Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...
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Опубліковано в:: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020) |
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Автори: | , |
Формат: | Стаття |
Мова: | Англійська |
Опубліковано: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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Онлайн доступ: | PDF-повний текст |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics