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Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...
में बचाया:
| में प्रकाशित: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016) |
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| मुख्य लेखकों: | , |
| स्वरूप: | लेख |
| भाषा: | अंग्रेज़ी |
| प्रकाशित: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | पीडीएफ पूर्ण पाठ |
| टैग: |
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| सारांश: | This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority. |
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| भौतिक वर्णन: | 42 Seiten |
| आईएसएसएन: | 1867-3678 |
| डिजिटल ऑब्जेक्ट पहचानकर्ता: | 10.17192/es2024.0485 |