The Value of User-Specific Information for Two-Sided Matchmakers

This article analyzes the incentives of a monopolistic matchmaker to generate user-specific information. By merging two-sided market modeling with two-sided matching, we derive a micro-foundation of cross-side externalities as a function of the number of potential matches and the accuracy level of u...

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Pubblicato in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 48-2014)
Autori principali: Brühn, Tim, Götz, Georg, Meinusch, Annette
Natura: Articolo
Lingua:inglese
Pubblicazione: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2014
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics