Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power

We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal supplie...

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書誌詳細
出版年:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 24-2013)
主要な著者: Heim, Sven, Götz, Georg
フォーマット: 論文
言語:英語
出版事項: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2013
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics