Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions

Despite negative experiences with auctioning off subsidies for renewable energy in some countries, tenders are increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources. Determining the quantity, demanded by the regulator, is in...

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Bibliografiset tiedot
Julkaisussa:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2015)
Päätekijät: Schäfer, Sebastian, Schulten, Lisa
Aineistotyyppi: Artikkeli
Kieli:englanti
Julkaistu: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2015
Aiheet:
Renewable Energy
Auction Design
Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard
Wirtschaft
Tendering
Burden Sharing
Economics
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Saatavuus:
Hyllypaikka: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-03800
Julkaisupäivä: 2024-01-12
Downloads: 24 (2024)
Lizenz: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
Linkki aineistoon: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0380
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0380

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