Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...
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發表在: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020) |
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格式: | Artikel |
語言: | 英语 |
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Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics