Non-cooperative and Cooperative Policy Reforms under Uncertainty and Spillovers

When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reform...

全面介紹

Gespeichert in:
書目詳細資料
發表在:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 07-2017)
Autoren: Hefeker, Carsten, Neugart, Michael
格式: Artikel
語言:英语
出版: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
主題:
在線閱讀:PDF-Volltext
標簽: 添加標簽
沒有標簽, 成為第一個標記此記錄!
實物特徵
總結:When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reforms. From a social perspective, too many reforms follow if the spillover effects of reforms become sufficiently uncertain. Since centralization of policies to correct ineffcient policies is often not possible, we look for alternative instruments that can restore the effcient level of reforms. We compare subsidizing reform efforts with insuring against bad outcomes, and argue that subsidies are advanta- geous in terms of requiring less information for implementation.
實物描述:25 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0533