networks sharing common ethical systems. I have interviewed participants of such groups as: three new inter-denominational protestant communities, a new Baptist community, a new Buddhist community, a new Sahadja-Yoga community, two Jewish groups, one of which is a youth association and the other - a new semi-secular semi-religious community founded a year ago etc. I am mostly concentrated on the new communities though sometimes the difference between old and new is very vague.

My research is based on 20 in-depth biographical interviews; participant observation; expert interviews and secondary data such as media publications, brochures and pamphlets published by faith-based communities et al. printed materials.

<sup>12</sup> Vestnik Nedvijimosti Akademgorodka (The News of the Real Estate Market). Novosibirsk, N 19 (2002, November 15), p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> Beyer Peter. Religion and Globalization. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1994, p. 36 – 37.

<sup>14</sup> Megre Vladimir. Anastasiia... p. 124, 128, 163, 195, 232, 235.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. , p. 225.

Now, the questions I am interested in are: why and how are faith-based communities becoming an important instrument of social cohesion? How do they reflect changes in the social structure? What is their contribution to “the progressive social and economic development” of the city of Novosibirsk, which “only the citizens of Novosibirsk” are responsible for?

In a nutshell, I am more interested in religion as a source of social cohesion rather than on religion as a source of conflict<sup>16</sup>.

*Social networks under socialism and in post-socialist period*

In order to understand what the significance of faith-based communities for social cohesion in Russia is, I will outline the principles of social integration before transformation.

The administrative system under socialism gave no room for self-organization. The social structure in Novosibirsk, as everywhere in the Soviet Union, was determined by a sophisticated hierarchy of distribution. It was, according to S. Fitzpatrick and E. Osokina, the hierarchy of consumption<sup>17</sup>. It was not the position in production and the relation to the means of production, as the communist ideologues claimed, but the status of a person in the consumption system that determined his/her status. The “spiritual goods” were also the subject of distribution: books, Western movies and art, travelling abroad, and contacts with foreigners as a communicative resource.

Sheila Fitzpatrick describes this system relative to the 30-s of the XX century. However, this is also true of the later socialist society<sup>18</sup>: “Of course, class was important in Soviet society. But it was not important in the ways one might expect, for example, as a basis for social and political organization or collective action. <...> The main way class was significant in Soviet society was a state classification system determining the rights and obligations of different groups or citizens. By stressing class... the regime had managed to engineer something like a de facto reversion to the old and despised estate system, where your rights and privileges depended on whether you were legally classified as a noble, a merchant, a member of the clerical estate, or a peasant. In the Soviet context, “class” (social position) was an attribute that defined one’s relationship to the state. A citizen’s social position was entered in his passport, along with his nationality, age, and sex, just as social estate had been written in passports in Tsarist times. ...Members of the new “service nobility” enjoyed a variety of privileges including access to closed stores, dachas, and use of chauffeur driven government cars.

Relations between classes were comparatively unimportant in Stalinist society. What mattered was the relationship to the state – in particular, the state as an allocator of goods in an economy of chronic scarcity. ... It... meant that production no longer served as a meaningful basis of class structure in Soviet urban society. In fact, the meaningful social hierarchies of the 1930-s were based not on production but consumption. “Class” status in the real world was a matter of having greater or lesser access to goods, which in turn was largely a function of the degree of entitlement to privilege that the state allowed”<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> McGuire Meredith B. Religion. The Social Context. Wadsworth. Thomson Learning, 5<sup>th</sup> edition, 2002, Ch.6: Religion, Social Cohesion and Conflict.

<sup>17</sup> Fitzpatrick Sheila. Everyday Stalinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Osokina E. A. The Hierarchy of Consumption [Ierarhii potrebleniia]. Moscow: MGU, 1993.

<sup>18</sup> See: Ledeneva Alena V. Russia’s Economy of Favours. *Blat*, Networking and Informal Exchange. Cambridge University Press, 1998; for a similar analysis of the role of consumption system in other countries see: Verdery Katherine. What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? Princeton; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996. Thus the latter writer argues in the same vein: “Socialism’s inner drive was to accumulate not profits, like capitalists ones, but distributable resources” (p. 25).

<sup>19</sup> Fitzpatrick Sheila. Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930’s. Oxford UP, 1999, p. 12-13.

The consumption system based on distribution embraced all groups and strata of the population, all geographic regions. In Novosibirsk new and enclaved regions of the city, as Alena Ledeneva's analysis of the situation in Novosibirsk Academic Center revealed, the hierarchy was more obvious than in the old and large environments<sup>20</sup>.

The social strata were constituted by the system of privileges and goods distribution, that laid invisible borders between social groups. However, the invisible borders could be crossed because the shortage of everything created the need for *extensive exchange networks*. Those who were crossing the borders were the major social capitalists under socialism. Therefore, social cohesion was based on the shortages at the market.

The liberal economic reforms have undermined the socialist hierarchy of consumption based on the deficit of goods, services, and communication resources and shook the foundations of "socialist social capital"<sup>21</sup>. The implications of these systemic processes are contradictory. The contradiction is determined by the combination of new forms of investment in the social capital (**networking**) and the persistent desire of new social capitalists, in our case, new believers, to reproduce the **hierarchy** as a principle of organization. Thus, my interviewees Tatiana P. (52 years old) and Vladimir O. (46) mentioned that members of new-faith based groups tended to install the rigid hierarchies which they perceive as niches of self-actualization through occupying top positions in the hierarchy.

The reproduction of hierarchies on the micro-level is supported by the hierarchies on the macro level, since there develops a "new legal culture of overt religious favoritism for some and overt religious repression of others"<sup>22</sup>. The governmental policy of supporting "traditional" religions (in our case – the Orthodox Christianity) has a certain impact on regular people. Thus, one of our interviewees<sup>23</sup> mentioned that she has problems telling people that she is Catholic since Catholics are not recognized by the majority of her environment as Christians (Svetlana, 48).

However, in spite of religious favouritism, new faith-based communities, especially, those started by foreign missionaries, attract many people, especially young one. Now, why are Russians so receptive to the foreign missionary groups?

The most common, let us say, the humdrum, explanation of the out-burst of various faith-based communities, including associations which are called "totalitarian sects", is "the ideological vacuum and philosophical malaise" specific to the post-totalitarian condition<sup>24</sup>. The other popular explanation of the religiosity splash is based on the current transformation period with its indeterminacy and lack of valid legal norms which are expressed through such

<sup>20</sup> Ledeneva Alena V. Op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> The system of informal connections based on exchange has not been completely destroyed since it became an inherent trait of the Russian mentality similar to exchange system in traditional cultures described by Claude Levi-Strauss and other anthropologists. The operation of this system in post-socialist Russia is very well documented in the autobiography of a famous Russian businessman Alexander Panikin (PanInter company). In order to promote his business he exchanged VCR, a porcelain desk-lamp and other goods for the grace and favour of decision-making persons (Alexander Panikin. *Shestoie dokazatel'stvo. Ispoved' russkogo fabrikanta* (The Sixth Proof (The Confessions of the Russian manufacturer). Moscow: PanInter Publishers, 1998, p. 55, 111, 116 et al.) Also, the principle of exchange was used in providing raw materials and equipment for the production cycle. He could get the materials he needed through a complicated chain exchanging excavators for pipes, pipes for metal etc until he received what he needed (Idem. pp. 105 - 106).

<sup>22</sup> John Witte Jr. Introduction. In: John Witte, Jr., Michael Bourdeaux (eds.). *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia. The New War for Souls*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York, 1999. P. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Several interviews I am quoting from here were taken by my colleagues Natalia Beletzkaia and Rouslan Assadov.

<sup>24</sup> This point of view is expressed, be S. Filatov in his paper "Sects and New Religious Movements in Post-Soviet Russia". In: John Witte, Jr., Michael Bourdeaux (eds.). *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia. The New War for Souls*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York, 1999. P. 164.

common sense concepts as ‘nepredskazuemost’ (*unpredictability*), ‘bespredel’<sup>25</sup> and ‘as if’ (*kak by*)<sup>26</sup>. This implies a quest for the Absolute, something that is invariant and stable.

I think that the major reason for the splash of interest in the foreign missionary groups and their success is that **through them Russians have finally gained access to the “item” which was unattainable in the socialist distribution system – representatives of other countries and cultures.** It was as much about *travelling* abroad as about the direct contacts with people of different cultures *in* the country. Many of my interviewees (Natasha K., 50; Oleg, 33; Boris, 70) mention that they first came to the religious fellowships because they were interested in foreign language, in foreign culture, in contacts with new people, in new information. The most interesting note was made by one of my interviewees who said: “I have joined the community NOT because there were Americans there”.

Novosibirsk people got exposed to various religious groups and churches such as Campus Crusade; the Navigators; the Scripture Union; the Unification church; Krishna consciousness association; Charismatic Church; Catholic Comunione e Liberazione; the Church of Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Christian Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist priests and theologians used secondary school classrooms, University Chairs, and Public Clubs to expose the audience to theological interpretations of the concept of freedom; problems of science and faith; history of culture and philosophy.

Through this communicative resource my interviewees are setting new contacts. But they also note the restoration of the old mechanisms of social cohesion.

One of my interviewees has indicated that “sects” for our people *were nothing new*. Says Lena (30): “Our beloved, unforgettable Soviet Union was a sort of big sect. The human being was responsible for nothing there. However, he was endowed with a feeling of self-significance. This situation is similar to the situation in a sect: God loves you, your brothers love you. For nothing. Just for what you are... Suppose you are a proletarian. You know nothing. You are not able to do anything, you are nothing but you are either a worker or a collective farmer (*kolhoznitsa*). It is not important that you are working badly, that you produce nothing. However, there was this great and powerful Soviet Union and the feeling of belonging to it. And for the majority of people this “we –feeling” is more important than a capital made”. “...One could be sheared (ripped off), but what was more important was this feeling of being significant”.

In other words, according to Lena, under socialism the identity was constituted through the position of a person in the system. He/she could feel significant because of belonging to a unique conglomeration - the Soviet Union or a ‘progressive’ class. In the post-Soviet period people were missing this feeling of unconditioned love, feeling of significance and belonging. They regained this condition through joining faith-based communities.

The crisis of identity through the crash of the feeling of belonging to the system is explicit with one of my interviewees who has overcome this crisis by joining the Live Ethic community (Varvara, 49).

### *Faith-based groups as communities of practice*

This section will be focused on the agency of faith-based communities structured as *learning, doing, and justification of meaning*.

My major idea is that all these components are a contamination of secular (lay) and sacral. In my research of various communities of practice I very rarely see a strict border between sacral and secular. Even overtly secular groups can justify their agency by an appeal to ultimate reality.

<sup>25</sup> Bespredel – “unjust and unhuman treatment; unthinkable, inconceivable *or* unheard-of situation” (Marder Stephen. Supplementary Russian-English Dictionary. New lexicon on the 90-s. Moscow, 1995, p. 26).

<sup>26</sup> See, for instance, the usage of ‘as if’ in the book of the founder of Anastasia faith-based community Vladimir Megre “Anastasia. I exist for those for whom I exist” (Moscow – Sanct-Peterburg: Dilia, 2000, p. 82, 167).

The lack of this border is evident through the usage of sacral images in everyday life. Thus, the owner of a little food store does not find it inappropriate to use a Christian leaflet for advertising his business. A producer of soya bean products does not see any inconsistency between the image of Virgin Mary, calendar and a collection of recipes for soya dishes.

#### Justification of meaning

Justification of meaning for religious communities seems to be the primary component comparatively to the other communities of practices. By the time my interviewees had met missionaries of various churches and religious associations or joined a faith-based community, most of them had been already been involved in an individual or collective quest for the ultimate reality in some other way.

The most common sources of spiritual knowledge by the beginning of the 90-e were Indian philosophy and the writings by Live Ethic ideologues. One of my interviewees mentioned that when he got interested in the problem of death, Live Ethic was the only available resource that was addressing this problem. However, he had a feeling that reading Live Ethic writings was like diving into deep water and not being able to dive out (Oleg, 33). It is the American Protestant missionaries who helped him to dive out, though at a certain moment he felt that the exposition of their doctrine was too simplified.

The same feeling was expressed by my other interviewee who later joined the Jewish community. Says Leo (34): "I have always been a believer – since I became aware of myself. I never believed that all this world emerged spontaneously and there is no one in the Universe but us". A very special issue here is the way my interviewees construct their believers' biographies. They tell me about their visions, dreams, and experiences which they see as precursors of their conversions (for instance, Galina, 51).

Some of my interviewees got involved in spiritual activities through health practices, since most of the healthy way of life systems they followed did not recommend only diet, exercises, or cold water showers but prescribed certain moral principles as well. The most popular spiritual therapies in the late Soviet - early post-Soviet times were Hatha-Yoga, Porfiri Ivanov's systems (originally Ukraine, later - Voroshilovgrad province), Constantin Buteiko's (Novosibirsk), and Galina Shatalova's systems (Moscow). Constantine Buteiko lived in Novosibirsk since the 60-s and was famous all over Russia for his anti-asthma therapy. His system did not cover only breathing exercises and diet recommendations but ethical principles too.

Justification of meaning for members of faith-based communities in the post-Soviet period is an appeal to divinity needed for *overcoming the negative patterns and emotional conditions they have acquired through their previous experience: socialist socialization; unhappy family relationship; professional failures.*

Besides health problems, my interviewees mentioned communication and emotional problems. According to my interviewees, the major deficiencies they were facing were **aggressiveness** (Petia, 24); **desire to deal only with ideal people** (Zina, 65); **inability to deal with anyone on equal basis** (Oleg, 33); **intolerance** (Vladimir, 46).

In overcoming these deficiencies my interviewees acquire practical skills of democratic behavior. While our politicians are looking for the mechanisms of democratization of society, religious organizations are often becoming the loci of democratization.

Some of my interviewees mention their problems as universal. Others conceive them as their own personal problems that have led them to a crisis or to a series of crises. Let me illustrate with two examples how important the practical philosophy developed by my interviewees through partaking in faith-based communities proved to be for them in overcoming life crises.

1. My interviewee Zina (65) said that her problems had originated in her brothers' family where she lived during her late teens and early twenties. Feeling alienated and lonely

she started to search for a solution in books and psychological manuals. What she learned from the books available to her was a construct of an ideal person developed by socialist ideologues. She explains her family failures with her persistent concept that her partners had to be remodeled according to this construct.

After she got access to faith-based communities she still kept looking for ideal people. According to her expectations the religious communities were the right place for the righteous people. But she got disappointed when she could not find them among her sisters and brothers in Christ either. Moreover, she felt discriminated against as a single person by those who had families. Feeling the Other in the community she was still keen on remodeling her community according to her newly acquired Christian ideals. She ended up with a deep emotional crisis.

She shared her problems with a German Baptist missionary who, according to her, taught her the most illuminating lesson of her life. He managed to persuade her that **social engineering** is not HER function, but the function of God. Zina thinks that this perspective has changed her initial attitude that has been the major source of her communication problems.

2. Under socialism “You either looked as someone from above or from below”, - says Oleg (33) and it has never been psychologically comfortable.

He said that his experience with American Protestant missionaries was important in terms of noticing this essential inequality. He stressed that even the English language with its lack of difference between “you” and “thee” forms was very helpful in understanding how important equality is. He began to contact a Christian community as a translator for Protestant youth group. Then he joined a Protestant community, started by this group. The hardest period was when he did not know anyone in the community. “First, I had a desire to look better and was afraid that I would not be accepted... Then, this feeling became weaker and I felt more free...”. He understood that he would be accepted independently of “whatever you are...” by his “brothers and sisters in faith”. The other component of his new attitude was a feeling of equality of everyone before God: God loves you as he loves anybody else.

Other interviewees also mention fear (to make a mistake), insecurity, loneliness; lack of love in the family, inability to take initiative (Olga, 26; Galina, 48; Leo, 34; Nadejda, 23; Natasha V., 24).

Before my interviewees joined a faith-based community they had tried to solve their problems individually by reading all sorts of psychological manuals and theoretical writings on Gestalt-Psychologie; neuro-linguistic programming and participating in psychological self-training and self-help groups. Novosibirsk has several centers of psychological support. One of them is a center of neuro-linguistic programming started and still guided by American Richard Connor. The center has been translating relevant texts and propagating neuro-linguistic techniques for more than 10 years. Thus, by the time my interviewees “were allowed to believe” they already had experienced meditation, group dynamics, analysis of their own condition in metaphysical and psychological concepts.

Joining a faith-based community proved to be another stage in overcoming negative behavioral patterns and emotional conditions and seems to be the dominant motive in justification of meaning for membership in faith-based communities.

#### *Learning component of faith-based communities*

Knowledge for my interviewees is the major component of a believer’s life and the criteria for community development. For my interviewees knowledge is the crucial element of faith. One of them said that his parents are believers on the fringe of faith and superstition “but my mother knows more” (Oleg, 33). It means that for him knowledge is estimated as a criteria for the depth of faith and there is much scepticism about the category of believers “who know only that the Orthodox faith is the most true”.

Most of my interviewees went through educational programs arranged by Western missionary organizations. For instance, Galina (48) studied in a series of educational

programs. She started with a primary (introductory) Bible study course, then continued with an Advanced Bible study course. She also studied in the Siberian Biblical Institute (director Roger Kim (Korea)) where they had teachers from Australia, Britain, Germany, Holland, USA. My other interviewee (Zina, 65) also studied in the Siberian Biblical Institute. However, after about 5 years of operation it closed.

At the theoretical level, the cognitive component of the community of practice is separated from the practical one. However, in new communities of practice they are often times inseparable. Usually, the learning component is symmetric to teaching. My interviewees (Oleg, 33; Natasha V., Anna, 21; Galina, 48) had to learn and teach at the same time.

Practicing Buddhist K. (41) is a college teacher of philosophy. She is closely relating her teaching experience and her knowledge of Buddhism. Says K.: “We have not had a course on Eastern philosophy at the university... I talked to my father and asked him questions that I could not understand and he told me that there is a special knowledge that you cannot explain since any interpretation will ruin it... I started to think again about those things after I had solved my everyday life problems. I have graduated, have defended my thesis. I have attained a certain social status. After that, you can drift and dip into the things that you have never had time to think about... At that time at my university they started a practice of offering non-compulsory courses for students. And I made an attempt to give an Introductory course on Buddhism.

*Interviewer.* So, in a sense, Buddhism became your profession?

K. Yes, I was trying to understand it myself and teach students what it is”.

The implication of her teaching Buddhism as a university course was that my interviewee could return to the faith of her ancestors. Also, while teaching Buddhism to technical college students she learned a lot about their mentality. She mentioned that she is coming from a milieu of humanitarian intelligentsia, while her students are representatives of technical intelligentsia that she otherwise does not have an access to.

The new practices which new believers get involved in demand immediate agency and don't give them time to acquire formal education.

Thus, Natasha V. (24) who has no formal pedagogical education has been leading a Bible study group for village children for five years. She has elaborated her own methods of Biblical exegesis for children. Her voluminous methodical archive covers all sorts of “know how”, including games, pictures, puzzles, charts, schemes, curricula for regular classes and for summer and winter camps etc. She has not been enrolled into a governmental college because of her severe myopia but she could use all her multiple talents in this doing/learning experience. She feels excited about it: “Five years of work with children are *as if* a whole pedagogical university...”.

Galina (48) who has neither formal psychological, nor medical background started on her own initiative the rehabilitation of drug addicts within the framework of a Charismatic church. She developed her own system of rehabilitation that is based on the balance of trust and control. She stresses that “they [former drug addicts] have to be taught everything, every sphere of life: family life, work, finances...”. She has acquired a practical knowledge of psychology and behavioral patterns of drug addicts. “One has to be very tough and strict with them. Because they are usually very spoiled. They constantly lie. They are good actors”. Besides her own experience and a course of mentoring at Siberian Biblical Institute she did a lot of self-teaching through reading. To deal with her “patients” she has also acquired the special slang that drug-addicts use.

Leo, who has a Ph. D. in mathematics from Virginia University, had been so motivated to contribute to the life of his Jewish community that he started to draw and write poetry. Though he is teaching mathematics at the State University of Novosibirsk and working for the Institute of Mathematics, he does not want to confine himself “to anything

now...". He says: "I am using every opportunity to do good things. My major instrument is, of course, violin. I can play violin. I am ready to play for single older people who feel lonely".

Besides the above mentioned creative skills, my interviewees have acquired technical skills and knowledge, such as writing applications and projects, compiling financial and narrative reports, oral and written translation, PR, communication, and organizational skills (Anna, 21; Petia, 23; Sergei, 33).

The organizational skills acquired in the process of collective spiritual quests sometimes contribute to overcoming the hierarchies that I have mentioned in the beginning of this paper and, therefore, constitute an important investment into social capital. One of my interviewees (Vladimir, 46) reported that initially he belonged to an association with a strict hierarchy where no one was allowed to share his insights if they were inconsistent with dogmatically approached teaching. However, later, an initiative group split from the "parent" association and started a new group. This group has now existed for 6 years. They are practicing collective slow reading of the texts of the teaching they follow. The primary principle of these seminars is that "there is no formal leader who determines everything". Everyone is supposed to contribute to the discussion. Moreover, the core participants of the seminars encourage individuals who are not direct members of the group to come to the meetings and share their opinions. "We are trying to listen to what is being said by those who follow other teachings and are trying to integrate their thoughts into our notions... Formally within the framework of the seminar we are all equal. However, basically we are not equally mature. The responsibility of those who are more mature is to create the environment for those who are lower in their level of spiritual maturity so that they can feel equal". My interviewee recognizes that this is a difficult approach and he is not sure that the group will survive in this format. But at least he is satisfied with this project as it is working now.

This concept of the community is drastically different from the style of work of the "parent" association that I saw myself and that my informants mentioned. The new community my interviewee Vladimir is describing is aimed at overcoming the false hierarchy supported by the authorities of the "parent" association and follow democratic principles of community organization.

My interviewee Galina S. (51) mentioned that on her path to spiritual quests she got interested in the "parent" association and wanted to feel accepted by this community she always experienced the alienation as the Other. On the face of it, she said "there was a total cordiality, however, I could still feel alienation. On the one hand, I felt completely dissolved in this community and on the other hand, I always felt the border I could not cross. I was even invited to visit their homes. And yet it meant nothing".

This environment did not prove to be favorable for learning, and she quit the association for a different one.

#### *Doing component of the faith-based communities of practice*

Faith-based communities realize various endeavors. As I mentioned before, many of my interviewees are involved in teaching/learning process and related activities such as translating manuals and sacred texts.

Besides doing related to the religious cult as such, my interviewees are involved in very complicated projects that they conceive as unrealizable without religious justification of their meaning.

The idea that her agency is supported by God has inspired my interviewee Galina (48) to work with drug-addicts. She converted her own small apartment into a shelter for those who are going through the rehabilitation period.

The new communities are often involved in construction works. One of the most amazing projects in Novosibirsk is the construction of the Nikolai Roerikh Museum in the very center of the city, realized by the Live Ethic followers. The construction of a beautiful two-storied building is almost over. Realization of the project took several years but it has

been done without any governmental support. A group of enthusiasts organized a fund-raising campaign. When the construction work began, many members of the Siberian Roerikh association volunteered as part-time and casual constructors.

The feeling of volunteer enthusiasm is very well expressed by one of our interviewees. It sounds as a hymn to work done for the good of the others: "O Lord! If we all had always been working with the same enthusiasm that we shared when we have been working on the construction site of the Museum of Nikolai Konstantinovich Roerikh, we could have already built the wonderful future!... It was such a joy, though it was a very hard work. This feeling that you can be useful, that you can contribute to such an important deed, this internal excitement cannot be bought for money!.. It cannot be explained to anyone who has not participated in anything like this... This is the most valuable thing when a human being has this internal flame in him... We all felt this burst of energy. We could accomplish everything very quickly, though it was a heavy job. I think that the most important thing here is that you can work for the good. For the good of other people, not for yourself!" (Varvara, 49).

Faith-based communities are also acquiring how to integrate the regular models of cooperative behavior like birthday celebrations, communal celebrations of state holidays into the new format. One of the communities under analysis celebrates together not only religious holidays but official government holidays (Women's day, Men's day, and the New Year holiday), as well as weddings and birthdays.

### *Conclusions*

The preliminary results of research of various, mostly new, faith-based communities has been presented above. These communities comprise multifaceted aspects of human agency. They provide space for practical endeavors, acquisition of new knowledge, and justification of meanings of practices.

The research was based on participant observation, secondary materials such as mass-media publications and sacral texts issued by religious associations, and biographical interviews.

For most of my interviewees joining a faith-based community is a part of a strategy for adaptation in transitional society. Since for many of them transition meant a drastic change in their occupation and everyday routine that was accompanied by downward mobility, justification of meaning of their new lives within a faith-based community is becoming as vital as cognitive and practical response to changes.

Justification of meaning can vary. It also can modify over time. However, there is a trend that is common for the majority of my interviewees: overcoming behavioral models and mentality acquired under socialism. For most of the new believers joining new faith-based communities is a challenge to the routine, boredom, and uniformity that they had under the totalitarian regime.

The new faith-based communities are normally organized around learning. Therefore, it is the one who knows more and is able to teach who becomes a leader. Much of the networking within the communities is based on sharing knowledge and sources of knowledge, such as books, video-materials etc. If for some reason the knowing person leaves the group, many members of the group might leave it as well.

In many cases it is difficult or almost impossible to discriminate between secular and sacred learning since the secular is sanctified and sacred is secularized.

This is clearly seen in special discursive practices my interviewees have acquired. My interviewees are learning how to refer to their everyday life experiences in theological terms. The other discursive skills they are acquiring are testimonies; oral collective prayers; oral translations; sermons; participation in exegesis.

The research of faith-based communities in my region is raising all sorts of theoretical issues: new principles of social organization in transitional societies; the relationship between public and private; the problems of social space etc. All of these problems can be somehow reduced to the general problem of the old and the new: how the new is integrated into the old? To what extent do the new practices follow the old patterns, for instance, how the current multiplicity is consistent with the persistent tendency to monopolize? How to arrange new practices in settings which were designed for different purposes, say can a cafe, or a club, or a kinder-garden be fit for religious fellowships?

The relationship between the government and faith-based communities also fits into the social network model where the pragmatic needs of transitional society seem to be more important than consistency with mainstream politics.

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22 January, 2003  
Novosibirsk

## 2. Religious Organisation Building in East Asia

### Hongkong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Nepal und Pakistan

#### Lai Chi-Tim: Hong Kong Daoism: A Study of Daoist Altars and Lü Dongbin Cults

##### *Introductory Remarks*

This paper examines the development of Daoist institutions (temples *guan*, altars *tan*, and halls *tang*) in Hong Kong.<sup>1</sup> It focuses on the historical factors behind that development, in the context of transplantation from parent institutions in the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong province after the 1940s.

In his study of Confucianism and Daoism, Max Weber (1864-1920) concluded that “Daoism remained purely magical in character” and that “the formation of religious [Daoist] communities, at least for laymen, was lacking.”<sup>2</sup> Weber’s characterization of Daoism as a religious system of negative and conservative values that were incapable of developing a dynamic social orientation toward capitalism was theoretically biased. It was created to support his wider theme of the ascetic Protestant ethic as the moving spirit of capitalism.

Arguing against Weber’s conclusion, I re-address the issue of Daoist community development by analyzing Hong Kong Daoism. I begin with a summary of the historical development of the local temple network and monastic community of Daoism in traditional and modern China. Thereafter, I trace the history of Hong Kong Daoism back to organizations that were founded in Guangdong in pre-modern China, and focus on the Daoist altars of Lü Dongbin cults (which are known as *Lüzū tan*). I then explore recent developments in Hong Kong Daoist institutions in connection with their social orientation, community building, and increased public involvement. Finally, I analyze the reasons for such developments in the context of Hong Kong’s increased urbanization and modernization since the 1970s.

#### **The Local Temple Network and Monastic Community of Daoism in Pre-Modern and Modern China**

There should be no doubt that the social characteristics of Hong Kong Daoism stem from the continuous development of Daoism in traditional and modern China. Despite Weber’s characterization of Daoism as “merely an organization of magicians,”<sup>3</sup> the Way of the Heavenly Master (*Tianshi dao*), an early Daoist movement that appeared during the last days of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), was a community of the faithful.<sup>4</sup> One Daoist scholar calls it an “ecclesia” to highlight the distinctive feature of the Heavenly Master community, which took the form of political assemblies of free citizens.<sup>5</sup> Rising in the area of Shu (modern Sichuan in Southwestern China), the religious community’s founder, Zhang

<sup>1</sup> The terms “temple,” “altar,” and “hall” principally describe differences in size between the Hong Kong Daoist institutions discussed.

<sup>2</sup> Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, trans. by Hans H. Gerth (New York: The Free Press, 1951), 224-225.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 225.

<sup>4</sup> Lai Chi-Tim, “The Opposition of Celestial Master Taoism to Popular Cults during the Six Dynasties,” *Asia Major* 3<sup>rd</sup> series, vol. 11, part 1 (1998): 1-20; Franciscus Verellen, “The Twenty-four Dioceses and Zhang Daoling: Spatial organization in early Heavenly Master Taoism,” in *Sacred Place and Sacred Biography*, edited by Phyllis Granoff and Koichi Shinohara (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2001).

<sup>5</sup> Kristofer Schipper, “Taoism: The Story of the Way,” in *Taoism and the Arts of China*, edited by Stephen Little (Chicago: The Art Institution of Chicago in association with University of California Press, 2000), 42.

Daoling, was conferred authority by Laozi as the first Heavenly Master.<sup>6</sup> The early Heavenly Master community established a hierarchically structured network of ecclesia that was known as the twenty-four “dioceses” (*ershisi zhi*). These dioceses were lay communities whose members were recruited from the Shu peasantry. As sacred sites, the dioceses were marked by sanctuaries that served as the liturgical centers of the movement and as the seats of its ecclesial administration.<sup>7</sup>

Although Weber was not able to find any Puritan type of ascetic Protestantism in traditional Daoism, many modern scholars have found a certain “ethical rationalism” in the early Heavenly Master community.<sup>8</sup> According to the Way of the Heavenly Master, salvation was obtained by entering the ecclesia and following its rites and precepts. Rather than a “magic garden,” as in Weber’s characterization, the Way of the Heavenly Master was a religious movement with a puritan lifestyle, no alcohol, and no banquets with rich viands, etc. It rejected the worship of all deified beings, be they humans, animal, or plants. The most precise and authoritative source for the rules governing the early ecclesia were the One Hundred and Eighty Precepts (*Yibaibashi jie*).<sup>9</sup> In the Way of the Heavenly Master, believers’ misconduct or evil deeds were sins against the “precepts of the Dao” (*daojie*), and heavenly officials meted out illness, misfortune, and death as punishment. They also ensured that living descendents of dead sinners suffered misfortune, pain and disease. It was of paramount importance to the direct link between Daoist social ethics in the world and the fate of those beyond it that the heavenly administration kept a complete and updated account of all human deeds, good and evil. In short, the governing principle of the precepts of the Dao and the idea of a heavenly legal administration provided a “rational” basis for the moral behaviors of the early Heavenly Master community. Indeed, this Daoist means of “religious control of life” still exerts a great influence on Chinese moral tradition.

According to historians of Daoism, the traditional ecclesia of the Way of the Heavenly Master lasted until the tenth century, and later transformed itself into modern temple organizations at the local level.<sup>10</sup> Kristofer Schipper explains that this transformation was the result of the total integration of Daoism in Chinese local society.<sup>11</sup> In the past, some scholars of Daoism, such as Weber among others, erroneously regarded this trend of integration as a move toward “a magic image of the world” and the decline of Laozi Daoism.<sup>12</sup>

At the end of Tang dynasty (618-906) and during the Five Dynasties period (907-960), the development of the great merchant cities in the regions south of the Yangzi River gave rise to a bourgeoisie. The new bourgeois organized themselves into assemblies or associations (*hui*) in honor of their local saints. At the beginning of the Northern Song dynasty, officially sponsored Daoist temples of Tai Shan (Dongyue Miao) were founded in all urban centers. Under the Dongyue Miao, Chenghuang City God temples were established in each township. Below the City God level came the Earth Gods and their shrines.<sup>13</sup> Mostly organized by lay associations, these temples hosted festival activities together with Daoist rituals to celebrate

<sup>6</sup> On the study of Zhang Daoling, see Franciscus Verellen, “Zhang Ling and the Lingjing salt well,” in *En suivant la voie royale: Mélanges en hommage à Léon Vandermeersch*, edited by J. Gernet and M. Kalinowski (Paris: Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1997).

<sup>7</sup> On the study of the Twenty-four Dioceses of the Heavenly Master Daoism, see Franciscus Verellen, “The Twenty-four Dioceses and Zhang Daoling: Spatial Organization in Early Heavenly Master Daoism.”

<sup>8</sup> See Lai Chi-Tim, “The Religious Belief of the Three Officials (*sanguan*) of Heaven, Earth, and Water in the Early Heavenly Master Ritual for Absolving Sins and Healing Illness,” presented at the conference on the “Canon of the Early Heavenly Master,” Hong Kong, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> B. Penny, “Buddhism and Daoism in *The 180 Precepts Spoken by the Lord Lao*,” *Taoist Resources* 6.2 (1996).

<sup>10</sup> K. Schipper, “Taoism: The Story of the Way,” in *Taoism and the Arts of China*, 48.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>12</sup> H. G. Greel, *What is Taoism?* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 11.

<sup>13</sup> K. Schipper, “Taoism: The Story of the Way,” 49.

local saints.<sup>14</sup> The temples allowed for a partnership between sacred and secular activities, such as the Daoist ritual of gaining merit for the community, gatherings of different lay associations, collecting taxes on trade, and local communal discussions.<sup>15</sup> In spite of this mixture, the temples were Daoist in nature because they always employed Daoist masters, mostly of the Heavenly Master liturgical tradition, which was now called the Zhengyi (Orthodox Unity) order.<sup>16</sup> In sum, the consequence of the “popularization and secularization of Daoism” in pre-modern China was that Zhengyi Daoist communities of the clergy and the faithful ceased to exist after the fall of the Tang dynasty.

As a reaction to the decadence of Daoist institutions, Wang Chongyang (1113-1170) founded the first monastic Daoist congregation, to which he gave the name of Quanzhen (Total Truth).<sup>17</sup> The Quanzhen movement established itself as an independent order, which was by and large recognized as a clerical community following the model of the Buddhist monastic *sangha*. All Quanzhen clerics lived in temples. The order was characterized by its strictly celibate lifestyle and the spiritual life of practicing Inner Alchemy (*neitan*) as the main path to salvation.<sup>18</sup> Due imperial favor, the Quanzhen order enjoyed great success during the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368), but the Heavenly Masters of the Zhengyi order were ascendant during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).<sup>19</sup> However, early in the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) the Quanzhen order was revived in the capital, the great White Cloud Monastery (Baiyun guan) was rebuilt, and a new school calling itself the Dragon Gate lineage (*Longmen pai*) took control.<sup>20</sup> As this school was in charge of Quanzhen public ordinations, it represents by far the most common lineage of Quanzhen clerics from the Qing dynasty until the present. During his field study in the White Cloud Monastery in the 1940s, Yoshioka Yoshitoyo found a list of twenty-four Quanzhen monasteries throughout the country that were registered as being public *shifang* temples, including the two Quanzhen monasteries in Guangdong, Chongxu guan and Huanglong guan.<sup>21</sup>

To summarize the historical development of the two Daoist orders until the pre-modern period in China, Schipper provides the following insight:

From Ming times on, Quanzhen and Zhengyi became the most representative Taoist traditions, and they complemented each other perfectly. The Quanzhen, with its strict and Spartan discipline maintained and perfected the higher forms of Taoist mysticism through its practice of Inner Alchemy. The Zhengyi fostered the local communities

<sup>14</sup> On the revival of the cult networks of temple gods in contemporary China, see Kenneth Dean, *Taoist Ritual and Popular Cults of South-East China* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 61-98.

<sup>15</sup> On the integrative function of temples in local society in late imperial China, see Barend J. ter Haar, “Local society and the organization of Cults in Early Modern China: A Preliminary Study,” *Studies in Central and East Asian Religions* 8 (1995): 1-43.

<sup>16</sup> K. Schipper, “Taoism: The Story of the Way,” 50.

<sup>17</sup> Chen Bing, “Jinyuan Quanzhen dao,” in *Zhongguo daojiao shi* (revised edition), edited by Ren Jiyu (Beijing: Zhongguo shekeyuan chubanshe, 2001), 661-730, and id., “Qingdai Quanzhen Longmen pai de zhongxing” (The Qing dynasty’s renewal of the Quanzhen Longmen school), *Shijie zongjiao yanjiu* 2 (1998): 12-18.

<sup>18</sup> On Quanzhen clerics, see Yoshioka Yoshitoyo, “Taoist Monastic Life,” in *Facets of Taoism*, edited by Holmes Welch and Anna Seidel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 229-252, and Vincent Goossaert, “The Quanzhen clergy, 1700-1950,” in *Religion and Chinese Society: The Transformation of a Field*, edited by John Lagerwey (Hong Kong: École Française d’Extrême-Orient and Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003).

<sup>19</sup> On Zhengyi Daoism in the Ming and Qing periods, see Hosoya Yoshio, “Kenryū chō no Seiikyō” (The Zhengyi Order under the Qianlong Reign), in *Dōkyō to shūkyō bunka*, edited by Akizuki Kan’ei (Daoism and Religious Culture) (Tokyo: Hirakawa, 1987), 577-578, and Vincent Goossaert, “Counting the Monks: The 1736-1739 Census of the Chinese Clergy,” *Late Imperial China*, vol. 21 (2000).

<sup>20</sup> Monica Esposito, “Longmen Taoism in Qing China: Doctrinal Ideal and Local Reality,” *Journal of Chinese Religions* 29 (2001), 191.

<sup>21</sup> Yoshioka Yoshitoyo, “Taoist Monastic Life,” in *Facets of Taoism*, 230. According to Yoshioka, Daoist temples are of two main types, that is “public” and “hereditary.”

and temple organizations and provided them with their liturgical framework and ritual specialists.<sup>22</sup>

### The Lü Dongbin Cults and the Spread of *Lüzū tan* in Guangdong and Hong Kong

Although Schipper's account of the Zhengyi and Quanzhen Orders is accurate, it is also evident that popularized Daoist organizations, which took a different religious form from these two most representative Daoist orders, existed in late imperial China. These new popularized or sectarian organizations emerged due to the increased influence of sectarian movements or popular cults of local deities upon Daoism during the Ming and Qing dynasties. They lasted until modern times in China, and were transmitted to overseas Chinese communities. Among these popularized Daoist organizations were altars devoted to Lü Dongbin cults (which were known as *Lüzū tan*), Daoist spirit-writing altars (*Fuji tan*), and sects of the Great Way of Former Heaven (*Xiantian Dadao*).<sup>23</sup>

Given their close links with Hong Kong Daoist organizations, the great popularity of Lü Dongbin cults in Daoist temples is evidenced in pre-modern and modern China. Cults of the immortal Lü are easily found in many Hong Kong Daoist organizations that claim a place in the Quanzhen tradition. Not only enjoying success in Quanzhen temples, Lü Dongbin cults in Hong Kong have built Daoist altars, which are called *Lüzū tan*, and are often associated with spirit-writing or planchette writing (*fūji*), morality book (*shanshu*) movements, and charitable societies (*shanhui*).

According to hagiographical accounts, Lü Dongbin was a Daoist of the latter half of the Tang dynasty. His given name was Lü Yan, but he later adopted the style-name Dongbin. After becoming a Daoist he used the Daoist name Chungyang (meaning "Purified Yang"). The immortal Lü Dongbin was presented as a master of internal alchemy and venerated as the patriarch of the Quanzhen order, and thus also named Patriarch Lü (*Lüzū*). It was told that in the year 1159, Wong Chongyang had a miraculous encounter with the immortal Lü Dongbin in a tavern at Ganhezhen (near Huxian in Shaanxi).

Apart from being venerated as a patron saint of the Quanzhen order, a wide variety of Lü Dongbin cults arose in Chinese grassroots culture after the Song dynasty. Most of them were built upon different representations of the immortal master (*xianshi*) that had little historical relation to the Quanzhen tradition. Scholars of Lü Dongbin cults often note the religious phenomenon that the Chinese people who worshipped Lü Dongbin saw him as "a healer and wonder-worker, a patron god of various tradespeople, ranging from ink makers to prostitutes, a powerful spirit of planchette cults, and a member of that powerful yet rambunctious group of deities known as the Eight Immortals (*Baxian*)."<sup>24</sup> In short, while Quanzhen Daoists worshipped Lü Dongbin as a Daoist master of *neitan* meditation tradition, he was popularly worshipped as a deity famed for his exorcistic and healing powers.<sup>25</sup> Until late imperial

<sup>22</sup> K. Schipper, "Taoism: The Story of the Way," 52.

<sup>23</sup> The direct historical relationship between Daoism and the sect of the Great Way of Former Heaven (*Xiantian dao*) is still debatable. For the history of this sect, see Marjorie Topley, "The Great Way of Former Heaven: A Group of Chinese Secret Religious Sects," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 26 (1963): 362-392.

<sup>24</sup> Paul R. Katz, "Enlightened Alchemist or Immoral Immortal? The Growth of Lü Dongbin's Cult in Late Imperial China," in *Unruly Gods: Divinity and Society in China*, edited by Meir Shahar and Robert P. Weller (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996), 70. See also Farzeen Baldrian-Hussein, "Lü Tung-pin in Northern Sung Literature," *Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie* 2 (1986): 133-176.

<sup>25</sup> On the interaction between Quanzhen Daoism and popularized Lü Dongbin's Cult, see Paul R. Katz, "The Interaction between Ch'uan-chen Taoism and Local Cults: A Case Study of the Yung-lo Kung," in *Minjian xinyang yu Zhongguo wenhua: Guoji yantao huilun wenji* 1, edited by Lin Ru (Taipei: Hanxue yanjiu zhongxin (1994): 201-249.

China, he was an object of worship among various cults of mediums, merchants, and the literati.<sup>26</sup>

One should be aware that the origin of most Hong Kong Daoist temples and institutions cannot be set apart from the larger Lü Dongbin cults that flourished in Guangdong during late imperial China.<sup>27</sup> Most temple Daoists in Hong Kong often believe that the Daoists of Quanzhen monasteries, who originated on Luofu mountain (Huizhou, Guangdong) and in the monastery of Sanyuan (*Sanyuan gong*) in Guangzhou city, were mainly responsible for organizing and promoting the Lü Dongbin cults that appeared in Guangdong.<sup>28</sup> However, Shiga Ichiko's recent meticulous study of the history of *Lüzü tan* in Guangdong between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century convincingly presents us with the conclusion that merchants and traders actually played a more significant role in the construction and promotion of *Lüzü* altars in Guangdong.<sup>29</sup> Shiga Ichiko finds a close relationship between people who worshipped Lü Dongbin for his healing powers and the local drug traders in Guangdong.<sup>30</sup> Hence, Shiga Ichiko contends that the great popularity of *Lüzü* worship in Guangdong came about not through the work of Quanzhen Daoists, but through that of a distinct community of believers.

Three important factors helped to characterize the Daoist altars of *Lüzü* as institutions that had histories based on volunteer communities of the faithful.

Firstly, according to Shiga Ichiko's account, among twenty-nine Daoist altars in the Pearl River Delta between 1848 and 1947, at least twenty-one were devoted to Lü Dongbin.<sup>31</sup> It is no surprise to see that only one *Lüzü tan*, which was known as the Immortal Hall of Chongyang (*chongyang xianyuan*), was constructed in 1881 by a Quanzhen *daoshi* from Luofu mountain.<sup>32</sup> The other twenty *Lüzü tan* were, however, founded by the local literati or merchants. For instance, the Immortal Hall of Yunquan (Yunquan xianguang) was founded in Xiqiao shan (Nanhai county, Guangdong) in 1848 and was the first Daoist institution in Guangdong to dedicate itself to the worship of *Lüzü* after the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>33</sup> Similar to the other *Lüzü* altars spread over late imperial China in the early nineteenth century, the Lü Dongbin cult of Yunquan xianguang was a literati-led religious group that tried to counter the perceived decline of traditional values by having the deity reaffirm those values, especially through the planchette.<sup>34</sup> By the early 1890s, Yunquan xianguang had begun to publish different volumes of "morality books" (*shanshu*), which transmitted and cultivated

<sup>26</sup> For more on the spread of cults of Lü Dongbin in connection with planchette cults in late imperial China, see David K. Jordan and Daniel L. Overmyer, *The Flying Phoenix: Aspects of Chinese Sectarianism in Taiwan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

<sup>27</sup> On the history of Zhengyi Daoism in Hong Kong, see Lai Chi-tim, "Minguo shiqi guangzhoushi nahm-mouh daoyuan delishih kuojii" (History of "Nahm-mouh Daoist Halls" in Early Republican Canton), *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica*, Vol. 37 (2002): 1-40.

<sup>28</sup> Bartholomew P. M. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Change: The Story of the Complete Perfection Sect in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture, 1991), 72, 90.

<sup>29</sup> Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō* (Shamanism and Daoism in Modern China: Study of Daoist Spirit-writings Cults in Hong Kong (Tokyo: Bensey Publishing, 1999), 191-197.

<sup>30</sup> Farzeen Baldrian-Hussein, "Lü Tung-pin in Northern Sung Literature," 169, has already noted the affinity of the cult of Lü Dongbin with merchants' activities in the southern area of the Yangzi River regions during the Northern Song period.

<sup>31</sup> Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 172.

<sup>32</sup> On the Quanzhen's relationship with the cult of Lü Dongbin, see Mori Yuria, "Junyō Teikun shinka miōtsūki ni mieru Zenshinkyō teki na tokuchō tsuite," *Tōyō no shisō to shūkyō* (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Doyō tetsugakkai, 1992), 31-47.

<sup>33</sup> B. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Change*, 85, does not give any evidence when he speculates that Yunquan xianguang "is the oldest known Lü Tsu temple founded by Taoists of the Lung-men subsect. Its founders came from the San-yüan-kung in Canton."

<sup>34</sup> Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 214-221. See also Philip Clart, "The Phoenix and the Mother: The Interaction of Spirit Writing Cults and Popular Sects in Taiwan," *Journal of Chinese Religions* 25 (1997): 1-31.

everyday morality including the basic Confucian virtues, such as benevolence (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), propriety (*li*), filial piety (*xiao*), chastity (*jie*), loyalty (*zong*), and honesty (*xin*).

Secondly, all *Lüzü* altars belonged to volunteer organizations. To be a member was necessarily one's own choice. Members of the cults, who were known as *daoyou* (members of the Dao), communed at regular intervals by means of the planchette. The ultimate goal of spirit-writing cult membership was to obtain divine guidance. Cult members brought their problems of everyday life or spiritual needs and sought divine solutions. Clearly, the most popular planchette deity was Patriarch Lü, whose statue or image appeared at the center of the Daoist altar.

The historical link between Daoism, especially the Quanzhen order, and spirit-writing cults is, however, obscure. Some scholars uncritically consider spirit-writing as a religious activity that belonged to popularized Quanzhen Daoism.<sup>35</sup> There is strong reason to argue against such a view. The distinctive Quanzhen tradition was characterized by its ordination procedure, monastic life, and practices of *neidan* meditation. In contrast, spirit-writing is a practice that began in Tang times and was structurally organized in Song times. It originated in a certain kind of literati-led divination technique of communicating with the transcendent realm.<sup>36</sup> In fact, the elite-patronized spirit-writing cults and the related phoenix halls could be considered as an independent religious phenomenon that was widely developed and popularized in late imperial China.

As Philip Clart and Shiga Ichiko have shown, specific historical and political factors caused the planchette movement to appear in traditional China around the middle of the nineteenth century. In face of a perceived apocalypse, the prevalence of planchette cults in late imperial China was a millenarian response to the wicked conditions of rapid social, political, and cultural change.<sup>37</sup> After the middle of nineteenth century, the elite-sponsored spirit-writing cults transformed into a phoenix hall movement that was further characterized by the fusion of four formerly distinct forms of religious cultures, namely sectarian devotionalism and millenarianism, popular Confucian moralism, Daoist cults of local saints, and the social reformism of the charitable societies (*shanhui*).<sup>38</sup>

Given their religio-historical context, the popularity of Daoist *Lüzü tan* in the Pearl River Delta during the late nineteenth century should be seen as a result of planchette cult movements combining with the internal structure of popularized Lü Dongbin cults. Hence, one may not be correct in drawing an organic link between these Daoist *Lüzü tan* and the Quanzhen Longmen Daoists. In short, the distinctive planchette cults of Lü Dongbin cannot be easily used as an indicator to measure the influence of the Quanzhen order or the achievement of Quanzhen Daoists.<sup>39</sup>

Finally, the Guangdong *Lüzü* altars were volunteer religious organizations whose members were recruited from the different strata of local society in the region. With the decline of the traditional gentry class in late imperial China, *Lüzü tan* became more

<sup>35</sup> B. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Change*, 73-74.

<sup>36</sup> Xu Dishan, *Fuji mixiu de yanjiu* (Hong Kong: Shangwu, 1941), 46.

<sup>37</sup> Philip Clart, "The Phoenix and the Mother: The Interaction of Spirit Writing Cults and Popular Sects in Taiwan," 6-7, and Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 221-227.

<sup>38</sup> "Charitable societies" were associations of wealthy gentry and merchants during the Ming and Qing dynasties. They engaged in all kinds of charitable activities, most commonly the free dispensation of medicine, coffins and burials for the poor, nurseries, as well as public lectures on and the printing of morality books. For more information, see J. H. Smith, "Benevolent Societies: The Reshaping of Charity During the Late Ming and Early Ch'ing," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46 (1987), and Leung K. C., "Organized Medicine in the Lower Yangzi Region," *Late Imperial China* 8 (1987): 134-166.

<sup>39</sup> B. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Change*, 72-90, holds such a view of the Quanzhen source for the popularity of the *Lüzü tan* that appeared in Guangdong. The problem with Tsui's account is that he uncritically concentrates the influence of Quanzhen Daoists in the widespread *Lüzü tan*. On a review of Tsui's account, see Shiga Ichiko, *Tōhō Shūkyō* 85 (1995): 1-23.

popularized at the local level. *Lüzū tan* disciples included local merchants, traders, school teachers, shop-workers, and peasants.<sup>40</sup> Most *Lüzū tan* retained a kind of volunteer membership-based structure. The planchette deity, Patriarch Lü, was venerated as the “teacher,” and the cult members were “disciples” (*dizi*). Cult members diligently studied the divine messages received from Patriarch Lü—such planchette texts were often composed and disseminated as morality books to counter a perceived decline of traditional values. As volunteer organizations, most *Lüzū tan* had a community of one or two hundred disciples devoted to the planchette cult of Lü Dongbin. Most often, *Lüzū tan* disciples were not very clear about the history of Daoist tradition and Daoist doctrines, and simply believed in the exorcistic and healing powers of Patriarch Lü.

According to Weber’s account, Daoism was a type of magical religion incapable of leading to “a rational method of life, be it inner or other-worldly.”<sup>41</sup> Given this view, one will not be surprised by Weber’s claim that “Taoist magic necessarily became one of the most serious obstacles to such a development.” Nevertheless, one can find a rational structure of ethics that transcended different social strata and working circles in the Daoist planchette cults of Lü Dongbin. Without doubt, the goal of planchette cult members was divine guidance in this world or in the beyond. Despite such otherworldly concern, most *Lüzū tan* that flourished in Guangdong were organized as charitable societies (*shanhui*) at the popular and local levels. To fulfill the duties of discipleship, individual cult members had to practice the moral virtues of the religion and to involve themselves in charitable works. As already seen in early Heavenly Master Daoism, the fundamental ground for Daoist ethics was the doctrine that progress (or lack thereof) in one’s cultivation for immortality or salvation was measured in units of merit and demerit.<sup>42</sup> In his study of phoenix halls in Taiwan, Philip Clart finds a structure of Daoist ethics which is similar to that of the planchette cult members’ worldly orientation. He writes:

Many phoenix halls use so-called ‘ledgers of merit and demerit,’ lists of good and bad deeds with amounts of merits and demerits attached to them. The balance of one’s merit account, the ‘phoenix register’ (*luanji*) established in Heaven once one becomes a cult member, determines one’s postmortem fate: one may fall into purgatory, to reborn as a human being, or ascend to Heaven.<sup>43</sup>

Besides the individual duties of membership, many *Lüzū tan* acted as charitable societies. Situated in the historical context of the *shanhui* movement that was devoted to social and moral reform in the late nineteenth and early twenty centuries, *Lüzū tan*, like other charitable societies, were involved in the dispensation of free medicine, meals, coffins and burials for the poor, the printing of morality books, and the organization of public lectures for the illiterate masses.

For instance, a *Lüzū tan* named Guangzhou Yushan tang was established in 1903. The founder, Zhao Zunsi, was initially a devotee of another *Lüzū* altar. However, in 1902, when a plague broke out, Zhao Zunsi obtained a recipe from Patriarch Lü. “When the medicine made from it was consumed three times by those who were stricken, the swelling subsided and they were cured. The recipe was effective every time it was used.”<sup>44</sup> As a result, the believers increased daily and Zhao Zunsi created his own altar dedicated to the cult of Lü Dongbin in

<sup>40</sup> Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 246-247.

<sup>41</sup> Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, 204-205.

<sup>42</sup> On the study of Daoist ethics in early Heavenly Master Daoism, see Lai Chi-tim, “The Demon Statutes of *Nūqing* and the Problem of the Bureaucratization of the Netherworld in Early Heavenly Master Daoism,” *T’oung Pao* 89 (2003), and “The Opposition of Celestial Master Taoism to Popular Cults during the Six Dynasties,” *Asia Major* 3<sup>rd</sup> series, vol. 11, part 1 (1998): 1-20.

<sup>43</sup> Philip Clart, “The Phoenix and the Mother: The Interaction of Spirit Writing Cults and Popular Sects in Taiwan,” 6.

<sup>44</sup> *Baosong baohe ji* (Hong Kong: Yunhe shanfang, 1962), 385.

the Hengsha district of Guangzhou city. This *Lüzū tan* became famous for its free distribution of medicine and charity to the needy. According to a biography of Zhao Zunzi,

Twenty-four branches were later established in the six regions of Nanhai, Panyu, Huaxian, Heshan, and Xinhui. Children cured from small-box numbered over ten thousand. Innumerable needy people and the sick were benefited. Zhao Zunzi and his friends went abroad to such places as the Southern Seas, Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao to seek for donations from rich merchants. As a result, the good work was never interrupted.<sup>45</sup>

We can take this account as a model to explain the historical origins and social characteristics of the many similar Daoist organizations that were later founded in Hong Kong. Many of Zhao Zunzi's disciples are thought to have emigrated to Hong Kong, and in the summer of 1921, by the order of Patriarch Lü, they founded the Baodao tang altar at Shanghuan.

### **The History and Social Development of Volunteer Daoist Organizations in Hong Kong**

In the early twentieth century, Hong Kong was just a coastal town in the Pearl River Delta, but British colonialism ensured that Chinese, like the foreigners who migrated to the territory, were outsiders with transplanted religious customs. Before Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842, the Daoist presence consisted only of local temples and shrines that were dedicated to popularized Daoist saints and village deities, such as Hong Sheng temple in Apleichau (1773), Tian Hou temple in Aberdeen (1851), and Chenghunag City God temple in Shaukeiwan (1877).<sup>46</sup>

Almost all Daoist masters of the Zhengyi (Orthodox Unity) tradition were ritual specialists who provided the village communities and temple organizations with Daoist liturgies during temple festivals. As K. Schipper notes in his account of Zhengyi history, the popularization of Daoism was a result of the total integration of the faith within Chinese local society from the Song dynasty until the present. The majority of what the Zhengyi Daoist masters did, and still do today, was to have a married *daoshi* life, to live at home, and to wear particular garments when performing rituals.<sup>47</sup> These professional and married *daoshi* were generally known as *huoju daoshi* or, as is now the case in most of mainland China, *sanju daoshi*.<sup>48</sup> In Guangdong and Hong Kong, these professional *huoju daoshi* are commonly known as *Nahm-mouh lao*.

Although *Nahm-mouh lao* do not build temples or sanctuaries in which the public worship, more than two hundred *Nahm-mouh* Daoist halls (*daoyuan*) spread all over Guangzhou in the late Qing dynasty and early Republican period.<sup>49</sup> They provided almost all Daoist ritual services for the Cantonese people in the city. However, in a campaign against superstition and popular religion that was known as the *Fengsu Gaige* (Reform of Customs), the self-styled progressive Nationalist government condemned the *Nahm-mouh* Daoist

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> On local temples in Hong Kong, see David Faure, "Folk Religion in Hong Kong and the New Territories," in *The Turning of the Tide: Religion in China Today*, edited by Julian Pas (Oxford: Hong Kong Branch Royal Asiatic Society in association with Hong Kong Oxford University Press, 1989), 259-270; Keith Stevens, "Chinese Monasteries, Temples, Shrines and Altars in Hong Kong and Macau," *Journal of Hong Kong Branch Royal Asiatic Society* 20 (1980): 1-33; David Faure, Bernard Luk and Alice Ngai-ha Lun Ng, *Historical Inscriptions of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Urban Council, 1986).

<sup>47</sup> K. Schipper, *The Taoist Body*, trans. by Karen C. Duval (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 54, claims that "on the basis of historical and contemporary observations, we can state that Taoism never was a monastic religion, for celibacy, is, in fact, inconsistent with its fundamental conception of the body. From the early times of the independent local communities of the Heavenly Masters' government, the *tao-shih*, men and women, were married people."

<sup>48</sup> For more information on contemporary *Sanju daoshi* in mainland China, see Lai Chi-tim, "Daoism in China Today, 1980-2002," *China Quarterly* (2003).

<sup>49</sup> For more on the Zhengyi Daoist masters in the Qing dynasty, see Vincent Goossaert, "Counting the Monks: The 1736-1739 Census of the Chinese Clergy," *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2000): 40-85.

masters as sorcerers. In 1928 and again in 1936, they twice ordered the banning of all *Nahm-mouh* ritual services and closed all Daoist Halls. Hence, *Nahm-mouh* Daoist Halls could not have survived intact in the city before 1949 and the advent of communist rule.<sup>50</sup> During the Second World War, more Cantonese *Nahm-mouh* Daoist masters fled to Hong Kong, especially in 1940, and set up their own Daoist halls. A union of these “*Nahm-mouh* Daoist Masters Living Abroad in Hong Kong” that was organized in 1947 had a great influence on the later development of Zhengyi ritual tradition in Hong Kong. At present, there are an estimated five hundred *Nahm-mouh* Daoist masters in Hong Kong.<sup>51</sup> Every day and night, more than one hundred funeral rituals are religiously conducted in the Daoist liturgical manner by *Nahm-mouh* masters in Funeral Halls or other *Nahm-mouh* Halls throughout Hong Kong Island and Kowloon city.<sup>52</sup>

In contrast to the Zhengyi Daoist masters, who do not unite as a community of the faithful to conduct group worship, Hong Kong Daoists belong to sects, halls, or temples, including altars devoted to Lü Dongbin, temples of Quanzhen Longmen Lineage and *Xiantian dao* (The Great Way of Former Heaven) temples. These three clusters of bodies dominate the Hong Kong Daoist Association, which was formed in 1961 and registered as a limited company in 1968.<sup>53</sup> Eighty-two organizations are now registered as members.<sup>54</sup>

In Hong Kong, organized monasticism has never been practiced in Daoist temples or altars, although many people worship Wang Chongyang and Qiu Chuji (1148-1227), the first founders of the Longmen lineage of the Quanzhen order.<sup>55</sup> According to Shiga Ichiko’s collected data, at least twenty-nine Daoist temples or Daoist altars in Hong Kong are predominantly devoted to the worship of Patriarch Lü.<sup>56</sup> Today, if one asks Daoist priests and devotees of these Daoist temples and altars to which lineage they belong most will answer “Longmen”—just as Buddhist monks are likely to answer “Linji.”<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, the truth is that almost all of these “Longmen” Daoist altars and temples are offspring of *Lüzu tan* parents that flourished in the Pearl River Delta from the late Qing dynasty until the early Republican period. Not only were they founded without any direct link to the official lineage of the Quanzhen order, but they also retain the appearance and characteristics of their *Lüzu tan* parent institutions.<sup>58</sup> These characteristics include the institutional appearance of “Immortal

<sup>50</sup> On the history of *Nahm-mouh* Daoist Halls in Quanzhou city in the Republican period, see footnote 26.

<sup>51</sup> According to the Zhengyi tradition, one becomes a *Nahm-mouh* Daoist master by following one’s father or by being introduced to the profession by other relatives or friends and becoming an apprentice in a *Nahm-mouh* Daoist hall.

<sup>52</sup> The purpose of the Daoist ritual for the dead (requiem services), known as the *gongde* or *Zhai* fast ritual, is to absolve and purify the souls of the deceased so that they can ascend to the realm of the immortals without going through the torments of hell.

<sup>53</sup> *Tao Mind* (The Hong Kong Daoist Association Bulletin), No. 1 (1979), 8.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 25 (2002), 15.

<sup>55</sup> Although Pengying xianguang is known as a Daoist temple of the orthodox lineage of Longmen originally built for the “hidden cultivation” of disciples, it is not evident that the temple, which is devoted to the worship of the Patriarch Lü, was a monastic temple with resident clerics.

<sup>56</sup> Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 16-17. In addition, You Zian (ed.), *Daofeng bainian* (The Hundred Years of Hong Kong Daoism and Daoist Temples) (Hong Kong, 2002), 28, claims that out of the fifty-eight Daoist altars to which he had paid visits, twenty-four were dedicated to worship of Patriarch Lü.

<sup>57</sup> Monica Esposito, “Longmen Taoism in Qing China: Doctrinal Ideal and Local Reality,” 191.

<sup>58</sup> According to tradition, the Daoist temple of Pengying xianguang was founded by a Daoist abbot of the Sanyuan gong, and Qingsong guan and Wande zhishanshe were founded by Daoist priests whose masters were abbots of Quanzhen temples in the mountain of Luofu or Quanzhou city. Despite such connections, we have no evidence to prove that these temples were established on the basis of Quanzhen tradition, such as having an organized monastery, a joining ordination platform, and taking Quanzhen’s precept program. For more on Quanzhen monasteries, see Yoshioka Yoshitoyo, “Taoist Monastic Life” and Vincent Goossaert, “The Quanzhen Clergy, 1700-1950.”

Halls” (*Xianyuan*),<sup>59</sup> lay membership, the importance of spirit-writing, charitable work, and the printing of morality books.

For instance, the Daoist altar of Yunhe shanfang has a founding pattern that echoes those of *Lüzu* altars in Guangdong, namely that they were founded because of divine messages taken through spirit-writing. The histories of most of these Daoist altars are preserved in the *Baosong baohe ji*.<sup>60</sup>

Before communist rule in mainland China, Hong Kong Daoist organizations were usually established only for small groups of members (*dizi*), even though some of them allowed the public to pay respects and give offerings to the deities that appeared in the center of their sanctuaries or altars. New members of these Daoist communities were initiated into the religion through recommendations from old members, and during initiation rituals that were known as crowning (*zanguan*) were given special Daoist names. Finally, they entered into a special master-disciple relationship with Patriarch Lü. Sometimes, the formal discipleship depended on the approval of the patronized deities as manifested by spirit-writing.<sup>61</sup> The social duties of discipleship included the practice of virtue and involvement in the affairs and running of the altars and charitable work.

As already noted, many Daoist altars in Hong Kong were offspring of parent altars in Guangdong, and they were mainly founded when Guangdong faced sociopolitical difficulties, especially in the 1920s when civil war broke out, and in the 1950s after the Second World War and the advent of communist rule. As representatives, Baodao tang was founded in 1921, Pengying xianguan in 1929, Yunquan xianguang in 1944, Qingsong guan in 1949, and Yuanxuan xueyuan in 1953. During their founding periods, disciples of these Daoist institutions initially kept very much to themselves. However, with the strengthening of communist rule in mainland China and the gradual industrial development of Hong Kong after the 1970s, Hong Kong Daoist temples and altars gradually opened their doors to the population and involved themselves in local affairs.<sup>62</sup> Many temples and altars transformed from private communities of believers into public charitable organizations, which had to be registered with the government as limited companies.

However, many of the Daoist organizations that celebrate the cult of Lüzu in Hong Kong today are still small. In general, each community has only a few hundred registered disciples. As can be seen in Table 1, the number of new Qingsong guan disciples in the last ten years is not very significant.<sup>63</sup> With regard to the interests and motivation of many devotees in Daoist organizations, their gathering activities mainly include the cult of spirit-

<sup>59</sup> *Chongyang xianyuan* (Immortal Hall of Purified Yang), the first known Daoist altar devoted to the cult of the Patriarch Lü, was established by a Daoist priest of the mountain of Luofu in Hong Kong during 1881. See Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 172.

<sup>60</sup> B. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Chang*, 133, provides the following translation of the founding history of the Daoist altar of Yunhe shanfang by means of spirit-writing: “(Since 1952) Master Ho Ch’i-chung was stationed at P’ao-tao-t’ang at number 15, T’ai-pai-t’ai, third floor, and acted as the fu-chi medium there... In the winter of 1958, the P’ao-tao-t’ang purchased its own property at North Point and intended to move the temple there. By coincidence, a certain Mr. Liang Jo-fu, the son-in-law of Mr. Chao Tsun-ssu (the founder of P’ao-tao-t’ang), came to the temple with his wife in order to seek for cure of their son, Chao-ming. After ten days, his was cured... The couple has long been devoted to Taoism... Therefore, Patriarch Lü Ch’un-yang sent them a message, saying, ‘The present site, number 15, T’ai-pai-t’ai, third floor, is the pride of the spirits of mountains and rivers, the favourite dwelling place of immortals and gods. For decades, it has been the source of religious traditions. Now, there is an opportunity (to acquire this site), why not retain it as a place of worship where one may practise cultivation and which may benefit the people?’ Whereupon, following Lü Tsu’s order, the couple rented the entire floor for the purpose of housing the gods so that the people may benefit from them. At the beginning of the first month, 1959, Lü Tsu named the temple *Yunhe shanfang*.”

<sup>61</sup> Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 86.

<sup>62</sup> B. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Chang*, 96.

<sup>63</sup> For more on history of Qingsong guan, see B. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Chang*, 129-132.

writing, temple festivals and the birthdays of temple deities, and ritual assemblies (*fahui*), including the ritual of recitation of litanies (*baichan*) and the ritual for the dead (*gongde*).

The rapid increase in average yearly income in Hong Kong was one of the key factors behind the more established Daoist temples taking on increased responsibilities from the 1970s. When Hong Kong's economy began to prosper, people were willing to spend more money on Daoist liturgical ceremonies, including rituals for the dead, Hungry Ghosts festivals ("Middle Origin Festivals"), and *Taiping qingjiao* festivals. Most of the *Taiping qingjiao* festivals now take place in the villages in the New Territories.<sup>64</sup> Because *jiao* festivals (communal sacrifices) are integrated into local society, Zhengyi Nahm-mouh masters are usually hired to perform the rituals on such occasions.<sup>65</sup> Apart from the *jiao* festivals in the New Territories, all Daoist temples and altars provide ritual services to their own devotees and the general public on the basis of payment.

During the Hungry Ghosts festival, although the primary aim of the Daoist ritual for the dead is to absolve and purify the souls of all orphan demons in the netherworld, some Hong Kong Daoist organizations now offer an additional liturgical service for the ancestors of the living, which is called "complement paying for ancestors" (*fujian*).<sup>66</sup> By doing so, they increase their yearly incomes. The 1988 income report of the Dongshan tan altar reveals that its total yearly income was HK\$1,960,039.12, of which HK\$572,848.50 was gained by providing ritual services.<sup>67</sup>

Other important sources of temple income are the fees charged for the display of ancestral tablets and the deposit of relics by the public. Such services indicate a change of the nature of these institutions.<sup>68</sup> In 1962, Qingsong guan was the first Daoist temple in Hong Kong to set up a Qinghua Hall inside the temple in Tun Man. In 1968, Qingsong guan built an independent hall in which the relics of the deceased could be deposited and honored by the living.

In 1970, Pengying xianguan and Yunxuan xueyuan constructed similar halls to serve the same purpose, and the practice became popular thereafter.<sup>69</sup> Indeed, the prevalence of this kind of religio-economic practice in Daoist organizations illustrates the way in which they have changed in the context of Hong Kong's social development. Scholars of Hong Kong *Lüzü* Daoism generally come to the conclusion that, "the practice of displaying ancestral tablets or depositing relics with a Buddhist or Taoist temple has become very popular in Hong Kong because of the shortage of land allocated for the use for burials."<sup>70</sup>

Such income generating services have also pushed Daoist organizations onto the public stage. Coming to identifying themselves more as charitable societies in a modern sense, major Daoist organizations such as Qingsong guan, Pengying xianguan, Yunxuan xue yuan, and Sese yuan have all contributed to the opening of many new kindergartens, primary schools, and secondary schools in Hong Kong. There are now five secondary schools and seven primary schools directly run by the Hong Kong Daoist Association.<sup>71</sup> In addition to developing educational institutions, all of the aforementioned organizations have established new social service centers for old people, orphanages, clinics, and study-rooms for students. Hong Kong Daoist organizations may well have been transplanted from parent institutions in

<sup>64</sup> Tanaka Issei, "The *Jiao* Festival in Hong Kong and the New Territories," in *The Turning of the Tide*, 271-298.

<sup>65</sup> For more on the study of *Jiao* festivals conducted by Nahm-mouh Daoist masters in the New Territories villages of Hong Kong, see Tanka Issei, *Chūgoku saishi engeki kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppansha, 1981), and id., *Chūgoku gōson saishi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppansha, 1989).

<sup>66</sup> Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 131-134.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 148.

<sup>68</sup> B. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Chang*, 96.

<sup>69</sup> Shiga Ichiko, *Kindai Chūgoku no shyamanisumu to dōkyō*, 146-147.

<sup>70</sup> B. Tsui, *Taoist Tradition and Chang*, 97.

<sup>71</sup> You Zian, (ed.), *Daofeng bainian*, 50.

the Pearl River Delta, but they are now working to develop Daoism with Hong Kong characteristics.

### **Conclusion**

Although most Daoist organizations in Hong Kong were founded during the early twentieth century as offspring of parent institutions in the Pearl River Delta, they are now changing their nature and integrating with the Hong Kong community. Yet, they have also contributed to the revival of Daoism in mainland China since the 1980s. They constantly raise millions of Hong Kong dollars for repairing and reconstructing Daoist temples in China, especially in Guangdong. They also invest large amounts of money in public works at the district level in Guangdong, funding such projects as schools, universities, hospitals, the improvement of village education and life, and welfare work

## **Karl-Fritz Daiber: Local Buddhist Organisations in Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Nepal**

The local formation of religious organisations has become a global phenomenon. This can be noticed especially in religions that traditionally did not focus on the formalisation of lay communities – like Buddhism.

In the following, I will outline the formation of Buddhist congregations in four Asian countries. They have been selected by chance, rather according to my possibilities and interests. The comparison helps, though, to point out typical developments.

In **Korea**, Buddhism goes far back in history, yet has regained vitality nowadays. The number of people that consider themselves Buddhists is almost equal to that of Christians (each 22% of the whole population, according to official statements; 6.1% of the Christians are Catholics. Source: U.S. Department of State (2001), 5586.htm, 02.09.02). Thus, Buddhism is a large religious community in Korea that is mainly challenged by the Korean Christianity.

Ethnically, Korea is homogenous, as Japan, yet different than several other Eastern Asian countries, including the People's Republic of China.

In **Taiwan**, Buddhism holds a leading position as well, together with Daoism. The Christian denominations represent a minority of about 3.5% (ibid. 5717 htm). In ethnic respect, it is remarkable that 70 % of the native inhabitants of Taiwan (2% of the whole population) are Christians. Other than that, the population of Taiwan is of Chinese extraction, thus also relatively homogenous (Story: 19). Not at least, the example of Taiwan proves relevant for religious development since it represents a democratic Chinese society, in contrast to the People's Republic.

**Malaysia** is a distinctive Islamic state. Although freedom of worship is guaranteed, Islam, more precisely: the Sunnite Islam represents the official religion. The Sharia is not applied to Non-Muslims; only in religious law, it is generally valid. For Muslims, it is almost impossible to convert. In many respects, Muslims are privileged, for instance in social life. Statistically, almost 60% of the population are Muslims, 8 % are Buddhists, 8 % Christians, 6 % Hindus, 5 % follow Chinese religions, such as Confucianism, Taoism etc. In spite of the leading role of Islam, Malaysia also shows multireligious aspects, due to the immigration of Chinese and Indian ethnic groups in the Malayan history. Multireligiosity is related to ethnic diversity. Islam is mainly supported by the Malaysian. The state legislation considers the Islamic faith as part of the Malayan identity, i.e. not just as an exclusively religious, yet also socio-cultural characteristic (ibid. 5604.htm). The most important ethnic members of Buddhism are the Chinese people. Their percentage, like that of the Indians as well as that of the native inhabitants, changes remarkably from one province to another. (Baedecker, 4-33).

Finally, **Nepal** is a Hindu country. Hinduism is not state religion but Nepal considers itself a „Hindu Kingdom“ (ibid. 5669.htm). 85 to 90 % of the population are regarded as Hindus. 5 - 10 % of the population are Buddhists, 2-5 % Muslims and under 2 % are Christians. Although officially, there is a freedom of worship, not even the Buddhists can act freely. Hindus and Buddhists normally regard their shrines as honourable places and visit them mutually. Beyond this cultural synthesis, also the Buddhists have a hard time: The more clearly Buddhism differs from Hinduism, the more it exposes itself to public control and even disapproval. This is the least true for an ethnically-based Buddhism, such as the Tibetan Buddhism, supported by monasteries and Tibetan refugees.

Concerning the situations that are apt for further examination, thus two of them show a „Majority-Buddhism“. „Majority-Buddhism“ address not necessarily the quantitative majority of the respective people, but a type of socially accepted religion that is strongly supported by the population and integrated into the public system of a society – as in Korea and Taiwan. The other two examples show an established „Minority-Buddhism“, which is mostly

supported by ethnic minorities. In Malaysia, Buddhism faces Islam as the religion of the majority, in Nepal Hinduism.

Which forms of organisation can now be distinguished? To answer this question I represent some casestudies. They are based on journeys in the years of 1998 – 2001 where I collected written material, did interviews and made observations. I talked with professionals in the field of social science and religious studies, as well as with leading persons of organisations and temples.

### **South Korea**

Today's Korean Buddhism is represented by 19 orders and sects, the diversity of which is founded on old traditions. Among the current orders, the oldest and most important one is the Chogye. In the 1930es, some splits happened, and especially between 1945 and 1975, several new sects were founded. In the late 1980es, more new foundings occurred, the last registered one in 1991 (Korean Buddhist Chogye Order: 26. The U.S. Department of State report knows about 38 orders in 2001). All these new foundings of sects are based on temples and their respective communities of monks or nuns. In general, each community focuses on a particular aspect of Buddhist tradition and a consequential life style. So Buddhism can nevertheless appear as a relative unity, even though the organisational border lines gain importance.

Today, the „sects“ represent organised temple communities which are subordinate to a central religious leadership and economically autonomous (at least the greater ones). Buddhist lay organisations are linked to the religious communities of the monks and nuns. It is remarkable, though, that not all current lay organisations are close to an order; some also regard themselves as „over-denominational“.

If they become a member of a lay organisation, is up to the individual believer. To be considered a Buddhist, as well by the temples' institutions, one has to visit a temple occasionally, at least once a year, and has to try to live according to the Buddhist teaching in a popular form. Thus one can distinguish a culturally vague Buddhism in accordance with the traditional constitution of social life from an organised temple Buddhism of the monks and nuns. As a modern development, the organised lay Buddhism takes places in between; it is partly linked with the temples, partly independent.

Above all, my studies address the Chogye order. I visited its administration centre at the Chogyesa (temple of Chogye) in Seoul (interview with an administration manager), the main temple Kumsansa in the province of Chollabukdo (interview with the monk in charge of the mission work) and the Buddhist Hwaom Academy in Chonju (interview with the monk leader).

As another order, I chose the Ch'ont'ae order, that is mainly active in social work and that separated itself off in 1967. I visited the Konmunsa (under construction; interview with an administration official) and two times the main temple Kuinsa close to Tanyang.

Today, the Chogye order shows a clear organisational structure that is represented in form of an organigramm: There is a monk leader, supported by a council of elders. On the administrative level, six main departments exist, including the jurisdiction. Further areas especially deal with the order life; there also exists a Buddhist charitable institution.

In regional respect, the order is structured into 25 main temple areas. On the level of the main temples, departments or committees deal with administrative and building issues.

The related lay organisations correspond with the temple organisation: the lay community of a particular temple represents the lowest level, on the regional level, there is the organisation of the temple province and on the national level the organisation of the Chogye order as a whole. If one raises the question to which extent Buddhism has become/still becomes a membership-based organisation, the lay organisations prove particularly interesting.

For its catchment area as a local temple, the Kumsansa assumes 30 to 40 000 members registered in its lay organisation. Aims of this organisation are the financial support of the temple, social activities such as visiting services in hospitals and for soldiers, children's and elderly people's care and „ecological tasks“.

The main temple has established academies in the bigger cities of the province, i.e. in Chonju, Iksan, Kusan und Namwon, that aim at increasing the educational work for lay Buddhists.

According to my observations, there exists at least a tendency for Buddhism to shift from the mountains to the urban centres. The religious education of the lay Buddhists in the worship services and in the different Sunday meetings gains relevance. Hereby the meeting is understood and performed as congregational gathering. One tries to practice mutual responsibility. Social activities, sometimes linked to missionary interests, play an important part. The influence of Protestantism onto the practice of worship and the creating of sacred space cannot be denied.

Beside the Hwaom Academy, which is related to Kumsansa, Chonju has a second Buddhist academy, the Chonbuk Bulkyo Academy, founded and presided by Kang Kon-Ki, professor of philosophy at Chonbuk National University in Chonju. This academy is not linked with any order. In an interview in 1998, Professor Kang assumed that there are about 150 of such free Buddhist academies in Korea. 250 „students„ study at his academy, half of them as Non-Buddhists who are just interested in Buddhist teaching. In general, the syllabi of the Chonbuk Academy is quite similar to that of the Hwaom Academy. Professor Kang pointed out that the academy has to be understood also as a kind of congregational formation. This contributes to the importance of social activities. The members of the free academy are relatively young, at the age of 40 on average. The upper middle class is over-represented.

In spite of these new approaches it may not be overlooked that they are not representative for the Korean Buddhism as a whole. Yet developments like that can be noticed not only in the form of free academies or in the temples of the Chogye order, but also in other ones, e.g. the Ch'ont'ae order (Unfortunately, FritsVos (Die Religionen Koreas) mentions nothing about the modern Ch'ont'ae order than its name).

The big new construction of the Konmunsa in Seoul I visited in 1998 reminds rather of an elegant conference centre than of a temple. The real temple building is not missing, but is on the seventh floor. The temple is conventionally shaped, yet out of concrete. The whole complex demonstrates how in Buddhist religious practice, educative, meditative and cultic aspects penetrate each other. The will for public performance with the most modern means of communication is especially striking. Several other temples in Seoul, Pusan etc. belong to the order. The headquarters is Kuinsa, a temple area in the Sobaeck mountains, close to Tanyang. Meanwhile (2001) the highest temple there is inaugurated, too, which is dedicated the order's and temple's founder, Sangwol Wongak.

In its self-representations, the order refers to Mahayana Buddhist traditions that go back to the 5th century a.D. Thus the work of Sangwol Wongak (who died in 1974) is described as reference to particularly venerable traditions. Yet exactly herein the order sees its contribution to coping with modernity. His three great aims are described like that:

#### **„Establishment of Patriotic Buddhism**

- Dedication to the Renaissance of Korean Culture
- Contributions to Social Works and Programs
- Positive Participation in the Movement to Purify Society
- Efforts to Re-establish the Morals of the People

#### **Promotion of Buddhism in Everyday Life**

- To Transform „Reward-motivated Buddhism„, to a Buddhism which Promotes
- Meritorious Activities

- To Transform Buddhism with a Limited Vision to a More Productive Form of Buddhism
- To Move to a Buddhism that Emphasises Concrete Practice
- In Other Words: To Practice the Ideals contained in the Buddhas' s Dharma

### **Establishment of Popular Buddhism**

- To Transform „Temple Buddhism,, into a Buddhism of the People
- To Move from Monastic Buddhism to a more Lay-orientated Buddhism
- To Transform Pessimistic Buddhism into a Buddhism that Stresses the Salvation of the world.“

(Kuinsa- Head Temple of the Korean Buddhist Ch'ont'ae Order)

The Kuinsa temple was founded in 1945 and Ch'ont'ae Order was registered as an autonomous Buddhist order in 1967. In 1996, it had nearly 1,7 m well-organised members. Thus the organigramm shows a strict hierarchy, yet on all levels, from the national one to the level of each single temple, there are lay representatives who formalise a say. According to the programme, these lay activities are high-ranking. (ibid.). In general, promoting a distinct Buddhist practice is the aim, which is supported by clear rules of membership.

The processes of transformation in Korean Buddhism can be described as the genesis of membership-based organisations on a formal level; they start at three different points:

- organising the „supporters“ of traditional temples and their congregational formation in the urban centres,
- teaching-oriented congregational education independently from any temple,
- finally the framework of new orders, open for modernity and with reform claims

### **Taiwan**

The observations in Taiwan are somewhat similar to those in Korea, yet partly more distinct and with its own particularities. One must not forget that my studies refer to urban centres, while Buddhism in rural regions is probably still more traditional: a network of local temples offers religious supply to the Buddhist population, above all concerning the remembrance of dead relative.

In Taipei, both Daoism and Buddhism are characterised by an intense congregational life. Temples offer much more than just rituals. In Buddhist temples Dharma meetings, combined with the exegesis of Buddhist writings, are relevant, as well as the religious education of children and adolescents, charitable activities, cultivating community life. Especially this last perspective seems to play an important part. So congregations with clearly defined membership and regular fees group around the temple. Even the places around the temple show the importance of these lay communities: Bigger and smaller community buildings are bustling with life, particularly women are active in a lot of different positions in the temple area. There are also the offices of the temple administration.

Mainly two Buddhist organisations are well-known in Taiwan: The World Religions Museum Foundation and the Tzu Chi Foundation. In the spring of 1999, I visited their centres in Taipei.

The World Religions Museum Foundation was initiated by the Dharma master Hsin Tao (born in Burma in 1948). The Wu-sheng monastery is its headquarters, a spiritual centre with 50 branches in Taiwan and beyond. In Taipei is an important study and working centre. When I visited it, the museum was not yet completed; meanwhile it is inaugurated as a centre for interreligious dialogue. The founder aims at promoting the mutual understanding among the different religious traditions of humankind. The museum has a high number of international

contacts. Hsin Tao himself practices Zen meditation and intends to teach an everyday-life Zen.

End of the 1990es, one reckoned on about 4 m believers, not knowing how committedly the individual might be a participant. In any case, the work in Taipei is supported by many volunteers, above all women. The master is adored, almost like a deity. The brochures describe his call to become an outstanding religious character. The work of the foundation could only arise because of his charismatic work. So it becomes clear that the self-description of the foundation is not totally appropriate: A new order has been formed, admittedly with a rather functional dissociation from other temples and with an efficient administrative staff that consequentially uses volunteers.

The Tzu Chi Foundation (founded in 1966) shows very similar structures, yet with another target. The foundation goes back to the female Dharma Master Cheng Yen (born in 1937) who followed a very individual path to Buddhism and founded her own community at an early point. Her interest in a charitable Buddhism is rooted not least in her encounter with charitable Catholicism, e.g. with Mother Teresa. When she met three Catholic nuns who wanted Cheng Yen to convert to Catholicism, she finally decided to strive for serving the needy from a Buddhist background.

Her teaching and intention are described as follows:

„The Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Association is a Buddhist organisation in modern Taiwan. As such, it holds no doctrinal position over or against Chinese Buddhism as a whole. The Association places a special emphasis on charitable giving (one of the traditional Six Perfections of Mahayana Buddhism) as the key to the religious life, and promotes the Confucian conception of individual morality as the foundation of a good society. It has also made some modifications in religious practice in an effort to meet the needs of Buddhist laypeople in contemporary society. In particular, in addition to the Five Lay Percepts (not to kill, steal, engage in sexual immorality, lie, or use intoxicants), which have been part of Buddhist practice since the time of the Buddha, the Association enjoins an additional five precepts: not to smoke, not to chew betel nut, not to gamble, to be filial sons and good husbands and fathers, and to buckle their safety belts when driving a car or wear a helmet when riding a motorcycle.” (Tzu Chi Compassion Relief Foundation. Concerning her teachings also cf. Cheng Yen.)

Meanwhile, the foundation has over 4 m members, also in other Asian countries and in America. In Taiwan, it maintains hospitals, a Junior College for nurses' education and a Medical College. Buddhist pastoral care and medical healing shall be applied in an integrated way.

The centre in Taipei is an administration centre. It houses the information department, a bookstore and a large assembly hall with a statue of the Kuanjin. The founder comes to Taipei once a month; a lot of people gather around her. At New Year's celebration 1999 the hall was filled four times, and each one had personally received a little gift from the leader. She is adored by her followers almost like a deity.

The centre is affiliated with a social counselling centre with professionals for the neighbourhood.

In this foundation, there are a lot of volunteers, too, at the centre itself and as procurators procuring of donations. Especially women do regularly collect donations and fees in her respective surroundings. By this, a great amount of money is guaranteed. (When I visited the Finance Department in Taipei, I saw an elderly women delivering just collected money. She wore a blue robe. All Chinese employees generally wear a specific uniform – a sign of the extent of organisation).

The collected money is not just of benefit for the foundation's activities in Taiwan, but also abroad. It is intended to create a personal relationship between the giver and the receiver in order to experience the mutuality of giving and receiving.

In general, the direct contact among each other and with the local context is considered to be essential. The members are organised according to this principle: 3000 commissioners take care of townships, each with 20 to 30 members (Yu Sen-lun). Thus, for instance quick and direct aid can be offered.

A folder of 1997 summarises:

„The Love of Tzu Chi

Why is the world today in such turmoil? Why do so many people pass their lives in pain and fear? The world suffers from a deficiency of love. Master Cheng Yen teaches us to use the religious spirit of compassion to purify human hearts and to wash away the sickness of the world, so that all living creature may receive more good fortune. By putting the Buddha's teachings into practice and following the Master's 'Just Do It'-philosophy, we strive to bring the Pure Land into our world and deliver all creatures from suffering." (Ten Thousand Lotus Blossoms of the Heart - Dharma Master Cheng Yen and the Tzu Chi World, 2nd ed. 1999 Taipei)

These two Buddhist organisations go back to charismatic founders. Cheng Yen, founder of the Tzu Chi Foundation, was induced by the Catholic charitable activities, the founder of the World Religions Museum focused his spiritual work on the interreligious dialogue. Thus it is possible to conclude that both foundations feel obliged to an interreligious context, while simultaneously adhering Buddhist traditions. Seemingly, this is the manner in which „modern“ ways of religious orientation can be pursued. This is also true for a religious faith that concentrates on its everyday-life practice and transcends a merely ritualised spirituality. Above that, it is striking to which extent the responsibility for the world is at stake.

Both foundations are founded by charismatic clergy members which represent the essential leaders. Other than that, the membership is clearly organised, partly even the local groups' formation (Tzu Chi Foundation). Many members work as volunteers.

Both Taiwanese foundations are conspicuously internationally oriented and calculated for a global context. On the other hand, at least the Tzu Chi foundation draws its members and supporters mainly from a Chinese cultural context. This points to the relevance of globally spread ethnic groups for constituting forms of action for a global society.

## Malaysia

Buddhism in Malaysia presents diverse organisation forms, both on the national, the provincial and the local level. One can structure the single organisations according to their different intentions:

There are organisations that represent religious centres with a spiritual leadership and assign themselves to different trends of Buddhism.

There are temples that have differentiated their functions in an organisational dimension; e.g. the Than Hsiang Temple in Bayan Lepas on the island of Penang that is devoted to both charitable, educative and pastoral tasks ([www.thansiang.org](http://www.thansiang.org)).

There are organisations that predominantly address a certain social subgroup, e.g. the Young Buddhists who are active on all levels.

Not least, there are associations of lay people that represent local congregational formations independently from a certain temple.

The „Malaysian Buddhist Association“, founded in 1959, functions as an umbrella organisation. It includes a public membership (including temples and Buddhist Societies), 485

units and 25,000 individual members. Its aim is described like that: „To promote unity and friendship amongst Malaysian Buddhists; to serve Buddha’s Percepts; to propagate the Dharma; to promote social welfare works; to uplift human morality and to foster racial harmony (Malaysian Buddhist Association).“ On the national level, the association is active in religious politics. It represents Buddhist interests against distinctly pro-Islamic religious politics, and endeavours to cooperate with the non-Islamic religions of Malaysia. The Malaysian Buddhist Association is also represented on the provincial and the local level and often works as a local Buddhist congregation.

In the following, I will exemplarily present a Buddhist lay congregation I visited in Georgetown on the island of Penang in the spring of 2001.

Penang is situated in the North of Western Malaysia. Its capital Georgetown still shows clear signs of its British colonial past, which is also the reason for its striking ethnic diversity: 59 % of the population are of Chinese extraction, 32 % are Malays. Arabs, Indians, Eurasians also live here (Baedeker, 181f.).

„The Penang Buddhist Association“, that I will deal with in the following, must not be confused with the „Malaysian Buddhist Association“, also working in Penang. When I visited it, its buildings showed a vivid congregational life, several groups were present. I interviewed the administrative director who passed a brochure to me that had been published on the occasion of the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the association (The Penang Buddhist Association, 70th Anniversary, 1925 - 1995). I refer to this brochure.

The Association was founded and registered in 1925 by a group of enthusiastic Buddhists who intended, „to study the Buddhist doctrine that is free from the defective influence of local superstitions and their degrading practices,, (Chan Seong Lok, Brief History). It is obliged to the Mahayana tradition, but also open towards Theravada. The spiritual counsellors are invited by the leaders of the congregation, partly for single ministries, partly for a continuous participation. In the beginnings, a monk from Sri Lanka accompanied the group.

The central aim is to gather people with a high interest in Buddhism as a community. This is why prayer services and weekend lectures are so important. The Association is also very committed to religious education, namely in kindergarten (1995: 700 children), Sunday school and youth groups. In the field of charitable activities, a Free Medical Aid Service based on both Chinese and Western medicine exists. Normally, this service is supported by physicians who are members of the Association. Poor people are provided with food, donations are given to temples.

In short, this is a lay Buddhism with an autonomous congregational formation which feels primarily obliged to spiritual life, but also in relation to an educative and charitable responsibility.

#### *Two anecdotal supplements*

*On my walk through the building, I ask my companion about ways of non-Buddhist practice and about the importance of Daoist-Buddhist syncretism. He replies that he does know any of such offers – he assumed, though, that individual members of the congregation also worship Daoist deities.*

*In Penang, I talked to a Buddhist taxi driver: If people associated with a specific Buddhist community considered themselves to be the better Buddhists. They were probably very religious people, he answered, yet he did not want to belong to them. Religion did not change the everyday-life, but would even lead to war. While driving, he would collect old cardboard boxes to deliver them at a dump. The collected money would come in useful for poor patients. As if to prove his statement, he ask me to allow for a little detour: he wanted to deliver cardboard boxes from his luggage hold.*

The Penang Buddhist Association is not the only one of its kind. In congregational formations like that, the interest in an everyday-life faith is joined with social responsibility, an interest that characterises the Malaysian Buddhist Association in general. Its congregations are no „priestly“ congregations. At most, monks are advisers, but never the hierarchical leaders of the community. This sort of lay Buddhism understands itself as Reform Buddhism rejecting religious syncretism. It has to be emphasised that in Malaysia, groups like that arose in the 1920es already. It needs to be clarified to which extent the minority situation, English examples of charity, the Christian congregational organisation have influenced their genesis.

## Nepal

Nepal is a „Hindu Kingdom“ – Hinduism is virtually a state religion, in every case the privileged religion. According to official statements, about 90 % of the whole population are Hindu (cf. the statements of the State Department above).

The following investigations were carried out in Nepal, July of 2001. Apart from observations and evaluating written material, I interviewed four persons: Loke Darshan, President of the Buddhist Association „Dharmodaya Sabba“ and one of the Vice Presidents of the „World Fellowship of Buddhists“; the sociologist Krishna B. Bhattachan Ph.D., Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu; Ashok Man Shakya, Vice President and Rajesh Shakya, General Secretary of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA, Nepal) and Assisting General Secretary of the World Fellowship of Buddhist Youth (WFBY HQ.Thailand).

In opposition to the state statistics, the Buddhist Association estimate over 56 % Buddhists in Nepal. Dr. Bhattachan also assumes that the number of Buddhist is clearly higher than the officially stated 5 to 10 %. These results referred to a census with the criterion „Do you worship Ganesha?“ for belonging to Hinduism. Through this, all the Buddhists that practice a syncretist popular religion were classed with the Hindus. The majority of Buddhist is oriented towards popular religion; the percentage of 5 to 10 % could be assigned to the convinced Buddhists, those who are Buddhist because of their ethnic background (like the Tibetans), those who are members of the Buddhist clergy and those who are members of a Buddhist lay organisation.

Religious organisations are wide-spread in Nepal, also Hindu ones or of some tribal religions (Bhattachan). The interest in organisational formation can be explained by its functions like adhering traditions and protecting identity. Concerning the problem of freedom of worship, the President of the Buddhist Association said: We do not have any. This statement is based on Buddhist experiences, it is the more true for Christian groupings.

The Buddhist organisations resemble the ones in Malaysia. In Nepal, institutions for education and training are common. The Dharmodaya Sabba and the Young Men’s Buddhist Association, for example, represent membership-based organisations. In general, the international networking of Nepalese organisations stands out.

The Young Men’s Buddhist Association resides in a poor district of Lalipur/Kathmandu. A small Buddhist temple prompted the Association to build its centre here. Beside the office and teaching rooms, the building site of a private school is located that should be opened in 2001. The responsible members are between 30 and 40 years old, usually they belong to the college-educated middle class. All tasks are fulfilled by volunteers. 700 people are valid members. They pay a small fee; other than that, the Association receives donations from sponsors. There are no state contributions; on the contrary, a registration fee has to be paid every year anew. At the same time, bribes become due.

The aim is to promote a peaceful attitude in life among young people and to facilitate spiritual interchange. Each Saturday, lay people or guest monks invite for a dharma teaching and an introduction into Vipassana meditation.

Besides religious activities the humanitarian ones play an important part, as well as the free medical supply for poor people in the urban neighbourhood and in villages.

A periodical informs valid and informational members about the Association's work, such as the above-mentioned school project and about a variety of international contacts. The Association maintains relationships with Thailand, China, Japan and other countries. On the national level, it is associated with the Dharmodaya Sabha and the World Fellowship of Buddhist Youth. Incidentally, Buddhist youth organisations have an over hundred-year old history starting with Americans of Japanese origin (cf. The Young American Buddhists of Jodo Shinshu). The YMCA served as a model.

The Dharmodaya Sabha came into being outside of Nepal in the 1940es already and was officially founded as an Nepalese association in 1950. According to Loke Darshan, the organisation is structured into 75 districts, subdivided into „branches“. Four youth organisations are affiliated. The aim of their work is the distribution of tolerance, the promotion of unity among the different Buddhist movements, the spreading of Buddhism, the mobilisation of sponsors and the realisation of a socially responsible Buddhism. This association simultaneously includes Buddhist monks, nuns and lay people.

The Dharmodaya Sabha is associated with the World Fellowship of Buddhists, forms a regional centre of this association which has its headquarters in Bangkok and was founded in 1950. Article 12 of the Constitution determines which organisations may apply for membership:

„12.1 The applying organisation represents a specific group of Buddhists in appreciable number...“

Within a region, several organisations can be accepted as regional centres. The important point:

„12.3 It has well been established locally, with reasonable good standing.“ (World Fellowship of Buddhists). The local reference is not to be understood too narrowly. The Young Men's Buddhist Association in Lalipur, for instance, works primarily on a local level, but has also distinct translocal activities.

In the form of the World Fellowship of Buddhists, one encounters a globally active Buddhist organisation, based on membership with regional centres that work both on a national and local level.

## Summary

The presented examples of four countries show the relevance of membership-based organisations in current Asian Buddhism.

These organisations can be temple-oriented, or can be initiated by a charismatic spiritual leader and thus represent a kind of new founding of a sect or an order, yet they may also build on lay initiatives and thus unite groupings of convinced Buddhists on an organisational level.

A certain recollection of plain teaching is central, in particular the lay movements can be characterised by an anti-syncretistic element. The spiritual recollection, though, is orthodox, just focused on a single perspective, but open for different approaches.

The groups' activities include practices of charitable responsibility, partly understood as responsibility for the national society and the global community. Religious faith is supposed to become part of everyday-life, instead of being limited to religious rituals. This can be described as „modern Buddhism“.

The relation to clergy is not the same in all organisations. Some are foundations of monks or nuns. Lay congregations in the narrow sense redefine the relation: They feel called by the community and serve for a more or less long time.

Also the global network differs. Partly it does not exist at all. The group is part of a local society, particularly the membership-based organisations of local temples. Partly the

organised communities act globally on the basis of branches that are dependent on the headquarters. Finally the local, autonomous groups can be united in a network-like association that allows for a lot of international contacts.

The problem of the Nepalese religions' statistics shows exemplarily that convinced Buddhists seeking for organised membership represent a small grouping within the whole spectrum of Buddhism. The most common Buddhist orientation in Asia is a Culture Buddhism that is interactively related to the respective religious contexts in rituals and philosophy of life, as long as it is itself open for a syncretist religious practice.

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**Jamal Malik: Local forms of religious organisation as structural modernisation. Impacts on religious community-building and globalisation**  
Traditional Islamic Learning and Reform in Pakistan<sup>x</sup>

In the following presentation the competition between the state and the ulama (traditional Islamic scholars) in the development of religious education in Pakistan is addressed. In doing so, reference will be made to globalization processes from within and from without, that is from a traditional, say pre-colonial, Islamic point of view, as manifest in the institutions and organizations of religious learning on the one side, and from a post-colonial stand-point, as can be seen from state-policy, on the other. It will be evident from the data presented, that there are two differing and contesting globalizations,<sup>xi</sup> connected through complex institution-building processes.

Hence, one may distinguish between two possible understandings of globalization, e.g., the intensification of a universal Islam, such as proclaimed by the policies advocated by the state and a movement towards a more or less uniform, global civilization. At the same time one can discern different positions Muslim communities may have in various types of contemporary globalization processes, namely what may be called positions as (co-) actor, as re-actor, or as victim, such as is the case with Islamic scholars and their places of learning, the madrasa (the Arabic word for school).

Similarly, both the dynamics of globalization and localization and the complicated — but not necessarily problematic — relation of Islam and modernity has to be taken into account. To be sure, these concepts are characterized by a combination of continuity and change, or a combination of transformation and permanence. In dealing with these issues, I will try to relate the data to the context of religious community-building and jihad, the holy struggle.

#### Introduction

To start with, considerable criticism has been directed towards traditional Islamic educational institutions, the madrasas, as breeding grounds of militant Islam and training camps for global jihad. The powerful perception of the supposedly unilateral inter-relatedness between these religious schools and jihad, between mullah and violence, produced and perpetuated fear in the public mind in the West. As a result, the relationship between state power and civil rights has been subjected to very severe restrictions in countries like Pakistan — and without major reactions from the public. This has enabled governments globally to push through restrictive policies in an unprecedented way.

Efforts in Pakistan and other Muslim countries to streamline madrasas into the national educational systems are not new, but they are now seen as a part of the global war on terrorism. Also in secular India, the approximately 100,000 madrasas have become subject to scrutiny and suspicion. It is evident that the majority of Muslims do not regard the madrasa as a terrorist institution. They believe it fulfils the needs of religious education and, in fact, community-building. It is therefore unsatisfactory and indeed too simplistic to equate madrasas with terrorism, as becomes evident in General Musharraf's historic speech of 12 January 2002 in which he indulges in a rather sweeping 'othering' of the ulama, reminiscent of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century colonial topos of the chaotic, unorganized, mad mullah. Even if the General appreciates religious schools as excellent welfare and educational organizations, better even than services offered by NGOs, he clearly revealed that he is influenced by the notion that religious scholars are narrow-minded and propagate hatred. The country's future, he postulated, was to be not a theocratic state but an Islamic welfare state, not marginalization but modernization, not traditionalism but reform.

To understand Musharraf's speech and his policy of crack-down, it seems proper to scan the structural, formative and normative developments in the field of Islamic education in the Indian sub-continent that have been regarded as responsible for the latest scenario.

I would like to shed some light on the background of these developments, by showing how state policies have been changing traditional education in content and form during the last decades and how autonomous religious institutions have reacted to these policies. I will also discuss the normative changes in religious education, the social and regional background of religious scholars and the latest trends resulting from state encroachment into these autochthonous institutions. The focus is thus laid on the struggle between a globalizing reform-Islam as perceived by state-authorities and Muslim avantgardists on the one hand, and the targets of change, the Islamic scholars, on the other. A short introductory note on the historical background of reform in the field of Islamic education will provide the basis for the argument of this presentation, namely that state Islam has produced a new – albeit uncontrolled – dynamics among religious scholars and their local forms of religious organization.

### Historical background

Recent studies suggest that the 18<sup>th</sup> century was a century of great cultural achievement with a new approach to life, that culminated among others, in the reform and standardization of education. Emphasis was placed on rational sciences with Islamic law, logic, philosophy, syntax and Arabic language, being important subjects. This syllabus – the *dars-e nizami* – developed by some scholars in Northern India,<sup>xiii</sup> went back to the Persian-Shiite tradition of knowledge, a tradition which had gained momentum in other Muslim empires as well, disseminated through a vast network of Islamic scholarship. Some speak of an "intellectual commerce between Turkey and the West, and also ... with Persia, and ... Mughal India". It was a shared knowledge<sup>xiii</sup> with shared history so to speak, a general education designed for functional elites.

The syllabus was, however, subject to several reforms well before the advent of nation-states on the sub-continent. Some of these changes go back to the 18th century when some pietists postulated mystical reform and the promotion of traditional, transmitted sciences. This tradition was also part of an inter-regional network, Mecca and Medina being its centres.<sup>xiv</sup>

But in the 19<sup>th</sup> century – in the wake of colonial penetration – with the introduction of new systems of education, the madrasa lost its function as a general training institute and turned into an institution exclusively for religious learning. While some groups made use of Islamic symbolism to mobilize against colonial power, others tried to change, reform or conserve it, as a means to counter colonialism. Hence, various Sunnite schools of thought emerged<sup>xv</sup>, making up for some kind of division of labor: They appealed to specific social groups and were tied to particular regions, and thereby added to the religious and societal complexity of South Asia.<sup>xvi</sup>

The various reforms, however different they may have been, were thought to be achievable only through 'modernization'. It was in this context, that modernity – as a vehicle of universally accepted ideas - came to be regarded as the opposite of – local - tradition and thus determined the fate of Muslim education. Religious institutions that did not subscribe to this development were marginalized politically and culturally but continued to provide knowledge to the majority of Muslims. This led to a dramatic societal split. It was only the recent wave of Islamization that has given the madrasa new life. While after 1947, in India, these schools were left more or less untouched by the secular state, in Pakistan, as in many other Muslim countries, the situation was quite different: political leaders have always been interested in

bringing the madrasas into the mainstream national system of education in order to try to curb autonomy.

#### State intervention

State encroachments in Pakistan became prominent fairly early, with Ayyub Khan's nationalization of religious endowments and schools during the 1960s. A first survey of religious schools was undertaken, discussing their histories, affiliations and locations and the numbers of religious students and teachers in what was then West Pakistan. Their institutional affiliation to state machinery was to be paralleled by curricular reforms which, however, aroused opposition among the representatives of religion. They therefore established umbrella organizations for religious schools – just prior to the proclamation of the 'West Pakistan Waqf Property Ordinance 1961', e.g., an ordinance to regulate religious endowments, waqf, which have been major economic sources for the madrasa. The main tasks of these umbrella organizations were to reform and to standardize their educational system, and of course, to counter state power collectively.

During Z.A. Bhutto's time Islamic scholars were able to negotiate some concessions, but it was with the advent of so-called Islamization in the late 1970s – that goes hand in hand with the global “return of religion”, that state activities touching on traditional institutions in general and centres of Islamic learning in particular took increasing effect, although most of them had been pushed to the margins of the political process before the advent of Zia al-Haqq's Islamization policy, when they regained significance partly as an alternative educational system.

The Islamization policy in Pakistan has resulted in a new dimension of curricular reform and has ushered in a new phase of institutionalization. For the first time the degrees of religious schools were put on a par with those of the formal education system and recognized by the centre – the University Grants Commission. This recognition was based on certain conditions: the students were now supposed to be taught a modernized syllabus lasting sixteen years, which meant that the religious scholars would have to follow the suggestions of the National Committee on Religious Schools established in 1979.<sup>xvii</sup> The report of the Committee suggested making

“concrete and feasible measures for improving and developing Deeni-Madrassahs along sound lines, in terms of physical facilities, curricula and syllabi, staff and equipment...so as to bring education and training at such Madrassahs *in consonance with the requirements of modern age and the basic tenets of Islam*...to expand higher education and employment opportunities for the students of the Madrassahs...integrating them with the overall educational system in the country.” (My emphasis)

The idea of this reformed, centralizing and unifying Islam stood in contrast to the concepts of most of the various ulama, however. These suggestions provoked considerable reaction, but with the insistent pressure of the government and its support – i.a. through zakat money, as we shall see – and with the equating of their degrees with those of national universities in 1981/82, the ulama became more and more convinced of the potentially positive consequences of this policy for them. So they did adapt the curriculum by merely adding subjects from the formal primary education system to their own syllabus, and Arabic instead of English was used on the certificates. Thus, the ulama showed their ability to gain official recognition by effecting minor changes, and they were gradually able to exercise more influence on the government. Theoretically, these degrees, once recognized, were to open up economic mobility and possibilities of promotion for the graduates. However, there was no consideration of how and where the now officially examined armies of mullahs would be integrated into the job market. This short-sighted planning soon resulted in considerable problems.

### Stemming the tide

Parallel to these administrative, institutional and curricular reform measures, the economic situation of religious schools was changed and, indeed, improved by means of money disbursed through the central and provincial zakat (alms) funds set up by the government in 1980: ten per cent of the alms collected from current accounts through zakat-deducting agencies – established throughout the country - go to religious education if curricular reform and political loyalty are observed. These additional financial resources enhanced the budgets of religious schools considerably, comprising up to one-third of their annual income, and were exclusively at the disposal of the rectors of the schools, e.g. the ulama. This certainly created new expectations and new patterns of consumption.

As a result of these changes, a new dimension of mobility of these scholars and their centres of learning can be discerned. One is tempted to speak of an expanding indigenous infrastructure which in the early 1990s already had far-reaching consequences: firstly, the prospect of zakat grants resulted in a mushrooming of madrasas, mostly in rural areas. In response, the government has introduced various measures to try to stem the tide, but this has only resulted in new problems. Secondly, the number of the graduates of higher religious schools – not to speak of students in religious schools in general – is constantly on the rise, as these institutions now also offer formal primary education with officially recognized degrees. Thirdly, the Islamization policy brought in a new phase of institutionalization among umbrella organizations, so that the number of affiliated schools has increased tremendously. Fourthly, the data available on religious schools also shed light on their spatial distribution and the social and regional background of their students:<sup>xviii</sup> It turns out, that each school of thought has its own reserved area, be it tribal, rural, urban, trade oriented or even strategic.

In the wake of the formalization and reform of religious schools, an increasing trans-provincial north-south migration from rural to urban areas can be observed, a sign of the degree of spatial mobility of the young religious scholars. Students from specific regions then look for schools and teachers who comply with their cultural perceptions and ethnic affiliations and the search for corresponding institutions that create identity-giving sub-structures in an urban environment which may otherwise be perceived as alien and even hostile. The migrant scholars-to-be gather in the metropolis and potentially contribute to conflicts that are often religiously and ethnically motivated. The fact that the number of religious schools and their students has grown spectacularly in urban, and even more in rural areas also suggests that not only cities have become locations of increasing conflict: the hinterland has also been increasingly drawn into the sphere of religiously legitimized battles. Thus, the Islamization policy has promoted the institutionalization of different groups, but has fostered their politicization and even radicalization. And since contemporary regimes are not able or willing to integrate ulama in a productive way, their increasing marginalization is the result.

The increasing number of young theologians, with degrees equivalent to an M.A. in Arabic/Islam Studies, are faced with government reform measures that lack plans for dealing with the labour market. The promised Islamization and improved literacy of the country has not been translated into jobs for the ulama; on the contrary, the lack of proper measures comprises a potential source of conflict. The American advisor on religious education made the following criticism:

'Reservations were voiced by various officials of the provincial Departments of Education about recruiting "Maulanas" for the schools on the suspicion that they would divide the students on the basis of their own preferences for a particular "Maktab-i-Fikr" (school of thought; J.M.)' He hastened to add that 'these suspicions, however, were proved in the field to be ill-founded. Such suspicions should never be allowed to affect the making of educational policy at any level.'<sup>xix</sup>

It is only as teachers of Arabic, having been promoted since 1979, that some young scholars have found jobs. These courses, however, targeted Pakistanis going to work in the Middle East, and so were motivated primarily by pragmatic financial considerations. On a different front, the military, against the background of the cold war, has been encouraging the recruitment of religious scholars since 1983 – with foreign aid. In the medium term, this has led to new values and structures in the army, especially at junior levels of command.

#### Danger of expectations

With the official support of religious scholars in the 1980s and even in the 1990s, the political strength of representatives of this section of Islamic traditionalism has increased unmistakably. Thus, the Islamization policy – or better the politics of de-traditionalization – has ultimately forced the politically dominant sector to rethink its own position. The centre may be pushed onto the political defensive, a position from which it could extricate itself only by violence, and with increasing alienation from the rest of the society. This danger exists especially when indigenous social and educational structures, such as endowments, alms and religious schools, still existent and mostly functioning, cannot be adequately replaced and thousands of unemployed mullahs who have access to the masses are not successfully integrated.

The raised expectations have pushed many graduates of religious schools into the hands of different players: their role in the cold war in Afghanistan, when they were exploited by certain groups and governments; their role in post cold-war Afghanistan, when once again, they were caught up in power politics supported by different secret services; and now in the post-Taliban era, when some of them have taken sides with terrorist groups.

In these circumstances, the rhetoric of Islamic symbolism and jihad has shown that it can be effectively used as a means of self-defence against foreign encroachments, and there has been constantly increasing pressure on the state by religious elements. The Council of Islamic Ideology set up in the 1960s, and the Pakistani Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs, should not therefore be blamed for issuing outrageous Islamic proposals. Similarly, the failure to reform either the Blasphemy Law in 1994 and 2001, or the madrasas in 1995 is simply a reflection of the aggressive mood of the clergy and Islamists, based on what has been called 'paranoid Islam'. In May 2000, Islamic political parties, who recruit their members from religious schools, were powerful enough to demand several Islamic provisions, some of them met instantly by the government. But in order to increase control over the clergy, the current regime came up with yet another madrasa reform proposal in August 2001.

Having said that, let us return briefly to General Musharraf's speech, in which he called for a peaceful 'Sunnatization' of life-worlds, referring to Islamic mysticism and prohibiting madrasa students from going for divine force. The re-construction of tradition ought to serve to raise the madrasa and bring it to a level with the mainstream. The major task was to open up the job market for the graduates. Similarly, mosques should be reformed in order to guarantee a secular and modernized society, otherwise Pakistan will be marginalized – and radicalized. This policy clearly aims at controlling some 20,000 madrasas with approximately 3 million students, and more than 50,000 mosques – a solid power-structure, indeed.

The control of the clergy seems to be even more important since there has traditionally been a movement across the borders of Pakistan with Afghanistan, India and Kashmir. This is especially true of ethnic groups such as Pashtuns in Pakistan, who outnumber their fellow Pashtuns in Afghanistan, and are linked by family networks, commercial connections, and religio-political solidarity. Hence, despite the Pakistan government's recent strict policy against foreign students, Afghan students of religious schools have vowed to continue their Islamic education in Pakistan.

#### Effects of the reforms

The reforms envisaged by the state have produced an imbalance that has resulted in a variety of problems, some of which were temporarily alleviated through jihad in Afghanistan. In the wake of these developments, several different branches of Islamic learning and madrasas have emerged. We need to distinguish: firstly, students of religious schools in general; secondly, mujahidin or freedom fighters; thirdly, Taliban; and fourthly, *jihadi* groups.

As far as the first category is concerned, they have been subjected to several reforms from within and from without, but have played a quietist role. Because of traditional ties with Afghanistan and other neighbouring countries and as a result of the use of jihad rhetoric, some of them were used as foot-soldiers in the cold war. This is the second group – the mujahidin. In order to keep this group under control and to maintain a grip on the region for economic and political purposes, another version was established by interested parties: these were the Taliban. Both the mujahidin and the Taliban are known for their forced recruitment of young children in madrasas and refugee camps. As for the fourth category, the *jihadis*, some of them can be traced back to groups returning to Pakistan from other battlefields such as Kashmir and Afghanistan, their leaders being middle-class and secular educated men, rather than madrasa students, though madrasa students also joined the militant and radical groups. There is little doubt that some of these organizations run private armies, collect compulsory donations, and indulge in militant and terrorist activities. Some of them have made a regional conflict, the Kashmir cause, their *raison d'être*. But what is the reason behind their radicalization? Mere hatred, violence and the obsession for jihad?

It is true that the struggle for victory over a super-power and their alleged connections to some international network enhances their feeling of Islamicity, no matter how blurred and intangible that may be. But it is the objective material conditions plus the symbolic power of regional conflicts, such as Palestine and Kashmir, that make up for the explosive mixture because these conflicts represent the suppression of whole nations. However international and globalized these organizations may be, they have arisen primarily as a result of an internal, local problem caused by political mismanagement, and they have subsequently been exploited by external powers. And the state itself has been constructing and perpetuating a martial climate all over the country. The dramatic flaunting and celebration of military power on national occasions such as Pakistan Day and the propagation of jihad in textbooks even in formal schools<sup>xx</sup> and daily on television for the cause of Kashmir are cases in point.

This state-promoted violence and hatred from childhood onwards might be part of the painful nation-building process and search for ideology, but it certainly fails to instil tolerance and acceptance of plurality in the students. The alarming increase in kidnapping for ransom in the cities as well as in rural areas, the killing of whole families by senior family members because of lack of material resources are causes of major concern.

#### Concluding remarks

In this scenario religious schools provide at least space for some kind of education and survival, and what is more important, they use the variety of religious repertoires to make sense of the predicaments people are facing in a highly fragmented society. The growing presence and visibility of religious power in the public sphere shows this struggle between the centre, e.g., the neo-colonial élites – mostly the military and bureaucracy that has been ruling in Muslim countries – and the periphery, e.g., local forms of religious organization and their agents that have been exploited in different quarters but have constantly been denied their share, very dramatically. In the face of these developments the making of an epitomizing prophet is easy: the 'ladinist' saviour, who would lead the campaign against suppression. It should be noted that the basis of this Islamically tuned radicalism still has a very secular basis: social conflict, poverty, suppression. The basis is not the Qur'an, but social reality, which is put into a global Islamic symbolism. Formerly, violence and terror were legitimized

nationally; today use is made of the Islamic repertory, not because this violence is or has become Islamic or religious, but because the political discourse has shifted.

The latest crack-down policy of Parvez Musharraf can hardly diminish the significance and power of these groups and organizations, because they reflect systemic problems. Unless these problems (e.g. material conditions of the common people and regional conflicts) are tackled, these groups will start operating under different names, change their modus operandi or move their operations elsewhere, making use of trans-Islamic networks.<sup>xxi</sup>

To conclude, the interaction between Islamic religious scholars and the State in the development of contemporary Pakistani education refers to the growth of state intervention in education. On the one hand, this process seems to be part of a uniformizing, indeed globalizing trend found almost anywhere on the globe nowadays, both in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. In other words, it is part of a movement towards a more or less uniform, global civilization. On the other hand, however, this process is part of a tendency towards a more universal type of Islam. As a matter of fact state authorities, Muslim avant-gardists and Islamists aspire at a type of universalizing, and globalizing Islam that contrasts with the Islam the traditional, nevertheless globalizing, institutions of religious scholars stand for. They seem to have learnt how to make use of the state-sponsored Islamization process to their own profit. As a consequence, the religious specialists and their institutions might well play a crucial role in the adaptation of globalizing and modernizing developments to specific local needs and situations. But if they are not properly integrated and given their due share, they go for a radicalization, as is the case in most of the Muslim states.

**Jamal Malik is chair of Religious Studies–Islamic Studies at the University of Erfurt, Germany.**  
**Jamal.Malik@uni-erfurt.de**

<sup>x</sup> Much of the article is based on my *Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Manohar Publications (1998 (2)) (reprint).

<sup>xi</sup> Basically, globalization may be defined as the process towards an increasingly strong interdependence among increasingly large parts of the world. Through this interdependence events and developments in one region influence most other regions. Certainly, processes that to a certain extent were similar, have existed before, but the unprecedented speed of relations — in transportation, information and communication — is often quoted as the quality that makes contemporary globalization the special phenomenon many hold it to be. See Johan Meuleman (ed.): *Islam in the Era of Globalization*, London: RoutledgeCurzon 2002.

<sup>xii</sup> For that tradition see Francis Robinson: *The `Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia*, New Delhi: permanent black 2001; Jamal Malik: *Islamische Gelehrtenkultur in Nordindien. Entwicklungsgeschichte und Tendenzen am Beispiel von Lucknow*, Leiden: E.J. Brill 1997, pp. 105 ff.

<sup>xiii</sup> P. Jackson/L. Lockart (eds.): *The Cambridge History of Islam*, 6, Cambridge 1986, p. 590. See also F. Robinson: "Ottomans-Safavids-Mughals: Shared Knowledge and Connective Systems", F. Robinson: *The `Ulama of Farangi Mahall*.

<sup>xiv</sup> See John O. Voll: "Scholarly interrelations between South Asia and the Middle East in the 18th Century", Peter Gaeffke / D.A. Utz: (eds.): *The Countries of South Asia: Boundaries, Extensions and Interrelations*, Philadelphia 1988, pp. 49-59; the same: *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, Boulder 1982.

<sup>xv</sup> Such as the Deobandis, the Barelwis, and the Ahl-e Hadith. For these movements and groups see Barbara D. Metcalf: *Islamic Revival in British India. Deoband 1860-1900*, Princeton 1982.

<sup>xvi</sup> Yet another movement, the modernist Aligarh school, tried to Anglicize the Muslim educational system, but this was contested by the Council of Religious Scholars (Nadwat al-Ulama), which aimed at an integration of religious and secular education.

<sup>xvii</sup> See Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Riport qaumi kamiti bara-ye dini madaris Pakistan* (Islamabad, 1979).

<sup>xviii</sup> Deobandis in the North Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan, where tribal society prevails, as well as parts of Punjab and Sindh; Barelwis in rural areas of Sindh and Punjab, where the cult of holy men is most popular; Shi`ites in Northern Areas and in some districts of the Punjab dominated by folk religion; Ahl-e Hadith in commercial centres and important internal markets; and Jama`at-e Islami primarily in urban and politically sensitive areas that seemed to have attracted a number of radical groups from various regions outside Pakistan.

<sup>xix</sup> Yusuf Talal Ali, draft chapter on 'Islamic Education for Inclusion in the Report of the President's Task Force on Education' (Islamabad, 1982, mimeo), 6.

<sup>xx</sup> 'Textbooks and the Jihadi Mindset', *DAWN*, 12 February 2002

<sup>xxi</sup> As a popular diviner has opined, a reaction was brewing: 'This government is paving the way for Islamic revolution by creating hurdles for the Islamic parties.' He hastened to add that '[t]here may not be instant reaction but they will respond once the dust is settled.... We are just watching the situation but the silence will not last for long.... The timing of this announcement by the president [e.g. crack-down, J.M.] has raised suspicion in the minds of religious people. It is being done under U.S. pressure.' And he asked: 'If they were terrorist groups, then why were they allowed to operate for such a long time?' *The News*, 15 January 2002, 11.

## Korea

### Cha Ok-Soong: The Donghak Religion and the Modernization of Korea - With a Focus on the Donghak Peasant War

#### I. Introduction

During the late 19th century, the Western powers expanded their colonial domain into East Asia. The East Asians hurriedly strove to modernize and conducted nationalistic campaigns abroad in efforts to fend off Western imperialistic aggression.

At the time, Korea, then known as Joseon, was undergoing a transition from a feudalistic, insular barter economy (Naturalwirtschaft) to a capitalist, colonial economy. An inevitable result of the transition, the peasantry rose up in what became known as the Donghak Peasant War to liberate themselves from feudalistic exploitation and to combat foreign encroachment into Korea. Donghak (Eastern Learning) was a new religion, which emerged in the mid-19th century. The Donghak Peasant War of 1894 was a defining event in Korea's modernization, marking the beginning of a rising modernistic self-awareness among common Koreans. It hastened the end of dynastic rule, abolished the feudal class hierarchy, and fostered the creation of a modern citizenry.

That the organizational structure and teachings of Donghak played an important role in the Peasant War cannot be overlooked. In the face of the grim reality of the late Joseon Dynasty, Choe Je-u (pen name: Suun), founder of Donghak, brought hope to the powerless and much-suffering masses whose lives were devastated by exploitation by corrupt officials and rampant epidemics. Donghak brought a great deal of meaning to their lives. Choe Si-hyeong (pen name: Haewol) succeeded Suun to become the second religious leader of Donghak and continued to propagate Donghak teachings. In this context, the writer attempts to explore the philosophy of Suun and Haewol and then examine the historical significance of the Donghak Peasant War and the organizational structure of Donghak.

#### II. Philosophies of Suun and Haewol

##### 1. Suun's Philosophy on Life

Suun was born to an impoverished *yangban* (noble) in Gyeongsangbuk-do in 1824. As a bright child beyond his years, he may have been particularly sensitive to his difficult surroundings and circumstances. At the age of thirteen, Suun roamed about the country, taking note of the social conditions of his time. He lamented the troubled situation of the country. After he returned home at the age of fourteen, Suun immersed himself in books. At the age of sixteen, he was orphaned by the death of his father. This tragic experience caused him to brood over the emptiness of life and harbor doubts about the world. It seems that Suun was deeply insecure and apprehensive in the face of his misfortune. He left home and spent the following years wandering around the country and gaining a deeper understanding of the psyche of the people and the social mood. On April 5, 1860, Suun experienced a great awakening through a mystical experience and founded Donghak. The country was then in dire circumstances, buffeted by serious social ills. Since the reign of King Sunjo, political power had been concentrated in the hands of the royal in-law families. This created disorder in the governing process and led to rampant corruption in officialdom. Among the many problems were trafficking of official posts, irregularities in the so-called three administrations (the agencies that administered the three prime sources of government revenue: land tax, military service tax, and the state granary system), and the corruption of local officials. This

increased the burden on the already hard-pressed masses of peasants and drove them further into poverty. The discontent of the peasantry began to manifest itself in a number of ways, most notably as a rash of popular uprisings. The Hong Gyeong-nae Rebellion in 1811 was followed by small-scale agrarian revolts, which continued almost without letup throughout the whole country. The Jinju Uprising of 1862 was the most serious of these.

Almost coincidentally, similar uprisings broke out in three provinces and spread nationwide. These popular uprisings were mostly spontaneous, sparked by decades of pent-up discontent against corruption in officialdom and the ailing *yangban* society.<sup>1)</sup> During the 19th century, the Western powers increasingly made demands for commercial relations. The repeated appearance of foreign ships off the coast of Korea added to the unease among the populace. The Koreans were aware of the humiliating collapse of the Ching Dynasty in China at the hands of the Western powers after a series of clashes, most notably the Opium War of 1839-1842 and the Arrow War of 1856-1858. The occupation of Peking by Anglo-French forces on October 30, 1860 came as a shock to Joseon society. Adding to the social confusion, the country was struck by a major epidemic and a series of natural disasters.

It seems that Suun came to fully understand the plight of the populace during this time while traveling the country and heard the rumors about the country being under siege by outside powers. Suun agonized over his country's distress and anxiously sought a solution to reverse its declining fortunes. He had sublimated his own existential situation of misfortune into a resolution to overcome the social problems of Joseon and bring about national stability and security.

What was perhaps the greatest problem Suun perceived was selfishness. He believed this to be at the root of all the social instability and unrest because it alone caused people to ignore Heaven. He, therefore, set about to discover the principles and the will of Heaven. His spiritual quest continued for years, and he finally arrived at *Mu-geok Dae-do* (infinitely Great Way or the ultimate infinite truth), the beginning of Donghak.

Having been raised in a family of Confucian scholars, it is clear that Suun's basic frame of thought was naturally constructed on the neo-Confucian tradition. In addition to Confucianism, Suun's philosophy was greatly influenced by Buddhism and Taoism as well as geomantic theory or *feng-shui*, a folk belief prevalent among the lower-class, which was best explained in *Jeong Gam Nok*, a book of prophecies widely known to the people. Several writings by Suun also contain references to Catholicism, which was secretly spreading among the populace in Korea at this time.

Suun's philosophy is well illustrated in a dialog between Suun and an old Buddhist priest named Song-wol-dang.

Suun said, "I love the fundamental principle of uniformity. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism are all parts of the whole; neither is a complete explanation of the universe unto itself. The Heavenly Way exists anywhere and everywhere in the world, so we must hear the messages of each of these three teachings." He then claimed that no truth could be a living truth unless it was able to breathe life into both the people and, at the same time, answer to the spirit of the times. Suun went on to observe that the three teachings had lost their relevance as bodies of living truths.<sup>2)</sup> Besides, Suun described to Haewol the relationship between Donghak and the three teachings by noting, "Our way is neither originally Confucian, Buddhist, nor Taoist. It is the whole unity of the three teachings. To reiterate, the Heavenly Way is not the three teachings, all of which are part of the Heavenly Way. The ethics of Confucianism, the awakening to nature taught by Buddhism, and Taoist cultivation of energy are all the essence of human nature and inherent parts of the Heavenly Way. Our Way has,

<sup>1)</sup> Lee Ki-baik, *Hanguksa Singang* (A New History of Korea), Seoul, Iljogak, 1989, pp. 297-305.

<sup>2)</sup> *Cheondo-gyo Changgeon-sa* (Founding History of Cheondo-gyo), pp. 33-34.

therefore, captured the infinite ultimate essence. Do not let those who follow the Heavenly Way after me misconstrue this."<sup>3)</sup>

Suun also made clear his opinion on the subject of Catholicism (*Seohak*, Western Learning). In 1861, scholars came to visit Suun from throughout the country to inquire about the relationship between Catholicism and Donghak. In reply, Suun enunciated that the two are identical in the Way, but different in principle.<sup>4)</sup> He explained why the two teachings were different in principle in *Donggyeong Daejeon* (Bible of Donhak Doctrine) and *Yondam Yusa* (Memorial Songs of Yongdam) as follows:

"Catholicism has only sought man's salvation. It has not addressed the need to keep a good mind and have the right energy, which makes a being one with God according to the instructions of Hanullim. It is also not right that the forces of Catholicism invaded and wrested territories from other countries under the pretext of fulfilling God's will and built churches in the occupied territories, forcing the local populaces to become Catholic." Suun made this statement upon hearing the news of the occupation of Peking by Anglo-French forces in 1860.

It can be safely argued that Suun did not categorically reject nor unconditionally accept various bodies of thought. He critically accommodated and incorporated them into his philosophy.

This paper attempts to examine the philosophy of Suun by inquiring into his central concept of Sicheonju (the innate God or 'God is within us') and the ideas of Hu-cheon Gaebyeok (the Great Opening of the new Heaven and new Earth) and Dong-gui Il-che (All returning to oneness). These conveyed a message of hope and optimism for a bright future to Joseon society at a moment of national anxiety and despair.

### 1.1 Suun's Concept of the Innate God

For Suun, the concept of innate God is the most important defining characteristic of Donghak. This concept is based on the supposition of Suun's mystical experience of encounter with the Divine ('numen') that transcends all logical notions.

This concept of a person's inherent Godliness negates the Neo-Confucianist understanding of *ki* (energy) as the essence of human nature, which gave justification to the rigid class division of feudal Joseon society. Suun proclaimed that every person carried Hanullim, or the God of Donghak, in their minds and, therefore, that all human beings are equal and precious regardless of their social status. Accordingly, any human being can attain a high level of moral virtue and immortality through reverence and devotion to God. This sweeping egalitarian concept brought new life and hope to all people who were exploited, oppressed, and suffering.

Suun asserted that practicing to become God required the 'keeping of a pure and good mind and having the right spiritual energy' as well as having reverence, sincerity, and faithfulness. He claimed that realization of truth and virtue had nothing to do with social position, literary talent, and education, all of which were prerogatives of the ruling *yangban* class. Suun stated that even the most ignoble commoner or servant could accomplish anything merely by harmonizing his mind with the ultimate energy of God and serving God with the utmost reverence, sincerity, and devotion. Apparently, the message of this teaching inspired hope and strength among the powerless populace, for though commoners had been resigned to lives of bondage and alienation and were subject to callous deaths, they felt that they could reach for human dignity and freedom.

<sup>3)</sup> *Cheondo-gyo Changgeon-sa* (Founding History of Cheondo-gyo), p.47..

<sup>4)</sup> "*Nonhakmun* (On Learning Truth)", *Yongdam Yusa* (Memorial Songs of Yongdam).

## 1.2 The Concept of Hu-cheon Gae-byeok (*Great Opening of the New Heaven and New Earth*)

Suun's utopian visions of a new world offered hope to the populace by painting a picture of a bright future in the midst of the profound social despair and anxiety during the declining years of the Joseon Dynasty.

Suun believed in the cyclical nature of history. It should also be noted, however, that his cyclical concept of history entails the active role of human beings as an imperative as well as a cyclical fate by pronouncing that man has the capacity to manifest the spirit of God.<sup>5)</sup> He emphasized the role and responsibility of human beings by asserting that the old fashioned and irrational world full of turmoil and social decay would be eliminated and a new era in a new world would come. However, the new world could be created only when man became the subject of creation of history and actively worked to transform the world.

Sin Il-cheol saw the humanistic ethic of "right energy and the stable mind, which is one with the virtue of the universe" as central to Suun's philosophy and pointed out that Suun emphasized the historical praxis on the part of human beings. In this regard, Sin argued "Suun's view of history is not a simplistic cyclical concept of history as the recurring cycles in nature. Rather, it basically a developmental view of history in which history follows a path dictated by human moral behavior."<sup>6)</sup>

In this context, the remainder of this section will discuss the new world as envisioned by Suun. His primary concern was to establish an ideal society in this present world, not in an other-worldly realm. Obviously, Suun believed that the spirit persisted after death. This is clearly shown in his belief that death should be embraced as heavenly destiny. Although he left death as an open possibility, Suun did not spell out the nature of the afterlife. Nor did he present a clear vision of the new world, though he strongly advocated the concept of it. The image of the new world can only be surmised from careful reading of relevant passages in Suun's writings.

The primary purpose of Suun's pursuit of the infinitely Great Way was to protect the nation, bring peace for the people, and to save the people. Suun must have envisioned a peaceful society free from outside incursions where all people are equal without class distinction and no one suffers pain or illness. In this world, people follow the will of Heaven and the principle of Heaven, and they revere Heaven and all other men. Through hard study, all people can attain a high level of moral virtue and become men of virtue and great sages. Some can even become earthly gods.

"People who are rich and noble in the present time were poor and humble in the previous time, and people who are poor and humble now will be rich and noble in the time to come."<sup>7)</sup>

In Suun's vision of the new world, there would not be a simple reversal of the people's fortunes. Instead, all the people would become rich and noble, regardless of their status in the previous and present time. Very simply, Suun envisioned a world in which all people are rich and noble and pursue life in the way it was meant to be.

## 2. Haewol's Philosophy on Real Life

Choe Si-hyeong, better known by his pen name 'Haewol', occupies an important place in the Donghak movement. Haewol was ordained by Suun as his successor and the second great leader of Donghak on August 14, 1863.<sup>8)</sup> After Suun's martyrdom on April 14 (10th day of the third moon), 1864,<sup>9)</sup> Haewol preserved the spirit of the religious order, expanded the religious

<sup>5)</sup> "Gyohunga (Song of Instruction)", *Yongdam Yusa* (Memorial Songs of Yongdam).

<sup>6)</sup> Sin Il-cheol, "Choe Suun-ui Yeoksa Uisik (Choe Suun's Historical Consciousness," in Suun Yeongu (Studies on Choe Suun), 1974, p. 32.

<sup>7)</sup> "Gyohunga (Song of Instruction)", *Yongdam Yusa* (Memorial Songs of Yongdam).

<sup>8)</sup> *Cheondo-gyo Changgeon-sa* (Founding History of Cheondo-gyo), Part II, pp. 45-46.

<sup>9)</sup> Pyo Young-sam, "*Haewol Sinsa-ui Sangae-wa Eopjeok* (Life and Accomplishments of Divine Teacher

organization, and established ceremonies and services. The propagation of Donghak had to be done underground as the government was doing its best to stamp the new religion out, persecuting the followers of Donghak. What was remarkable about Haewol was his attitude towards life born out of his life experience and noble character. He did not leave behind his own doctrinal writings; the only written records of his life and words were written from recollections of his disciples. Considering the fact that these accounts were mainly written by educated men such as Son Cheon-min and Seo In-ju, who were well versed in Chinese classics, the episodes about him orally passed down may provide a clearer picture of his ideas than these abstract records written in Chinese characters. Therefore, the writer will attempt to examine the major ideas of Haewol with a focus on the episodes and records in Chinese characters.

Haewol was born to a poor peasant family in Gyeongju, in 1827. He became a follower of Suun at the age of 35 (1861) and never failed to receive instructions from Suun three or four times a month. As a consequence of his studious devotion to spiritual practice, Haewol had a religious experience the following year (1962) during which he heard the word of Heaven. He succeeded Suun's as leader of Donghak at the age of 37.

### 2.1 Sa-in-yeo-chon (*Serve men as you would serve Heaven*)

Haewol went one step further beyond Suun's concept of the innate God, very nearly proclaiming the omnipresence of God. He declared that God (Heaven) is the spiritual presence in man and also in the universe. That is, God is present everywhere in the world.<sup>10)</sup> According to Haewol, everything in the universe derived from the one and only ultimate energy (Heaven) and all spiritual presences, in the form of spirits in nature, are the presence of the same God. Thus, Haewol identified the innate God with creation as well as the life energy in everything in the universe.

Suun believed the innate God was realized by calming the mind, keeping the right spiritual energy, and experiencing the resultant mythical experience of communion with God. Haewol, however, interpreted the idea of the innate God from the perspective of a new ethical instruction, and he believed that worship of the innate God must be done not only by practicing reverence towards every person but also toward little inanimate things. The Divine Teacher said, "Man is Heaven. He should be treated as Heaven is to be served. I listen to women and children and learn from their words."<sup>11)</sup> "We cannot think of God without the mind. Neither can we think of man without God. Revering only God and not caring about man is like picking up flowers and then waiting for the fruit to bear."<sup>12)</sup>

Clearly, Haewol's new ethic of treating man the same as God is a denunciation of social discrimination and inequality. Haewol's statement on the irrationality of revering only God without caring for man is in the same spirit as the saying of Jesus that love of God is proven in how one loves his neighbor.

Haewol's philosophy of the omnipresence of Heaven elevates human labor to the level of the creative work of the holy God. Never idle or taking a nap, he was always making cords or shoes out of straw. Sometimes, he even untwisted and then re-twisted cords if he had no work to do. Out of curiosity, his disciples asked why the Great Teacher was doing this. Haewol answered: "God hates idleness in man." Haewol was always on the move with a small bundle, not staying in one place for more than two or three months. For this reason, he became known as "*Choe Pottari*" ("Bundle" Choe). Whenever he moved into a new house, he planted trees in the summer and wove straw mats in the winter. When his family and disciples asked, "What's the use of doing this when you may move out tomorrow?" He

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Haewol)" in *Sin Ingan* (New Human Being), Combined Issue of February and March, 1987, p. 6.

<sup>10)</sup> *Cheondo-gyo Changgeon-sa* (Founding History of Cheondo-gyo), Part II, p. 36.

<sup>11)</sup> *Cheondo-gyo Changgeon-sa* (Founding History of Cheondo-gyo), Part II, pp. 37-38.

<sup>12)</sup> *Cheondo-gyo Changgeon-sa* (Founding History of Cheondo-gyo), Part II, pp. 36-37.

replied, "Why not? Those who will move into this house will be able to eat fruit and use the mat."<sup>13)</sup>

When he was passing through Cheongju, Haewol visited Seo Taek-sun and heard Seo's daughter-in-law weaving. Haewol preached about the value of labor at a time when labor was disdained. He also stated that to work is to participate in God's continuing creation.<sup>14)</sup>

Haewol went yet one step further from the idea of treating man the same as God. He preached to the people that they ought to treat everything as God. In preaching not to cause unjustifiable harm to anything but to cherish and respect every earthly thing from animals to plants, Haewol exhibited his world-view of "all things and I as one". Haewol viewed the entities of nature not as lifeless objects but as living communities that together make up a single organism. In this context, the symbol of things as used by Haewol entails the underlying meaning of creation and life.

Haewol took this philosophy still further by declaring explaining that *Eo-Cheon-Sik-Cheon* (heaven nourishes itself) during everyday meals. He noted that even a bowl of rice contains within it God's work as well as the creative act of God in the form of human labor, and he preached that people ought to be grateful and appreciative of every meal. In the same manner, Haewol preached that the earth should be cherished as much as our mothers' skin.<sup>15)</sup> The earth should not be spit at or trampled upon. This view of nature seems especially relevant at a time when widespread ecological destruction due to heavy environmental pollution is posing a serious threat to mankind's continued existence. Likewise, Haewol believed that "*yang-cheonju* (nurturing God, or self-spiritual cultivation)" is necessary to bring about inner sincerity and morality and to keep the innate God.<sup>16)</sup>

Haewol explained this nurturing of the infinite life of God as *si-cheonju* (Being in touch with God). According to this concept, Haewol advised against all immoral acts and emotions including greed, hate, telling lies, and moral judgment, stating these all injure God. Haewol asserted that if a man made up his mind according to the Way and practiced self-spiritual cultivation, then the innate God would grow stronger and the man would eventually become a great sage and become one with God.<sup>17)</sup> Haewol flatly renounced discrimination by birth and went on to state that distinction among men should only depend upon the respect and sincerity they have towards God. The writer understands the tenet of nurturing God as trying to resemble God in character. If one does this, a selfish mind will return to the original state of a pure mind (seed of God), which will become stronger and reach the state of unity of man and God, or "*eo-sim-jeuk-yeo-sim* (My mind is your mind)."

As discussed thus far, Haewol's philosophy reflects his belief of human dignity as well as the recognition that all things have the infinite life-force of the universe within them and that the universe is an organism of living communities. Reflecting his life experience as a poor slash-and-burn farmer, Haewol's understanding of nature is that all living things are precious because God's seed or God, from which everything is derived, dwells in everything in the universe. It may be concluded that Haewol inherited Suun's philosophy of the innate God, which is based on his pantheistic view on real life with elements of a transcendent and personal God and an innate God. Haewol then built upon this philosophy to create a new ethic of omnipresent Heaven, drawing on his own religious and secular experience.

This paper has examined the philosophies of Suun and Haewol on real life. In the next part, the historical significance of the Donghak Peasant War and the role of the Donghak religious organization will be examined.

<sup>13)</sup> *Cheondo-gyo Changgeon-sa* (Founding History of Cheondo-gyo), Part II, p. 35.

<sup>14)</sup> *Haewol Sinsa Beopseol* (Preachings of Divine Teacher Haewol).

<sup>15)</sup> *Haewol Sinsa Beopseol* (Preachings of Divine Teacher Haewol), p. 306.

<sup>16)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 367

<sup>17)</sup> *Cheondo-gyo Changgeon-sa* (Founding History of Cheondo-gyo), Part II, pp. 36-37.

### 3. *The Historical Significance of Donghak Peasant War and Donghak's Organizational Structure*

Before Donghak followers rose up in the 1894 Peasant War, they repeatedly petitioned the government to clear the name of the founder, who had been put to death under false charges. Calling for exoneration of the founder, Donghak believers staged a demonstration at Samnye Station in Jeolla-do province in December, 1892, submitted a petition directly to the King, and knelt in front of the royal palace in a Confucian appeal in January, 1893. They then staged a mass rally in Boeon, Chungcheong-do province the following April.<sup>18)</sup> Although the initial Samnye Station Rally started as a petition for the exoneration of the martyred founder and the legitimacy for the Donghak movement, the subsequent petition in front of the royal palace went beyond the religious dimension. It marked the politicization of the movement as the followers of Donghak then sought to protect the country from foreign invasion and restore political and social stability. The mass rally in Boeon was a definite turning point in the nationalistic movement in Korea. In their mission statement for the Boeon rally, political objectives including calls for fierce resistance to foreign interference in Korean affairs by Japan and other powers gained prominence over the original goals of restoring the name of the founder and ending religious persecution. It was at the Boeon mass rally that the movement began to take the form of an organized political mass resistance movement against the dynastic government. From this point onwards, the Donghak movement increasingly became a pro-democratic and nationalistic political movement.<sup>19)</sup>

Donghak's reinstatement petition for the founder Suun was the first-ever political protest against the government in the form of a mass demonstration in traditional Korean society. Similar to today's people's society or party, the movement also heralded modern social organizations and political fraternity, leading up to the Gapjin Cultural Reform Movement and the March 1st Independence Movement in 1919 and later becoming viewed as a model of citizenship of modern nation states.<sup>20)</sup> Also noteworthy is the fact that at the beginning of the Gubu Peasant Uprising, the Donghak Peasant War was called "*gipo* (launching Po)". This means that a note was sent to each Po (the lowest organizational unit of Donghak) to assemble the Donghak believers. This shows that the organizational apparatus of the Donghak movement was very important in bringing about the Donghak Peasant War. It should also be pointed out that this kind of decentralized organizational structure with minimum linkages among cell-like religious communities (Yeonwon, spiritual lineages or Po) and the egalitarian spirit based on the concept of the innate God had political implications in that they developed a tremendous capacity to mobilize the masses from the southern provinces of the country. The Jeop and Po organizations were the spiritual lineage system of Donghak for the recruitment of believers, and they played a crucial role in creating a revolutionary consciousness among the people while also functioning as the core leadership of the Donghak army.

The reign of King Cheoljong is commonly called the age of popular uprisings because a rash of popular riots and acts of resistance broke out during that time. In the midst of such social turmoil, Donghak and its religious organizations carefully prepared the philosophical foundation and organizational structure for the Donghak Peasant War. Also noteworthy is the fact that the oppressed and exploited masses began to exercise their rights of resistance in the

<sup>18)</sup> Kim Young-jak, "*Donghak Sasang-gwa Nongmin Bonggi* (Donghak Ideology and the Peasant Uprisings)" in *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Peasant War) compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan-seodang, 1993, p. 97.

<sup>19)</sup> Commemorating Society of the Hundredth Anniversary of Donghak Revolution, *Donghak Hyeokmyeong Ginyeom Nonchong* (A Collection of Treaties in Commemoration of the Hundredth Anniversary of Donghak Revolution), Vol.1, Taegwang Munhwasa, 1994, p. 20.

<sup>20)</sup> Commemorating Society of the Hundredth Anniversary of Donghak Revolution, *Donghak Hyeokmyeong Ginyeom Nonchong* (A Collection of Treaties in Commemoration of the Hundredth Anniversary of Donghak Revolution), Vol.1, Taegwang Munhwasa, 1994, p. 35.

form of mass protests against the government and the dynasty. In this sense, the Donghak religious organizations were the first of new mechanisms through which the people exercised power that had been nurtured among the peasants and other unprivileged people to secure basic rights and to fight for democracy. These later evolved into the mechanisms of citizenship in modern society.

Initially a movement to clear the name of the founder Suun, the Donghak mass rally at Boeon went beyond seeking the exoneration of the martyred founder and the legitimacy of their church. It turned into a collective act of political resistance based on the organizational cohesion of popular groups that had been formed through a religious movement. In this sense, the Boeon assembly can be viewed as the crucible of creation of modern civil organizations and the seed of what was to become the model image for the citizens of modern nation states as the Donghak struggle culminated in the Donghak Peasant War. From a historical perspective, the establishment of Jeop-so (meeting place) at several sites and the network of religious communities to create a hierarchy of church leadership consisting of Po and Jeop<sup>21)</sup> by the second Donghak leader Haewol in 1879 is of great significance. As the Donghak movement gained strength, the church structure was organized into an efficient

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<sup>21)</sup> Donghak communities were composed of Po (local Donghak congregation) and Jeop (the smallest Donghak administrative unit). It is not clear when Jeop organization was first created, but the first Jeop leader was appointed at Son Bong-jo's house at Maegok, Heonghae on the 29th day of the 12th moon, 1862. It is also not clear when Po organization was created, but it was at the Boeon Rally in the third moon of 1893 when the first official name was given to Po district and Dae Jeop Ju (great leader who controlled all the Po groups in his province). Initially, Jeop was the smallest unit of lineages made up of propagators and religious trainees completely through personal connections regardless of locality, though Pos and Jeops were given the name of the region where most Po members or the Jeop leader resided. Po and Jeop organizations were totally based on the logic of spiritual ties between the religious propagator and receiver. This principle of religious lineages still remains intact in the Yeonwon (Spiritual Lineage) System of Cheondo-gyo (successor of Donghak, Faith of Heaven's Way). A Jeop consists of a group of 30 to 70 families. If the size of a Jeop grew more than 100 families, then the Jeop was split into two Jeops. However, the upper administrative unit of Po controlled several Jeops without a limitation to the number of Jeops under its umbrella. Originally, the smallest administrative unit of Donghak had been Jeop, but it was changed to Po in March, 1893 when the Po system was officially adopted.

Pos were organized as a natural product of the increase in the number of Jeops. As more people were recruited into Jeops under the control of a Po, the number of Jeops will increase. However, all these Jeops belonged to the same spiritual line or lineage. The leaders of derived Jeops of the same spiritual lineage treated the leader of the original Jeop as Dae Jeop Ju (great Jeop leader). Here the spiritual lineage was called Po. Initially, each Po had been given the name of its great Jeop leader, thus called, for example, "Kim so-and-so's Po." Then, each Po was given an official name in March, 1893.

In the 1890s, there were senior Jeop leaders, Jeop leaders, and Jeop officers below great Jeop leaders as each Po grew in size. At the time of Donghak Revolution, each Po controlled 10 - 20 Jeops. What is noteworthy about Po and Jeop, compared with such religious communities of other churches, is that each Po or Jeop served as a main player of socializing the spirit of Donghak's ethical system. In staging the campaign for the exoneration of the founder at Yeonghae in 1871, subsequent mass rallies at Gongju in 1892 and at Samnye and at the gate of Gwanghwa-mun in 1983 and the Boeon rally under the slogan of renouncing Japanese and Western influence in March, 1893, Donghak followers were mobilized by the Po. And the decision to participate in the protests was usually made based on the consensus of the Po, not on the mind of individual Donghak followers. It should be remembered that the distinctive feature of Po and Jeop organization was the function of practicing the spirit of Donghak ethics in the social context (Pyo Young-sam, *Hanguk Sasang* (Korean Thoughts), 1995, pp. 364-366). Contemporary Cheondo-gyo church is composed of two disparate organizational structures: spiritual and administrative organizations. The spiritual organization is Yeonwon (spiritual lineage or Po) organization, consisting of afore-mentioned Po that had existed since the religion began. Spiritual lineages are established around Dojeong (Great Leader) and Dohun (Great Trainer). The title of Great Leader is given to Donghak propagators who have converted at least 200 families and the title of Great Trainer is given to those who have recruited at least 100 families. Currently, there are 38 Great Leaders and 76 Great Trainers. Before the division of the country into two Koreas, Cheondo-gyo followers numbered about 1.68 million persons across the country, but it is estimated that currently there are 100 thousand Cheondo-gyo followers in South Korea. As the spiritual organization, Jungang Chongbu (Central Administration) is in charge of general administrative affairs.

fighting machine. Leaders bearing the titles of Dae Jeop Ju (Great Jeop leader), Do Jeop Ju (Master Jeop leader), Su Jeop Ju (Head Jeop leader) and Jeop Ju were appointed depending on the size of the Jeop communities, and the Po were created as a group of Jeop communities with the Po Ju (Po leaders) controlling several Jeop leaders. In 1884, Haewol established the Yungnim Jedo (Six Responsibilities system) which dictated that the Po (local congregation) would be staffed by six types of officers<sup>22)</sup>: (1) Gyojang (chief instructor): must be of honest and noble character; (2) Gyosu (teacher): must have integrity, pursue self-cultivation, and have ability to spread the Donghak doctrine; (3) Dojip (chief administrator): must be highly persuasive, of strong character, and possess a clear understanding of Donghak principles and the situation in his local area of responsibility; (4) Jiptang (judge): is in charge of enforcing Donghak principles, and must fully understand the distinction between right and wrong; (5) Daejeong (counsellor): should be fair, diligent, and gentle; (6) Jungjeong (censor): should be frank-speaking and have a strong character. This system was subsequently implemented throughout the Donghak organization on the central and provincial (Po) levels. A special place called a Yungnim-so was established at the central level to provide advice to the Jangsil (the executive board), and appropriate responsibilities were assigned to the teacher and the chief administrator. At the provincial Po level, these six types of posts were little more than honorary posts and the holders just served as counselors to the Great Jeop leaders.<sup>23)</sup> By 1894, this type of Donghak organization had been established throughout the country with many of them concentrated in Gyeongsang-do, Jeolla-do, and Chungcheong-do provinces. Over time, Donghak's well-organized movement spilled over the local boundaries into other parts of the country and became a the greatest nationwide movement in the history of the Joseon Dynasty, as evidenced by the Boeon rally where more than 20,000 Donghak followers gathered in 1893.<sup>24)</sup> Following the opening of the country, foreign encroachment began to create greater strains on the peasantry. Unable to endure, scattered groups of farmers rose up in protests against the intensifying feudal exploitation. The anti-*yangban* (nobility) and anti-Japanese message and egalitarianism of Donghak appealed strongly to the oppressed peasantry, who swelled the ranks of Donghak believers. As the core organization of mobilizing Donghak believers and non-believers alike, the Donghak organization developed a tremendous capacity of mobilization throughout the whole country, a major factor in the outbreak of the largest peasant uprising in Korea's history<sup>25)</sup> The Donghak Peasant War of 1894 was sparked by the Gobu Uprising under the leadership of Jeon Bong-jun, a mid-level leader of Donghak, on April 15, 1894. Gobu-gun county was located near the northern coast of Jeolla-do province, the rice bowl of Korea. Its location meant that Gobu-gun was particularly vulnerable to the effects of the opening of ports and foreign trade, especially the great outflow of rice to Japan, coupled with the intensified exploitation by feudal landlords that ensued. The county was also subjected to the internal contradictions of Joseon society including the breakdown of agricultural production. The government imposed fresh levies upon the peasants, while the local officials who collected the taxes resorted to increasingly harsh methods of extortion. Meanwhile, Japanese economic penetration was further eroding Korea's rural economy as Japanese commercial establishments, Japanese usury, and the price spiral added to the

<sup>22)</sup> Commemorating Society of the Hundredth Anniversary of Donghak Revolution, *Donghak Hyeokmyeong Ginyeom Nonchong* (A Collection of Treaties in Commemoration of the Hundredth Anniversary of Donghak Revolution), Vol.1, Taegwang Munhwasa, 1994, pp. 18-19.

<sup>23)</sup> Pyo Young-sam, "*Sin Ingan-sa* (History of New Human Beings)" in *Sin Ingan* (New Human Beings), Consecutive Vol. No. 540, June Issue, 1995, pp. 38-39.

<sup>24)</sup> Kim Young-jak, "*Donghak Sasang-gwa Nongmin Bonggi* (Donghak Ideology and the Peasant Uprisings)" in *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Peasant War) compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan-seodang, 1993, p. 96.

<sup>25)</sup> Park Jong-geon, "*Donghak Sasang-gwa Nongmin-Bonggui* (Donghak Ideology and the Peasant Uprisings)", in *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Peasant War), compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan Seodang, 1993, p. 40.

hardship. This added greater impetus to the Gobe Uprising, causing it to spontaneously grow into the largest-ever peasant struggle. Another factor was the leadership of Jeon Bong-jun, who organized the motley bands of peasants into a well-run war machine.<sup>26)</sup> The Gobe Uprising abruptly escalated when the governor of Jeolla-do and an investigator dispatched from Seoul ordered wholesale executions of the Donghak army. Beginning on May 6, 1894, the Donghak peasant army pushed northward against practically no resistance and captured Jeonju, the capital of Jeolla-do province on May 31. Nearly the whole region south of Gongju and Cheongju fell under the control of the peasant army. The Donghak Peasant War shook the country to its foundations for about a year before the peasant army was defeated by government troops and the Japanese army on May 1, 1895.<sup>27)</sup>

Jeon and his peasant army exposed the crimes of the ruling class, and he appealed to the peasantry to rise up against the oppressive feudal system and drive out foreign invaders in the *Changui mun* (The statement of Call for Justice) and the manifesto: "We have arrived at this point in the name of justice. Our only intent is none other than to save the people and lay a firm foundation for the country."<sup>28)</sup>

"The people are the foundation of the nation. When the foundation is destroyed, the nation too will necessarily be ruined. How can it be right not to think about the protection of the nation and the peaceful life of the people and only pursue one's own self-interest by wasting national wealth? Although we are useless people in the countryside, we live by the land and wear clothes given by the King. How can we sit with folded arms when we see the ruin of our nation? The people in the eight provinces shall unite into one mind, and all the people shall gather together; we shall raise the flag of justice for the protection of the nation and the peaceful life of the people.

We shall take the oath of life. Let us not be astounded at today's situation; but aspire to live by bringing peace and holy education."<sup>29)</sup>

In addition, Jeon issued the following four-point manifesto that communicated the goal of their struggle:

- (1) Do not kill the (innocent) people.
- (2) Fulfill the duties of loyalty (to the sovereign) and filial piety (to parents); protect the nation, and provide for the people
- (3) Drive out the Japanese and restore the Way of the Sages.
- (4) Storm the capital in force and thoroughly cleanse (the government of) the powerful families to destroy the corrupt Min oligarchy and drive the Japanese from the Korean soil.<sup>30)</sup>

After the Jeonju truce, the Donghak leaders established Jipgang-so (administrative offices) in 53 counties of the three southern provinces. From a historical perspective, this is a very significant development. With the southern provinces of the nation occupied by the Donghak army, Kim Hak-jin, the newly-appointed governor of Jeolla-do province, proposed a truce and promised to implement a number of political and economic reforms demanded by the

<sup>26)</sup> Hweng-cheon Jeong-bu, *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Peasant War), compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan Seodang, 1993, pp. 127-128.

<sup>27)</sup> Kim Young-jak, "Donghak Sasang-gwa Nongmin Bonggi (Donghak Ideology and the Peasant Uprisings)" in *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Peasant War) compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan-seodang, 1993, p. 103.

<sup>28)</sup> O Ji-young, "Donghak-sa (History of Donghak)" p. 112 in *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Peasant War) compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan-seodang, 1993, p. 33.

<sup>29)</sup> Kim Young-jak, "Donghak Sasang-gwa Nongmin Bonggi (Donghak Ideology and the Peasant Uprisings)" in *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Peasant War) compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan-seodang, 1993, p. 112.

<sup>30)</sup> Park Jong-geon, "Donghak Sasang-gwa Nongmin-Bonggi (Donghak Ideology and the Peasant Uprisings)", in *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Peasant War), compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan Seodang, 1993, p. 33.

Donghak army to put an end to decades of misrule. He also agreed to allow Donghak to establish administrative offices in each town and village in the occupied territory in Jeolla-do province to restore order there. Earlier, Governor Kim had invited Jeon to his office to discuss the possibilities for cooperation between the government and the Donghak army in order to avoid an administrative vacuum in Donghak-occupied territory. As a result of this meeting, the Donghak army began to carry out reforms through this non-governmental Jipgang local autonomous body. Some researchers argue that the administrative office represents the first case of peasant rule. Instead, it should be viewed as a provisional military government in the Donghak occupied area where the Dynasty's local government administration had been paralyzed. The Jipgang (Judge) was a post in the 'six responsibilities' system of the Donghak religious organization charged with settling disputes and maintaining public order and discipline. In this sense, the administrative body may be viewed as a transitional self-governing body for public security.<sup>31)</sup>

As a condition of the cease-fire, the Donghak army submitted a set of comprehensive reform measures in the 12-point Administrative Code issued for use in the occupied areas:

- (1) The antagonism existing between Donghak members and the government shall cease, and mutual cooperation shall be sought.
- (2) Greedy, corrupt officials shall face severe punishment.
- (3) High-handed, wealthy people shall be punished.
- (4) Unprincipled Confucian scholars and the ruling elite shall be reprimanded.
- (5) All slave records shall be incinerated.
- (6) Those of the lowest caste shall receive better treatment, and discriminatory headgear shall be abolished.
- (7) Young widows shall be allowed to remarry.
- (8) All unnecessary taxation shall be entirely discontinued.
- (9) Employment of government officials shall be granted based on ability rather than nepotism and family background.
- (10) Those who engage in conspiracy shall be severely punished.
- (11) All outstanding debts, public or private, shall be cancelled.
- (12) Farmland shall be equitably redistributed.<sup>32)</sup>

This reform plan has two main thrusts, one for economic justice and the other for civil right. It denounces corrupt officials and economic exploitation and is a demand for economic equality. It also calls for improvement of the treatment of people of the lowest caste, the destruction of slave records, the abolition of the feudal class system, abolition of the hereditary aristocratic order, opening the ranks of officialdom to men of talent, and participation of the peasantry in politics. This reform bill is epochal in that shows that the common people sought the institutionalization of political participation. An anti-feudal philosophy aimed at freedom from feudalism in the social, political, and economic spheres and an anti-foreign penetration philosophy based on the perception of national crisis formed the basis of the reform plan submitted by the peasant army.<sup>33)</sup> Although concrete cases are hard to find, the demand for the equitable redistribution of farmland is a major landmark toward modern land reform.<sup>34)</sup> There is no doubt that, if this plan had been implemented in its entirety, it would have brought about the disintegration of the feudal system of Joseon and served as the foundation for a new, modern society.

<sup>31)</sup> Commemorating Society of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Donghak Peasant War, *Donghak Hyeokmyeong Ginyeom Nonchong* (A Collection of Treaties in Commemoration of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Donghak Peasant War), Vol.1, Taegwang Munhwasa, 1994, pp. 31-32.

<sup>32)</sup> Kim Young-jak, "*Donghak Sasang-gwa Nongmin Bonggi* (Donghak Ideology and Peasant Uprisings)" in *Donghak Yeongu* (Studies on the Donghak Revolution) compiled by No Tae-gu, Baeksan-seodang, 1993, p. 103.

<sup>33)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 107-109.

<sup>34)</sup> Commemorating Society of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Donghak Peasant War, *Donghak Hyeokmyeong Gi-nyeom Non-chong* (A Collection of Treatises in Commemoration of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Donghak Peasant War), Vol.1, Taegwang Munhwasa, 1994, p. 33.

The Japanese army invaded Korea under the pretext of suppressing the peasant insurrection. After winning the Sino-Japanese War, however, Japan took virtual control over the internal security of Korea. At the news of the seizure of the Korean royal palace by the Japanese army, the Donghak army decided to take up arms once again in December, 1894. This time, they rose as an anti-Japanese righteous army with the specific purpose of driving out the Japanese invaders from the Korean soil. The Donghak army achieved a few victories but eventually suffered a crushing defeat, overwhelmed by superior Japanese modern firepower and equipment. Donghak fighters were then hunted down and massacred by the Japanese army and government troops across the country. This second peasant war was truly a war fought to defend the national sovereignty against the Japanese army. In conclusion, the Donghak Peasant War should be properly appraised as an important event in the history of modern Korea for its role in the collapse of the Joseon Dynasty and in forming a modern nation state.<sup>35)</sup>

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<sup>35)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

### III. Concluding Remarks

This paper examined the ideology of Suun and Haewol as well as the organizational structure of Donghak. Both were instrumental in bringing about the Donghak Peasant War of 1894. The paper then went on to discuss the historical significance of the Donghak Peasant War. Suun's concept of the innate God and his affirmation of human dignity were the gospel of life and a message of hope for the powerless masses who were oppressed, exploited, and suffering the ravages of epidemics during the darkest hours of the late Joseon Dynasty. In Confucian society, which was based on rigid class distinctions, the general perception of Suun's time was that class was determined by birth. Suun's new belief in social equality, according to which even the most ignoble commoners and slaves could become men of virtue or sages through sincere spiritual cultivation, may therefore be viewed as a Copernican change in thought.

Furthermore, Suun proclaimed that all men as God are equal and precious, and he asserted the dignity of human life. He also spread a message of hope that, if man believes in God, follows the will of God, and becomes One with God, then a new cosmic era will be upon the people and all will become rich and noble.

Reflective of his long experience as a poor peasant living in nature, Haewol came to appreciate the value and mysteries of life. Through his realizations, Haewol developed Suun's concept of "Man is God" into a humanistic ethic of "Serve man as you serve Heaven." Haewol's philosophy reflects his belief of human dignity as well as the recognition that the universe is an organic life community. Thus, he preached the importance of life and showed the people the way in which the world as an organic living community ought to follow. Furthermore, Haewol elevated human labor to the level of creative work of God by stating that labor was a holy act of participating in God's continuing creation. This was a most revolutionary statement in a society where human labor was disdained.

Founded with the purpose of "protecting the nation and securing safety for the people" and "saving the people," Donghak ideology proclaimed that all the people should be united with God. This Donghak ideology did not remain within the realm of religion, but evolved as a political ideology of national self-determination and anti-feudalism, and then eventually became the driving forces behind the Donghak Peasant War of 1894, also known as the Second Peasant War. Thereafter, while emphasizing the anti-feudal campaign at some times and other times emphasizing the struggle against foreign influence, Donghak came to occupy an important place in the popular movement of the Joseon popular movement. Donghak organizations were composed of Jeop and Po (local religious communities), which had been built up through human relationships or spiritual lineages. What is especially interesting about these local Donghak communities, compared with their counterparts of other churches, is that each Po or Jeop was an important mechanism for socializing the spirit of the Donghak ethical system. At the time of Donghak Peasant War, 339 Po communities from 85 districts participated in the struggle, along with a greater number of like-minded non-believers. After the Jeonju truce, the Donghak leaders established Jipgang-so (administrative offices) in 53 counties of the three southern provinces. The reform plan of the Jipgang-so administrative office shows that Donghak began to pursue, through the Jipgang-so administration, agricultural reforms, abolition of the feudal system, and the severe punishment to corrupt officials and feudal landlords. In particular, this reform plan cleared the way for the transition of Korea into a modern civil society. Towards this end, the reform efforts to eradicate discrimination against people of the lowest caste and slaves and the emphasis on equality for all human beings were especially important. The demand for the equitable redistribution of farmland was a watershed in land reform throughout the world.

The reform plan submitted by the peasant army and the management of the Jipgang-so administrative offices did a great deal to bring about a new political consciousness among the masses and a modern self-awareness. The Jipgang-so administrative offices served as model of local autonomy. If only the experiment of the short-lived (three months) Jipgang-so

administrative offices had not been brought to such an abrupt end by the Japanese and continued for at least a few years, the modern history of Joseon would have seen substantial advancement in the realm of civil rights. This would have greatly hastened the era of modern civil society, which would have been built by the Koreans themselves rather than imposed by foreign pressure.

## **Keum Jang-Tae: Adaptation of Confucian Organizations to the Contemporary Korean Society**

### **1. Present conditions of Korean Confucianism**

As a tradition most deeply rooted in the foundation of Korean society, Confucianism still has an extensive influence on the Koreans' ways of thinking and modes of culture. A recent survey indicates that most Koreans adopted Confucian values as their own,\*1) and that the organizations of Korean Confucianism are managed loosely enough to accommodate most who hold Confucian values. Since the organizations accept as their members all who adopt the Confucian moral norms and observe the ancestor-worship rites, eligibility and obligations for the members are minimal. In fact, attending the official worship ceremonies held by the Confucian order is recommended to all its members but not required, and even attending worship ceremonies of other religions such as Buddhism and shamanism is allowed except to its executive members. As for the Christians, the Protestants are not admissible to the Confucian organizations due to their denial of the ancestor-worship ritual, while the Catholics who observe the ancestor-worship rites are eligible for the Confucian membership. Moreover, the Confucian organizations have a structure so similar to that of administrative bodies that they do not conflict with the secular administrative system, thereby giving their members no sense of discrepancy between the religious order and the secular order. Thus loosely organized and ineffectively managed, the Confucian religious order has not spoken up for the collective will of its believers except for in such cases as radical social changes transforming the traditional Confucian institutions, and played no significant role in the contemporary Korean society.

The Confucian order has adapted itself to the contemporary Korean society in three ways: a conservative way of adhering to the tradition, an accommodative way of trying to cope with changing situations, and a reformative way of radically reevaluating the tradition. Broadly speaking, the Confucian order is gradually heading from the conservatism through the accommodative adaptivism toward the overall reformativism. However, while recognizing the need for self-reformation in order to adapt itself to the contemporary society, the Confucian order has scarcely demonstrated a will to fulfill it. In 1979, a bulletin of the Confucian order emphasized the necessity of self-reformation of the order, indicating that evil practices penetrated its heart and the Confucian faith was extremely enfeebled. Nevertheless, the Confucian order in the twenty-first century still remains content with maintaining its old customs, leaving the task of self-transformation at the level of an ideal argument.

Since the liberation of Korea in 1945, the adaptation to new social environments of the Korean Confucian order has been required in three folds. Firstly, the Confucian order had to organize Confucian believers more systematically. By organizing serious believers around the Confucian Association, Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos, it has secured stability to some extent. However, on the one hand, Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos used to be state institutions in the Choson dynasty for performing memorial services at national Confucian shrines and for teaching Confucian canons. By building itself mainly on such formerly government-serving bodies, the Confucian order ended up with limiting its representative capacity. On the other hand, the Confucian Association, though being the general congregation of the Confucians, depends on Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos. This illustrates the general tendency of looseness in the setup of different levels of Confucian organizations. Moreover, the directors of the

Confucian order do not have the representative capacity due to the lack of professional education or training in Confucianism.

Secondly, the Confucian order had to establish a timely set of ritual and moral obligations that the contemporary Confucians could follow. For all the evidences of the inappropriateness of the traditional Confucian norms in contemporary society, however, the Confucian order has never thoroughly examined how to update them, but rather accumulated haphazard amendments within the same old framework. Thus, the Confucian ritual and moral obligations were reduced to an empty skeleton of conventions, having lost their original vitality.

Thirdly, the Confucian order had to prove its social commitment by responding to the rapid changes of the contemporary Korean society. However, it kept silence toward such pursuits of modern Korea as the democratic social reform and the capitalistic industrialization. The most distinct socially involved response that it had ever made was to define the demand for its self-reform as a crisis to its self-preservation and resist them. For instance, the Confucian order opposed strongly to amending the prohibition law against the marriage of two people of the same family name and family origin, only to confirm its conservative characteristics.

Basically many problems that the Korean Confucian order confronted in process of adaptation to contemporary society are related to its understanding of self-identity. In other words, it is a serious problem that the Korean Confucian order has no clear view on the question whether it is a religious group or not. Although both affirmative and negative opinions on the question of the religious identity of Confucianism appeared on one of the Confucian bulletins, no one showed any particular interest in or provoked any serious debate for or against either side. Even the response of the director of Sunggyung'wan has not been consistent, since the directorship was taken alternatively by speakers on both sides. Moreover, even when the Confucian order officially declared Confucianism as a religion, it scarcely received any public support. Many Confucians still consider Confucianism as a system of norms for moral life instead of a proper religion, and the Confucian order also prefers establishing itself on the traditional cultural foundation as a whole to identifying itself as one religious group among many. Rather, it is other religious groups that view the present Korean Confucianism as a form of religion. Religiosity and conviction having almost faded out of the lives of Confucian believers, Confucianism, although once deeply revered, has now lost its religious character. In fact, the present Korean Confucianism is not firmly established as an organized religion but merged extensively in the norms regulating everyday conducts and in the social consciousness of Korean people. The Confucian population, estimated only 2.1 million in a survey done in 1995, is downsizing rapidly and losing cohesive power in Korean society. So, if not as a religious organization, the Korean Confucian order is very likely to take roots as a bureau of preserving Confucian cultural heritages such as Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos.

## **2. Organizations of the contemporary Korean Confucianism**

There are three kinds of Confucian organizations currently active in the Korean society: first, the Confucian order centering around the Confucian Association, Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos; second, the academic lineage groups centering around local private Confucian academies and shrines; third, the gatherings of scholars of Confucianism.

### (1) the Confucian order

The Confucian Association, Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos were organized nationwide under the leadership of Kim Changsuk(1879-1962) in 1945, immediately

after the liberation of Korea. The Confucian Association, with its headquarters in Seoul and local branches in other areas, is the official organization of the Confucians and forms the basis of the Korean Confucian order. Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos, which used to be state institutions in the Choson dynasty, are now juridical foundations affiliated with the Confucian Association. They consist of Sunggyung'wan in Seoul, 15 foundations for Hyanggyo in each province and each city under the direct control of the central government, and 234 Hyanggyos in each city and county. As executive organs of the Confucian order, Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos perform the sacrificial rites at the national shrines for Confucius. In addition, there are Young Men's Confucian Association (founded in 1976) and Women's Confucian Association (founded in 1975), which are intended to encourage the previously underrepresented youth and women groups to play an active part in supporting Confucian beliefs. Yet in fact, they did not go beyond reinforcing the traditional obligations on these groups, not to speak of allowing them to represent themselves in the decision-making process of the Confucian religious order.

The Confucian order took pains to found Sunggyung'wan University in the hope of recovering the educational function of Confucianism. However, after suffering a devastating internal struggle ("the dispute of the Confucians") from 1956 to 1969, it lost all its capacity of university management. The consequent separation of the university from the order weakened it further. Although not an exact measure, the total number of Confucian believers is a fine indicator of such reality of the Korean Confucianism. The number cannot be measured exactly, since most Confucians live up to the Confucian conviction and observe ritual obligations without forming a strictly bound religious community or being aware of their religious identity. The Confucian order estimated it at 6.9million in 1982,\*2) but the national census reported it as 786,955 in 1983, which equals to 1.99% of the total population or 5.05% of all the religious population of Korea(South). Two year later, the number stood at 483,366 with the decrease of 38.6%, and a decade later in 1995, it dropped again to the half, standing at 210,927. As is illustrated by the statistics, the Confucians are rapidly diminishing in number, occupying an insignificant portion of the population. The reason of such rapid decrease is that the Confucian population consists mainly of the aged people and so it decreases in proportion to their death, and also that in general the Confucian faith is fading out of contemporary minds.

Besides, the infrastructural weakness of the Korean Confucian order has impeded its adaptation to the contemporary society: it lacks a firm financial basis and a professional leadership. The financial basis of the Confucian order is not the membership contributions but merely its real estates and government subsidies for maintenance of the buildings designated as cultural properties. This can be understood as a custom handed down from the Choson dynasty when the Confucianism was the state religion whose maintenance was entirely at government expense. As a result, staffs of most Hyanggyos cannot be paid for their labor, and except the government-designated cultural properties, Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos cannot even afford to repair their buildings. The Confucian order cannot overcome the limitation on its activities without first establishing its financial independence, and the only solution is the mass support of the common believers.

It is no wonder that the Confucian order has no professional ministry system, considering that the representatives of Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos are regularly elected among the renowned figures by vote at the general meetings. So, very few of them have thorough Confucian training, while the specialized Confucian education at Sunggyung'wan University is not systematically connected to a career in the Confucian order. As a result, in Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos, the sacrificial rites are performed

superficially by non-specialists and the Confucian education are provided randomly by guest lecturers. It is obvious that neither the restoration of reverence for the Confucian ritual nor the systematic Confucian education of the public is impossible in this way. Recent efforts of Sunggyung'wan to deliver its operational policies to Hyanggyo directors through their reorientation and to produce better qualified human resources by installing classic-reading courses for college and graduate students at Hallimwon (Academy of Letters) do not seem to yield its desired effect of producing Confucian leaders.

#### (2) the academic lineage groups

As in the Choson dynasty, Seowon (local Confucian academy) and Sawu (local Confucian shrine) are private organizations established by the physical or mental descendents of ancestral founders of an academic lineage. Usually Seowon has a lecture hall and a shrine for ancestral founders of a particular academic lineage,\*3) while Sawu has a shrine but no lecture hall. Each of the 813 Seowons and the 1,237 Sawus presently existing nationwide is, according to its regulations, equipped with a legislative board and an executive board, but there is a great disparity among them in size and the maintenance condition. The membership to one Seowon or Sawu is directly connected with an academic or familial line. For this reason, the academic lineage groups are relatively more active in ancestor-worship rites and other activities for memorializing and honoring the intellectual virtues of their enshrined ancestors, than public Confucian organizations like Hyanggyos. Besides, many of their members are well-informed in Confucian canons and ritual, thanks to their Confucian upbringing.

Nevertheless, the academic lineage groups have problems of the exclusiveness, the lack of social involvement and the loss of the educational function. Each group is so tightly confined within the boundary of its academic line that it has little connection or exchange with local public Confucian organizations. Only the ones in southeastern Korea that formed recently a joint assembly called Pakyakhoe can be considered as an exception. This limitation in scope of the academic lineage groups has led their activities to private self-ennobling devoid of any concern for social issues. One recent change is that a few major ones among them began to organize or support scholastic societies and to try to explain the meaning and role of their ancestral masters' thoughts in the contemporary society. The problem of the loss of the traditional role of Seowons as local private educational institutions appears partly because of their inconvenient locations in isolated and less populated area. So, the academic lineage groups are trying to restore its relevancy to education or academic activities by offering Seowons to scholars and students nationwide at such special occasions as workshops or field trips.

#### (3) the scholastic societies

Under the present circumstances where the Confucian order is inactive and the academic lineage groups are uncommunicative, the societies for Confucian studies are the most vigorously growing Confucian organizations of all. As for the general societies for Confucian studies, there are the Korean Confucius Society(founded in 1980), the Association for Confucian Studies(founded in 1985), the Korean Society for Eastern Philosophy and so forth. In cases of specialized societies for studies on a particular Confucian thinker like Yi Hwang(Toegye), Cho Shik(Nammyong), Yi Yi(Yulgok) and Chung Yagyong(Tasan), most of their founders or sponcers are the academic or familial lineage groups, but some of them are universities with the local background.

The Confucian scholastic societies are not faithful to Confucian convictions enough to cooperate with the Confucian religious order, on the one hand. It is no wonder that the Confucian scholastic societies may well have no strong faith in Confucian values nor any motivation for realizing these values, since they are academic organizations designated for the critical and theoretical examination of Confucianism. On the other

hand, however, the scholastic societies are not critical enough to be free from such biases for their subject matter as are desired by their patronizing clansmen or academic lineage groups. Thus their researches on the past Confucian thinkers are often criticized as the extravaganza of one-sided admirations, and so are the clansmen and academic lineage groups for making the clan-affiliated scholarship in the academic trend, in spite of their undisputable contribution to revitalizing Confucian studies in Korea.

### **3. Present state and crisis of the institution of Confucian ritual**

The Korean society is thoroughly permeated with Confucian culture, the most explicit phenomena of which can be found in the ritual codes and the moral norms of Korean people. The Koreans consider the sense of propriety and duty seriously as a necessary condition of the cultured personality, and the criticism of being discourteous means the most severe reproach to a person. So, the disruption of the traditional Confucian social order in Korea can be best observed in the collapse of the ritual codes and the moral norms in people's lives.

The Confucian ritual in the contemporary Korean society generally consist of two subcategories: the sacrificial rites at the national shrine for Confucius held by the Confucian religious order, and the daily rites of the Confucian believers. The sacrificial rites at the national shrines for Confucius of Sunggyung'wan and Hyanggyos are of two kinds: the semestral ceremony called Seokjeonje and the semimonthly incense-burning ceremony. Seokjeonje went through a reform during the reconstruction of the Confucian order in 1946. In process of the reform, the spirit tablet of many ancestral Chinese sages enshrined from the Choson dynasty without particular relevancy to the Korean Confucian tradition were dismissed from the national shrines, and only those of Confucius, twenty Chinese sages and eighteen Korean sages were left.\*4) This reform is significant in that it cleared the subordinate attitude of copying the Chinese model and constructed a unique shrine system of Korean Confucianism. Also, such reforms as the admission of the female participants in Seokjeonje of Sunggyung'wan and the use of current Korean expressions instead of classical Chinese ones in the announcement of ceremonial proceedings were attempted.

Among the daily rites, the most widely observed are the four basic family rites for coming-of-age, wedding, mourning and ancestor-worship. It is true that the adoption of the Western lifestyle led to a great change in the daily rites of Korean people. The coming-of-age ceremony has long been abolished, while the wedding ceremony has lost its meaning as a Confucian rite. The mourning rite and the ancestor-worship rite have more or less preserved the framework of the Confucian ritual, and yet they are significantly transformed. Thus left in the form of fragmentary formalities in people's lives, the Confucian tradition still matters.

When the Government legislated the Models of Family Rites in 1969 in order to renovate the family rites plagued with meaningless formalities and extravagances under the name of tradition, the Confucian religious order accepted it, thereby revealing its lack of will to lead the reform on an active stance. Again in 1973, when the Family Rites Law became effective and the traditional Confucian ritual such as the mourning rites were forced to get simplified, the Confucian order showed a lukewarm attitude, petitioning the Government for relaxing its restrictions on the Confucian rites. However, the Family Rites Law was repealed before long, not because of an opposition of the Confucian order but because the traditional Confucian rituals themselves were disintegrated rapidly in people's lives, leaving no need for a legal restriction on them. Now even among the Confucians there are few who practice the mourning rites in full scale for two years or in traditional mourning costume.

Unable to adapt itself to the changes of the times, the Confucian ritual is at a crisis. This crisis can be attributed to the lack of balance in the ritual system, the loss of meaning in the ritual formalities, and the collapse of the ritual communities and norms. Firstly, the Confucian ritual used to be a multi-layered system composed of the state rites, the village rites and the family rites. As for the worship ceremonies, there were various rites for the heaven, the land and grain, the royal ancestors, and the Confucian sages and masters. However, the Confucian order is clinging exclusively to the sacrificial rites at the national shrine for Confucius, ignoring other traditional state rites. The academic lineage groups also continue the sacrificial rites for their ancestral masters only. Especially the fact that the Confucian order does not perform the heaven-worship ceremony indicates that it lost the sense of balance regarding the Confucian ritual system. Secondly, by losing the original spirit and depending on the convention, the Confucian rites degenerated into a set of wasteful and complicated formalities. Particularly in the ancestor-worship rites, as the reverence for the deities and the belief in their blessing vanished, the motivation of participation as well as the solidarity of the community through the rites got weaker. In case of the funeral rite, the Confucian order adheres to the traditional burial without making any substantial comment on the highly demanded cremation. Thirdly, the communities that provided the practical foundation for the Confucian ritual have not been re-established. The state ritual like the sacrificial rites for the heaven and for the land and grain became extinct with the collapse of the royal family. The village rites that the local Confucian communities had practiced also ceased to exist. The family rites are separated from the Confucian ritual system and underwent a considerable degree of modification, as the family groups broke away from the Confucian world-view and the moral obligations to one's parents and ancestors changed.

#### **4. The campaigns for morals and the adaptation of Confucian moral norms**

The most representative Confucian moral norms are loyalty, filial piety and the Three Bonds and Five Relations. The Three Bonds and Five Relations generally raise aversion as an antiquated and conservative idea among the middle-aged Koreans as well as the younger generation, if not directly rejected. Loyalty and filial piety are generally accepted norms, but only through reinterpretation. Loyalty means sincerity in giving one's heart, not the conservative feudalistic ethics that prescribes submission to one's superiors and the Government. Filial piety is interpreted as a sense of duty in gratitude for the love of one's parents, instead of a patriarchal norm which demands unconditional obedience of the children. Thus, the Confucian moral norms today can be persuasive only when reinterpreted as the horizontal norms regulating reciprocal relationships, as opposed to the vertical norms regulating hierarchical relationships.

Since the 1970's, the Confucian moral norms came to attract considerable interest and sympathy in Korea, as loyalty and filial piety were recognized as a way to re-establish the public morality, and practicing them was promoted as a government project for social education. In response to this project, the Confucian religious order announced its general principle 'raise the standard of morals' and specified the standard as loyalty and filial piety. In 1973 the Confucian order conducted vigorous campaigns in promotion of morals by issuing the Declaration of Morality and the Outline for Moral Practice, and by holding a mass meeting where public lectures were delivered and filial sons and daughters were commended. However, the morals-promoting campaigns made too much of lecturing and prize-awarding to formulate strategies for realizing their ideal and get feedback.

From the Confucian world-view, each individual is organically connected to the society and the entire world through his or her family. In this organic and holistic understanding of the social structure, the familial ties is a prototype of general social relationships and, therefore, a matrix of the Confucian moral sentiments. Especially the parent-child relation lies in the center of the familial ties, giving the greatest weight on filial piety as a basis of Korean morality. Even today it is generally recognized as a necessary condition of realizing human values to feel an obligation to support one's aged parents. In this regard, the sense of familial ties play important roles in the contemporary Korean society. Firstly, it provides the sense of stability and belonging to a community. Usually the Koreans feel more settled and attached to their workplaces and residential places, by extending the usage of familial titles to their colleagues, neighbors and even to strangers. Secondly, it promotes the old people's welfare. Most Koreans still feel morally obliged to take care of their aged and diseased parents and do not send them to asylums. Thirdly, it continues, strengthens and extends the kinship relationships. Despite the individualism and urbanization of society and the consequent downsizing of family, people with country background maintain a close relationship with their clansmen by organizing family councils or recompiling genealogies of the family.

In another regard, the sense of familial ties has led to social evils. First of all, once the society is understood as an organic extension of a family, it is likely to be overpowered by personal feelings rather than to establish public legal order. Secondly, the Confucian moral norms of loyalty and filial piety, when misunderstood, contribute to consolidating authoritarianism, by demanding one-sided obedience to the authority of seniors and superiors at home, school and workplace. Such an authoritarian environment seem to affect youngsters with the lack of independence and self-control. Also, the one-sided emphasis on the obedience to the seniors in disregard of their duty to serve the younger or lower obstructs the mutual understanding of the two sides. Thirdly, the sense of familial ties often fails to get extended to larger communities and in reality, leads to a family-centered exclusivism. The exclusive attitude is an obstacle to unification and rational operation of social communities. Many private enterprises in Korea are managed by blood relations rather than by unrelated experts. Many foster parents in Korea avoid adopting a child outside of the paternal lineage, making the domestic adoption far more difficult than the international one.

Another Confucian norm that has bound the Korean moral consciousness is righteousness, which means faithfulness in personal relations and unyielding resistance against injustice in social relations. Most of the highly respected Confucian scholars were those who coped with historical crises in the spirit of righteousness. Those who were true to the Confucian principles without yielding to political and financial powers were called 'Sonbi', the exemplary Confucians. Today we can find the legacy of the moral norm of righteousness in many Koreans' disposition to suffer a loss willingly for a just cause and regard shrewd reckoning of profits and losses despicable as well as in Korean international diplomacy seeking for nominal honor at all costs.

## **5. Social activities of Confucian organizations and their problems**

Although the Korean Confucian order has made no remarkable success in its internal reform of organization and management, its social activities limited to public education and protests against government policies fare no better than that.

Firstly, as a part of the social enlightenment project, the Confucian religious order has made constant effort to cultivate the public sense of morality and propriety. Sunggyng'wan has held public lectures at the semimonthly incense-burning ceremonies

and on Saturdays, and published manuals of Confucian ethics for young generations. Young Men's Confucian Association has sponsored classic-reading group activities and general Confucian education programs at the elder's colleges. Also with its campaigns for Discovering the Ancestors' Wisdom, it endeavored to revitalize the tradition of family precepts. Local Hyangyo's has held calligraphy workshops and Sunday schools for teaching Confucian classics, and drawn extensive sympathy from the public with their workshops for Loyalty and Filial Piety. School for Domestic Training held by Women's Confucian Association has been successful, evoking considerable responses as a program for training young women for the Confucian family rites and proprieties. However, the Confucian order has scarcely provided regular school education, and its chance to regain the lost right of management over Sunggyng'wan University is small.

It is noteworthy that the calligraphy workshops for training one's mind with brushwork on the Chinese writing containing Confucian morals, are developing an area of the Confucian art. In fact, the artistic field of the Confucian tradition is limited to the academic studies on poetry and novels written by ancient Confucian scholars and on ceremonial music used in worship rites, and small group activities for composing poems in classical Chinese. Nevertheless, the Confucian order has shown no interest in developing the limited field of art, and its reproduction of the ceremonial music and dance for the sacrificial rites at the national shrines for Confucius and for the royal family has served the purpose of preserving the intangible cultural properties, not that of revitalizing the Confucian art in people's lives.

Secondly, the Confucian organizations have protested against the government policies directly concerning the Confucian tradition, such as the revision of family laws or the abolition of Chinese letters education. The revision of family laws was made an issue in 1974 when the National Assembly submitted a bill to that effect at the request of feminist groups. The feminist groups insisted that the law prohibiting women from being the heads of their families is the residue of the patriarchal ideology of the Confucian tradition, and that the law forbidding the marriage of two people with the same family names and the same family origins is anachronistic and an inhumane measure inflicting unnecessary pain on such couples and their children.

The Confucian order refuted the revisionist arguments on the ground of protecting the traditional Korean family system and avoiding genetic degradation, and manifested its strong opposition to the revision bill by making a declaration of the anti-revision campaign and a countermeasure committee. In 1975, it launched a nationwide signature-collecting drive by organizing the National Council for Restraining the Family Laws Revision and collected over 2.16 million signatures, and in 1981, organized another national council for protecting the prohibition law against the marriage of those with the same family name and family origin. This nationwide resistant movement against the family laws revision demonstrated an organized power of the Confucians and won the sympathy of country people, but no particular response from townspeople. In fact, it ended in failure,\*5) thereby revealing that the Confucian order has little appeal to the public and lacks adaptability to the changes of the times.

Moreover, in the present situation where the linguistic environment of the Koreans has changed rapidly from literary Chinese to colloquial Hangul as can be seen even in the newspapers, the Confucian order regards the reduction of Chinese letters education as the greatest crisis that the Korean Confucianism is confronting and insists that the regular education of Chinese letters should be given from early years. It is reality that most college students in Korea cannot even read the Chinese letters properly. Nevertheless, the Confucian order is so deeply attached to the literary Chinese culture that it cannot adapt itself to the changes of the times. For instance, it has not even

established a standard Hangul translation of Confucian canons for over half a century after the liberation of Korea from the rule of imperialist Japan.

However, the Confucian order is apt to depend on the central or local government, not to mention the maintenance of its buildings on the government budget. So the Confucian order has usually supported the government policies, unless contradictory its basic stance. For instance, in July 1972 when the atmosphere of national security crisis arose from the issue of the evacuation of the U. S. Armed Forces in Korea, it held a pro-government rally. Three months later when the military regime established the Renovative Constitutions and led the Renovation movement, it announced a written resolution for spearheading the movement. Also, in 1982 on the issue of the distorted historical account of Korea in the Japanese government-compiled textbooks, the Confucian order presented to the Government a proposal of retaliation. These facts manifests its government-serving character and more fundamentally, its lack of financial and organizational self-reliance.

## **6. Adaptability of Korean Confucianism to today's society and its requirements**

Korean Confucianism in the twenty-first century has ahead of it the alternatives of functioning as a new vital power in reality and becoming extinct. Since the Confucian way of life still has a firm footing in the traditional and moral consciousness of Korean people, it is still possible for Korean Confucianism to restore its appeal to the people and its leading role in the society through the self-reform of Confucian organizations. Without the self-reform, it will either fade out from people's mind while fragmentarily preserved only in the closed societies of Confucian scholars and directors of the order, or completely disappear with the death of its last believer. Unlike in Choson dynasty when it flourished under the government protection, it is not easy today for Korean Confucianism to take root in the public. Especially, it is likely to appear a meaningless relic of the past to the young generation living in the swift current of Western-oriented social changes. So, if the Confucian organizations do not adapt themselves to the changes of the times but adhere to outdated conventions, Korean Confucianism cannot gain the sympathy of the young generation nor can be transmitted to them. For its adaptation to the new social order, the Confucian order is facing three requirements.

Firstly, the Confucian order should establish new moral norms for harmonizing communities. Discord within the family between generations or spouses is getting intensified after the destruction of the traditional Confucian patriarchy in families. Also, the mutual ties between neighbors are being cut off along with the urbanization and the spread of individualism after the dissolution of local communities helping one another in disaster or moral deprivation according to the village codes. So new moral norms for communities are in need today for harmonizing people with their neighbors as well as their families without violating each family member's autonomy nor neglecting those in misfortune. By providing them, Confucianism can become the source of social stability.

Secondly, the Confucian order need develop new forms of ritual system and art. In order to revitalize Confucian religious faith, the obsolete ritual system should be reformed to increase the public participation and conform with the social reality. In order to convey the Confucian teachings to contemporary people's hearts, not only literature, music, calligraphy, painting, dance and theatrical performance but every possible artistic field of Confucianism need be developed. Particularly, it is in urgent need for the Confucian order to develop a colloquial Hangul culture instead of clinging to the literary Chinese tradition, since by reviving the rich cultural inheritance of the Korean Confucian tradition for present Hangul generations, it can have a new power over Korean society.

Finally, the Confucian order should respond to the practical problems of society. The variety of the present social problems demanding reformation and adaptation of the Confucian value system means that the field that it can contribute to is wide to that extent. For example, to settling troubles that come from the technological civilization or the legalism of democratization, the humane morality of Confucianism can contribute. To overcome the destruction of nature and the environmental pollution resulting from egoistic avarice and excessive consumption of the masses, the Confucian ideal of extending one's love of family to one's neighbors and to all creatures and reaching the unification of human beings and nature needs be reawakened. Also, for overcoming the agony of the political and ideological division of the Korean people into South and North and realizing their reunification, the Confucian spirit of 'Moderation' harmonizing varieties and 'Great Unity' covering the whole need be realized.

### Footnotes

- \*) According to the survey conducted by Prof. Yi-hum Yun together with Gallup Korea (*Religions and Religious attitudes of the Korean*, 1984), only 0.5% of all subjects identified themselves as Confucian. However, 91.7% of all subjects adopted Confucian values and it is noteworthy that this figure consists of 100% of the Buddhists, 90% of the Catholics, and 76.4% of the Protestants.
- \*) The total number of the Confucian believers that Sunggyung'wan presented by 1982 is estimated by assuming that all the people in the nation excluding those who are affiliated to any of the religious groups are tentatively Confucian, and that among those tentative Confucians the head of each family is a faithful Confucian adherent, the number of families being calculated based on the standard family of five.
- \*) Depending on its scale, it can be equipped with a lecture hall and no shrine, and in that case it is called Seodang.
- \*) The twenty ancestral Chinese masters consist of four saints(Yen Yuan, Tsang Shan, Tsze Sze, Mencius), ten disciples of Confucius and six sages of Sung dynasty China.
- \*) The prohibition law against the marriage of those with the same family name and the same family origine is abolished for a violation of the constitution at the Constitutional Court in 1997. The case for the abrogation of the headship of family is presently under consideration at the Constitutional Court.

### ***3. Theoretical Discussion***

#### **Peter Beyer: Forming Religion in Global Society: From Organization to Invisibility**

My aim in this paper is to offer some theoretical reflections on how we form religion in today's global society. The underlying assumption is that what we might consider to be "religiousness" will not operate as "religion" unless it is given form as such, something that requires the at least implicit collaboration of insiders and outsiders, those engaged in the enterprise and those watching them. The possibilities for lending this form are not endless, and therefore one needs a conceptual apparatus to understand these possibilities and their implications. The approach that I take is a very Luhmannian one, meaning that I will avail myself rather centrally of Niklas Luhmann's conceptual apparatus, but without being too much concerned with whether I am using those concepts as he might have intended. The purpose is to gain some insight into religious formation or non-formation, not to gloss or criticize an overall theory.

Since the focus of this conference is largely on organized religion, my comments are to some degree ordered around that particular way of giving form to religion, but my aim is rather to situate organized religion in the context of what I see as other major possibilities, not go into a detailed discussion about types of organizations and their characteristics. My main question is "where do religious organizations fit in?" not, for instance, "how do organizations operate in detail?" To go about this, I first set the stage by arguing that, sociologically, we look at religion strictly as a variety of communication, thereby strategically abstracting from persons and, among other consequences, presenting the notion of membership and belonging in a rather different, and I hope useful, light. On this basis, I then examine what forms communication takes as religion and translate this question into one of social systems, namely societal systems, organizations, social movements, and interactions. I argue that in today's global society, religion has taken on the form of one important societal function system among several others. In the context of that system, religious organizations, social movements, and interactional social networks play key roles as concretizers of this system, which is to say as forms that permit religious communication to converge sufficiently to guarantee its systemic recursiveness or self-reference. What also plays a central role is other function systems, notably the state and legal systems, but also mass media, education, and art. The combination of all these possibilities makes for a rather complex situation, one that is for instance reflected in the fact that observation from the perspective of any of these systems will yield rather different conceptions of what religion is and what counts as religion. This leads to that obvious feature of religion in the contemporary world, that it is a contested arena and category as well as an arena and category of contestation. Such contestation very much involves the forms that religion does or does not take.

#### *Religion as Communication*

In the following theoretical reflections, I want to treat religion almost exclusively as a social phenomenon. Psychological and religious realities especially, both as observational perspectives and in terms of what they intend, are, like the physical and the biological, important only in so far as they condition the social or become thematized in the social. What happens in the consciousnesses of individuals or in the worlds of gods, spirits, and other supraempirical planes are of concern to the extent that they impinge upon or contextualize the social, but not beyond that. Claiming the relative independence of the social in this way, however, means that one has to be able to say explicitly what constitutes the social as opposed

to the psychological or the theological. Historically, neither the discipline of sociology as concerns the psyche or consciousness, nor that of religious studies as concerns the spiritual/ultimate/divine has been very consistent in making such distinctions clear. Here I want to do precisely that because my aim is to analyze how religion is constructed as a contemporary social reality, and not primarily as the “expression” of aggregate individual experience/belief or the human response to divine initiative or to the character of ultimate reality. Putting the emphases on these latter aspects tends to shift the questioning away from how the social operates in its own terms in favour of the relation between the psychological and the social or the theological and the social. Important as these may be from other perspectives, locating the observation of religion too much at these junctures obscures or at least underexposes the ways that social processes also follow their own logic. Focussing on the independence of the social allows one to see, for instance, that individuals can believe and even practice, but that this by itself is not sufficient to constitute religion socially; and religion can persist as a social reality without everyone or even the majority of people believing or practicing. Thus, to give but a couple of examples, Chinese or Japanese people may believe in the reality of spirits and gods and may even perform activities in relation to those beliefs, but that is not sufficient to constitute such belief and activity as religion. Similarly, but in reverse, a great many Western Europeans may not believe in a god or even engage in religious practice very often, but the Christian religion can nonetheless remain an important social reality in countries like Sweden or France. It is not that individual belief and practice are unimportant for the constitution of religion. Usually they are essential. But they are not already by themselves religion; they do not already *operate socially as religion*. At a minimum, they also have to be observed or treated as religion – and here my use of the grammatical passive voice is deliberate and contributes to what I am saying.

Attempts conceptually to isolate the specifically social are not uncommon in the sociological and anthropological literatures. Ideas such as collective representations, social action, interaction, and culture have been among the possibilities. They do well in pointing out how the social is more than the fact of people living in groups, more than the sum of consciousnesses, but instead a product of what these conscious humans do. For my purposes here, I avail myself of a conceptualization that maximizes the emergent and independent quality of the social vis-à-vis these humans. This is Niklas Luhmann’s idea that the social consists in communications, operations that are to be identified neither simply as the “expressions” (or externalizations) of consciousness, nor as the activity or action of human beings, nor as the products of human endeavour or “labour”. Instead communications from a Luhmannian perspective are a synthesis of three selections, namely information, informing or imparting (*Mitteilung*),<sup>1</sup> and understanding, and these somewhat in abstraction from who or what does the selection of the information, the imparting of the information, or the understanding of the information thus imparted (Luhmann 1984; Luhmann 1997). The details of this theory of the social and of communication need not detain us here because the purpose in introducing it is to prepare the way for observing religion in a particular way, namely as something quintessentially social, which here means as communication (Beyer 2001; Tyrell 1998).

From this Luhmannian point of departure, to observe religion as a social phenomenon is to observe it as communication, but this is not another way of defining religion. It is only to say

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1 The German word, in particular the way Luhmann uses it, is somewhat difficult to translate into English and could equally be rendered as communicating, utterance, expression, or simply communication. I choose “informing” or “imparting” here in order to capture the performative aspect of generating information that can be understood, without, however, implying that the process somehow has its fundamental origin “inside” something and therefore consists in the putting out or externalization.

that, to the degree that religion is a social phenomenon, it will construct itself as communication and not as something else like experience or consciousness, let alone mystical insight. We have not defined religion in claiming that it is a variety of communication; we have merely set the parameters of observation in which the conceptualization of religion will take place. These parameters religion will share with all other social phenomena. Some of the more important include the following: First, the elements of religion are events that impart information, and only in that context are things like “experience”, “tradition”, “sacrality”, “supernatural presence”, “devotion”, “enlightenment”, and “transformation” produced and reproduced, structured and given social meaning. The religious communication generates the *social* reality of both human piety and divine nature. The extent to which the reverse also applies is not relevant so long as the communication happens. Second, and flowing from the first, religion, like all communication, is self-referential or recursive: the only thing that gives religious communication meaning is previous and subsequent religious communication or communication about religion. Social meaning is context, and that context can only be provided by other or more communication. Third, what counts as specifically religious communication will depend on its thematization as something called religion, usually in implicit or explicit contrast to communication that is not religion. That thematization has to happen in communication, whether religious or not. Therefore, if religious communication or communication about religion ceases, so will, socially speaking, religion; if no communication is structured and thematized as religion, there will be no religion. To suggest otherwise is precisely to engage in such structuring and thematization. Treating religion as communication disallows any essentialist understanding of religion as a social reality, because that essence of religion has first to be generated and reproduced as essence in communication. Among the many consequences of this position is, of course, that my observing religion in this way is itself part of the construction of religion, but only if my communication (namely, this paper) is understood and thematized in subsequent communication.

Focussing on the close relation between “religion” and “thematizing as religion” is fairly important to what I want to say in this presentation because it allows one to trace key social changes through an analysis of historical shifts in the semantic meanings of words; or at least to begin the discussion there. Accordingly, as examples, when Europeans of the early modern centuries began to use the word “religion” to refer to a distinct and systematic unit which manifested itself only as a plurality of “religions”, that signalled not an insignificant localized usage and especially not a distortion of a purportedly “original meaning”. Instead, it indicated simultaneously a change in how these Europeans understood religion and how they structured religion in their communication and hence in their social institutions. Similarly, when South Asians in the 19<sup>th</sup> century began to use the Sanskrit word *dharma* (and its vernacular variations) also to mean something like what the Europeans who then ruled the region meant with “religion”, that marked not just a translation of a foreign word but also a shift in how many South Asians began to see their own cultural traditions and therefore how they began to reformulate and restructure these as “religions”. A comparable observation applies, for instance, to the changed ways that older words like *zongjiao*, *shukyo*, *jonggyo*, and *agama* came to be used in countries like China, Japan, Korea, and Indonesia: semantic shifts as aspects of the (re)structuring of a peculiarly modern religious domain. Of note in all these examples is both the changes and the continuities. Older words come to have changed meanings. We are not dealing so much with the pure invention of social realities that were not there before – although that is also the case – as we are with the partial dissolution of received patterns of communication and their recombination with new elements to create a new form that bears a strong resemblance to old ones. From this combination of continuity and discontinuity derives the understandable twin observation that the new “religions” were already always there at the same time as they are entirely modern inventions. Recognizing that the social is communication, and that all communication exhibits this combination of old

and new thereby obviates the question of which is more “authentic”, which is more appropriate for describing social realities in a particular place and time. Instead, one asks as to which communicative patterns prevail and how these patterns developed out of what happened before. This way of understanding what, socially speaking, constitutes religion also leaves ample room for considering the contested aspects of the construction of this modern religion and for the involvement of these contests in the relative distribution of social power and influence. It permits an appreciation of how religion can at one and the same time be constructed as a domain *sui generis* (McCutcheon 1997) and yet thoroughly implicated in other social processes, including the economic and the political.

The basic feature of communication by which it is at the same time in continuity and in discontinuity with previous and subsequent communication – hence its fundamental character as imparting information – is also a way of saying that communication, and thus sociality more generally, is always self-referential and recursive: in constructing itself it refers to itself and only to itself. (Leach 1976) This recursiveness, in turn, points to the possibility of self-referential systems of such social communication of which society as a whole is merely the most encompassing. What is of interest in the current context, however, is not just this encompassing system of communication – which today is a globally extended society – but the smaller subunits or subsystems of this larger one. Even though, ultimately, all communication that constitutes a society can be said to refer to all other communication, in reality the range of communication that is relevant in any given instance or situation is far more limited. It is by establishing such limits that subsystems generate themselves. Social subsystems are therefore structures of boundary creation and boundary maintenance, but not in the sense of strictly delimited parts, like the pieces of a pie. Instead, social subsystems are ways of continuously regenerating certain kinds of boundaries of meaning. Their purpose varies. They may serve to create concentrations of particular sorts of social power or knowledge; they may exist to render communication more manageable by limiting the variety of themes and meanings that structure their elements; they may allow different and even contradictory sets of communicative rules to operate, thereby creating possibilities for “dissent” or “deviance” or “subculture” with respect to the larger social environment. Systems are in this respect conceptual parallels to the idea of “social groups”, except that they consist of communications rather than people. Human beings are conditions for the possibility of social systems, but they are not to be identified with them. It is the communications which humans help to generate that refer to one another and thus constitute the system; the humans, strictly speaking, are just tools or instruments like the instruments of an orchestra. They are essential so that music can be made; the system is like the music, and specifically the making of the music.

Continuing this metaphor, my purpose in this presentation is to explore the different ways that religion is typically “composed” and “performed” in today’s society as particular kinds of social system. Like complex symphonies, these systems are generated in certain ways and not others: it is not everything that religion could be or for that matter, depending on the definition of religion, everything religion has been and even currently is. Thus, I explore four types of system, drawing largely from the work of Niklas Luhmann, namely societal systems (especially function systems), organizations, social movements, and interactions, more specifically interaction networks. Given the limitations of time, my attention to each of these types will be brief, allowing only the exploration of certain issues that may be of relevance to the sorts of question being asked at this conference.

#### *Types of Social System: Societal System, Interaction, Organization, and Social Movement*

In moving now to a discussion of social systems, I first present a general and skeletal outline of what characterizes these, partially in order to introduce the notions before applying them to religion, but also to underscore how, from the theoretical perspective I am presenting here,

religion forms itself normally, socially speaking it is not exceptional, but structurally a regular aspect of modern and global social life.

I begin with societal systems, and in particular the societal function systems that are from a Luhmannian point of view the dominant or most powerful structures of modern and global society. Luhmann's most typical way of discussing the core structures of these function systems, and one that I adopt here, is to speak in terms of central, binary codes and the attendant and complex programmes which put those codes into operation. Through the codes and programmes, the communicative elements of these systems are generated with reference to one another. The system constitutes itself through its own reflexivity. The binary code is in a key sense what the system is about, its central and unifying point of reference and what distinguishes it from its social environment and therefore other systems. The two poles of the code are not, however, the same as the distinction between the system and its environment. Instead they consist of a positive pole, which as it were names the system's central concern, and a negative pole which is simply the other side of the positive pole. Thus, to take three examples, economy operates around the binary distinction between owning (Marx's private property!) and not-owning; law centres on the difference between legal and illegal; and science functions in terms of true and false. The religious code, as I shall argue shortly and in contrast to Luhmann's own suggestion, is something like the difference between blessed and cursed, even though that formulation may strike some as insufficiently broad. Given that each of these distinctions could be understood in diverse ways, the codes by themselves do not already show how the system constitutes itself. The programmes are what accomplish this; in a real sense they determine what the system is. Accordingly, when speaking of these systems, it is of critical importance to qualify them, for instance, not simply as economy, but as capitalist economy, positive law, empirical science, academic education, medicalized health, and so forth. The qualifier refers in each case to the programmatic aspect. For much the same reason, even outside the Luhmannian framework, it is common to refer to "modern" versions of all these domains, including, of course, modern religion.

The codes and the programmes thus lend the systems their characteristic identities; but like all social systems, the actual elements of these systems are communications. The codes and programmes incorporate those elements into a system; they are the instructions of the system somewhat analogous to the way DNA provides the programmes of cells and, through them, bodies. As communications, however, these elements also help constitute the larger society, can be woven into other social systems, and therefore can "belong" to more than one social system. Accordingly, it would be misleading to try to understand the boundaries of these systems (or any social system for that matter) by distinguishing strictly between elements that are part of the system and those that are not. Instead the system establishes its boundaries through the operation of its code and programmes; it is the reach of this operating that bounds the system. Indeed, the question of what are the boundaries of a system is something with which the programmes concern themselves, not something somehow naturally given with the inherent characteristics of the elements. That also includes questions of the boundaries of other systems, including organizations. Thus, to take the example of religion, rituals are quite central elements of the religious system. Yet, what makes a ritual a *religious* ritual is its role in the religious programme to which it gives expression, not something inherent in the nature of rituals, however we wish to determine these. The upshot of this consideration is that in terms of boundaries, these systems do not occupy social space; they are not so many pieces of a social pie. Rather, like languages, they operate within a wider social arena, and their extent is coterminous with the range of their influence, which can be strong and determinative all the way to weak and indirect. This aspect is very important for understanding how a religious system constitutes itself in global society.

A further general characteristic of these function systems, which they also share with any social system, is the possibility of "internal" differentiation. The reasons for such

differentiation are the same as for society as a whole: to make the reflexivity of communication more manageable, so that not everything will be relevant in all circumstances. The types of system that come into consideration are also the same as for the larger society, namely interactions, organizations, social movements, and societal systems; and within the latter the different forms of differentiation, namely segmentary, core/periphery, stratified, and functional. Thus, to flag some examples, the capitalist economy relies heavily on organizations like business firms and stock exchanges; it still carries significant stratified differentiation in the form of classes (owners/managers vs employees/workers); schooling still depends significantly on interactions among teachers and students; states often have clear functional differentiation between legislative, executive, and judicial functions; science structures itself functionally along the lines of academic disciplines; and both the global political system and the global religious system avail themselves of segmentary differentiation between, respectively, states and religions. As this last example indicates, the question of internal differentiation of function systems is particularly salient when one considers the religious system. The brief discussion of the function systems raises many connected questions. One of the more important of these concerns what sort of communication falls outside these systems or at least is only indirectly or marginally included in them. Even a cursory glance at any of our social worlds reveals a fair amount of this. Myriad conversations and day to day interactions, letters, telephone conversations, e-mail, and other forms of understood informing often have little to do with buying, sacrificing, performing, learning, recovering, knowing, judging, informing, or deciding in such a way as to reproduce these systems. To be sure, it may be difficult to think of social operations that have nothing whatsoever to do with them, except of course among the excluded and marginalized or our world. But if we keep in mind that each of these systems consists substantially of certain recognizable types of core communication, then it becomes apparent that a not insignificant portion of social performances are only tangentially involved. Obvious examples are conversations about the weather, about the flowers and birds I saw on my walk through the park, or the letter from cousin George telling me about the antics of his dog. The systems are there in the background: I might decide to take a course on meteorology, buy a book to identify those birds and flowers; and cousin George may be concerned about animal-control by-laws or visit the veterinarian to have his dog repaired. Yet taken by themselves, these illustrative communications do not reproduce the systems; subsequent, previous, or other communications might. Moreover, much of what people do is not as such communication. Planting tomatoes in my garden or sitting in my room and thinking are not by themselves communication, although they could become themes or otherwise be incorporated in communication.

Beside communication outside the function systems is another, already adumbrated, question, namely that of other types of social system. The just-mentioned interactions are prime examples, as are organizations and social movements. I shall not dwell on the first of these in the present context except to point out that interactions are a type of social system beside the others and not somehow the building blocks of social life more generally. Much social process takes place within interactions; society would be as unimaginable without them as it would be without people. Yet a great deal takes place outside such contexts. Whether we are speaking of direct face-to-face interactions or mediated ones like those that take place over telephones and other electronic devices, these simply do not encompass more than an important portion of communications in contemporary society. To take some examples, scientific communication occurs largely through publications in various forms and not just in formal and informal conversations among scientists as is presumably happening here; economic transactions occur as often by machine as “over the counter”; most artists communicate their art without direct interaction with their audience; governments now as in the past communicate with their subjects more often in mediated fashion than face-to-face;

and the pious recitation of sacred text along with much religious ritual takes place away from other people. Non-oral media of communication, especially writing and electronic means (but not just those), of course play a key role in these possibilities. What is important to underscore is that interactions are not all that there is to sociality; that the difference among types of social system is not merely one of scale, for instance from micro to macro.

If interactions have been a rather universal and ubiquitous form of social system in all societies, the same cannot be said for organizations. Although these are by no means unique to modern or global society, their importance, numbers, and differentiation as distinct social systems has increased enormously. The reasons for this proliferation and greater prominence are fairly clear. Following Luhmann's conception of organizations, these are a type of social system that constitutes itself by distinguishing between members and non-members, more precisely between member communication and non-member communication. On this view organizational systems no more consist of "people" than do other types. The rules, and thus roles, that distinguish between the two establish a relatively clear social boundary by which one can identify what communication is part of the system. Like other types of system, organizations allow different rules to prevail for specific purposes without having to claim the entire person, although totalizing organizations, like totalizing societal systems (e.g. strata, kinship groups) are possible and exist. Yet unlike interactions which are too restricted in their range and complexity, and unlike function systems which structure themselves each in unique ways, organizations can be wide ranging, very complex, and be adapted to a virtually infinite variety of purposes. The member/non-member communication distinction takes the place of the binary codes and thereby allows this flexibility. Where, for instance, an economic system has to be about economy or an educational system has to be about education, an organization can be about either of these, both of these, or most anything else. Within organizations, one can do very different things and do things very differently, and this expressly in the context of the same society. They can, therefore, serve to institutionalize important boundaries, but also to cross-cut others. These features are critical for forming religion in our society, one of the main reasons that we are witness to a proliferation of religious organization all around the world.

In the context of modern and contemporary global society, organizations have an essential role in virtually every one of the dominant function systems. Ranging from business firms and hospitals to sports clubs and state bureaucracies, organizations are instrumental in the way that function systems structure themselves and carry out their typical and programmatic communication. Modern function systems would be pretty well impossible without them. If interactions are essential to all types of social system, organizations are essential to two very prevalent modern and global types, function systems and, as I discuss shortly, social movements. Again, these other types are not simply "macro" versions of organizations: the latter help produce and reproduce these systems; but there is much communication that reproduces these systems that is not or not just organizational communication, governed by the rules of membership in them. If a great deal of economic production is organized, much consumption is not; the core communication of the economic system, purchase or ownership transfer, more often than not involves both organizational and non-organizational communication. In some function systems such as the education system, the complementary or "consumer" roles are also for the most part organizational roles; and in such systems core communication, for instance the examination, is more completely organizational communication. In other systems such as the art/entertainment system and the religious system, even the primary/professional or "producer" roles are frequently not organizational roles; and in these systems less of their core communication, for example artistic performance or religious ritual, is organizational. In all cases, however, organizational communication plays a central part in lending the system definition, in concretizing and identifying it. The place of religious organizations in forming religion is therefore of central importance.

The significance of organizations in global society is not limited to their role in the function systems. Just because they permit heterogenous concentrations of communications in what from other respects is a continuous and to that extent homogenizing web, namely society, they can serve to focus social resources and social process so as not only to help to define the function systems, but also to subvert or otherwise cross their boundaries. Organizations as diverse as gardening clubs, international aid agencies, and revolutionary cells can cut across other systemic boundaries, largely ignore these, or seek to undermine them. To the degree that the function systems together can be regarded as the forces of homogenization in the historical process of globalization, organizations present a prime systemic resource for counteracting that homogenization, for expressing different orientations than the function systems represent and even opposing these. It is because of this potential for “subverting” dominant lines of societal subsystem differentiation that organizations have tended to be problematic in other types of society; that the carriers of dominant power have sought to coopt or destroy such forms. Today in modern and global society they are often controversial and oppositional as well. Yet they also proliferate, perhaps mostly as expressions of the dominant function systems; but also significantly as the crystallization of different purposes or simply as ways of expressing difference.

In comparison with organizations, a fourth type of social system, the social movement, bears similarities but is also different from both societal function systems and organizations. Like the function systems, social movements are much more structured around the particular issues and particular elements that inform them and far less on the basis of a distinction between member and non-member communication. Moreover, organizations are also instrumental in lending social movements form, just as they are for function systems. Yet, like organizations and unlike function systems, social movements are adaptable to most any purpose, are relatively easily generated, and can come and go individually without the society being changed in any fundamental way. While social movement organizations do in large measure express and stand for particular social movements – for instance, Greenpeace for the environmental movement or the World Council of Churches for the Christian ecumenical movement – the most basic element of a social movement, what constitutes its recursiveness, is the particular communicative event that displays the movement’s “mobilization”. The current anti-globalization movement, for example, amorphous and complex as it is in many respects, produces and reproduces itself in protest communications like demonstrations, marches, tearing down fences, targeting business icons, and a great deal of Internet communication. These communications are not always or even usually organizational communication, and there may be a great deal of controversy as to which of these is actually “of the movement”. Amorphousness, rather than casting the specificity of such movements into doubt, is one of their more important characteristics. They exist through mobilizing communication of this sort and cease to exist as movements when this no longer happens. In an important sense, social movements are the socio-structural equivalent of Weber’s charismatic authority, inherently evanescent and subject to routinization. Social movements can arise quickly and disappear quickly. Their constitutive concerns can also be transposed almost entirely into the communication of other forms. Feminist and ecological agendas can become the stuff of political regulation, educational curricula, legal judgements, and economic production. In one sense, such transposition marks the “success” of social movements; in another it signals their decline or the need to find new issues around which to mobilize. “Cooptation” for social movements, especially those centred on protest, points to this ambiguity of success.

Social movements do not have to be movements of protest, but they often are. Social movements centre on issues, on themes of communication, that do not appear to be dealt with elsewhere. They crystallize matters that other systems do not and even cannot address because of the way these other systems are structured. Thus social movements frequently have first to

make their issues into issues. They have to mobilize so that what they address will come to be thematized as a problem requiring a solution, primarily within the social movement, but also critically in other social systems, notably in contemporary society in the dominant function systems. Correspondingly, social movements can and do occur in the context of these function systems and as an aspect of their functioning, not just as voices crying in the wilderness outside them. Social movements, like organizations and interactions, can arise as a way for the function systems to function. Educational movements like that for “student-centred learning” in the 1960s and 1970s or “back to basics” in the 1980s and 1990s do not just challenge the educational system; they also reproduce it. Similarly, political reform movements do not have to be “extra-parliamentary”. They can be as internal to the political system as the rise of a reform movement that seeks to become a political party, or a movement to replace a particular political leader with another. And religious movements, although frequently expressive of directions that claim to run counter to the convergent orthodoxies of the formed religions, can also be expressive of them. Thus, for example, the worldwide Christian Pentecostal movement represents both a new direction, but is also one of the more visible and vital ways of currently reproducing Christianity as religion. Like organizations, social movements are integral to the production and reproduction of the religious system of global society. Indeed, the history of the construction of that system as well as its continued operation today would be incomprehensible without them. This dimension of the religious system is broadly evident, whether we are dealing with the rise of the modern notion of religion, the imagining and construction of Hinduism, the (thus far) non-construction of Confucianism, the generation of so-called “fundamentalisms”, or the rise of new religious movements like the New Age or neo-Paganism.

*Religion as Social Systems: Lending Religion(s) Form*

#### The Function System for Religion

I begin the consideration of the idea of a religious function system by noting that this system is not identical with differentiated religious communication as such. Societies that exhibit some form of differentiated religious activity have existed throughout history and around the world. What has been especially common is the separation of particular times, places, social roles, and social activities that focus specifically on what today we call religion. Many are the social-scientific and other definitions of religion that take these widespread phenomena as their point of departure. One thinks particularly of Durkheim’s use of the sacred/profane distinction in this regard. For Durkheim religion was whatever centred around “sacred things – things set apart and forbidden”(Durkheim 1965). The cogency of his definition lies in the fact that many societies feature a clear distinction between sacred and profane in their systems of communication. The problem with it is that it can easily be challenged by referring to other societies where that difference is anywhere from unclear to totally absent, but which nevertheless exhibit the sort of ritual and other performative practices that today we commonly associate with religion. The ambiguity can become clearer if we note that such debate centres on religion as a functional category in the sense of one that concerns itself with a particular variety of thing that people do according to certain forms and for certain purposes. Religion refers to a particular sort of communication. It is that which functions to, for example, “serve the gods”, “deal with ultimate questions”, or “invoke a sacred reality”. The principle of distinction is function. In social contexts where such functional distinctions are not primary, however, they can and do recede in importance and clarity in favour of other sorts of difference. Yet modern and now global society uses function as its *principal* mode of primary subsystem differentiation. To the extent that religion has become the subject of one such system, it attains a very high level of clarity precisely as religion or, if one wishes, the realm of the sacred. The sacred/profane distinction is now pressed into service to express the primary form of social differentiation and thus defines itself in those terms; and, as it happens, only secondarily in terms of group differences. These latter can and do avail themselves of

functional distinctions, but the order of priority between functional and segmentary is reversed.

The sacred/profane distinction may thus seem to be the logical place to begin when searching for an identifiable religious code, for what religion is supposed fundamentally to be all about. In his own work, Luhmann suggests immanent/transcendent in this position. I would, however, argue that sacred/profane is not appropriate because it is too close to a system/environment distinction. If immanent is to be the positive pole of the code, then immanent/transcendent is better, but still somewhat misleading for the same reason. As already adumbrated, in their place I would put something like blessed/cursed, not as power terms as in blessing and cursing, but as religious conditions parallel in other systems to having ownership or not, being educated or not, occupying governing positions or not, being ill or healthy, and so forth. Whenever we have communication that structures itself with reference to this basic religious code or self-referential dichotomy, we are dealing with religion. As in other systems, however, the code by itself does not already determine how it is to be put into concrete operation, how the religious becomes or manifests itself as religion. That is the role of programmes. In the case of religion, these programmes are the religions, very much in the plural. Like the political system of sovereign states, the religious system segments itself internally into religions and that is the outcome of an ongoing historical process, not some sort of natural subdivision. Just as there is no single state in global society but only states, so there is no single religion; there are only religions. To understand what constitutes, for instance, Islam as a religion, one must know the self-referential programme that lends the idea of Islam expression. This would include a whole host of aspects like Qur'an, ritual practices, the role of experts, codes of conduct, rules of community or belonging, and so forth. Something similar applies for the other religions. A large part of the ambiguity surrounding the religious code is a product of the programmatic differences of the various religions. Codes really only operate clearly at the level of these religions, and therefore naming a general formulation for the system as a whole always carries with it the risk of seeming to set up one religion or subset of religions as normative. Religious power also operate clearly only at the level of the religions, much more so than in the roughly parallel cases of political and legal systems. Each religion has its own typical variant or variants on the basic religious code, and what constitutes religious power (i.e. the religious equivalent of money, political power, or scientific knowledge) also varies according to religion and even subdivision of a religion.

Codes and programmes describe the structured patterns through which religious communications refer to one another, thus constituting the system. That does not already tell us, however, what those communications are, what the elements of the religious system are. Where for the economy the core communication is purchase, for the political state it is collectively binding decision or regulation, for education it is examination, and science it is publishing research, the core element of religion can be described as ritual practice. Among the many implications of this statement is that religion is not basically a matter of belief; it is basically practice. Belief, in the form of "faith" refers more to religious power than to elements. Unless the beliefs structure a particular sort of communication, they do not reproduce the religious system. Communication is not just consciousness or communicative potential. Religious communication is more than belief in spiritual beings. It is a matter of religious meaning, but only in the exercise of religious power, even if that power is styled as belief or faith.

Like other function systems, religion also avails itself of other types of social system to help structure it. These forms of religion include organizations such as churches, temples, denominations, religious orders, and organized confraternities. Perhaps equally as important are various social movements, namely religious movements like the Christian Pentecostal/Charismatic movements, Hindu nationalist movements, and new religious movements, all of which themselves have their typical organized faces. Yet, again as with

other systems, the religious system is not simply the total of these organizations and movements. They are critical for giving the system concrete form, but they do not include all communication that together constitutes the system. Just as not all religious communication takes place as interactions, so is it not all organizational or social movement communication. In this context, we shall also have to examine the role of social networks, informal (i.e. not organized) patterns of regular communication that are not by themselves recursive social systems but contribute nonetheless to the reproduction of the system, its organizations, and its movements.

Finally, like the other systems, the religious system depends on the existence of other function systems in its social environment, not only in the sense that it is interdependent with these, but also with respect to its own self-definition. Above all, if the religious system is to be the specialized realm of, for instance, the sacred, then the other systems cannot be centred on the same matter, and religion cannot easily substitute criteria of other systems – for instance positive law or empirical knowledge – as its own. This is another way of saying that the other systems must to a large degree be secularized; they are, by contrast, not religious, which is not the same as saying that they are irreligious, the latter being a religious designation. What this means is that the religious function system is differentiated in two ways: it is differentiated “out of” or “within” society more generally, but a key dimension of that distinction is the differentiation “from” other function systems. In both these directions, we shall have to discuss a number of ambiguities which have to do with the peculiarity of this system vis-à-vis the others.

Having set the context of this important relation between the overall global function system for religion and these other types of system and other function systems, I now move on to a more detailed consideration of each of these relations: what is the role of organizations, social movements, social networks, and other societal function systems in giving contemporary religion form. And, related to that question, what can we say about religious communication that seems to fall outside these modes, above all highly individualized religiosity and the sort of “communitarian” religious practice that borders more on what we now are in the habit of calling culture than it seems to be part of a global religious system?

The ideas of code, programme, element, and medium deal with the social “stuff” of this system, but they do not address directly how one assures the recursiveness, the convergence of this religious matter. What mechanisms, social techniques, or social forms keep religious communication within recognized and recognizable bounds? What keeps the possibility of religious pluralism from eventuating in the de-systemization of religion altogether? What forms, in other words, does effective religious authority take in contemporary society? I am not referring here directly to the offices or roles of authority, such as in Weber’s well-known magician-prophet-priest typology (Weber 1978). These roles are of course involved, but the larger question concerns the forms in which these leadership offices can be effective. In the classic sociological literature, beginning with Troeltsch and Weber, but extensively developed thereafter, the main way to address this question has been through the idea of “religious organization”, namely the church/sect typology and all its elaborations and variants (McGuire 2002; Troeltsch 1960; Weber 1978). These typologies can serve as our point of departure, but they also have to be unpacked and taken in a different direction because they pose the question too narrowly; organizing religion is only one way of assuring its authoritative convergence.

In introducing the church/sect distinction, Troeltsch had in view precisely the problem we are addressing here, namely one religious authority structure, the putatively dominant and overarching church, being challenged by one or more smaller and marginal ones in the form of sects. Embedded in that analysis were already a couple of factors that point beyond the twofold typology itself. On the one hand, the church implied not only itself but also its relation to another powerful social unit, the state. An important aspect of what made the

church authoritative was its positive relation to the state, meaning that the church typically looked to the state to back up its authority claims. On the other hand, however, the sect represented a more clearly differentiated religious form, one not “tainted” with the relation to the state and all sorts of other “compromises”, which is to say non-religious selection criteria. A third type, one which was not subsumed very often in subsequent sociological discussions, was “mysticism”, which is precisely the unformed religiosity that I adumbrated above. Contained in Troeltsch’s analysis, therefore, are several of the factors that are germane in the present context: differentiation, authority, recursiveness (clarity of structure), pluralism, and the possibility of de-differentiation or de-systematization.

Subsequent development of the typology really only added one other possibility, namely the denomination as introduced by H.R. Niebuhr (Niebuhr 1929). What this notion contributed to the debate was the idea that religious pluralism could exist in a society without challenging other and otherwise dominant structures; that religion in the modern context could be differentiated from state and society at the same time as it differentiated internally; and that this pluralistic situation could be stable. The most critical contribution of the denomination is that it shows how organization itself can be the key to pluralistic religious convergence, this latter being a vital feature of today’s global religious system. In this light, it becomes clear that this typology of religious organization refers primarily to that modern situation of religion and only very poorly to others in which religion is much more marginally organized and differentiated as system. That said, the typology also has to be unpacked if it is to be useful for understanding, not just modern religion – and specifically modern religion in Europe, North America, and Australasia – but also global religion.

Transposing the church/sect/denomination typology into a Luhmannian social systems key allows the broader perspective required. In this mode, we ask not what are the possible types of religious organization but rather through what kinds of social system does religion attain authoritative form in contemporary society. From this perspective, organizations are only one such kind of social system, not a general term for all the ways that religion is given form. As already mentioned, three other possibilities exist beside organizations, namely social movements, societal systems, and interactions. The four types are not mutually exclusive in that each type conditions the operation of the other three: social movements rely on interactions, organizations are critical for social movements, societal systems influence the structure and content of interactions, and so forth. Accordingly, religion and religions gain form in contemporary society in four ways: as (1) organized religion (including denominations, churches, and sects), (2) social movement religion, (3) as religion thematized in societal (namely function) systems, including of course the religious system itself, and (4) as social network religion (networks of interaction). The last category includes what one might call “community” religion; the third encompasses the use of societal systems beside the religious to support religious authority.

#### Organized Religion

One of the more notable features of contemporary global society is the proliferation of organizations in virtually every sphere of social life. Although these are certainly not evenly distributed in this society, any more than is wealth or power, they effect social life in all parts of the world. The most powerful of these are economic and political organizations. Yet, both at the national and the international level, an ever increasing number of non-business and non-state organizations make their presence felt in our daily lives. Among these is a complex array of religious organizations of greatly varying power, size, internal structure, and degree of stability. More than any of the other forms, it is organizations that give religions the recursive presence that is at issue here. Although the Christian Roman Catholic church (along with its numerous subsidiary organizations such as religious orders) is no doubt the largest and most evident of these, every other recognizable and recognized religion has them. They range from Buddhist monasteries to Hindu temple organizations, from Muslim Sufi brotherhoods

(*tariqat*) to Christian Pentecostal churches, from organizations that run major Muslim, Hindu, or Christian pilgrimage centres to international Daoist societies. Their span can be anything from extremely local to worldwide, from the storefront church in Brooklyn, New York to the international Orthodox Jewish Agudat Israel. Moreover, organizations are one of the two most important mechanisms for giving form to a new religion, or for concretizing variations in already recognized ones. Thus, for example, the much discussed religious pluralism of a country like the United States is primarily an organizational pluralism; religious organizations can lend form to the most minimal variations, enhancing the appearance of pluralism even when the underlying religious programmes are quite uniform. Some relatively new religions such as the Baha'i Faith or the Church of Scientology, as well as old ones such as the Roman Catholic church, locate organization at their theological core and have successfully established themselves or maintained their presence largely through their concerted organizational strategies. In other cases, such as that of the Hindu Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Vishva Hindu Parishad, the greater organization of religion has been a deliberate strategy in order to "compete" with other religions. Many states and legal systems, such as that of countries as diverse as Japan, Indonesia, and Canada, encourage the organization of religions as a condition for their recognition and thus for the application of freedom of religion provisions.

The great advantage of organization in contemporary global society is that it offers a very effective way of generating clear social boundaries that need not be all-encompassing. Organizations define themselves by making a distinction between those who belong and those who do not, between social actors that are part of the organization and those which are not. They structure that difference through rules that govern belonging or not belonging, inside and outside, especially through social roles such as member, client, office holder, and so forth. Organizations thus tend to be quite clear about who is subject to their rules, when they are so subject, for what they are subject, and where their most typical activity takes place. Moreover, organizations almost always articulate a clear purpose to which their activity is oriented. As such, they can give concrete and representative form to intrinsically partial and abstract functions, goals, ideas, and categories. In a complex and pluralistic social environment, organizations are social structures well suited to carrying out differentiations that would otherwise be unsustainable or simply not recognized by many or even most members of the society, both inside and outside the organization. They range in their strategies from including some members of society totally to including all members of society for certain purposes and at certain times or in certain places. Most are located somewhere in between. Their internal structure can be quite clear as in formal organizations like business corporations, state bureaucracies, or universities. They can also take more informal shape, shading off in the extreme case into mere social networks or social movements centred on some purpose or idea.<sup>2</sup> The modern category or idea of religion(s), ambiguous, contested, and relatively recently constructed as it has been, benefits greatly from the possibilities afforded by the organizational social form. Indeed, without it, religion, like virtually every other major function system, would have little hope of operating as a differentiated social domain at all. That includes the economy, the state, the courts, education, health, sport, mass media, science, and art. All have their characteristic organizations which are so critical to these systems that observation often treats them as identical. More than any of the other three types of system beside the societal system that is the religious function system itself, religious organizations are the sites where religion is given form as religion and rendered visible as such.

#### Social Movement Religion

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<sup>2</sup> For a good overview of the ranges that the form of organization can cover, see McCann, 1983.

Important as organized forms of religion are, they are by far not the only possibility. Social movements offer another way of giving concrete social form to religion. Exactly what constitutes a social movement is a much debated issue. For the present purposes, the description of certain common features can serve to delimit what is at issue. As the word indicates, social movements “move”: they consist in the mobilization of people, ideas, and material resources to bring about change in existing social arrangements or to generate new ones (Klandermans 1988; Zald 1987). As such, in the contemporary world, they typically have organizations closely associated with them, but they are not simply coterminous with them. One thinks, for instance, of post-1960s social movements in the West such as the women’s or environmental movement. Although each has organizations identified with it, such as the American National Organization of Women or Greenpeace, it is movement events like protests, diverse publications and public discussions, lobbying efforts, and other symbolic communications that also give these movements their concrete social presence, to such an extent that it is these more than the organizations that call for names by which they can be called. Unlike organizations, the communication or action that typically constitutes them is not so much communication by members as members, as communication – no matter by whom – that furthers and reproduces the movement. What constitutes the recursive structure of a social movement as opposed to an organization or societal system is the programmatic story that it tells, the meaningful discourse about what the movement is, why it is necessary, and what has to happen for a successful resolution of its necessity (Ahlemeyer 1989; Ahlemeyer 1995). Social movements are thereby comparatively amorphous, lacking the sort of visible clarity of an organization; but they are nonetheless real as concerns social importance and effect. Movements, in contrast to organizations, rely far more on the symbolic possibilities of space and time, or particular places and particular times, than they do on particular people abiding by particular rules.

Social movements can embody religion to various degrees. Thus, the many religio-national movements in regions as diverse as North America, the Balkans, and South Asia have incorporated themes and semantics from particular religions as part of their visions of nation and as concrete aspects of their mobilizing events. These movements therefore profile religion, give it social visibility, without themselves being primarily religious movements. The latter do of course also exist, but most of those things commonly called religious movements in the sociological literature, especially the new religious movements, are in fact not social movements in the sense just described, but rather organizations that are founded at a particular time and seek to spread in terms of membership. This is the case with new religious movements like the Brahma Kumaris, the Church of Scientology, Falun Gong, the Unification Church, or Soka Gakkai, religious organizations originating in India, the United States, China, Korea, and Japan respectively. In contrast, religious movements that would fall under this type quite clearly are, for example, Transcendental Meditation, New Age, neo-Paganism (Wicca), Tai Chi, and Qi Gong<sup>3</sup>. In each of these cases, although there may exist organizations associated with them -- or, what amounts to the same, there also exist organized expressions of these movements -- the dominant form of participation is episodic, occasional, largely uncontrolled by any sort of central authority, and to the extent that it is regular, as often individual as they are collective.<sup>4</sup> In certain instances, such as Transcendental

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3 These latter two can also fall under Daoism, just as Transcendental Meditation may under circumstances be claimed by Hinduism. Since the text is dealing with social forms rather than again the question of the boundaries of specific religions, I leave that issue aside here.

4 Comparing the distinction I am using here to Stark and Bainbridge’s typology of sects and cults, social movements would correspond to their audience and client cults, but cult movements are for the most part organized religion. See Stark & Bainbridge, 1985. Yet, since social movements include social movement organizations, the line cannot be drawn that sharply. To some degree, as noted above

Meditation, there has been a move towards the clearly organized form in recent decades as the movement itself faded. In others, such as notably the example of Western neo-Paganism, the movement ideology rejects organization as illegitimate concentration of what is for them a basically individual religious authority. Neo-Pagans of this sort will therefore congregate for specific events like festivals and local circle meetings, but there are few if any “rules of membership”, let alone well defined offices of a stable organization. Thus, typically, when the festival or circle is over, its space (but not necessarily time) reverts to “normal” or non-religious use just as is the case for other episodic events that constitute the nodal points of a social movement. This comparatively evanescent quality is characteristic of this type of social system. Its reverse side is the tendency for social movements, at some point, to disappear or have their concerns reconfigured in the structures of other types of system, notably, but not exclusively, organizations. Indicative of this aspect is that even those religious social movements that wish deliberately to avoid this fate, namely greater convergence, organization, recognition by the state and other social agencies as a “religion”, seem to find themselves under a fair amount of pressure to go just in these directions. In some cases like the neo-Pagans, the primary reason may be the “freedom of religion” that such congregation and recognition typically brings. In others like Transcendental Meditation, the difficulty of maintaining the dynamism and constant mobilization of a movement may make the concentration and regularization of organization seem an attractive strategy to follow.

In light of their various qualities, it is evident that social movements are of significance in this question of forming religion because they, along with social networks, lend definition to what one might call non-institutional religiosity, including much of what seems to be highly individual religiosity or, to use a currently popular term, spirituality. From this perspective, what seems like an entirely non-convergent and therefore non- or even anti-systemic religiosity shows how it is nonetheless formed. Truly individualized religiousness, such as in the “Sheilism” of *Habits of the Heart* (Bellah 1985), may actually be to a large extent part of these (and indeed other) social forms or systems, and only appears “individualistic” and unsystemic when one takes the individual her/himself as the criterion of definition. One could say something similar about the religious involvement of most people in the world. And indeed, avoiding this sort of ambiguity of perspective is one of the main advantages to observing religion strictly as communication.

#### Religion in Other Function Systems

One of the reasons that religion is a contested category in today’s society is that the carriers of religion sometimes resist the categorization of their activity as religion because this implies acceptance of the secularization of non-religious domains and thereby the restriction of religion to its own domain. A common direction for this resistance to take is the politicization of religion, which is to say making the state and its legislative, legal, administrative, and military structures instruments for collectively enforcing the precepts and practices of the religion in question. This direction can yield a distinct social form of religion in contemporary society to the extent that religious structures become an express aspect or arm of the state; or, what amounts to the same, the state becomes an expression of the religion. The capacity of the state to set collectively binding norms for the people within its territorial boundaries and thus its ability to make a particular religion an unavoidable part of these people’s daily lives lends the religion a clear presence as a religion over and beyond what non-state religious organizations can do in this regard (Beyer 1994). Today, this way of giving religion form is most radically evident in certain Muslim countries like Iran and Afghanistan, but varying degrees of it can also be found in a number of other countries where state identities or ideologies include a particular religion. Examples of the latter would be Israel, India,

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in the text, the typology outlined here and the received typology of religious organizations are incommensurate.

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia, and, to an increasingly less effective sense, European countries like Great Britain, Sweden, or Germany. One should note, however, that in none of these cases does the religion in question, whether it is Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism or Hinduism, lack organizational expression as well. State religion, or the use of the state to give social form to a religion is in that sense a supplementary form. Only through the extreme use of this possibility, such as was the case in Afghanistan under the Taliban, can the politicized or state form of religion become the primary form. In other instances where organized religion is weak or contested, for example Hinduism in contemporary India, the involvement of the state apparatus in a vague and general way does relatively little for the differentiation of the religion beyond giving its name a certain public symbolic prominence.

There is, of course, another side to the state giving form to religions, and this involves the efforts of states to regulate religions and control what counts as religion. In most countries around the world, religion and religions have become a political issue in this sense. Some states, like Indonesia, China, and to a lesser extent Russia, currently expressly limit what may count as religion to a restricted list. In Indonesia, only Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism are recognized religions. In China it is the same list, only Daoism substitutes for Hinduism. In Russia, under current law, only religious organizations that had established themselves in Russia by a certain date count as legitimate religions. In most other countries, what counts as one of the religions is not that clearly spelled out, but disputes over new and marginal religious movements in countries as varied as Japan, Argentina, and France point to at least an implicit model of religion in operation, one that favours heavily the "world religions" and those with a long history in the country in question.

Such translation of religious criteria into the terms of political and legal systems is, however, only an example of the broader possibility of assisting the formation and convergent authority of religion through the mechanisms of other function systems. One way to look at this relation of the religious to the other function systems is to speak about the conditioning influence of religion on their operations. From another perspective the effect is in the reverse direction. Political and legal control of religion is an example. Although one can regard this as a restriction of religion, it is by that very token also the formative observation of religion; it contributes to its consolidation as a recognizable, differentiated, and effective social reality. Much like any identity, the identity of the religious system is the consequence of both "inside" observation, which is to say self-reference, and "outside" observation, namely the recognition of religion as religion by other social forms or systems. The political regulation and legal judgement of religion is an important factor in delimiting and lending structure to what counts as religion, to what can operate as religion in our society. Moreover, these are not the only ways that religion is formatively observed, as it were, from the outside. Other obvious and important societal systems that engage in such observation are the scientific, the educational, and the mass media. That scientific observation of religion has had an effect on what religion has become is at the centre of the contemporary critiques of the category, such as that of McCutcheon or Fitzgerald (Chidester 1996; Fitzgerald 1997). Scientific endeavours do tend to regard religion somewhat differently than do theological observers or "insiders". The partial incommensurability of these perspectives is a reflection of different systemic criteria or interests. Yet both help determine what religion is in contemporary society. Analogously, religion is often a category of observation in schools around the world; and who controls how or even if religion is taught to students is likewise a contentious issue because of the different systemic interests involved. Mass media attention to religion, whether on radio, television, newspapers, or the internet is similarly a location for contestation between systems. Mass media also offer important fora for performing religion, as is especially evident in religious publications, radio, television, and increasingly on the internet. Since all these systems are sites of broader social power, influence, and authority, they all have an effect on

the form of religion and of the religions. They are part of what makes religion what it is. The fact that they are also arenas of contestation only reinforces the point that social conflict is in its own way just as productive of social order as is cohesion or congruence. Moreover, those critiques of the modern category of religion which point out its indebtedness to theological, scientific, and political interests are accurate as concerns their analysis, but incorrect in their conclusion that religion is therefore “not real”. Precisely the opposite is the case, at least in today’s global society with its dominant function systems.

#### Social Network Religion

There is also a fourth possibility for giving form to religion, but this represents both a fourth way and a boundary “form” between religion that is institutionalized as such, and that which is religious but unformed as religion except perhaps analytically by outside observers. In terms of social systems it takes place largely in interactions, yet this is really only a way of saying that the systems involved are none of the other three. Interactions, after all, are integral to organizations, social movements, and societal systems as well. Thus, in much of the world today, as in times past in most societies, what we now call religion is practised locally, regionally, and, given today’s communication technologies, even globally, but without a strong sense of the system of practices and beliefs being part of a larger whole or of it being a distinctly identified activity called religion. Contemporary examples may be the local or community religious practices in India, China, or different parts of Africa, the religious dimensions of life among various aboriginal peoples all over the world, those individual and idiosyncratic practices of individuals that really do not owe anything to the various formed religions, small group practices in various places, and a whole array of cultural practices that have escaped incorporation into one of the religions. Examples of the latter would be Western “secular” celebrations of holidays like Hallowe’en, Easter (bunnies and eggs, not Jesus on the cross), and Groundhog Day. All of these manifestations are religious in the sense that one could and occasionally does observe them as religion. But they do not belong to that category in any consistent fashion because insiders do not seek to have them recognized as religion, do not consider that possibility, or reject such categorization; or because no formed and recognized religion successfully claims them. Much of this sort of activity in fact gets observed not as religion but as some other category, notably culture or custom. Put more strongly, these manifestations can appear as religion only by association with the other forms or through incorporation in those forms. It is the formed religions that act as implicit models for such religion; any sort of social activity that bears resemblance to them may on occasion be observed and treated as religion. The category and the system have themselves acquired this expansive capacity, this propensity to “colonize” communications that otherwise escape its structures. Their presence in today’s society, as of course in societies of the past, is what makes the idea of religion as a differentiated and selective societal system or delimited social domain seem inadequate: so much that “looks like” religion appears to be excluded from such an observation.

This situation with religion can be compared to that with respect to other systems. The modern global capitalist economy seems to have stretched its tentacles, more technically its form, virtually everywhere in the world. And yet there is much that is not commodified or incorporated into this system. We do not acquire all our “goods and services” through monetary exchanges, even if abstractly or implicitly “everything has its price”. The capitalist economic mode could colonize everything, but in fact does not. Similarly, governments could regulate absolutely all aspects of all our lives. Some of us may even have the impression that they do. In reality, however, they do not. We could make similar observations for other systems. The science system has not digested all the possible things that people around the world know, and yet this knowledge somehow also counts. It is almost a truism that we do not learn all our competences in schools. Not everything that is artistic counts as art. Illness and healing happens massively outside the medicalized health system, even though modern

medicine probably could categorize them all if they were brought for diagnosis and treatment. Information is to be had outside the mass media, and much physical activity does not count as sport. In each of these cases, the effort to arrive at a conception that includes all that could analytically be included leads to the same sort of vagueness and inconclusive discussion as the search for a monothetic concept of religion valid for all times, societies, and places. Therefore the fact that there is a lot of “religious culture” out there which neither its carriers nor most outside observers deem part of one of the religions does not lead to the conclusion that religion is simply a misnomer. It does indicate highly selective, even if one wishes, manipulative, impositional, and “colonizing” structures, as do the categories that name the other systems. These are nonetheless real, with W. I. Thomas, at least in their effects.

### *Summary and Conclusion*

In this paper, I have focussed on the forms of religion in today’s global society using conceptual apparatus from Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems. My main aim has been to theorize the question of what gives form to religion in contemporary society and how those forms relate to one another. Two important assumptions underlie the entire presentation: that sociologically religion be regarded simply as another variety of communication and that as such it takes on the forms that are “normal”. Religion may be exceptional in some respects, but not in terms of the social forms that it adopts. On the basis of these assumptions, I have sought to outline religion as societal system, that is as a modern global function system among and in comparison with others; religion as organization, as social movement, and as social network. These four types of form, and especially the first three, are the dominant ones in today’s society, which is not the same as saying that all religiosity is incorporated in these forms. It is, however, to say that these forms are at the core of what makes religion recognizable as a distinct domain in our society; and, by the same token, that they profile the degree to which this taking of forms is historically and otherwise contingent, non-necessary, non-essential, selective, and arbitrary.

Another main purpose and strategy in the foregoing has been to situate specifically organized religion in relation to the other possible forms. Although organized religions are taking on an increasingly important role in forming religion in most places around the world, they are only part of a broader development that includes other possibilities, above all religio-social movements and the incorporation of religious criteria, themes, and orientations in the operations of other function systems. It is these things together, and not one more importantly than the others, that make religion what it is. This gives us a multi-dimensional picture, where one of the most interesting and significant areas of research will be on the relations of these different forms, the degree to which they condition and inform each other in different places around the world, at different times, and in different social circumstances. Indeed, the future of religion, the directions that it is taking, can to a large degree be phrased in terms of these forms and their relations.

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## Mady A. Thung-Laeyendecker: COMMENTS ON MAIN THEMES OF THE WORKSHOP

The purpose of these comments, given by the end of the workshop, is,

- first, to put the main theme of the workshop: **membership-based local forms of religious organizations** - which in Prof. Daiber's introduction are seen as the forms of organization best suited to modern society - in the context of a wider frame of reference derived from both the **comparative sociology of organizations** and the **sociology of religion**,
- and, second, to relate this exercise to two other concerns of the workshop: **globalization** and **interreligious dialogue**.

As the comments were given in telegraphese during the workshop, they will be explained somewhat more.

The wider frame came about by selecting from the sociological sub-specializations just mentioned, such insights as seemed useful for questions asked in the ecumenical movement<sup>1</sup> as to what forms of organization would be suited best to the churches' mission in modern society. This is related to fundamental changes in ecumenical thinking<sup>2</sup> about 'mission', i.e. from proselytizing to: taking responsibility with respect to injustice, poverty, violence and other major problems in society. I consider this selection a type of 'applied sociology'; it led me to a view of 'missionary' churches as 'precarious organizations'. Why precarious?

### Definition of 'organization':

- means of attaining a purpose collectively
- by dividing up tasks in a rational way
- and co-ordinating and finalizing these towards realizing the task.

Said otherwise: a purposive and rational way of institutionalization, in contrast and next to the spontaneous institutionalization which always occurs wherever people meet frequently.

One reason for **precariousness** is that purposive and spontaneous institutionalization interact and interfere with each other. Organizations never function precisely according to their blueprints, even if constantly revised. After the 16th century Reformation it was already recognized that "the reformed church always needs reformation" (as the latin adagium said: "ecclesia reformata semper reformanda est"). The American sociologist Philip Selznick talked of organizations as indissoluble but 'recalcitrant' tools for reaching our purposes: they often become ends in themselves and thus come to stand between us and our goals.

With respect to **membership** it means that boundaries seldom are clear. There usually are members who do not really participate in, nor sympathize with the organization, next to non-members who contrariwise do. Augustine said that there are lambs outside the church and wolves within; German sociologists described the phenomenon of 'distant church membership' (distanzierte Kirchlichkeit) and it occurs in many forms<sup>3</sup>.

Another reason for **precariousness** has to do with differences in the type of compliance by members: in so-called coercive organizations (prisons, e.g.) members comply

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<sup>1</sup> The movement which since the beginning of the former century tries to further unity among the Christian churches and has its main centre in the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> not shared by all Christians

<sup>3</sup> Therefore I cannot quite agree with Prof. Beyer's characterization of organizations as 'effective ways of generating clear boundaries'.

because they are forced to; in utilitarian organizations (which employ people, or see to their interests) they do in turn for material benefits; in normative organizations they participate for the sake of shared beliefs, ideals and values (distinction of Amitai Etzioni's). The chance for deviation from the formal blueprint is especially great for the latter type to which also voluntary organizations (and for that matter membership-based religious organizations) belong. More so in the case of religion, which easily gets distorted, as Prof. Mansoor also stated. Religious motivations often get overruled by mundane interests; the American sociologist Thomas O'Dea talks of 'the dilemma's of the institutionalization of religion' and one of them is 'the dilemma of mixed motivations'.

### **Third source of precariousness**

There is a third source of precariousness - the most important one in connection with the churches' mission - which can be learned from the **sociology of religion**. This needs some explanation.

This subspecialization of sociology points, i.a., to the enormous variety of religions and confessional differences within each religion. Examples are the differences in Christian groups that led to the distinction between the church-, sect-, mysticism- and denomination types (Troetsch, Weber, H.R. Niebuhr), mentioned by Prof. Beyer. It has been extended by other typologies. Which typology one had best use depends on what one wants to know. The ecumenical people and I were especially interested in the different roles which religious groups can fulfill in society, such as:

- a an integrating role, coming about by sustaining a common culture and legitimating the state's policies; examples in this workshop were the Islam organizations in Malaysia and Turkey discussed by Prof. Mansoor and Dr. Emel Topcu-Brestrich, next to Confucianism under the Choson dynasty as described by Prof. Keum. Weber's description of the established church (Anstalt Kirche) is an example in Christianity;
- b a compensating role which exists in giving support to marginalized groups, as is done by, e.g., the Hindu en Islam organizations of immigrant groups in Europe discussed by Prof. Baumann and dr. Gerdien Jonker and the Siberian faith-based communities presented by dr. Tatyana Barchunova. In case of a national religion this role is often combined with the integrating and the legitimizing role, since it helps stabilizing and - in Weber's terms - domesticating the masses, even those severely deprived. The compensatory role may evolve into
- c an emancipatory role when religious organizations start to defend their members' (material or cultural) interests (no examples in this workshop, or did Donghak religion in Korea, discussed by Prof. Cha, function this way? Or the religious immigrant organizations mentioned at b?). Or it may lead to
- d a rebellious role (no examples either; sects have often functioned thus in Christianity); and
- e a transformative role for the sake of justice, peace or other values important to a specific religion (the 'adaptive' type of Confucianism in Korea mentioned by Prof. Keum perhaps? or Won Buddhism as presented by Prof. Cha?).

More roles could be mentioned but these may suffice to make clear that it is possible to distinguish between different types of religion according to the role each type fulfills in society. J. Milton Yinger drew a typology of christian groups from a comparable perspective: in order to indicate which type of Christianity has the best chances of realizing its ethical concerns, or, in the terms used here, fulfilling a transformative role in society. The underlying argument was, that this depended on the degree of acceptance or rejection of the society's culture. Complete acceptance (which, of course, exists in theory only) makes a religious group effectless, but so does complete rejection and withdrawal from the world. The point of maximal influence lies somewhere in between (cf. figure). It is an important typology in my

view, it calls attention to the fact that religion nearly always fulfills some role or other in society. Responsible leaders and members cannot refrain from reflecting on the specific role their own religious organization fulfills, whether positive or - unwittingly perhaps - negative. That exactly was what was done in the ecumenical movement which partly originated from the embarrassing discovery by Western national churches after World War I, that each had blessed and supported its own nation in its battle against the others. It led to the strong desire that henceforth Christian churches would refrain from legitimizing the state of affairs in society, and fulfill a transformative role, rather, for the sake of 'Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation', as the slogan said. Or for the sake of 'sustainable development', as we would say presently.

Sociology now brings to consciousness that, with secularization, the Christian churches in the West are in a process of development from ageold institutions to more rational organizations<sup>4</sup>. (The development described by Prof. Daiber from parishes to membership-based congregations seems part of that process.) If this is to lead to Christian organizations with a transformative role in society (rather than integrating, legitimizing, etc.) then the question must be asked, which form of organization would be best suited to such a role. The distinctions a - e are important, to wit, as each role requires an appropriate form of organization.

It is at this point that our workshop's themes are related to the ecumenical discussions. Both can benefit from the insight that looking for suitable organizational forms in the context of modernization has to be preceded by the question of what role one would want to fulfill in society. Here also lies **the most fundamental source of precariousness**, since striving for a transformative role entails many more difficulties than fulfilling a stabilizing, a compensatory or any other role. If a religion is centered around the rituals of the crucial moments in personal and social/political life, it doesn't need much organization; centres for performing these and priests or monks for administering suffice. If it also fulfills charitable tasks, relief-workers are needed in addition. In both cases extra organizing may be necessary for religious education of the young and for raising funds, but quite often the state provides these since such activities go along very well with the role mentioned at a.

In the case, however, of a religion critical of the state of affairs, which calls up for a just, peaceful, humane world, much more is needed in addition to worship services and charitable activities. What means it has at its disposal (raising peoples's consciousness, demonstrations, lobbying, projects of renewal etc.) cannot be discussed here since so much depends on opportunities in the environment, but some way or other the believers' engagement will be needed and it is for this reason that the concept of membership becomes meaningful. Why else should there be 'organizing' and registered membership if not for a common purpose that is to be attained collectively? (Cf. the definition of organization.)

But the membership may be reluctant, as ideas and actions directed to change in society often are unpopular. We are concerned with 'precarious values', as the American sociologist B.R. Clark has it. Moreover, a church has to be well informed about the state of affairs in society and needs enough expertise in order to decide which reformatory goals should be set and how these might be realized.

#### *Different forms of organization*

All this requires more complicated organizational structures than those of local congregations. The figure on Models of sub-division, e.g., shows that other systems of sub-division are possible than in local groups (cf Figure: models I - III for the latter). Overlapping sub-groups, each with its own task and own region of operation, are possible, as well as temporary groups (model IV, e.g.). And members need not be anchored in the overall organization by belonging

<sup>4</sup> The term 'more rational' is used because there still is a lot of irrationality and traditionalism in western churches.

to local subdivisions alone; they become more closely attached to the organization by multiple than by single anchorage. For the case of a 'missionary church in a region' I would - for reasons which cannot be discussed here - suggest three main sub-divisions, focussing on reflection on faith itself (as is done, i.a., in worship services), reflection on the ethical side of the believers' ways of life, and on action according to the church's mission in society. Members can, and in the ideal case should take part alternately in each one, which makes for overlapping membership. Rituals can take place in any of these sub-divisions, may even be needed in connection with their activities.

In fact, plural organizational forms like this one do exist at present in numerous ways. In the 19th century already sub-organizations appeared in the churches for all kinds of purposes, and today believers participate in old as well as new types of subgroups, such as choirs, youth groups, women's circles, welfare institutions, broadcasting institutions, working groups or associations for the support of refugees, promotion of peace, combatting poverty, reflection on moral issues such as genetic engineering, overconsumption in the West, lobbying for ecologically more responsible policies, bible study and many more concerns.

But participation in these non-local forms of organization is not recognized as legitimate membership by the (theologically trained) church leadership nor furthered or financed systematically. Officially the churches consist of local parishes or congregations and have nation-wide leadership structures (more or less centralized and more or less democratic - according to the specific church's doctrine), in spite of all the organizational sub-structures that have emerged in and around the congregation or parish system. Although actual practice does not follow the official blueprint, most churches cling to the doctrine of this blueprint with such a tenacity that a critical Dutch theologian talked about 'morphological fundamentalism' as a hindrance for renewal.

My conclusion therefore is, that the churches need much more structural modernization than mere change from the parish system to membership-based local organizations, but **what kind** of structural modernization is required, depends on the role in society a specific church wants to fulfill. In addition I would ask attention for the importance of being aware that a religion always fulfills some role or other in society, whether stabilizing and acquiescing its followers to the state of affairs, or stirring up criticism. The tendency in religion is to foster obedience to authorities, but the type of religion advocated by the ecumenical people stresses responsibility of believers in their various social roles even if it leads to disobedience. Although it usually is easier not to pose questions on such difficult issues as a religion's role in society, a religion based on 'exemplary prophecy', in Weber's terms, may require the precarious task of doing so.

## Globalization

As 'modernization' in this workshop was interpreted in the most up-to-date sense of globalization, a short word on its meaning is in order. For brevity sake I will only give an abbreviated list of problematic trends we must expect in its wake, mostly borrowed from Paul Kennedy's book *Preparing for the twenty-first century*. It is open to discussion, of course, and doesn't mention major risks such as nuclear power plants explosions, (nuclear) wars or other disasters, but it may suffice to give an impression:

- 1 **population explosion**, especially in non-industrialized countries, leading to food crises, exhaustion of agricultural areas, mass unemployment, slum areas in the poor countries and an exodus as consequence, next to racial and ethnic conflict in rich countries;
- 2 **growing pressure on the environment**, global warming, with rising sea levels, changing conditions for crop-growing, hurricanes and draughts as consequences, next to

- exhaustion of reserves such as water, rain forests, mining products and biodiversity, as well as pollution of oceans, rivers, lakes and the air;
- 3 **lagging behind of food production** and the introduction of biotechnological crop-growing as a mixed blessing;
  - 4 **the technological revolution** which leads to technological-unemployment and intensification of world communication with numerous often unforeseeable effects. One is that the contrast between rich and poor countries becomes all the more visible and dramatic;
  - 5 **economic power concentration in TNO's** (transnational organizations) and **fluctuating capital funds**, with the effect of economic destabilization because of frequent relocation of industries and other income resources, according to what is most profitable for the time being;
  - 6 **decreasing authority and autonomy of local governments** which diminishes the chances of maintaining order and securing the peoples welfare in all respects, with the effect of political apathy in populations because of their government's loss of effectivity.
- The recently finished World Conference in Johannesburg (september 2002) showed that there is a growing concern about **sustainable development** as an answer to these problems. The countervailing pressures this conference tried to raise over against the trends above, are relatively weak, however, up till now. This brings us to the third concern of this workshop, the question of the interreligious dialogue.

### Interreligious Dialogue

It went without saying in this workshop that such a dialogue should be furthered; the only question asked was, what organizational basis would be needed. But one may wonder what the subject of discussion should be. In view of the global trends above and the awareness that religions do have influence on developments in the world, I would suggest that interreligious dialogue is highly necessary for the sake of sustainable development. The slogan often cited in the World Council of Churches 'Doctrine divides but service unites' may be remembered in this connection, even if it foregoes some of the complications involved. It suggests that dialogue on doctrine may be much more difficult than dialogue on the tasks needed in society. By way of conclusion I would therefore submit the following questions as themes for the interreligious dialogue:


1. Do representatives of the different religions recognize the question posed by ecumenical people of **what function their religion is fulfilling** with respect to the power structures and cultures of their society?
2. Do they recognize the possibility that their religion is **participating in the struggle for global sustainable development** and the importance even of doing so, in view of the urgent need for support to this struggle?
3. Do they think it important to investigate **which organizational forms** would hamper and which forms would serve that participation best?

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**TYOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN GROUPS – as drawn by J.M.Yinger \***  
 with rough estimation of the place of various religious groups



Theoretically complete rejection of dominating culture      Theoretically complete acceptance of dominating culture


The headings sect, established sect, etc., refer to ideal types, as well as the extreme poles rejection and acceptance of the dominating culture.

\* Cf.: J. Milton Yinger, *Religion in the Struggle for Power*. Duke Univ. Press, Durham, N. Carolina, USA, 1946.

**DIFFERENT MODELS OF  
SUB-DIVISION AND CO-ORDINATION**


From: Mady A. Thung,  
An Alternative Model for  
a Missionary Church,  
*Ecumenical Review* 1978/1, 18-31

**I. UNITARY ORGANIZATION**




- one goal
- mutual dependency between departments
- constant membership in each department

**II. FEDERAL ORGANIZATION**




- several goals
- separate management independent departments
- constant membership in each department

**III. "COMPOSITE" ORGANIZATION**




- several goals
- specialized divisions (for personnel, accounts, etc.) providing services for all departments
- constant membership in each department

**IV. PROJECT ORGANIZATION**



- successive goals realized in successive projects
- specialized divisions make contributions as needed
- members grouped in changing units responsible for specific projects (e.g. members from C and D divisions work together on Project 3)

**V. MODEL OF A MISSIONARY CHURCH IN A REGION**



- three major goals
- project organization in action department
- members temporarily grouped in ad-hoc units participate in all kinds of activities

## **Gerhard Wegner: What is Religion, if looked upon by „Organisation“?**

Some tentative conclusions of the Marburg-workshop on local forms of religious organisation as structural modernisation

### Summary of some results

The results of the papers presented during der workshop concerning the leading question display a wide variety of different forms of religious organisations and processes of organizing religion. It ranges from grasroot communities on a simple interactional basis to state organized and highly controlled temples; from a traditional self – evidential sense of belonging to a specific local bound community or a temple to the modern parish-system of christian churches in europe, esp. in Germany, which seems to contradict modernisation as growing individualisation; from religion as implied or used by nationalistic or liberation movements which can foster democracy to religion acting actually in the same way but on the contrary causing desatrous effects in a multi-religious and multi-cultural-setting; from religion to cope with the need to be recognized by the state in certain political and cultural conditions in order to get regular financial rессources to the simple but very complex question to be answered, wether a certain set of values and symbols (e.g. confucianism) actually is a religion as any other or is something else.

### Some conclusions

One conclusion which can be drawn out of these results is the simple fact, that religion can be dressed in any garment; Religion can be organized or organise itself in any form you want. There are no problems to adapt any single form. But the process to become an organisation and therefore in some way or the other cut the ties to simple interactive structures raises many question out of which the most important seems to be the distortions of egalitarian claims. Virtually all religions therefore seem to feel in some way – if not discuss – that ‚something gets lost‘ in the move towards organisation esp. towards membership-based organisation.

This „feeling“ on the other hand causes the need for new religious organisations to recur heavily to the roots and sources of the resp. Religion as a whole. In order to be legitimated the new organisation has to be purer than religious life was before. The move towards a new pureness in itself provides the tools and gives the righth to the religious leaders to get into a certain distance to simple interactive religion (which by this way can be looked upon as being ‚simple‘).

New religious organisations emerge along the process of acting out this dilemma. On a world-wide scale you can say that organising religion is in some aspects similar to alphabetisation. While in the same time many self-evidential knowledge and forms of communication gets lost or at least are relativized the process causes disciplinary effects on the resp. People, which in turn are the rессources for growth in many respects.

Seen in this way one may conclude that religions take the shape of organisations, in any case of membership-based organisations, because they have to do. In order to survive in modern societies religions have to establish more complex forms and by this overcome the dependancy of the interactive level. Therefore one can agree to Luhmann, that religions are inclined to be victims of modernity und very seldom are really shaping modernity. In most cases they do not want to modernize themselves but they have to do reluctantly. In some cases you got the impression that religions are literary ‚playing‘ with modern forms – but they are

by no means taking these forms seriously as necessary features of religion. Probably these religions are the most impressive ones. Although organisation is seen as a modern concept it can be used by as a kind of shelter against modernisation at least to get rid of it within the boundaries of religion.

To say the same out of another angle: To exist and prosper in modern societies of the western type religions have to communicate in the public and therefore have to organize themselves in order to provide means for that purpose. The most powerful means for that is the process of recruiting members in society. In order to do this you will have to show, that it is god for people to be religious in the way of the resp. organisation. This means that there will be competition between the religious organisations; a religious market so to speak. In order to compete successfully religions have to transform their traditional convictions, their whole world-view, which, according to the structure of belief itself, can only be lived from within – not assest from outside, into ‚arguments‘ (or in luhmannian notions: codes). Many religions may eyperience this process as a way of forced alienation. That‘ s why they are reluctant. Faith cannot become an option as any other. Religion seen in this way is deeply idiosyncratic – an possibly very modern in this special respect. One can question therefore wether Luhmann is right, when arguing that the membership-organisation of religion is the only way religion can survive. At least the german case of the stability of the unfinished transformation of the local based parish system (Daiber) raises many question in this direction.

One thesis / One proposal

What does this mean? Religion is much more than can be caught in the notional web of organisation-theory. It is „something“ which under modern conditions normally appears als beeing organised in some way or the other. But Religion itself is not organizable. It puts into communicational forms „something“ which cannot be communicated. And that is what makes religions attractive and fascinating – especially in modern times, where every aspect of life seems to be organisable. If discussing the relationship between religion and organisation from within and from without one has to come back to a real meaningful definition of religion vs. e.g. system-theory. Can religion be constructed as an antonomous autopoietic system, into which you will only get out of religious reasons? Can there be religion for the sake of religion only? If so religion will be compatible with modernization as seen by Luhmann. But if this is doubtful, since religion depends heavenly on „Lebenswelt“ and satisfies needs on the interactive level, religion will possibly survive but not with organisation only.

One Proposal for further studies: Anthony Giddens tries to analyse the emerging of organised acting out of the „Lebenswelt“ by applying the notions of embedding – disembedding – reembedding (e.g. in: *The consequences of Modernity*, 1990). It seems to me that we could use these notions as tools for better analysing how religions get organized and what this actually does to them. Any process of disembedding (e.g. the constitution of money) depends in trust, since there is nothing real behind it.

Gerhard Wegner, 10.11.02  
Wegner@Kirchliche-Dienste.de

## **Matthias König: Comments "Local Forms of Religious Organisation as Structural Modernisation. Effects on Community-Building and Globalisation"**

The major question of the workshop was to assess the impact of cultural and societal contexts, and particularly of structural modernisation, on the forms of local religious organisations. Its theoretical framework as laid out by *Karl-Fritz Daiber's* and *Gerdien Jonker's* in their introduction draws mainly on Niklas Luhmann's early work on the problems of formal organisation in the functional sub-system of religion (Luhmann 1972 and 1977: 272-316). The underlying hypothesis is that structural modernisation, understood as an increased functional differentiation of society, results in the transformation of religious communities as voluntary membership-organisations. *Peter Beyer's* theoretical contribution has further elaborated this Luhmannian framework, by highlighting the relevance of networks and movements as social forms of religion under the global condition of modernity and by stressing the thematisation of religion in (both external and internal) communication (see also Beyer 1998a and 1998b).

However, the contributions to this workshop have demonstrated a variety of empirical phenomena of local religious organisations which are only partially captured by this theoretical framework. They call for a re-specification of the theoretical approach and for the development of an analytical framework for a systematic comparison of the empirical case studies. For that purpose, I consider it useful to draw on Shmuel N. Eisenstadt's historical sociology (e.g. Eisenstadt 2000) and on some insights of neo-institutionalism in the sociology of organisations (Powell / DiMaggio 1991). In the following, I shall elaborate on some elements of such an approach which, in my view, would render the theoretical framework more resonant with the empirical findings presented in the contributions of this workshop.

### 1. The impact of civilisational traditions ("*Weltreligionen*")

At the outset, I would like to introduce a basic conceptual distinction which helps to avoid the classical definitional problems in the sociology of religion. On the one hand, the concept of "religion" can be regarded as a specifically modern social category that encompasses belief systems shared by a community of believers and expressed in a set of symbols, narratives, and rituals (see Asad 1993). As Beyer argues, the category of "religion" has indeed become a global cultural model in modernity, providing a blueprint for the organisation and re-organisation of traditional practices (Beyer 1998a). Thus, in neo-institutionalist terms, the global cultural model of "religion" operates as an institutional environment for local religious organisations. On the other hand, we can use the concept of religion in the sense of Max Weber's "*Weltreligionen*". It is well-known that Weber never systematically wrote about "religion" within modernity. His concern was rather to illuminate, from a world historical perspective, the impact of deeply rooted ideas of salvation on social practices or, to use Eisenstadt's terminology, the impact of transcendental visions of Axial Age civilisations on the construction of ontological and social order, of collective identities, and of legitimate forms of power (Eisenstadt 1993). Arguably, the "*Weltreligionen*" therefore provide the underlying premises which shape the institutionalisation of the transcendental vision of modernity, thus resulting in "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt 2000).<sup>1</sup> We can therefore expect that the diffusion of the global cultural model of "religion" results in multiple institutional forms which are embedded in the deeper structures of civilisations or "*Weltreligionen*", respectively.

Precisely this is an impression resulting from the presentations of this workshop. In spite of certain similar trends towards formal membership organisations, the specific organisational

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that this approach provides an alternative to what in Luhmann's systems theory of modern (world) society is called, as a rather residual category, the "regions".

forms of modern "religions" seem to co-vary with their underlying civilisational traditions. Thus, *Daiber's* paper on the parochial system in European Christianity demonstrates that early theological conceptions of the *paroikia* (congregation) combined with a mutual reinforcement of spiritual and secular systems of public administration within the *Res publica Christiana* led to the firm establishment of territorial forms of local religious organisations throughout Europe. The historical impact of these forms – which closely resemble Weber's ideal-type of "*Anstalt*" (Weber 1906) – explains the obstacles encountered by attempts of institutionalising membership-based forms of Catholic and Protestant organisations in modern Europe.<sup>2</sup> While *Daiber's* paper on Buddhist local organisations in Asia highlights the increasing relevance of membership-based forms of religious organisations within Buddhism, other contributions on the East Asian context show a more complex picture. Thus, *Lai Chi Tim's* contribution on Hong Kong Daoism suggests that voluntary forms of religious organisation actually have a long history in Cantonese Daoism and were therefore well-adapted to structural modernisation as experienced in 20<sup>th</sup> century Hong Kong. Confucianism, to the contrary, appears to be rather non-receptive to the modern cultural model of religious membership organisations. *Keum Jang-Tae* shows that attempts at a self-conscious "religionisation" of South Korean Confucianism including the establishment of criteria of formal membership do not seem to be successful; and, as *Mansor Mohd Noor* argues, Confucian congregations in Malaysia seem to operate more as social networks than as membership-organisations. Hinduism, understood as a general system of cultural orientation, also continues to shape social practices of believing and belonging beyond the organisational unit of the temple, although there are temples which today are organised according to the model of formal membership organisations. As *Martin Baumann's* contributions shows, formal organisation can indeed be observed among Tamil Hindus in Europe, but more traditional ways of temple life – and, not least, of caste order – continue to be practised, thus resulting in what neo-institutionalist literature calls the "de-coupling" of formal models and actual practice.

Without going into details, it seems obvious that a comparative framework based on the idea of Axial Age civilisations provides useful analytical tools to interpret some of the empirical differences of patterns of local religious organisations. In this respect, one should also note a further aspect which concerns those regions where Axial Age cultures have been entirely de-institutionalised, as it seems to be the case in some areas of contemporary Russia. Thus, *Tatyana Barchunova's* presentation on faith-based communities in Novosibirsk refers to a situation where traditional religions have drastically lost influence under Soviet rule; as a consequence, the spread of new religious movements under the conditions of the new economy in the 1990s was not affected by traditional models of organisation but took the form of highly unstable and individualised communities, thus calling into question the very concept of "membership".

## 2. The impact of the modern nation-state on religious local organisations

If the concept of Axial Age civilisation allows to theorise some of the systematic differences to be found between patterns of local religious organisation in various "regions", a further concept for comparative analysis, addressing the analytical unit of "countries", is the nation-state.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the political arena has been the prime arena for the institutionalisation of the transcendental vision of modernity, resulting in a strong politicisation of collective identities and in a strong structural coupling of collective identity and political organisation epitomised

<sup>2</sup> The comparison of Europe and North America would demonstrate the prevalence of *Anstalt*-like modes of organisation in Europe, whereas *Vereine* and "sects" are much more common in the US.

<sup>3</sup> This approach gives some more theoretical weight to the residual category of "countries" as it is used in Luhmann's systems theory of world society.

by the nation-state.<sup>4</sup> Local forms of religious organisations have thus become embedded within the institutional field of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state as well as within a public sphere where symbols of national identity are projected. One can reasonably expect that local forms of religious organisations co-vary with the forms of public order (Jepperson 2000) and the codes of collective identity (Eisenstadt / Giesen 1995), respectively.

(a) To begin with the varieties of public order and the ensuing state's religious policy, one can discern different patterns of competition between state and religious authorities, most notably in the sphere of education, even within the premises of one civilisation such as Islam. Thus, *Jamal Malik's* contribution on the development of *madrasas* in Pakistan exemplifies a fragmented public order, with state authorities and *ulema* struggling over the definition of the content and form of religious education; here, local forms of religious organisation often function as substitutes and sometimes even as opposition to a fragmented, yet militarily powerful state. Turkey provides a rather different case, since, as *Emel Topcu-Bestrich's* papers demonstrates, the form of a centralist state which incorporates within its own administrative apparatus the structures of religious supply directly affects the pattern of local religious organisation; not unlike the Ottoman Empire, the "laicist" state established by Mustafa Kemal has set up a ministry for religious affairs (*Diyanet*) which directly controls both local mosques and Koran schools. The impact of this state structure is even prevalent among emigrated Turkish Muslims in Germany, who are to a large extent organised under the control of the foreign branch of the *Diyanet* (DITIB). Yet, as *Jonker's* contribution shows, Turkish Muslim groups in Germany which oppose the control by the Turkish state are confronted by the exigencies to adapt their organisations to the models for religious associations ("*Vereine*") or corporations ("*Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts*") inherent in the German legal system, especially if they wish to gain access to the system of public religious education. Finally, *Noor's* presentation of the Malay Islam highlights the linkages of state structures and religious authorities mediated by the party system; in a pluri-national state, the representation of the Malay nation within constitutional politics seems to draw on Islamic authorities, thus politicising local forms of religious organisation to a high extent.

While the last example already points to the connection between religious authority and the construction of national identity, we should note a further dimension of the state administration's impact on local forms: the very definition and recognition of "religion". One of the most important forms of external thematisation of "religion", to re-call *Beyer's* phrase, seems indeed to be the definition and recognition of "religion" through the state's administrative and legal apparatus. Distinctions between "religion" and "cult"/"sect" or between "religion" and "superstition" as well as hierarchisations of "religions" are common strategies of states in Europe as well as in Asia to control the religious field. As the contributions by *Barchunova*, *Cha*, *Daiber*, *Jonker*, and *Keum* show, local religious organisation pay attention to these categorisations in order to enhance their legal status, to mobilise financial resources, to get permits for the construction of temples or churches etc.

(b) The impact of constructions of national identity on local forms of religious organisations was mentioned only implicitly in most of the contributions. As already mentioned, *Noor's* analysis of the public role of religion in the pluri-national state of Malaysia highlights the relevance of symbols of national identity for the content of local religious belief-systems, by interpreting Confucian congregations and Islamic organisations as ethnically-based Chinese and Malay organisations, respectively. Another somewhat explicit reference to this problem

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<sup>4</sup> In historical perspective, there is a close connection between Christian patterns of church organisation and the development of the modern territorial state; with respect to the territorial form of administrative organisation see the contribution by *Daiber*, with respect to the role of law for the regulation of social life, in a sense developed in the "papal revolution" of the 11./12<sup>th</sup> century see Berman 1983.

came up in the paper of *Cha Ok Soon* on the Donghak movement in 19<sup>th</sup> century Korea, a case where a newly founded religion was directly interrelated with an early national movement on the Korean peninsula. The organisational problems resulting from state attempts at constructing and official national identity by drawing on religious traditions are explained in *Malik's* analysis of the competition between state bureaucrats and *ulema* over the control of religious education. What these examples suggest is that the cleavage structures within a nation-state (religious, ethnic, economic) and of various codes of national identity (primordial, civic, sacred) should be analysed more explicitly in order to explain different local forms of religious organisation.

### 3. Impact of global interconnectedness on religious local organisations

Whilst the two previous sections have introduced macro-variables at two distinctive levels which explain some of the differences between local forms of religious organisations in different "regions" and "countries" or, more precisely, within the context of different Axial Age civilisations and different nation-states, a final element of the re-specification of the theoretical framework concerns the concept of "world society". Instead of conceptualising structural modernisation and globalisation as linear processes, the neo-institutionalist theory of "world society" identifies, in a more concrete fashion, the carrier groups, epistemic communities, organisational units etc. which contribute to the diffusion of global cognitive and normative models constitutive of individuals, formal organisations and nation-states as rational actors (see Meyer et al. 1997).

With respect to the global impacts on local forms of religious organisations, a first factor to be taken into account is the emergence of transnational networks of both religious experts and lay people. As the analyses by *Baumann*, *Jonker* and *Noor* of Hindu, Muslim and Confucian diasporas suggest, religious affiliation is a major element for the maintenance of transnational migrant networks and, in turn, migration strengthens the social cohesion of local religious communities. More self-conscious modes of constructing transnational religious networks were mentioned in the discussion of *Malik's* and *Noor's* presentations; the formation of local and national Islamic organisations seems to be increasingly affected by ideological projections of a universal *umma* based on the infrastructure of transnational networks of religious authorities.<sup>5</sup>

A second factor that has to be considered, concerns the redefinition of legitimate statehood within the world polity. The de-coupling of political organisation and collective identity resulting from the ideologies of human rights, minority rights, cultural diversity etc. has led to new forms of struggles over citizenship and identity, often referred to as the "politics of recognition". Legitimate statehood is increasingly premised on the inclusion of ethnic, linguistic or religious minority groups through "multicultural" policies. In this context, claims for the recognition of religious identity framed in the language of "rights" have become a common feature of relations between politics and religion world-wide (see Koenig 2002). As *Jonker's* contribution demonstrates, local forms of religious organisation are adapting themselves to this institutional field by re-constituting religious communities as identity groups articulating legitimate claims for recognition within the public sphere of the nation-state and, potentially, the European Union.

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<sup>5</sup> Of course, a similar development can be observed in the Christian context, with the rise of the ecumenical movement in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Indeed, Christianity might have functioned as a blue-print for other universal "religions"; the Christian missionary movement already had a strong impact on the re-definition of "religion" in non-Christian civilisations in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and thus operated as a mechanisms for the transmission of cognitive and normative frames of "religion"; see for the Korean case Koenig 2000.

On the whole, one may conclude that the empirical study of local forms of religious organisation provides a highly interesting lens for analysing the processes of structural modernisation from comparative perspective, by taking into account civilisational frameworks, the contexts of nation-states, and the institutional field of the emerging world polity. This analytical framework might prove to be highly valuable for re-specifying systems theory society and its theorem of the differentiation of a religious sub-system within world society.

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**Teilnehmer / Participants**

Dr. Tatiana Barchunova, Soziologie  
Novosibirsk State University

Prof. Dr. Martin Baumann, Religionswissenschaft  
Universität Luzern

Prof. Dr. Peter Beyer, Soziologie  
University of Ottawa, Dept. of Classics and Religious Studies

Prof. Dr. Cha Ok Soong, Religionswissenschaft  
Hanil University Chonju, Korea

Prof. Dr. Cha Seong Hwan, Soziologie  
Hanil University Chonju, Korea

Prof. Dr. Karl-Fritz Daiber, Praktische Theologie und Religionssoziologie  
Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Evang. Theologie

Prof. Dr. Christoph Elsass, Religionsgeschichte  
Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Evang. Theologie

Dr. Gerdien Jonker, Religionswissenschaft,  
Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Ev. Theologie

Prof. Dr. Keum Jang-Tae, Religious Studies  
Seoul National University, Korea, Dep. of Religious Studies

Matthias König MA, Soziologie  
Universität Marburg, Institut für Soziologie

Prof. Dr. Jamal Malik, Islamwissenschaft  
Universität Erfurt

Prof. Dr. Mansor Mohd Noor, Soziologie  
Center for Policy Research  
Universiti Sains Malaysia  
11800 Penang, Malaysia

Prof. Dr. Mady Layendecker-Thung, Soziologie  
Bunnik, Niederlande

Prof. Dr. Lai Chi Tim, Religionssoziologie  
Chinese University of Hongkong, People's Republic of China

Dr. Emel Topcu-Brestrich, Verwaltungswissenschaft  
University of Ankara/Berlin

Prof. Dr. Gerhard Wegner, Praktische Theologie und Religionssoziologie

Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Evangelische Theologie

Prof. Dr. Theresa Wobbe, Soziologie  
Universität Erfurt, Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät