Partial cross ownership and collusion

Partial cross ownership and collusion

This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...

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Detaylı Bibliyografya
Yayımlandı:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016)
Asıl Yazarlar: de Haas, Samuel, Paha, Johannes
Materyal Türü: Makale
Dil:İngilizce
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2016
Konular:
Wirtschaft
Merger Control
Coordinated Effects
Unilateral Effects
Collusion
Minority Shareholdings
Economics
Online Erişim:PDF Tam Metin
Etiketler: Etiketle
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Diğer Bilgiler
Özet:This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
Fiziksel Özellikler:42 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0485

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