Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Despite negative experiences with auctioning off subsidies for renewable energy in some countries, tenders are increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources. Determining the quantity, demanded by the regulator, is in...

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Bibliografski detalji
Izdano u:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2015)
Glavni autori: Schäfer, Sebastian, Schulten, Lisa
Format: Članak
Jezik:engleski
Izdano: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2015
Teme:
Renewable Energy
Auction Design
Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard
Wirtschaft
Tendering
Burden Sharing
Economics
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Signatura: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-03800
Datum izdanja: 2024-01-12
Downloads: 24 (2024)
Lizenz: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
URL pristupa: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0380
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0380

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