R&D Incentives in Vertically Related Markets

This paper focuses on incentives to invest in research and development (R&D) in vertically related markets. In a bilateral duopoly setup, we consider how process R&D incentives of the firms in both upstream and downstream market depend on the intensity of simultaneous interbrand and intrabra...

সম্পূর্ণ বিবরণ

সংরক্ষণ করুন:
গ্রন্থ-পঞ্জীর বিবরন
প্রকাশিত:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 07-2013)
প্রধান লেখক: Memar, Ahmad Reza Saboori, Götz, Georg
বিন্যাস: প্রবন্ধ
ভাষা:ইংরেজি
প্রকাশিত: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2013
বিষয়গুলি:
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন:পিডিএফ এ সম্পূর্ন পাঠ
ট্যাগগুলো: ট্যাগ যুক্ত করুন
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বিবরন
সংক্ষিপ্ত:This paper focuses on incentives to invest in research and development (R&D) in vertically related markets. In a bilateral duopoly setup, we consider how process R&D incentives of the firms in both upstream and downstream market depend on the intensity of simultaneous interbrand and intrabrand competition. Among the results: both interbrand and intrabrand competition have twofold effects on R&D incentives. Existence of a vertically related market with imperfect competition lowers both the incentives to invest in process R&D and the competitive advantage through the R&D investment. We will show how the impact of a firm's R&D investments in either market on consumer surplus as well as on the profits of all firms in both markets depends on exogenous parameters.
আইএসএসএন:1867-3678
ডিওআই:10.17192/es2024.0170