The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types

The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types

A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's...

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Publicat a:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 39-2017)
Autor principal: Rusch, Hannes
Format: Article
Idioma:anglès
Publicat: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Matèries:
collaboration
Wirtschaft
strategy choice; evolution;
cooperation
Economics
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Signatura: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-04774
Data de publicació: 2024-01-19
Downloads: 32 (2024)
Lizenz: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
URL d'accés: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0477
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0477

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