The Impact of Persistent Shocks and Concave Objective Functions on Collusive Behavior
This paper provides a theoretic model for the analysis of cartel formation in an industry that is subject to profit shocks. The competitive or collusive conduct of a firm is determined by a decision maker who maximizes the present value of utility that accrues to him by earning a share of the firm...
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Vydáno v: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 28-2013) |
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Hlavní autor: | |
Médium: | Článek |
Jazyk: | angličtina |
Vydáno: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2013
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On-line přístup: | Plný text ve formátu PDF |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics