Environmental Aspects of Resource Extraction Contracts

This paper analyzes resource partnerships and their in uence on the environmental quality in a resource-rich country by introducing incomplete contracts, imperfect property rights protection, and a lack of valuation for the environment by the government in the South. Em- ploying numerical simulat...

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שמור ב:
מידע ביבליוגרפי
הוצא לאור ב:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 35-2014)
מחבר ראשי: Krings, Hanna
פורמט: Artikel
שפה:אנגלית
יצא לאור: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2014
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תיאור
סיכום:This paper analyzes resource partnerships and their in uence on the environmental quality in a resource-rich country by introducing incomplete contracts, imperfect property rights protection, and a lack of valuation for the environment by the government in the South. Em- ploying numerical simulations, I determine the equilibrium extraction rate, the applied extraction technology, and the environmental quality in dependence of the state of democracy in the resource-rich country. In contrast to what one might expect, under certain circumstances it can be environmentally bene�cial to have incomplete contracts that induce the utilization of a suboptimal technology for resource extrac- tion. Further, reducing the holdup problem by shifting bargaining power to the North, is only desirable if the environmental quality in- creases with a better extraction technology.
תיאור פיזי:29 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0335