The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...

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Bibliografske podrobnosti
izdano v:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017)
Glavni avtor: Herold, Daniel
Format: Artikel
Jezik:angleščina
Izdano: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Teme:
cartels
Wirtschaft
corporate crime
moral hazard
incentive pay
Economics
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics

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