Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Despite negative experiences with auctioning off subsidies for renewable energy in some countries, tenders are increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources. Determining the quantity, demanded by the regulator, is in...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2015)
Autoren: Schäfer, Sebastian, Schulten, Lisa
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2015
Schlagworte:
Renewable Energy
Auction Design
Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard
Wirtschaft
Tendering
Burden Sharing
Economics
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Número de Clasificación: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-03800
Data de Publicación: 2024-01-12
Downloads: 24 (2024)
Lizenz: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
URL de acceso: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0380
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0380

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