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Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power
We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal supplie...
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| 發表在: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 24-2013) |
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| Autoren: | , |
| 格式: | Artikel |
| 語言: | 英语 |
| 出版: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2013
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | PDF-Volltext |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics