Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...
Salvato in:
Pubblicato in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020) |
---|---|
Autori principali: | , |
Natura: | Articolo |
Lingua: | inglese |
Pubblicazione: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
|
Soggetti: | |
Accesso online: | PDF Full Text |
Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics