Publikationsserver
Lower Sanctions, Greater Antitrust Compliance? Cartel Conduct with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk
This article provides a model of two risk-neutral firms that may cooperate to achieve a goal that is potentially illegal. The model assumes enforcement risk and firms that are imperfectly informed about antitrust law enforcement. It is shown that compliance training, which educates the agents about...
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Cyhoeddwyd yn: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 60-2014) |
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| Prif Awdur: | |
| Fformat: | Erthygl |
| Iaith: | Saesneg |
| Cyhoeddwyd: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2014
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| Pynciau: | |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | Testun PDF llawn |
| Tagiau: |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics