Experimental Evidence on Forecaster (anti-) Herding in Sports Markets
We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in foreca...
में बचाया:
में प्रकाशित: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 38-2020) |
---|---|
मुख्य लेखकों: | , , |
स्वरूप: | लेख |
भाषा: | अंग्रेज़ी |
प्रकाशित: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
|
विषय: | |
ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | पीडीएफ पूर्ण पाठ |
टैग: |
टैग जोड़ें
कोई टैग नहीं, इस रिकॉर्ड को टैग करने वाले पहले व्यक्ति बनें!
|
सारांश: | We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts. |
---|---|
भौतिक वर्णन: | 29 Seiten |
आईएसएसएन: | 1867-3678 |
डिजिटल ऑब्जेक्ट पहचानकर्ता: | 10.17192/es2024.0664 |