Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...

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書誌詳細
出版年:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020)
主要な著者: García, Israel, Hayo, Bernd
フォーマット: 論文
言語:英語
出版事項: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2020
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics