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Lower Sanctions, Greater Antitrust Compliance? Cartel Conduct with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk
This article provides a model of two risk-neutral firms that may cooperate to achieve a goal that is potentially illegal. The model assumes enforcement risk and firms that are imperfectly informed about antitrust law enforcement. It is shown that compliance training, which educates the agents about...
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| Xuất bản năm: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 60-2014) |
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| Tác giả chính: | |
| Định dạng: | Bài viết |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Tiếng Anh |
| Được phát hành: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2014
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| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Bài toàn văn PDF |
| Các nhãn: |
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| Tóm tắt: | This article provides a model of two risk-neutral firms that may cooperate to achieve a goal that is potentially illegal. The model assumes enforcement risk and firms that are imperfectly informed about antitrust law enforcement. It is shown that compliance training, which educates the agents about law enforcement, may prevent hardcore cartels. Compliance training programs may also promote forms of cooperation that are beneficial for customers. The article shows that a competition authority can sometimes spur the implementation of compliance programs by imposing lower sanctions on wrongdoers. |
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| Mô tả vật lý: | 37 Seiten |
| số ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0360 |