Understanding Institutional Arrangements for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam. A mixed methods approach.

In the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam, property rights on water and land change with the seasonally occurring flood. Land is usually cultivated on an individual basis with people holding at least private use rights to the parcels. In contrast, water is a public good and as soon as water covers...

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1. Verfasser: Werthmann, Christine
Beteiligte: Kirk, Michael (Prof. Dr.) (BetreuerIn (Doktorarbeit))
Format: Dissertation
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2011
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Ausgabe:http://dx.doi.org/10.17192/z2012.0032
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institution Wirtschaftswissenschaften
topic Verfügungsrechte
Institutional Economics
Wirtschaft
Kollektives Handeln
Collective action
Aquakultur
Management natürlicher Ressourcen
Feldexperimente
Mekong Delta
Vietnam
Kambodscha
Property rights
Aktionsforschung
Institutionenökonomie
Experimental economics
Action research
spellingShingle Verfügungsrechte
Institutional Economics
Wirtschaft
Kollektives Handeln
Collective action
Aquakultur
Management natürlicher Ressourcen
Feldexperimente
Mekong Delta
Vietnam
Kambodscha
Property rights
Aktionsforschung
Institutionenökonomie
Experimental economics
Action research
Werthmann, Christine
Understanding Institutional Arrangements for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam. A mixed methods approach.
Die vorliegende Forschung befasst sich mit den institutionellen Arrangements, die die Nutzung und das Management von Land, Wasser und Fischressourcen im Mekong Delta beeinflussen. Es wird untersucht inwieweit Verfügungsrechte und kollektives Handeln die nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung in der Region beeinflussen. Für die Mehrheit der Kambodschaner und Vietnamesen spielt der Zugang zu natürlichen Ressourcen wie Land, Wasser und Fischbeständen eine bedeutende Rolle. Die formellen und informellen Regeln, die den Zugang zu und die Nutzung von diesen natürlichen Ressourcen auf lokaler Ebene regeln stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit. Im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam wechseln die Verfügungsrechte an Wasser und Land mit der halbjährlichen auftretenden Flut. Land ist vornehmlich privates Eigentum oder es bestehen zumindest private Nutzungsrechte. Wasser hingegen wird in beiden Ländern als öffentliches Gut betrachtet, welches allgemein zugänglich ist. De facto liegt sowohl in Kambodscha als auch in Vietnam dann eine open access Situation vor: die Nutzung des Wassers ist nicht beschränkt und vorliegende Nutzungsregeln werden nicht oder kaum durchgesetzt. Es bestehen zwar formelle Regeln, die die Nutzung von Land-, Wasser- und Fischerei regulieren, diese sind jedoch stark miteinander verwoben, überlappen oft aufgrund der dynamischen natürlichen Gegebenheiten und Verantwortlichkeiten zur Durchsetzung sind oft auf verschiedene Jurisdiktionen verteilt. Dies führt zu einem nicht nachhaltigen Management der natürlichen Ressourcen vor Ort und eine Degradierung mit einem Rückgang der natürlichen Fischbestände ist bereits zu beobachten. Die Dissertation nutzt ein Fischzuchtprojekt als Referenzrahmen. Dieses wurde vom WorldFish Center von 2005 bis 2010 in der Region durchgeführt. Im Interesse der vorliegenden Untersuchung stehen die verschiedenen institutionellen Faktoren die den Erfolg oder Misserfolg von kollektivem Handeln für das nachhaltige Management natürlicher Ressourcen im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam beeinflussen (Forschungsproblem). Zur Beantwortung der Forschungsfragen wurde in dieser Dissertation ein Methodenmix mit sowohl qualitativer als auch quantitativer Datenanalyse gewählt. Die Implementierung des gemeinschaftsbasierten Projekts in den Projektdörfern in Kambodscha und Vietnam stellte sich offensichtlich als problematisch heraus und die Pilotphase wurde nach meist einem Jahr wieder eingestellt. Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die Gründe dafür nicht in der mangelnden Kooperationsbereitschaft der Teilnehmer liegen, sondern vielmehr mit den vorliegenden Verfügungsrechten an den natürlichen Ressourcen zusammenhängen. Aufgrund der mangelnden Rechtsgrundlage sowie verschiedener informeller Regeln, ist es den Projektgruppen nicht gelungen andere lokale Nutzer von den Projektgebieten auszuschließen und somit ihre Investitionen in Material und Fischsaat zu schützen. Die Arbeit schließt mit Empfehlungen insbesondere hinsichtlich der Dezentralisierung von Wasser- und Landmanagement in der Region.
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genre_facet Economics
topic_facet Wirtschaft
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doi_str_mv http://dx.doi.org/10.17192/z2012.0032
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author Werthmann, Christine
title Understanding Institutional Arrangements for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam. A mixed methods approach.
title_short Understanding Institutional Arrangements for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam. A mixed methods approach.
title_full Understanding Institutional Arrangements for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam. A mixed methods approach.
title_fullStr Understanding Institutional Arrangements for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam. A mixed methods approach.
title_full_unstemmed Understanding Institutional Arrangements for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam. A mixed methods approach.
title_sort Understanding Institutional Arrangements for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam. A mixed methods approach.
author2 Kirk, Michael (Prof. Dr.)
author2_role ths
title_alt Institutionelle Arrangements im kollektiven Management natürlicher Ressourcen im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam.
last_indexed 2012-11-22T23:59:59Z
building Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
url http://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/diss/z2012/0032/pdf/dcw.pdf
publishDate 2011
era_facet 2011
ref_str_mv references
first_indexed 2012-02-16T00:00:00Z
contents Die vorliegende Forschung befasst sich mit den institutionellen Arrangements, die die Nutzung und das Management von Land, Wasser und Fischressourcen im Mekong Delta beeinflussen. Es wird untersucht inwieweit Verfügungsrechte und kollektives Handeln die nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung in der Region beeinflussen. Für die Mehrheit der Kambodschaner und Vietnamesen spielt der Zugang zu natürlichen Ressourcen wie Land, Wasser und Fischbeständen eine bedeutende Rolle. Die formellen und informellen Regeln, die den Zugang zu und die Nutzung von diesen natürlichen Ressourcen auf lokaler Ebene regeln stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit. Im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam wechseln die Verfügungsrechte an Wasser und Land mit der halbjährlichen auftretenden Flut. Land ist vornehmlich privates Eigentum oder es bestehen zumindest private Nutzungsrechte. Wasser hingegen wird in beiden Ländern als öffentliches Gut betrachtet, welches allgemein zugänglich ist. De facto liegt sowohl in Kambodscha als auch in Vietnam dann eine open access Situation vor: die Nutzung des Wassers ist nicht beschränkt und vorliegende Nutzungsregeln werden nicht oder kaum durchgesetzt. Es bestehen zwar formelle Regeln, die die Nutzung von Land-, Wasser- und Fischerei regulieren, diese sind jedoch stark miteinander verwoben, überlappen oft aufgrund der dynamischen natürlichen Gegebenheiten und Verantwortlichkeiten zur Durchsetzung sind oft auf verschiedene Jurisdiktionen verteilt. Dies führt zu einem nicht nachhaltigen Management der natürlichen Ressourcen vor Ort und eine Degradierung mit einem Rückgang der natürlichen Fischbestände ist bereits zu beobachten. Die Dissertation nutzt ein Fischzuchtprojekt als Referenzrahmen. Dieses wurde vom WorldFish Center von 2005 bis 2010 in der Region durchgeführt. Im Interesse der vorliegenden Untersuchung stehen die verschiedenen institutionellen Faktoren die den Erfolg oder Misserfolg von kollektivem Handeln für das nachhaltige Management natürlicher Ressourcen im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam beeinflussen (Forschungsproblem). Zur Beantwortung der Forschungsfragen wurde in dieser Dissertation ein Methodenmix mit sowohl qualitativer als auch quantitativer Datenanalyse gewählt. Die Implementierung des gemeinschaftsbasierten Projekts in den Projektdörfern in Kambodscha und Vietnam stellte sich offensichtlich als problematisch heraus und die Pilotphase wurde nach meist einem Jahr wieder eingestellt. Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die Gründe dafür nicht in der mangelnden Kooperationsbereitschaft der Teilnehmer liegen, sondern vielmehr mit den vorliegenden Verfügungsrechten an den natürlichen Ressourcen zusammenhängen. Aufgrund der mangelnden Rechtsgrundlage sowie verschiedener informeller Regeln, ist es den Projektgruppen nicht gelungen andere lokale Nutzer von den Projektgebieten auszuschließen und somit ihre Investitionen in Material und Fischsaat zu schützen. Die Arbeit schließt mit Empfehlungen insbesondere hinsichtlich der Dezentralisierung von Wasser- und Landmanagement in der Region.
description In the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam, property rights on water and land change with the seasonally occurring flood. Land is usually cultivated on an individual basis with people holding at least private use rights to the parcels. In contrast, water is a public good and as soon as water covers the individual plots, the streams, lakes and reservoirs are legally accessed by many households using the water for many different purposes. Actually, during wet season, an open access to the water resources is found as the water use is not restricted, meaning that de facto there are no rules in place that govern the water use. This thesis focuses on the institutional arrangements that influence the management of land, water and fisheries in the region. It is assessed how property rights influence the natural resource use and how collective action can contribute to the sustainable management of land and water. The research was conducted in a community-based fish culture project that functions as a reference frame. This aquaculture project was implemented in the Mekong region by the WorldFish Center from 2005 until 2010. The aim was to test, whether community-based aquaculture can increase the food security of local communities. The thesis also addresses the question whether such a community-based approach can be successfully introduced in the described complex system of property rights. The underlying theories for this dissertation are New Institutional Economics and Game theory. As a framework for the analysis the Institutional Analysis and Design Framework (Ostrom 2005b) is used. Further, the dissertation draws upon findings from other scholars in the realm of public goods and common-pool resources. The research uses as a mixed methods approach and contains qualitative as well as quantitative results. In four case study sites, action research was conducted along with the aquaculture project implementation. Further, a socio-economic survey was implemented, providing information about different livelihood aspects of a large amount of households. Based on the findings of both these methods, hypotheses in regard to resource users’ behaviour towards natural resources were elaborated. Those were then tested using the methods of experimental economics. The implementation of the community-based project faced several challenges and the pilot phase was discontinued by most of the villages. The results presented in this thesis show that reasons for this cannot be seen in the low willingness for cooperation of participants, but rather in the underlying property rights on natural resources. Due to a missing legal base as well as other informal regulations, the project members had no possibility to exclude other local users from the project sites and thus to protect their investments in material and fingerlings. Recommendations mainly focus on the decentralisation of land and water management in the region.
publisher Philipps-Universität Marburg
thumbnail http://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/diss/z2012/0032/cover.png
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Im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam wechseln die Verfügungsrechte an Wasser und Land mit der halbjährlichen auftretenden Flut. Land ist vornehmlich privates Eigentum oder es bestehen zumindest private Nutzungsrechte. Wasser hingegen wird in beiden Ländern als öffentliches Gut betrachtet, welches allgemein zugänglich ist. De facto liegt sowohl in Kambodscha als auch in Vietnam dann eine open access Situation vor: die Nutzung des Wassers ist nicht beschränkt und vorliegende Nutzungsregeln werden nicht oder kaum durchgesetzt. Es bestehen zwar formelle Regeln, die die Nutzung von Land-, Wasser- und Fischerei regulieren, diese sind jedoch stark miteinander verwoben, überlappen oft aufgrund der dynamischen natürlichen Gegebenheiten und Verantwortlichkeiten zur Durchsetzung sind oft auf verschiedene Jurisdiktionen verteilt. Dies führt zu einem nicht nachhaltigen Management der natürlichen Ressourcen vor Ort und eine Degradierung mit einem Rückgang der natürlichen Fischbestände ist bereits zu beobachten. Die Dissertation nutzt ein Fischzuchtprojekt als Referenzrahmen. Dieses wurde vom WorldFish Center von 2005 bis 2010 in der Region durchgeführt. Im Interesse der vorliegenden Untersuchung stehen die verschiedenen institutionellen Faktoren die den Erfolg oder Misserfolg von kollektivem Handeln für das nachhaltige Management natürlicher Ressourcen im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam beeinflussen (Forschungsproblem). Zur Beantwortung der Forschungsfragen wurde in dieser Dissertation ein Methodenmix mit sowohl qualitativer als auch quantitativer Datenanalyse gewählt. Die Implementierung des gemeinschaftsbasierten Projekts in den Projektdörfern in Kambodscha und Vietnam stellte sich offensichtlich als problematisch heraus und die Pilotphase wurde nach meist einem Jahr wieder eingestellt. Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die Gründe dafür nicht in der mangelnden Kooperationsbereitschaft der Teilnehmer liegen, sondern vielmehr mit den vorliegenden Verfügungsrechten an den natürlichen Ressourcen zusammenhängen. Aufgrund der mangelnden Rechtsgrundlage sowie verschiedener informeller Regeln, ist es den Projektgruppen nicht gelungen andere lokale Nutzer von den Projektgebieten auszuschließen und somit ihre Investitionen in Material und Fischsaat zu schützen. Die Arbeit schließt mit Empfehlungen insbesondere hinsichtlich der Dezentralisierung von Wasser- und Landmanagement in der Region. In the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam, property rights on water and land change with the seasonally occurring flood. Land is usually cultivated on an individual basis with people holding at least private use rights to the parcels. In contrast, water is a public good and as soon as water covers the individual plots, the streams, lakes and reservoirs are legally accessed by many households using the water for many different purposes. Actually, during wet season, an open access to the water resources is found as the water use is not restricted, meaning that de facto there are no rules in place that govern the water use. This thesis focuses on the institutional arrangements that influence the management of land, water and fisheries in the region. It is assessed how property rights influence the natural resource use and how collective action can contribute to the sustainable management of land and water. The research was conducted in a community-based fish culture project that functions as a reference frame. This aquaculture project was implemented in the Mekong region by the WorldFish Center from 2005 until 2010. The aim was to test, whether community-based aquaculture can increase the food security of local communities. The thesis also addresses the question whether such a community-based approach can be successfully introduced in the described complex system of property rights. The underlying theories for this dissertation are New Institutional Economics and Game theory. As a framework for the analysis the Institutional Analysis and Design Framework (Ostrom 2005b) is used. Further, the dissertation draws upon findings from other scholars in the realm of public goods and common-pool resources. The research uses as a mixed methods approach and contains qualitative as well as quantitative results. In four case study sites, action research was conducted along with the aquaculture project implementation. Further, a socio-economic survey was implemented, providing information about different livelihood aspects of a large amount of households. Based on the findings of both these methods, hypotheses in regard to resource users’ behaviour towards natural resources were elaborated. Those were then tested using the methods of experimental economics. The implementation of the community-based project faced several challenges and the pilot phase was discontinued by most of the villages. The results presented in this thesis show that reasons for this cannot be seen in the low willingness for cooperation of participants, but rather in the underlying property rights on natural resources. Due to a missing legal base as well as other informal regulations, the project members had no possibility to exclude other local users from the project sites and thus to protect their investments in material and fingerlings. Recommendations mainly focus on the decentralisation of land and water management in the region. Werthmann, Christine Werthmann Christine ths Prof. Dr. Kirk Michael Kirk, Michael (Prof. Dr.) Philipps-Universität Marburg
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