Partial cross ownership and collusion

Partial cross ownership and collusion

This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...

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Veröffentlicht in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016)
Autoren: de Haas, Samuel, Paha, Johannes
Format: Artikel
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2016
Schlagworte:
Wirtschaft
Merger Control
Coordinated Effects
Unilateral Effects
Collusion
Minority Shareholdings
Economics
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
Umfang:42 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0485

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