Publikationsserver
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power
We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal supplie...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রকাশিত: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 24-2013) |
|---|---|
| প্রধান লেখক: | , |
| বিন্যাস: | প্রবন্ধ |
| ভাষা: | ইংরেজি |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2013
|
| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | পিডিএফ এ সম্পূর্ন পাঠ |
| ট্যাগগুলো: |
ট্যাগ যুক্ত করুন
কোনো ট্যাগ নেই, প্রথমজন হিসাবে ট্যাগ করুন!
|
| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive behavior, but can even increase them. |
|---|---|
| আইএসএসএন: | 1867-3678 |
| ডিওআই: | 10.17192/es2024.0187 |