Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...
Tallennettuna:
Julkaisussa: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020) |
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Päätekijät: | , |
Aineistotyyppi: | Artikkeli |
Kieli: | englanti |
Julkaistu: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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Aiheet: | |
Linkit: | PDF-kokoteksti |
Tagit: |
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Internet
PDF-kokotekstiHyllypaikka: |
urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-06414 |
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Julkaisupäivä: |
2024-01-19 |
Downloads: |
41 (2024) |
Lizenz: |
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
Linkki aineistoon: |
https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0641 https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0641 |