Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Despite negative experiences with auctioning off subsidies for renewable energy in some countries, tenders are increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources. Determining the quantity, demanded by the regulator, is in...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Publicado no:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2015)
Principais autores: Schäfer, Sebastian, Schulten, Lisa
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:inglês
Publicado em: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2015
Assuntos:
Renewable Energy
Auction Design
Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard
Wirtschaft
Tendering
Burden Sharing
Economics
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Número de Chamada: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-03800
Data de Publicação: 2024-01-12
Downloads: 24 (2024)
Lizenz: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
Acessar a URL: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0380
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0380

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