The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types

A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's...

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Bibliografski detalji
Izdano u:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 39-2017)
Glavni autor: Rusch, Hannes
Format: Članak
Jezik:engleski
Izdano: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
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