Incentives and Influence Activities in the Public Sector: the Trade-off in Performance Budgeting and Conditional Grants
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections generate incentives for the potential recipients of performance-based funds to use up resources in socially wasteful influence activities. We develop a game-theor...
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Publicado en: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2013) |
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Autores principales: | , |
Formato: | Artículo |
Lenguaje: | inglés |
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Philipps-Universität Marburg
2013
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Acceso en línea: | Texto Completo PDF |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics