Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...
שמור ב:
הוצא לאור ב: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020) |
---|---|
Autoren: | , |
פורמט: | Artikel |
שפה: | אנגלית |
יצא לאור: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
|
נושאים: | |
גישה מקוונת: | PDF-Volltext |
תגים: |
הוספת תג
אין תגיות, היה/י הראשונ/ה לתייג את הרשומה!
|
MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics