Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...
Uloženo v:
Vydáno v: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020) |
---|---|
Hlavní autoři: | , |
Médium: | Článek |
Jazyk: | angličtina |
Vydáno: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
|
Témata: | |
On-line přístup: | Plný text ve formátu PDF |
Tagy: |
Přidat tag
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!
|
MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics