Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process

Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...

Descrición completa

Gardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020)
Autoren: García, Israel, Hayo, Bernd
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2020
Schlagworte:
Wirtschaft
Representative population survey
Political budget cycles
Signalling mechanism
Local government
Germany
Fiscal policy
Economics
Acceso en liña:Texto completo PDF
Tags: Engadir etiqueta
Sen Etiquetas, Sexa o primeiro en etiquetar este rexistro!
MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics

Títulos similares