Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...
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Publicat a: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020) |
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Autors principals: | , |
Format: | Article |
Idioma: | anglès |
Publicat: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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Accés en línia: | PDF a text complet |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics