Publikationsserver
Worker or Shirker – Who Evades More Taxes? A Real Effort Experiment
With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রকাশিত: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 26-2013) |
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| প্রধান লেখক: | , |
| বিন্যাস: | প্রবন্ধ |
| ভাষা: | ইংরেজি |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2013
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| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | পিডিএফ এ সম্পূর্ন পাঠ |
| ট্যাগগুলো: |
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| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than in the moderate work treatment. |
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| আইএসএসএন: | 1867-3678 |
| ডিওআই: | 10.17192/es2024.0189 |