The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types

A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 39-2017)
Autor principal: Rusch, Hannes
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Texto Completo PDF
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!