Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power

Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power

We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal supplie...

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I publikationen:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 24-2013)
Huvudupphovsmän: Heim, Sven, Götz, Georg
Materialtyp: Artikel
Språk:engelska
Publicerad: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2013
Ämnen:
Market Power
Balancing Power
Reserve Power
Collusion
Auctions
Wirtschaft
Energy Markets
Economics
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics

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