Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...

Descripció completa

Guardat en:
Dades bibliogràfiques
Publicat a:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020)
Autors principals: García, Israel, Hayo, Bernd
Format: Article
Idioma:anglès
Publicat: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2020
Matèries:
Accés en línia:PDF a text complet
Etiquetes: Afegir etiqueta
Sense etiquetes, Sigues el primer a etiquetar aquest registre!
MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics