Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power

Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power

We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal supplie...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 24-2013)
Autoren: Heim, Sven, Götz, Georg
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2013
Schlagworte:
Market Power
Balancing Power
Reserve Power
Collusion
Auctions
Wirtschaft
Energy Markets
Economics
Acceso en liña:Texto completo PDF
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics

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