Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process

Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...

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Veröffentlicht in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020)
Autoren: García, Israel, Hayo, Bernd
Format: Artikel
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2020
Schlagworte:
Wirtschaft
Representative population survey
Political budget cycles
Signalling mechanism
Local government
Germany
Fiscal policy
Economics
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics

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