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Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...
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| Xuất bản năm: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016) |
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| Những tác giả chính: | , |
| Định dạng: | Bài viết |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Tiếng Anh |
| Được phát hành: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Bài toàn văn PDF |
| Các nhãn: |
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| Tóm tắt: | This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority. |
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| Mô tả vật lý: | 42 Seiten |
| số ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0485 |