Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Despite negative experiences with auctioning off subsidies for renewable energy in some countries, tenders are increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources. Determining the quantity, demanded by the regulator, is in...

Popoln opis

Shranjeno v:
Bibliografske podrobnosti
izdano v:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2015)
Autoren: Schäfer, Sebastian, Schulten, Lisa
Format: Artikel
Jezik:angleščina
Izdano: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2015
Teme:
Renewable Energy
Auction Design
Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard
Wirtschaft
Tendering
Burden Sharing
Economics
Online dostop:PDF-Volltext
Oznake: Označite
Brez oznak, prvi označite!

Internet

PDF-Volltext

Podrobnosti zaloge
Signatura: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-03800
Publikationsdatum: 2024-01-12
Downloads: 24 (2024)
Lizenz: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
Zugangs-URL: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0380
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0380

Podobne knjige/članki