Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power

Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power

We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal supplie...

Ful tanımlama

Kaydedildi:
Detaylı Bibliyografya
Yayımlandı:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 24-2013)
Asıl Yazarlar: Heim, Sven, Götz, Georg
Materyal Türü: Makale
Dil:İngilizce
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2013
Konular:
Market Power
Balancing Power
Reserve Power
Collusion
Auctions
Wirtschaft
Energy Markets
Economics
Online Erişim:PDF Tam Metin
Etiketler: Etiketle
Etiket eklenmemiş, İlk siz ekleyin!
MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics

Benzer Materyaller