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Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...
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| Publicado en: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016) |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto Completo PDF |
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| Sumario: | This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority. |
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| Descripción Física: | 42 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0485 |