Experimental Evidence on Forecaster (anti-) Herding in Sports Markets

We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in foreca...

पूर्ण विवरण

में बचाया:
ग्रंथसूची विवरण
में प्रकाशित:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 38-2020)
मुख्य लेखकों: Bühren, Christoph, Meyer, Tim, Pierdzioch, Christian
स्वरूप: लेख
भाषा:अंग्रेज़ी
प्रकाशित: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2020
विषय:
ऑनलाइन पहुंच:पीडीएफ पूर्ण पाठ
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विवरण
सारांश:We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts.
भौतिक वर्णन:29 Seiten
आईएसएसएन:1867-3678
डिजिटल ऑब्जेक्ट पहचानकर्ता:10.17192/es2024.0664