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Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...
保存先:
| 出版年: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016) |
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| 主要な著者: | , |
| フォーマット: | 論文 |
| 言語: | 英語 |
| 出版事項: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | PDFフルテキスト |
| タグ: |
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| 要約: | This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority. |
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| 物理的記述: | 42 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0485 |