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Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...
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| 發表在: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016) |
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| Autoren: | , |
| 格式: | Artikel |
| 語言: | 英语 |
| 出版: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | PDF-Volltext |
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| 總結: | This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority. |
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| 實物描述: | 42 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0485 |