The Impact of Persistent Shocks and Concave Objective Functions on Collusive Behavior

This paper provides a theoretic model for the analysis of cartel formation in an industry that is subject to profit shocks. The competitive or collusive conduct of a firm is determined by a decision maker who maximizes the present value of utility that accrues to him by earning a share of the firm&#...

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書誌詳細
出版年:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 28-2013)
第一著者: Paha, Johannes
フォーマット: 論文
言語:英語
出版事項: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2013
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics