Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power
We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal supplie...
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Опубліковано в:: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 24-2013) |
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Автори: | , |
Формат: | Стаття |
Мова: | Англійська |
Опубліковано: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2013
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Предмети: | |
Онлайн доступ: | PDF-повний текст |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics