The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types

The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types

A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's...

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Bibliografiska uppgifter
I publikationen:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 39-2017)
Huvudupphovsman: Rusch, Hannes
Materialtyp: Artikel
Språk:engelska
Publicerad: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Ämnen:
collaboration
Wirtschaft
strategy choice; evolution;
cooperation
Economics
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