Publikationsserver
Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...
محفوظ في:
| الحاوية / القاعدة: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016) |
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , |
| التنسيق: | مقال |
| اللغة: | الإنجليزية |
| منشور في: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | PDF النص الكامل |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
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| الملخص: | This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority. |
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| وصف مادي: | 42 Seiten |
| تدمد: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0485 |