Partial cross ownership and collusion

Partial cross ownership and collusion

This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...

Fuld beskrivelse

Gespeichert in:
Bibliografiske detaljer
Udgivet i:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016)
Autoren: de Haas, Samuel, Paha, Johannes
Format: Artikel
Sprog:engelsk
Udgivet: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2016
Fag:
Wirtschaft
Merger Control
Coordinated Effects
Unilateral Effects
Collusion
Minority Shareholdings
Economics
Online adgang:PDF-Volltext
Tags: Tilføj Tag
Ingen Tags, Vær først til at tagge denne postø!
Beskrivelse
Summary:This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
Fysisk beskrivelse:42 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0485

Lignende værker