Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process

Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020)
Autores principales: García, Israel, Hayo, Bernd
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2020
Materias:
Wirtschaft
Representative population survey
Political budget cycles
Signalling mechanism
Local government
Germany
Fiscal policy
Economics
Acceso en línea:Texto Completo PDF
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics

Ejemplares similares